JUDGMENT : S.N. SRIVASTAVA, J. 1. Petitioner who had applied for appointment under Dying-in-harness Rules, has instituted the instant petition impugning the order dated 29th March, 2001 thereby rejecting his application for such appointment on ground of being barred by time. 2. A brief resume of necessary facts is that the father of the Petitioner who was serving as Conductor in Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, died in harness on 25.11.1990. He was survived by Petitioner who was then eight years old and daughter namely Smt. Archana. The mother of the Petitioner predeceased her husband and both the siblings were reared up by their cousin brother Rakesh Pal Singh. According to further averments in the writ petition, the Petitioner passed his High School examination in the year 2000 and after attaining majority on 20.7.2000, he preferred representation before the Respondent No. 2 seeking appointment under Dying-in-Harness Rules. According to further averments, the Respondent No. 2 endorsed copy of letter bearing No. 139, dated 28.2.2001 to the Petitioner from a perusal of which it would surface that the Petitioner was assured by the then Regional Manager U.P.S.R.T.C. that he would be given employment after he had attained majority. Thereafter, it would further transpire from the averments made in the writ petition, the Petitioner approached the Minister of Transportation U.P.S.R.T.C. who directed the Respondent No. 1 to do the needful in the matter. Ultimately, the Respondent No. 2 passed the impugned order dated 29.3.2001 by which the representation of the Petitioner was rejected on ground that his claim was barred by time. It is in the above context that the present petition has been filed by the Petitioner for the relief. 3. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record. It is stated across the bar by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that mother of the Petitioner's having predeceased the Petitioners' father, there was none in the family at the relevant time to claim appointment under Dying-in-Harness Rules and therefore, the Petitioner was rightly assured of appointment by the then Regional Manager and the Petitioner was sustaining on legitimate expectation that he would be given appointment after he attains majority. The learned Counsel also referred to the relevant rule which, proceeds the submission, envisages making of application within five years and in exceptional cases, it also prescribes relaxation of the prescribed period. The learned Counsel also referred to the relevant rule which, proceeds the submission, envisages making of application within five years and in exceptional cases, it also prescribes relaxation of the prescribed period. Referring to the above Rules, the learned Counsel submitted that the authorities erred in rejecting the application without delving into the aspect of delay in making application. Per Contra, learned Counsel for the opposite parties tried to prop up the order urging that appointment under Dying-in-Harness Rules in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation has been interdicted since June, 2001 excepting for short period during which the ban was lifted. He further contended that Amendment of 1997 cannot be taken aid of as it could not be applied retrospectively in the matter of Petitioner. It was further contended that assurance given by the Regional Manager would operate in void as the Regional Manager was wholly incompetent to extend any assurance though it was conceded by the learned Counsel that he was competent to give appointment under Dying-in-Harness Rules. 4. The question that emerges for consideration in the above context is whether there was any exceptional circumstance warranting relaxation of the period by the authority concerned and whether the authority was justified in rejecting the application as time barred in the facts and circumstances of the case. 5. It bears no dispute that at the time of death of his father, conductor in the U.P.S.R.T.C. the Petitioner was minor then aged 8 years and his mother having predeceased his father, there was none in the family to claim appointment on compassionate ground. Further from a perusal of the letter of Regional Manager contained in Annexure-5 to the writ petition, it is explicit that the then Regional Manager had assured appointment to the Petitioner later on after he attains majority in the unusual circumstances. It also bears no repudiation that the Petitioner was brought up by his cousin and he has no resources to fall back upon. It thus leaves no manner of doubt that the Petitioner was a victim of unusual circumstances and the then Regional Manager U.P.S.R.T.C. showed compassion taking into reckoning unusual cut inflicted by Destiny upon him. 6. It also bears no repudiation that the Petitioner was brought up by his cousin and he has no resources to fall back upon. It thus leaves no manner of doubt that the Petitioner was a victim of unusual circumstances and the then Regional Manager U.P.S.R.T.C. showed compassion taking into reckoning unusual cut inflicted by Destiny upon him. 6. From a perusal of proviso (1) to Rule 5 of the Dying-in-Harness Rules it would crystallize that competent authority could entertain application by relaxing the prescribed time in exceptional cases in order to do justice to the party in equitable manner. It leaves no manner of doubt that the authority was empowered to relax the period in exceptional circumstances. 