ORDER A.K. Shrivastava, J. Both these petitions have been preferred under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India against the Award dated 13th December, 1991 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Jabalpur (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal'). The L.I.C. (hereinafter referred to as 'the employer') who is the petitioner in M.P. No. 1787/92 has assailed that part of the Award by which the employee has been directed to be reinstated and the Santosh Kumar Sharma (hereinafter referred to as 'the workman') who is the petitioner in M.P. No. 3046/92 has challenged the validity of that part of the Award by which the tribunal had declined to award the backwages. No exhaustive statement of facts are necessary for disposal of these two petitions, suffice it to state that the Life Insurance Corporation of India (in short "the Corporation") is duly constituted under the provisions of Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The said Corporation is having its Central Office at 'Yogakshema' Jeevan Bima Marg, Bombay and one of its Divisional Office is at 'Jeevan Prakash' Madan Mahal, Nagpur Road, Jabalpur. According to the Corporation, it is being governed by the said Act and the Regulations made thereunder. The workman worked at Chhatarpur Branch. According to him, he worked from 8-5-1985 to 15-7-1985 (according to the employer upto 17-7-1985) then again from 24-4-1986 to 17-7-1986 and thereafter again w.e.f. 8-8-1986 to 3-4-1987 (according to the employer he worked from 11-8-1986). The services of workman were terminated w.e.f. 4-4-1987. It has also not been disputed by the parties that there had been a National Award. According to the workman for first two occasions he was employed as temporary waterman and on the third occasion, he was employed as Sub-Staff Office Peon on temporary basis. According to the workman without any reason his services have been terminated and the break in service has been given just to deprive him of the status of permanency which amounts to unfair labour practice and contrary to the National Award. Since there was an industrial dispute, a reference was made by the Central Government, Ministry of Labour vide its notification No. L-17012/13/88-D-IV(a)/D-1(b) dated 4-11-1988 for adjudication of the following dispute: Whether the action of the Management of LIC of India, Jabalpur in terminating Shri Santosh Kumar Sharma, Sub-Staff from services on 4-4-1987 is justified? If not, to what relief is the workman concerned entitled? If not, to what relief is the workman concerned entitled? According to the case as set forth by the employer before the Tribunal is that the workman was employed on specific undertaking that he would not claim any regular appointment and on this undertaking only he was employed as casual temporary workman on different occasions from time to time in the Office of employer. According to the employer, workman was casual and a temporary employee and he is not covered by the National Industrial Tribunal Award. According to the employer, a class IV employee in order to claim absorption must have worked for more than 70 days in three calender years within the cut off date i.e. 1-1-1982 to 20-5-1985. Since the workman has not fulfilled this condition and he was pure and simple waterman and not a peon, he was not entitled for any relief. According to the employer, in view of the National Industrial Tribunal Award, the Corporation was unable to make regular appointment and an undertaking was given on behalf of the employer to the National Tribunal that till the hearing and disposal of the second reference, the employer will not make any appointment from the open market. It was on this undertaking the regular appointment was not made. The further case, as putforth by the employer before the Tribunal is that the second Award was given on 26th August, 1986 and published in the Gazette on 1st October, 1988 and, therefore, the employer was justified in making temporary appointment in exercise of their powers under Clause (8) of the LIC of India (Staff Regulations), 1960. According to the employer, the workman was not entitled for any relief. Before the Tribunal, the workman filed his own affidavit as W.W.1 and examined one Kashiram as W.W.2. On the other hand, the employer filed an affidavit of Shri R.S. Tiwari as M.W.1. All the witnesses were cross-examined by the respective opposite counsel. The Tribunal, after appreciating and marshalling the evidence, came to hold and gave finding of fact that the workman did not complete 240 days in a calender year but by the impugned Award passed order of reinstatement without awarding any backwages. The Tribunal further directed that the workman shall be deemed to be in continuous service w.e.f. 4-4-1987 and a further direction was made for the consideration of his regularisation. The Tribunal further directed that the workman shall be deemed to be in continuous service w.e.f. 4-4-1987 and a further direction was made for the consideration of his regularisation. While passing the impugned Award in concluding para the Tribunal categorically held that the action of employer terminating the services of the workman though not void but cannot be accepted as a valid termination. It has been contended by Shri R.P. Agrawal, Sr. Advocate, that the Award of Tribunal is without jurisdiction in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of M. Venugopal Vs. The Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Machilipatnam, Andhra Pradesh and another, . Learned counsel has also placed reliance on another decision of the Apex Court in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. Mrs. Asha Ramachandra Ambekar and another, . The other contention of the learned Sr. counsel is that since the Tribunal itself has found that the workman has not completed continuous service of 240 days in a calender year, therefore, no right accrued in the workman to ask for reinstatement and his termination does not amount to illegal retrenchment. On the other hand, it has been contended by Shri U.K. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the workman that the objection of jurisdiction was not raised before the Tribunal and, therefore, now it cannot be agitated. He has also contended that the Tribunal gave cogent reasons for passing the order of reinstatement which could not be interfered by this Court. By assailing that part of the Award of the Tribunal by which backwages have been declined, it has been contended by learned senior counsel for the workman that for no rhyme and reason the backwages have been disallowed. After having heard learned counsel for parties, this Court is of the view that the petition filed by the employer deserves to be allowed. After having heard learned counsel for parties, this Court is of the view that the petition filed by the employer deserves to be allowed. In the case of M. Venugopal (supra) the Apex Court while considering the amended provisions of Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 and its effect discussed the various provisions of it and came to hold in paras 10 and 12 that by statutory fiction the Regulations relating to the terms and conditions of the employees and agents of the Corporation framed u/s 49(2)(b) shall be deemed to be now the rules framed u/s 48(2)(c)of the Life Insurance Corporation Act and as such the rules shall have overriding effect over the provisions contained in the Industrial Disputes Act so far as the terms and conditions of the employment of such employee who also confirm to the requirement of definition of "workman" under the Industrial Disputes Act concerned. In para 12 of the said decision, the Apex Court