D. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) THE decision by the learned single Judge dated 25th april 2003 (reported in 263 ITR 186) is under challenge before us. The learned single Judge had found that rectification sought for in this case by the Department does not come within the narrow scope and ambit of section 154 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for the reasons given in the said judgment. The department has preferred this appeal in this Court. Appellant's points: ( 2 ) MR. Shome, learned senior counsel for the appellant, had pointed out that the law with regard to the power of the Settlement Commission in waiving interest is settled in the case of CIT v. Anjum M. H. Ghaswala and Ors. , (1998) 230 ITR (AT) 1. It is pointd out that the Commissioner had no power to waive interest chargeable under section 234a, 234b and 234c. Therefore, it is a case covered under the provisions of section 154. Elaborate submission was made by Mr. Shome with regard to the applicability of the various decisions cited by Mr. R. N. Bajoria, learned senior counsel for the respondents and also to the validity of the submission advanced by him. Respondent's points: ( 3 ) AT the same time Mr. Bajoria had also made elaborate submission and had met all the submission advanced by Mr. Shome and had pointed out that the rectification that was sought for was not free from doubt. At the point of time when the rectification was sought for the decision in anjun Ghaswala (supra) had not come and was pending reference to a larger Bench of five Judges and was decided substitute to the stage when the rectification was asked for. Similarly, the other decision in CIT v. Damani Brothers, 254 ITR 91 on which Mr. Shome had anchored his submission was also pending decision before the three Judges bench, which decided the same later on. Therefore, it does not come within the purview of the scope where section 154 can be applied. Facts: ( 4 ) WE would refer to the detailed submission made by the respective counsel at appropriate stages when occasion would require. In order to appreciate the situation, we may refer briefly to the facts of this case on which we are called upon to apply the principles of law argued by both the learned counsel with apt erudition. 4. In order to appreciate the situation, we may refer briefly to the facts of this case on which we are called upon to apply the principles of law argued by both the learned counsel with apt erudition. 4. 1. The respondent/assessee was carrying on business of licenced money-lender, jewellery and goldsmith etc. On 24/25th February 1993, a search was conducted at the business and residential complex of the respondents. In course of such, jewellery, cash and other assets were seized. On deposit of Rs. 39,01,400/-, the seized jewellery was returned and the said sum became part of the seized cash. The respondents made an application for settlement of their tax liabilities before the Settlement commission. The Settlement Commission by its order dated 27th november 1997 passed under section 245 (d) (4) settled the case by accepting a sum of Rs. 41. 25 lakhs as assessable income (page 28 of the pb ). By the said order, it was further directed that no interest was to be charged (page 41 of the PB ). Assessing Officer gave effect to the said order dated 27th November 1997 passed by the Settlement Commission on 17th February 1998. The Assessing Officer refunded a sum of rs. 17,34,375/~ out of the seized cash after adjusting the tax determined. All matters relating to tax liability of the respondents were fulfilled and finally settled. Long thereafter on March 6, 2002, a copy of the application dated 1/4th March 2002 was served on the assessee-respondent. In the said application rectification was sought for by the Department in respect of the order dated 27th November 1997 passed under section 245 (d) (4)of the Act (page 91 of the PB ). The respondents submitted their objection to the said application (page 91 of the PB) on March 19, 2002. This rectification was allowed under section 154 holding that the interest under section 234a, 234b and 234c was mistakenly waived. The respondents moved a writ petition before the learned single Judge. The learned single Judge was pleased to allow the writ petition and set aside the order of rectification by its order dated 25th April 2003. 4. 2. Thus it appears the rectification was sought to be made on I/ 4th March 2002. The respondents moved a writ petition before the learned single Judge. The learned single Judge was pleased to allow the writ petition and set aside the order of rectification by its order dated 25th April 2003. 4. 