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2004 DIGILAW 527 (MAD)

Central Bank of India, represented by its Branch Manager, Virudhunagar v. J. Maria Jesu Kennady and others

2004-03-25

T.V.MASILAMANI

body2004
ORDER: The revision petition is filed challenging the fair and decretal orders passed by the Subordinate Judge, Virudhunagar in I.A.No.305 of 1997 in O.S.No.196 of 1996 dated 5.8.1997. 2. The revision petitioner is the nationalised bank and as plaintiff, the bank filed the said suit on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Virudhunagar for recovery of the mortgage money due from the respondents/defendants on the basis of the registered mortgage deed executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs.7,50,600.85 with interest and costs. A preliminary decree was passed on 13.11.1996 wherein the Pleader’s fees had been calculated as per Rule 3(2)(a) of the Legal Practitioners Fees Rules, 1973 and a sum of Rs.10,056 towards senior advocate’s fees and Rs.3,352 as Junior advocate’s fees had been taxed as per the cost memo filed by the plaintiff, even though a sum of Rs.16,656 and Rs.5,559 had been claimed by the plaintiff towards the fees payable by the defendants to the senior advocate and the junior advocate respectively. Hence the revision petitioner was constrained to file the said application to award the schedule fees in accordance with the provision under Rule 3(2)(b) of the said Rules. The learned Subordinate Judge having analysed the facts and the provisions of law dismissed the application. Hence, the revision. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued at the outset that the trial Court was not correct in holding that the legal practitioner’s fee in this case has be calculated under Rule 3(2)(a) which is applicable only with regard to suits for money based on negotiable instrument and loan. Moreover, he has contended that the proper provision is Rule 3(2)(b) which is applicable to the suits based on mortgage deed. He has also pointed out in this connection that the procedure followed by the Subordinate Courts in this regard is not uniform and therefore it has become necessary to decide whether the advocate fees taxed by the Court below is in accordance with the said Rules. 4. He has also pointed out in this connection that the procedure followed by the Subordinate Courts in this regard is not uniform and therefore it has become necessary to decide whether the advocate fees taxed by the Court below is in accordance with the said Rules. 4. It is essential to extract Rules 3(2)(a) and (b) of the Legal Practitioners’ Fees Rules, 1973 to appreciate the question involved in this case as under: “In Courts Subordinate to the High Court, in suits for money, effects or other personal property or for land or other immovable property of any description, fees to legal practitioners shall be payable on the following scale: (1) .. .. (2) Original Suits: (a) for money based on negotiable instruments and loans: (b) Other original Suits not falling under Sub-clause (a) of Clause (2). 5. In this context, it is relevant to mention that the suit filed by the revision petitioner was not based on a negotiable instrument and therefore, it is essential to find out whether the suit was based on any loan transaction as per the said Rules. In effect, the question for consideration is whether the principal and interest secured under mortgage is a loan within the meaning of the said term. 6. The dictionary meaning of the term ‘loan’ as given in” The Concise Oxford Dictionary (10th Edition) is as follows: “A thing that is borrowed, especially a sum of money that is expected to be paid back with interest; the action of lending.” Similarly, P.Ramanatha Aiyer’s “The Law Lexicon” (2nd Edition 1997) defines “loan” as follows: “Loan means a loan whether of money or in kind, and included any transaction which is in the opinion of the Court, in substance a loan. Act X of 1918 (Usurious Loans), Sec.2(2)” Again if one has to find out the nature of money being the subject matter of loan, the Law Lexicon provides the definition of "loan of money" as follows: "By a loan of money, is meant the delivery by one party... and the receipt by the other party... of a given sum of money, upon an agreement, express or implied, to repay the sum loaned with or without interest." 7. and the receipt by the other party... of a given sum of money, upon an agreement, express or implied, to repay the sum loaned with or without interest." 7. In this context, it is necessary to refer to the case law on this point with reference to Sec.2(2) of the Usurious Loans Act, 1918 so as to find out whether the mortgage transaction falls within the meaning of the term loan. Sec.2(2) of the said Act defines "loan" as follows: "‘Loan’ means a loan whether of money or in kind and includes any transaction which is, in the opinion of the Court, in substance a loan." 8. In case of usufructuary mortgage, it was held that the transaction whereby the mortgage money was secured originally would not fall within the definition of a loan under Secs.2 and 3 of the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act, 1934 (vide)M/s.Goodwil India Limited v. M/s.P.S.B.Paper Mills Private Limited, A.I.R. 1996 P. & H. 60. 