7. Before proceeding further, it must be noticed that compassionate appointment is a benevolent legislation and too rigid or too technical view is impermissible. No doubt, every case entailing huge delay cannot be equated and treated alike with compassion. Where delay is deliberate or the applicant has proceeded leisurely and carelessly, or the claim has outlived its usefulness with the passage of time, no commiserable view can be taken nor any leniency should be shown but in harsh cases like the present one, where the applicant was then 8 years old and his mother having predeceased his father, and there was none in the family to claim appointment and also considering that he was brought up by his cousin ostensibly acting on the assurance of the then Regional Manager that he would be given appointment later-on on his attaining majority, if the authority does not look beyond the rule book and proceeds unmoved by any compassion, it would be a negation of the very purpose of the Rule for which it was enacted. In my considered view, exceptional circumstances have to be construed not in a narrow and too technical sense but it must be applied in the conspectus of the facts and circumstances of the cases. According to dictionary meaning, exceptional means unusual, uncommon. In some dictionaries it signifies something unusual and special. In the light of the above meaning, exceptional circumstances can be construed to mean one not common to all victims. There is no formulaic standard to be applied whether any particular circumstance would fall within the meaning of exceptional or unusual circumstance. The exceptional circumstances have to be construed in the light of facts of each case. In the light of the above meaning, exceptional circumstances can be construed to mean one not common to all victims. There is no formulaic standard to be applied whether any particular circumstance would fall within the meaning of exceptional or unusual circumstance. The exceptional circumstances have to be construed in the light of facts of each case. In the instant case, circumstances were such which could be construed to be unusual or exceptional. 8. It is not indicated in the impugned order how the case of the Petitioner does not fall within the exceptional circumstances. To all appearances, the order impugned herein is a laconic order containing no discussion or analysis of the circumstances for taking a contrary view and it merely enumerates that the application having been moved after a lapse of 10 years is time barred. As stated supra, the present case is not a case out of which it may be discernible that the applicant slept over the matter or he proceeded leisurely. The authority has not cited any reason for the view that it was not a fit case for being treated within the periphery of exceptional circumstances. The Rule prescribes a period of five years for making of such application and thereafter, such application could be considered in exceptional circumstances. 9. Coming to grips with next submission, the learned Counsel submitted that the amendment of 1997 was unavailing to the Petitioner inasmuch as it was incorporated much after the death of the father of Petitioner. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Opposite Parties (supra) does not commend to me for acceptance. In my considered view, had the authority taken circumstances stated in the application into consideration, it could have furnished valid justification for forming opinion that the case had all the indicia of being falling within the exceptional circumstances and he having not done so, the impugned order does not commend itself for being one passed with application of mind. Since, the application was moved in the year 2001 after the Petitioner had attained majority ostensibly acting on the assurance of the then Regional Manager, the provisions contained in the Amendment of 1997 could well be invoked for being applied to his case by the Petitioner in the facts and circumstances enumerated by the applicant. 10. As a result of foregoing discussion, the petition is allowed. 10. As a result of foregoing discussion, the petition is allowed. In consequence, the impugned order dated 29.3.2001 passed by Regional Manager U. P. State Road Transport Corporation, Etawah as contained in the letter dated 29th March, 2001 of Assistant Regional Manager, U.P.S.R.T.C. Farrukhabad and the matter is relegated to the competent authority attended with the direction that he may consider Petitioner's case afresh taking into reckoning the assurances given by the then Regional Manager and also the circumstances indicated in the application and also in the present writ petition whether the circumstances were such which could be treated exceptional circumstances to warrant relaxation of the prescribed period. The ultimate order shall be passed by assigning reasons for conclusions within a period not exceeding three months from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order.