2. Thus it appears the rectification was sought to be made on I/ 4th March 2002. The decisions in CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, 259 itr 449 and CIT v. Damani Brothers, 259 ITR 475 by three Judges Bench of the Apex Court was rendered on 17th December 2002. Therefore at that point of time (1/4th March 2002) the question decided in Damani brothers (supra) was still awaitirg decision. However, the decision proceeded on the basis of the decision in Anjurn Ghaswala (supra) by seven members Special Bench of the Settlement Commission rendered on 12th December 1997, which, however, was operating in the field, which was not the basis on which this notice was issued. The Supreme court (three Judges' Bench) in Anjum Ghaswala (supra) had settled the issue on 18th October 2001. In that decision all the three Judges had pointed out that the Settlement Commission had no power to waive interest chargeable under section 234a, 234b and 234c while passing the order under section 245 (4 ). 4. 3. Reliance was placed by Mr. Shome on Anjum M. H. Ghaswala and ors. , (1998) 230 ITR (AT) 1 (supra), a decision of seven members Special bench of the Settlement Commission on 12th December 1997. Whereas the Settlement Commission has passed the final order on 27th November 1997, namely, before the Ghaswala 230 ITR (AT) 1 (supra) decision by settlement Commission overruling Ashwani Kumar Aggarwal (1992) 195 itr 861. In Ashwani Kumar Aggarwal (supra) the jurisdiction of Settlement commission to waive interest was recognized. The order was given effect to on 17th February 1998. It was only on October 18, 2001, the five judges Bench of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Anjum M. H. Ghaswala and ors. , (2001) 252 ITR 1 (SC) approved Ashwani Kumar's case (supra)reversing the seven members Special Bench decision holding that the settlement Commission could reduce/waive the interest under section 234a, 234b and 234c in accordance with the Circular of the Board. , (2001) 252 ITR 1 (SC) approved Ashwani Kumar's case (supra)reversing the seven members Special Bench decision holding that the settlement Commission could reduce/waive the interest under section 234a, 234b and 234c in accordance with the Circular of the Board. A bench of two learned Judges of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Damani Brothers, (2002) 254 ITR 91 noticed the constitution Bench decision in Ghaswla 252 ITR 1 (SC) (supra) and referred the matter for consideration of a larger Bench on 11th February 2002 the application for rectification was made on 1/4th March 2002. On the basis thereof the Settlement Commission passed the order of rectification under section 154 holding that the interest was payable under sections 234a, 234b and 234c was waived by mistake on 20th March 2002. Whereas the larger Bench of three Judges of the Supreme Court delivered its decision on 17th December 2002 in Cit v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 259 itr 449 and CIT v. Damani Brothers, (2003) 259 ITR 475. Appellant's submission: ( 5 ) MR. Shome had contended that the principle was settled by the five Judges Bench in Ghaswala 252 ITR 1 (SC) (supra) on 18th October 2001 after which the notice was issued. The reference to a larger Bench in Damani Brothers (supra) did never cast any doubt on the principle laid down in Ghosimla 252 ITR 1 (SC) (supra ). He contended further that subsequent settlement of legal proposition is one of the grounds on which rectification can be asked for. He also referred to sections 245-1 and 245f (1) to support his contention. According to him, mistake of law on the basis of subsequent Supreme Court decision is rectifiable under section 154. To support this contention, he relied on Nav Nirman P. Ltd. v. CIT. (1998) 174 ITR 574 (MP) (DB); Kit Kotagiri Ta and Coffee Estates co. Ltd. v. ITAT and Ors. , (1988) 174 ITR 579 (Ker) (DB); Commissioner of income Tax v. Smt. Aruna Luthra, (2001) 252 ITR 76 (FB) (Punjab and haryana ). He also contended that the Settlement Commission can rectify error under section 154 notwithstanding section 245-1 in view of the provisions contended in section 245f (1 ). In support of this contention, he relied upon Aop of Sanjaybhar R. Patel and Ors. v. Assessing Officer/ assistant CJT, (2004) 267 ITR 129 (Guj) (DB ). He also contended that the Settlement Commission can rectify error under section 154 notwithstanding section 245-1 in view of the provisions contended in section 245f (1 ). In support of this contention, he relied upon Aop of Sanjaybhar R. Patel and Ors. v. Assessing Officer/ assistant CJT, (2004) 267 ITR 129 (Guj) (DB ). To support his contention that the Settlement Commission has no power to waive or reduce interest, he relied on the decision in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Anjum M. H. Ghaswala and Ors,, 252 ITR 1 (SC), a five Judges Bench. This decision, according to him, cannot be doubted neither was it doubted by the two judges Bench in Damani Brothers (2002) 254 ITR 91 (supra) nor in the three Judges Bench decision in Damani Brothers (2003) 259 ITR 475 (supra ). On the other hand, the two Judges Bench in Damani Bors 254 itr 91 (supra) followed the ratio of the five Judges Bench and referred only one question to the three Judges Bench, whether the Settlement commissioner gets a complete role in substitution of the other authorities under the Act. The three Judges Bench in Damani Brothers 259 ITR 475 (supra) followed Ghaswala 252 ITR 1 (SC) (supra ). The three Judges Bench clearly held that interest under section 234a, 234b and 234c becomes payable on the income already disclosed in the return as well as those disclosed before the Settlement Commission. Another three Judges Bench in Hindustan Bulk Carriers 259 ITR 449 (supra) following Ghaswala 252 itr 1 (SC) (supra) took the same view. Therefore, there was no doubt as to the ratio in Ghaswala 252 ITR 1 (SC) (supra ). According to him, the settlement Commission failed to consider the decision in Ashwani Kumar 195 ITR 861 (supra) and, therefore, it had committed a mistake as such the error was rectifiable under section 154. Thus the decision in Geo miller and Co. Ltd. v. Deputy CIT and Ors. (2003) 184 CTR (Cal) 119 has no manner of application in the present case. The error was not sought to be rectified on the basis of the pre-existing law laid down by the larger bench in Ashwani Kumar's case (supra) and incidentally the ratio in ashwani Kumar's case (supra), subsequently affirmed by the Constitution bench in Ghaswala 252 ITR 1 (SC) (supra ). The error was not sought to be rectified on the basis of the pre-existing law laid down by the larger bench in Ashwani Kumar's case (supra) and incidentally the ratio in ashwani Kumar's case (supra), subsequently affirmed by the Constitution bench in Ghaswala 252 ITR 1 (SC) (supra ). Therefore, the order passed by the learned single Judge cannot be sustained and that of the settlement Commission should be affirmed. Mr. Shome had also in his reply distinguished all the decisions cited by Mr. Bajoria and had contended that here the rectification does not require any long drawn argument and mistake is apparent and there cannot be any two opinions with regard thereto. The respondent's submission: ( 6 ) MR. Bajoria, on the other hand, had contended that no proceeding for rectification would lie where investigation into facts or determination afresh of the facts or issues and the debatable points are involved. It is only glaring obvious and patent mistake that can be the subject matter of rectification. In this case, the factual position apart from other legal issues was required to be determined. Even in the factual position there was no glaring, patent mistake apparent on the face of the record rectifiable. The notice of rectification was issued on the basis of presumption and assumption for the purpose of appreciating the situation. It would be necessary to examine the statements made in the rectification application forming the foundation therefor. He pointed out that the grounds made out are based on assumption and presumption and that the Commissioner had never examined or considered the circular issued by the Board and that the waiver or reduction of interest could not be on the basis of any Circular of the Board. However, the supreme Court had reversed the seven-member decision of the Settlement commission in Anjum Ghaswala (1998) 230 ITR (AT) 1 (supra ). In Anjum ghaswala (2001) 252 ITR 1 (SC) the Supreme Court had held that the commission had power to waive interest only to the extent and in accordance with the Circular issued by the Board under section 119 of the Act and no further. In Ashwani Kumar's case (supra) the five Member bench had also held so since approved by the Supreme Court in Ghaswala 252 ITR 1 (SC) (supra ). 6. 1. According to Mr. In Ashwani Kumar's case (supra) the five Member bench had also held so since approved by the Supreme Court in Ghaswala 252 ITR 1 (SC) (supra ). 6. 1. According to Mr. Bajoria, the rectification proceeding is wholly without jurisdiction and illegal for the following reasons, namely, (1) the order sought to be rectified was passed under section 254d (4) on 27th november 1997. whereas the decision in seven Member Bench of the commission in Ghaswala (supra) rendered on thereafter on 12th december 1997. Thus Ghaswala's case (supra) was not the basis of waiver of interest : (2) the application for rectification proceeds on surmises, assumption and presumption as to what the Commission might have taken into consideration while waiving interest; (3) how far the commission had taken into consideration Ashwani Kumar's case (supra)and the Circular while granting waiver needs an investigation into facts and also to arguments with reference to presumption, assumption and surmises made in the rectification application; (4) in Ghaswala's case (supra) the Supreme Court did not hold that in no circumstances interest can be waived, on the other hand it had held that waiver should be granted in terms of Circular. According to him, investigation into facts, debate and fresh adjudication on the question of applicability of Circular would be involved. It was alleged in the rectification application that the circular was not considered. Whether Circular was considered or not or the extent of its applicability cannot be gone afresh; (5) the contention that Rs. 45,000/- was the tax liability and the rest of the benefit of the circular would be hardly of any consequences. The contention of rs. 45,000/- was assessed is incorrect. Inasmuch as Rs. 39. 