9. In another decision in Vedachal Naicker v. Mahadeva Mudaliar and others, A.I.R. 1955 Nuc. (Mad.) 3187, it was held as follows: "In order to constitute a loan it is not necessary that money should be handed over by the lender to the borrower, but is essential that the lender must find and part with his money and though he may not transfer it to the borrower must utilise it for the purpose of or on behalf of the borrower or at his instance. There is a distinction between a loan and a debt. The meaning of debt is that what is due from one person to another that is a thing owed whereas loan is that what is lent, i.e., what is given in the shape of money or of money value." Similarly, it was held in the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of Patna High Court in Bhulan Prasad v. Rup Narain, A.I.R. 1941 Pat. 233 as follows: "Security bond for future contingent liability is not a loan." 10. On the contrary, the mortgage is defined under Sec.58(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as follows: "A mortgage is the transfer of an interest in specific immovable property for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan, an existing or future debt, or the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary liability. The transferor is called a mortgagor, the transferee a mortgagee; the principal money and interest of which payment is secured for the time being are called the mortgage-money, and the instrument (if any) by which the transfer is effected is called a mortgage-deed." Hence, it is clear from the said definition that the principal money and interest secured under the mortgage are called the mortgage money and unlike a loan, the mortgage deed with reference to such transaction of lending must be registered so as to satisfy the requirement under law. 11. Similarly, the money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan, an existing or future debt, or the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary liability may form part of the consideration in respect of a mortgage, but, on the other hand, the loan transaction need not necessarily be entered into by means of a registered document. 12. In Quarrel v. Beckford, 1 Mad. 278, while defining a mortgage, it was held as follows: "Everybody knows, it consists of two things: it is a person contract for a debt secured by an estate; and in equity, the estate is no more than a pledge or security for the debt: the debt is the principal; the Estate is the security. Whether the mortgagee is, or is not, in possession of the pledge his right is precisely the same, with this difference, indeed, that he has never any right in equity to the estate except as a fund to pay him his debt; for every other purpose the estate is the estate of the mortgagor, and when the debt is paid all the mortgagee’s right and interest in the estate ceases." 13. Similarly, it is essential to point out that in the Illustration (d) to Sec.37 of the Indian Easements Act, 1982, a case is cited as follows: "A mortgages Sultanpur to B, and lawfully imposes an easement on the land in favour of C in accordance with the provisions of Section 10. The land is sold to D in satisfaction of the mortgage debt. The land is sold to D in satisfaction of the mortgage debt. The easement is not thereby extinguished." Sec.37 of the said Act provides for the extinction by dissolution of right to servient owner as follows: "When, from a cause which preceded the imposition of an easement, the person by whom it was imposed ceases to have any right in the servient heritage, the easement is extinguished. Exception: Nothing in this section applies to an easement lawfully imposed by a mortgagor in accordance with Sec.10." A careful perusal of the dissimilarities between a loan transaction and the mortgage referred supra would indicate that the transaction under a mortgage deed cannot at any stretch of imagination be termed as loan. 14. Above all, the contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner is that under O.34, Rules 4 and 5, Civil Procedure Code contemplates preliminary decree and final decree in the suits filed by the plaintiff for recovery of the mortgage money by selling the hypothica and therefore he has urged that the Legal Practitioner’s work is more onerous in the case of mortgage in relation to a suit based on negotiable instrument and loan. Therefore, he has urged that the Pleader’s fees should commensurate with the volume and quality of the expertise put in the respective cases by the Legal Practitioners and if that be so, the suit based on a mortgage should necessarily fall under Rule 3(2)(b) of the Legal Practitioner’s Rules, 1973. 15. Having regard to the above reasons on the aspect of the matter under consideration, this Court is of the considered opinion that the proper Rule to be invoked in this case should be Rule 3(2)(b) of the said Rules. The opinion of this Court is further supported by the High Court Original Side Rules, 1956 under O.4, Rule 1(2)(c), in that the fee structure is more or less similar to that of the one adumbrated under Rule 3(2)(b) of the Legal Practitioners Fees Rules, 1973. For the above said reasons, the civil revision petition has to be allowed setting aside the impugned order. 16. Thus, the civil revision petition is allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs. The trial Court is directed to amend the decree in the light of the observations in this order.