after reading the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act as well as Life Insurance Corporation Act conjointly, came to hold and decide that in view of the amended Act of 1981 of Life Insurance Corporation Act, the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act shall not be applicable and the provisions of Life Insurance Corporation Act will have overriding effect over the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act so far as the provisions relating to the terms and conditions of employment which are in conflict with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are concerned. Thus, in view of the decision in the case of M. Venugopal (supra), the view of this Court is that the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act so far it relates to terms and conditions of employment are not applicable to the workman and, therefore, the impugned Award cannot be allowed to remain stand and the same is hereby set aside. The contention of the learned counsel for the workman that the point of jurisdiction was not raised and was not agitated before the Tribunal is also without any substance for the simple reason that this is a pure question of law regarding inherent lack of jurisdiction which goes to the root of the matter and it can be agitated at anytime, in this context the basic case of the Supreme Court is Kiran Singh and Others Vs. Chaman Paswan and Others, wherein it has been held that a defect of jurisdiction if it is in respect of the subject matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree and such defect cannot be cured even by consent of the parties. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Rakesh Kumar Gupta, in para 18 by placing reliance on Ram Singh and Others Vs. Gram Panchayat Mehal Kalan and Others, , has held that when jurisdiction of a forum is taken away resort to such forum would be misconceived and an exercise in futility. In the case of State of M.P. vs. Mathura Prasad Sharma, 1997 (2) VB 175 this Court held that the question of jurisdiction can be challenged at any stage even in execution or in collateral proceedings. If the decree passed without jurisdiction is nullity, the same cannot be executed. The reliance was placed on Kiran Singh and others (supra). Similarly the Division Bench of this Court in the case of S.P. Gupta Vs. State of M.P. and Another, held that if the jurisdictional competence was not objected the Court can suo motu examine such point. In the case of State of M.P. vs. Deena Nath, 1993 (2) VB 292, this Court categorically held and decided that Court cannot create jurisdiction in itself when there is none given under the statute. Similarly the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Zila Sahakari Kendriya Bank Maryadit vs. Labour Court, 1993 RN 403 has laid down the law that the jurisdiction is a statutory creation and it cannot either be usurped or arrogated to or extinguished by any one. Thus, in the present case, when there is inherent lack of jurisdiction, merely such an objection was not raised before the Tribunal would not disentitle petitioner, to raise the said objection. Since there is inherent lack of jurisdiction, the Award passed by the Tribunal is without jurisdiction and, therefore, it cannot be allowed to remain stand. The Tribunal, after considering the statement of claim of the parties as well as after marshalling and appreciating the evidence, gave a finding of fact that the workman did not work continuously 240 days in a calender year. This is a finding of fact and cannot be challenged in this Court. The Tribunal, after considering the statement of claim of the parties as well as after marshalling and appreciating the evidence, gave a finding of fact that the workman did not work continuously 240 days in a calender year. This is a finding of fact and cannot be challenged in this Court. Indeed the counsel for the workman has also not challenged this finding. Thus, this finding had attained finality that the workman did not work continuously for 240 days in a calender year under the employment of the employer. u/s 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, continuous service has been defined and for the ready reference I would like to opt to reproduce it: 25-B. Definition of continuous service.-For the purposes of this Chapter- (1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman; (2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer- (a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than- (i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and (ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case; (b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than- (i) ninety-five days, in the case of a workman employed below, ground in a mine; and (ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case. Explanation.- For the purposes of clause (2), the number of days on which a workman has actually worked under an employer shall include the days on which- (i) he has been laid-off under an agreement or as permitted by standing orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946), or under this Act or under any other law applicable to the industrial establishment; (ii) He has been on leave with full wages, earned in the previous year; (iii) he has been absent due to temporary disablement caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment; and (iv) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity leave; so however, that the total period of such maternity leave does not exceed twelve weeks. Under section 25F of the said Act, a workman can be retrenched only after complying the conditions as envisaged in clause (a), (b) and (c) to this section. It would be apposite to re-write the said section: 25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman.-No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until- (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette. (emphasis supplied). Thus, on conjoint reading of the abovesaid provisions, it is clear that a right would accrue in a workman to ask for reinstatement on account of his retrenchment only if he had worked continuously for 240 days in a calendar year. The expression "retrenchment" has been defined u/s 2(o) of the said Act. Since the workman has not worked continuously for 240 days in a calendar year, the view of this Court is that no right has been accrued in it and he cannot ask for reinstatement. The expression "retrenchment" has been defined u/s 2(o) of the said Act. Since the workman has not worked continuously for 240 days in a calendar year, the view of this Court is that no right has been accrued in it and he cannot ask for reinstatement. The Tribunal itself has held that the action of termination by the employer terminating the services of the workman is not void. According to me, since there is a clear finding of the Tribunal that the workman has not worked continuously for 240 days in a calendar year, he is not entitled for any relief. Therefore, the opinion of this Court is that the Tribunal erred in passing the order of reinstatement. The employee was only a casual and temporary employee and he had also not completed 240 days of his service in a calendar year, therefore, his termination does not amount to illegal retrenchment. Since the petition of employer is being allowed, the petition of workman to award backwages cannot be allowed and is hereby dismissed. In the result, the petition (M.P. No. 1787/92) filed by the employer is hereby allowed and the petition (M.P. No. 3046/92) filed by the workman is hereby dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. The security amount, if deposited, be refunded to the parties. Final Result : Allowed