01 lakhs was assessed and after adjustment having been furnished in replacement of the seized jewellery and even then out of the said amount income tax liability after adjusted to the tune of Rs. 17. 34 lakhs was returned; (6) in a rectification application the facts cannot be gone into for determining the applicability of this Circular and its extent for determining the quantum for which the waiver or reduction is allowed; (7) inordinate delay stand in the way; and (8) under section 245d (4) the order of settlement Commission under section 245d is conclusive and cannot be reopened except otherwise provided in Chapter 19a itself. To support this contention, reliance was placed in Capital Cables (India) Put. To support this contention, reliance was placed in Capital Cables (India) Put. Ltd. v. Income Tax Settlement Commission, (2004) 267 ITR 528. Scope of section 154 : The present case: ( 7 ) EXTREME erudite argument has been made by the respective counsel complicated issues or questions and questions of law were dealt with. Extensive citations were cited by the respective counsel. We do not think that in this case it is necessary to go into all those intricacies of law as has been ably argued by both the learned counsel. The question is to be looked into within the scope and ambit of section 154 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The rectification would be permissible if the case comes within the purview of the scope for rectification as has been settled by various decisions operating in the field. We have occasion to deal with this question in the decisions in Vijay Mallya v. Assistant cit, Investigation, (2003) 263 ITR 41 (DB) and Kesoram Industries Ltd. v. CIT, West Bengal-II, Calcutta (ITA No. 359 of 2000) disposed of by us on 13th July 2004. The learned Single Judge has also proceeded on the said principle and rightly allowed the writ petition. On which the scope of section 154 is hinged can be found in the decision in T. S. Baloram, ITO v. Volkart Brothers, (1971) 82 ITR 50 (SC ). The proposition of law is well settled. The Income Tax Act has not conferred any jurisdiction to review any or either of the authorities under the provisions. The Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable in a proceeding under the Act; neither section 151 CPC can be conceived of to enable the authorities under the Act to exercise inherent power. The power that has been specifically conferred upon the authorities is that under section 154 or under section 254 or section 263, as the case may be. We are now concerned with section 154. The section 154 only confers power of rectification if there is a mistake apparent on the face of the record. The power that has been specifically conferred upon the authorities is that under section 154 or under section 254 or section 263, as the case may be. We are now concerned with section 154. The section 154 only confers power of rectification if there is a mistake apparent on the face of the record. The settled proposition as has been laid down by different decisions including Volkart Brothers (supra) and all subsequent decisions following it are that the limit of rectification can be stretched only to the field where the mistake is glaring, obvious, patent and apparent on the face of the record Glaring, obvious, patent and apparent mistakes are those for which no investigation into facts or determination of law or discussion of debatable points are involved, to establish which long drawn argument would not be necessary and in respect of which no two opinion is possible. 7. 1. In order to find out all these ingredients, one has to look into the basis on which the rectification was sought to be made. This can be found from the application made by the party, detailing the grounds for rectification. It may be mentioned either in the notice under section 154 or it may be found from the application on the basis whereof the notice under section 154 was issued. In case such notice is issued suo motu, then it has to be found out from the formation of opinion in the order pursuant to which section 154 notice is issued. 7. 2. In the present case, there was an application in which the grounds were disclosed. We would find that application at page 91 of the Paper book. We may beneficially quote the text of the said application as hereafter:"1. The Settlement Commission, Addl. Bench, Kolkata vide its order passed under section 245d (4) on 27. 