CHAMU JINAPPA SHERI v. SAVITRI YESHWANTRAO CHAGULE
2004-01-21
body2004
DigiLaw.ai
( 1 ) THE appeal filed against the judgment and decree passed in RA No. 5/96 on the file of District Judge, Belgaum arising out of the judgment and decree passed in O. S. No. 44/92 on the file of Additional Civil Judge, Belgaum. ( 2 ) THE appellants are defendants 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7 to 13 in the suit. The respondents 1 and 2 are the plaintiffs filed a suit for partition and share in the suit schedule property bearing Sy. No. 829 measuring 2 acres 3 guntas situate in Belgaum City. According to plaintiff =s pursuant to the arbitration the family properties case to be divided and registered in a partition deed marked at Ex. P. 1 dated 4-10-1963. One Jinnappa is the propositus. The defendants 1 and 2 and one Nemanna are the sons of Jinnappa. The defendant No. 3 and plaintiffs 1 and 2 are the daughters of Jinnappa. Nemanna is dead. The plaintiffs contend that there are not consenting parties to the arbitration and to the award and also not parties to the partition deed. Therefore the terms of partition deed would not bind them and they are entitled to 1/6th share each in the suit property. ( 3 ) UNDER the partition deed a limited interest in the suit property was created in favour of the appellant Jinnappa and Jivabalawwa and after their life time it is said that the property to devolve jointly on defendants 1,2 and Nemanna. Jinnappa died in the year 1992 Nemanna died in the year 1994. The defendants contend that by terms of partition, their parents had only limited interest and later on the defendants 1 and 2 and deceased brother Nemanna succeeded to the property. Therefore the plaintiffs have no right to seek partition in the suit properties. The plaintiffs alternatively contend that property given to their mother Jivabalwwa enlarges into a full estate u/s. 14 and that they are entitled to a share in the property. ( 4 ) THE trial court upholds the claim of the plaintiffs that the limited interest created in favour of Jivabalawwa ripens into a full estate and as such the plaintiffs are entitled to share in the property. The appellate court confirms the findings in the judgement and decree of the trial court and dismissed the appeal of the defendants. Hence, the second appeal.
The appellate court confirms the findings in the judgement and decree of the trial court and dismissed the appeal of the defendants. Hence, the second appeal. ( 5 ) THE judgment and decree rendered by this Court came to be set aside by the Supreme Court in CA 2667/03 with a direction that substantial question of law has to be framed and to be disposed of. This Court at the stage of admission by order dated 27-3-02 had framed the following substantial question of law. Whether both the courts below have committed an error in not interpreting and construing the true intention of the parties to the partition deed Ex. P. 5? ( 6 ) IN the light of the facts and disputed contentions, the following substantial question of law is framed. Whether the appellate court committed error in holding that property allotted to Jivabalawwa under Ex. P. 5 ripens into a full estate under section 14 (1) and as such the plaintiffs are entitled to share and such an interpretation of Ex. P. 5 by the appellate court is contrary to law and contrary to the terms of the document? ( 7 ) THE appellate court was fully aware of the our of the issue and refers to section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. The parties are governed by Bombay School of Mithskshara law. At a partition jivabalawwa had a right to a share as that of a son along with her husband and sons. At the time of partition, the plaintiffs have no right or interest in the ancestral as daughters. The partition was effected between the male members but in which the mother Jivabalawwa was entitled to a share. The parties got the matter arbitrated and a registered partition deed in Ex. P. 5 came to be executed. Under the terms of deed, the parents Jinnappa and Jivabalawwa take only a limited interest in the property during their life time with a stipulation that after their demise, the property shall devolve upon their sons who are parties 3 to 5 under Ex. P. 5. ( 8 ) THE property given to Jivabalawwa and her husband was obviously for their maintenance during their life time. It is therefore necessary to find out whether the provisions of section 14 would apply to the share of Jivabalawwa. For convenient reference the provisions are extracted here under: 14.
P. 5. ( 8 ) THE property given to Jivabalawwa and her husband was obviously for their maintenance during their life time. It is therefore necessary to find out whether the provisions of section 14 would apply to the share of Jivabalawwa. For convenient reference the provisions are extracted here under: 14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property:- (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation: In this sub-section, property includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also by such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property. ( 9 ) IT is perfectly lawful and valid for the parties at a partition evidenced by registered deed to take only a limited interest as their share and allow the devolution of the property on the persons of their choice and such an arrangement would in law amounts to relinquishment of ones full rights in the property and taking only a life interest with the vested reminder making over to somebody else named in the document. Such a stipulation is valid and binding. In that view, the stipulation contained in Ex. P. 5 granting limited interest in favour of the appellants is perfectly valid and enforceable at law.
Such a stipulation is valid and binding. In that view, the stipulation contained in Ex. P. 5 granting limited interest in favour of the appellants is perfectly valid and enforceable at law. Jivabalawwa and Jinnappa although they were entitled to equal share in the property consentingly and voluntarily they have forgone their full rights over the property and opted to have only a limited interest during their life time and after their demise direct that the property shall devolve upon their three sons in equal proportions. In view of the terms of the document in Ex. P. 5, I find that sub-section (2) of section 14 would attract. Jivabalawwa has voluntarily under a valid and a binding registered deed at Ex. P. 5 has restricted her right in the property to a life interest to be enjoyed during her life time. If there was no stipulation of devolution of the property after the demise of Jivabalawwa and her husband in favour of their sons in Ex. P. 5, the Section 14 (1) would be applicable but in view of the clear stipulation in Ex. P. 5 the interest created in Jivabalawwa is squarely within the purview of Section 14 (2 ). In that view, it is impermissible for the plaintiffs to seek any share in the property contrary to the terms of Ex. P. 5. The contention that the plaintiffs were not parties to Ex. P. 5 is untenable since they had no subsisting interest at the time of Ex. P. 5. It is only by way of succession, they can claim right to the property through their parents-Jinnappa and jivabalawwa but the parents are signatories and parties to Ex. P. 5. Therefore non participation of plaintiff and the absence of their consent to the terms of Ex. P. 5 is of no consequence in law. In that view of the matter, the view taken by the appellate court that section 14 (1) applies to the facts of the case is perversely contrary to law and terms of document. The question of law is answered in affirmative. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the appellate court is set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is dismissed. --- *** --- .