11. 1997 in the above case cases has waived interest under section 234a, 234b and 234c of income Tax Act, 1961 for the above assessment years vide page 14 of the said order. While waiving the interest the Hon'ble commission has observed as under: interest Chargeable: "in view of the cooperation extended by the applicant, in the settlement of his case, no interest under various sections will be charged. " 2. The Commission has not specified which interest they are waiving. While waiving the interest the Hon'ble commission has observed as under: interest Chargeable: "in view of the cooperation extended by the applicant, in the settlement of his case, no interest under various sections will be charged. " 2. The Commission has not specified which interest they are waiving. Since assessment years involved are 1989-90 to 92-93, it is presumed that they are waiving interest chargeable under sections 234a, 234b and 234c. It seems the Commission has waived the above interest by presuming that they have inherent power under section 245d (6) to waive or reduce interest chargeable under sections 234a, 234b and 234c of Income Tax Act. However, in aswani Kumar Agarwal's case reported in 195 ITR 861 (ITSC) (SB), the Special Bench Settlement Commission has held that under section 245d (4) or under 245d (6), the Commission does not have power either to waive or to reduce the statutory interest payable under the Act. The waiver/reduction of interest chargeable under these sections, is not permissible and Commission is bound to follow Special Bench decision in Aswani Kumar's case which was decided by a larger bench and this additional bench was legally bound to follow the decision of the larger bench. Ignoring the decision of Special Bench in Aswani Kumar's case is an error of law apparent from record. The erroneous view of the additional bench Kolkata found a temporary support from Special Bench decision in Anjum M. H. Ghaswala reported in 230 ITR (AT) 1 (SB ). However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide its judgment in the case of CIT v. Anjum M. H. Ghaswala reported in 252 ITR Page-1 has reversed the said decision of the Special Bench of the Settlement commission and upheld the decision of the Commission in Aswani kumar's case. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Ghaswala's case that the Commission does not have power to reduce/waive statutory interest chargeable under section 234a, 234b and 234c, except to the extent of granting relief under the circulars issued by the Board. In this regard it is also submitted that the commission has been waiving reducing interest only on the basis of Special Bench's decision in Ghaswala's case quoted above. The commission never examined or considered any circular issued by the Board for such waiver reduction of interest. In this regard it is also submitted that the commission has been waiving reducing interest only on the basis of Special Bench's decision in Ghaswala's case quoted above. The commission never examined or considered any circular issued by the Board for such waiver reduction of interest. Thus the waiver reduction of the interest by the Commission could not be on the basis of any circular of the Board. 3. Now that the Special Bench's decision of the Commission has been reversed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the said interest under sections 234a, 234b and 234c was incorrectly waived. Your arc accordingly requested to rectify modify/withdraw that part of the order of the Commission, waiving reducing interest under sections 234a, 234b and 234c restore the said interest charged chargeable by the Assessing Officer. 4. The order under section 245d (4) was passed by the Commission on 27. 11. 1997. Thus the limitation to pass order under section 154 by the Commission expires on 31st of March, 2002. Hon'ble commission is prayed to decide this petition before the expiry of limitation. " 7. 3. It appears that the Department has not contended that the-mistake is glaring, obvious, patent and apparent on the face of the record. On the other hand, it proceeds to surmise and presume certain things, which weighed with the Settlement Commission. It proceeded on the basis of assumption and presumption. At the same time, we have also found that there was a Circular which is at page 126 of the Paper Book under which the power of reduction or waiver of interest under sections 234a, 234b and 234c was recognized by the Department itself. Whether pursuant to such Circular, the interest was waived or not is not apparent from the order. Whether in spite of the Ghaswala's decision, the Circular could be overlooked altogether and that the Ghaswala's case (supra)proceeded on the basis that there was no power to waive or reduce interest except under any Circular. How the Circular would be fitting in the decision of Ghaswala (supra) is a question of argument and in respect whereof tow opinions may be possible and at the same time the role of the Settlement Commission as a whole was in question in Damani Brothers (supra) since referred to a larger Bench. How the Circular would be fitting in the decision of Ghaswala (supra) is a question of argument and in respect whereof tow opinions may be possible and at the same time the role of the Settlement Commission as a whole was in question in Damani Brothers (supra) since referred to a larger Bench. Despite the decision in five judges Constitution Bench in Ghaswala (supra) and the decision on damani Brothers (supra) by a three Judges Bench upon such reference was rendered after the final order of rectification was passed namely expiry of limitation. Thus by reason of Ghosimla's decision, it cannot be conclusively concluded that the mistake was rectifiable under section 154, though subsequent contrary decision in law is a ground for rectification. 7. 4. In the present case, what the Department had asked for on the strength of the application at page 91 is virtually a review, a power, which is absent in the authorities. As discussed above, this is not a case, as rightly pointed out by the learned single Judge, coming within the narrow scope and ambit of rectification under section 154. On the other hand, it stretches to the field of review, a power not available with the Income Tax Authorities". An analysis of the appellant's submission : ( 8 ) IN view of our above decision, we may now answer Mr. Shom's contention on point No. 1 that a mistake of law oil the basis of subsequent supreme Court decision is rectifiable under section 154 is a settled proposition of law and the decision cited by Mr. Shome seem to propound settled principle of law on which we need not dilate any more. Since the mistake does not come within the purview of section 154 as we have observed, it is not necessary to answer the second question raised by mr. Shome whether the Settlement Commission can rectify error under section 154 notwithstanding section 245-1 and section 245f (1 ). But, however, the question has since been raised, we may express our view as hereafter. Scope of section 245-1 vis-a-vis section 245 F (l): 8. 1. It appears to us that by reason of the scheme of Chapter 19a once an order under section 254d (4) is passed, the same becomes final and cannot be reopened except as provided in Chapter 19a. Scope of section 245-1 vis-a-vis section 245 F (l): 8. 1. It appears to us that by reason of the scheme of Chapter 19a once an order under section 254d (4) is passed, the same becomes final and cannot be reopened except as provided in Chapter 19a. But the provisions of section 245-1 have to be read in consonance with the scope of the entire chapter and all the provisions incorporated in the Chapter are to be given its due meaning so as to reconcile each other. Section 245f (1) gives all powers to the Settlement Commission in addition to the powers conferred upon it under Chapter 19a as are vested in an income tax authority under the Act which includes the authority to rectify under section 154 alone with which we are concerned. The intention of the legislature was to give finality to a determination under section 245d (4) and it cannot be reopened in any proceeding under the Act or under any other law for the time being in force. Having regard to the scheme of the chapter, it appears that section 245f was introduced in order to give full power to the Settlement Commission to exercise its power under Chapter 19a. But by reason of section 245-1, it seems to us that this power under section 245f is limited and confined within the scope of exercise of the power under Chapter 19a that is up to the passing of the final order. As soon a final order is passed by reason of section 245-1, the same becomes conclusive and cannot be reopened except as provided in Chapter 19a. Chapter 19a does not provide for any power of rectification except in exercise of power inherent in it to do justice in a case where because of its action a party is not injured or in other words to rectify the injury caused to the party by reason of an order. Apart from this extremely limited scope, it has no power to exercise the power of rectification under section 154 under any other circumstances. This is apparent from section 245ha where the application of section 154 is confined only in respect of cases coming under section 245c since remanded to the Assessing Officer on account of non-cooperation of the assessee. Apart from this extremely limited scope, it has no power to exercise the power of rectification under section 154 under any other circumstances. This is apparent from section 245ha where the application of section 154 is confined only in respect of cases coming under section 245c since remanded to the Assessing Officer on account of non-cooperation of the assessee. When the statute specifically provides that section 154 is applicable only in a limited sphere, then on the face of the provisions contained in section 245-I such power cannot be exercised by the Settlement Commission unless it is necessary in extreme cases. 8. 1. 1. In our view the present case does not fall within such an extreme case where the power of rectification that inheres in the tribunal can be exercised. The Settlement Commission has no inherent power to exercise the jurisdiction under section 154 after a final order is passed and becomes conclusive by reason of section 245-I. We are unable to agree with the reasoning given by the Gujarat division Bench in AOP of Sanjaybhar R. Patel and Ors. v. Assessing officer/assistant CIT, (2004) 267 ITR 129. On the other hand, we are in full agreement with the reasoning given by Delhi High Court division Bench in Capital Cables (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax settlement Commission, (2004) 267 ITR 528. 8. 2. We have already answered the questions No. 3 and 4 raised by mr. Shome, as discussed above. Analysis of the respondent's submission: ( 9 ) IF we rely on the decision in C/tv. Oriental Co. Ltd. , 215 ITR 844 of this Court, in that event, it would be difficult for us to arrive at a definite conclusion with regard to the present situation. Inasmuch as in the said decision, it was held that the allocation of expenses between business income and income from other sources would not be subject matter of rectification proceedings. Drawing analogy therefrom Mr. Bajoria had contended that this is also such a case where it is just not possible to decide whether interest can be waived or not. Delhi High Court in Capital cables (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) had held that rectification proceeding for charging interest on the basis of Supreme Court decision in Ghaswala's case (supra) was struck down. Bajoria had contended that this is also such a case where it is just not possible to decide whether interest can be waived or not. Delhi High Court in Capital cables (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) had held that rectification proceeding for charging interest on the basis of Supreme Court decision in Ghaswala's case (supra) was struck down. In the case of CIT v. Damani Brothers, (2002) 254 ITR 91, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court considering the power of the Settlement Commission to waive interest under sections 220 (2) and 234b of the Act referred the matter to a larger Bench on 11th February 2002. After noticing Ghaswala's case (supra) at page 94 of the Reports, it was observed that"serious issue has been raised in the matter before us with directly conflicting stands on either side as to the extent of power that could be exercised by the Settlement Commission pursuant to the applications filed under section 245c of the Act. "9. 1. Thereafter, at page 97 of the Reports, the issue was posed as under:"does the Settlement Commission get a complete role in total substitution of the other authorities under the Act, and if so, for what purpose and to what extent. An answer to the questions thus raised before us may call for a detailed consideration of the views expressed in the earlier decisions in order either to further elaborate or to confine them in a matter that is desirable or permissible in terms of the scheme, the language used and the purpose underlying the various statutory provisions. Therefore, we would consider it more appropriate as well as proper to have the matter referred for the consideration of a larger Bench that merely a Bench of two Judges as we are. Such questions, being recurring in nature, deserve to be decided at an early date. " (Emphasis added)9. 2. It would thus be seen that in Ghaswala's case (supra) all the aspects relating to waiver of interest had not been dealt with by the supreme Court. The distinction sought to be made by the appellants that the case of Damani Brothers (supra) was dealing with section 220 (2)of the Act and not sections 234a, 234b and 234c of the act dealt with in Ghaswala's case (supra) is not correct. It would appear from page 94 of the Reports, where the facts of SLP (C) Nos. The distinction sought to be made by the appellants that the case of Damani Brothers (supra) was dealing with section 220 (2)of the Act and not sections 234a, 234b and 234c of the act dealt with in Ghaswala's case (supra) is not correct. It would appear from page 94 of the Reports, where the facts of SLP (C) Nos. 18012-18015 of 2000 have been noted, that section 234b was also involved. Even otherwise, under section 220 also circumstances are specified under which interest can be waived as in the case of interest under sections 234a, 234b and 234c by the Circular. Merely because such circumstances are specified in one case in the statute itself and in the other by the Circular issued under the statutory provisions would make no difference. The matter was reconsidered by the Supreme Court in the case of C/tv. Hindustan bulk Carriers, (2003) 259 ITR 449 and in the case of CIT v. Damani bros. , (2003) 259 ITR 475, both decided on 17th December 2002. In the said decision in Hindustan Bulk (supra) each of the learned Judges delivered separate judgments running into 26 pages. The case of Damani brothers (supra) was also considered by the same Bench and the said decision also runs into 10 pages. In the said decisions, interest under sections 234a, 234b and 234c was also considered and the law clarified. In the circumstances, the submission of the appellants that the law had been finally settled by the Supreme Court in all its aspects in Ghaswala's case (supra) and the reference by the Division Bench of the Supreme court to the larger Bench of the issues involved is not relevant is not correct. It appears that all aspects relating to charging of interest had not been finally decided by the Supreme Court in Ghaswala's case (supra ). 9. 3. Another contention, which was raised before the learned trial judge in the alternative was that a subsequent decision of the Supreme court in another case could not be the basis for any rectification proceedings. The learned trial Judge decided the issue against the respondents relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of s. A. L. Narayana Row, CIT v. Model Mills Nagpur Ltd. , (1967) 64 ITR 67. The learned trial Judge decided the issue against the respondents relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of s. A. L. Narayana Row, CIT v. Model Mills Nagpur Ltd. , (1967) 64 ITR 67. The contention of the appellants that the respondents cannot agitate the said issue is not correct as they are entitled to support the judgment of the learned trial Judge on any ground decided against them as provided in Order 41 Rule 22 of the CPC. The decision in the case of Narayan row (supra) does not deal with the issue whether a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of another person can form the basis for rectification. 9. 4. The decision of the Supreme Court laying down the law cannot be equated with retrospective legislation. A Division Bench of this Hon'ble court in the case of Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. v. FTO, (1981) 130 ITR 710 had held that a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court cannot be the basis of any rectification proceedings (Page 731 of the Reports ). Special Leave Petition against the said decision was dismissed by the supreme Court [ (1983) 142 ITR (Statutes) 2 ). In the case of Geo Miller co. Ltd. v. Deputy CIT and Ors. , (2003) 184 CTR 119 , a learned single judge of this Hon'ble Court has also so held. Conclusion: ( 10 ) THE decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of AOP of sanjaybhai R. Patel and Ors. v. ACIT, (2004) 267 ITR 129 is not relevant and is in any event is erroneous for the reasons following : (a) in the said case the order of settlement was passed after Ghaswala's case was decided by the Settlement Commission unlike the respondents' case herein; (b) the rectification order was passed by the Settlement commission after the reference to larger bench in the case of Damani bros, but before it was decided by the Supreme Court; (c) it does not deal with and decide the issue that in rectification proceedings investigation into facts relating to circumstances in which order of waiver was passed; applicability of circular etc. cannot be considered. cannot be considered. It has rather proceeded on the basis as if interest had to be charged in all circumstances ignoring the fact that Supreme Court had not so held; (d)the decision, as Delhi High Court points out, proceeded after recording that it need not go into the issue whether section 154 of the Act applied or not; (e) the finding that subsequent decision of the Supreme Court can be a ground for rectification is contrary to the Division Bench decision of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Jiyqjeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. reported in (1981) 130 ITR 710 . 10. 1. We do not think we are called upon to answer the other questions raised by respective counsel for the parties or dealt on the decisions cited by them respectively. Order: ( 11 ) IN the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. The order of the Learned Single Judge is hereby affirmed. The order of rectification impugned in the writ petition is hereby set aside and quashed. ( 12 ) THERE will, however, be no order as to costs. Urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, the same be supplied within seven days. Appeal dismissed