JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. The judgment and order under challenge, in the present appeal, was passed, on 6.9.2001, in Civil Rule No. 144 of 1992, directing the Appellants herein to, inter alia, absorb the writ Petitioner-Respondent herein in the vacant post subject to qualification, eligibility, etc., as prescribed by the relevant Recruitment Rules, etc. 2. We have heard Mr. P.R. Barman, learned Counsel for the Appellant, and Mr. D.K. Biswas, learned Counsel for the Respondent. 3. Before entering into the merit of the appeal, we deem it pertinent to lay out the scope of the appellate Court in a writ appeal. A writ appeal is not really a statutory appeal preferred against the judgment and order of an inferior Court to the superior Court. The appeal inter se in a High Court from one Court to another is really an appeal from one coordinate Bench to another co-ordinate Bench and it is for this reason that a writ cannot be issued by one Bench of the High Court to another Bench of the High Court nor can even the Supreme Court issue writ to a High Court. Thus, unlike an appeal, in general, a writ appeal is an appeal on principle and that is why, unlike an appeal, in an ordinary sense, such as a criminal appeal, where the whole evidence on record is examined anew by the appellate Court, what is really examined, in a writ appeal, is the legality and validity of the judgment and/or order of the single Judge and it can be set aside or should be set aside only when there is a patent error on the face of the record or the judgment is against the established or settled principle of law. If two views are possible and a view, which is reasonable and logical, has been adopted by a single Judge, the other view, howsoever appealing such a view may be to the Division Bench, it is the view adopted by the single Judge, which should, normally, be allowed to prevail. If two views are possible and a view, which is reasonable and logical, has been adopted by a single Judge, the other view, howsoever appealing such a view may be to the Division Bench, it is the view adopted by the single Judge, which should, normally, be allowed to prevail. Hence, the judgment of the learned single Judge, impugned in the present appeal, cannot be completely ignored and this Court has to consider the judgment and order in its proper perspective and if this Bench, sitting as an appellate Bench, is of the view that the decision has been arived at by the learned single Judge without any material error of fact or law, then, the judgment, in question, should be allowed to prevail. See Tractor and Farm Equipment Ltd. v. Secretary to the Govt. of Assam, Department of Agriculture, reported in AIR 2004 Gau 73 : 2004 (1) GLT 117, wherein a Division Bench of this Court, relying upon an earlier decision of a Division Bench of this Court, in State of Tripura v. Ramendra Nath Dey, reported in 2000 (3) GLT 214 : (2001) 1 GLR 54, has, in no uncertain words, emphasized this position of law in a writ appeal. 4. Bearing in mind the scope of a writ appeal, as delineated above, we, now, turn to the facts of the present appeal. With the help of this application made under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner-Respondent herein approached this Court with the prayer to issue, inter alia, a Writ commanding the Respondents-Appellants to regularize the service of Petitioner in the post of Automobile Mechanic with effect from November, 1982, and allow him all benefits incidental to such service, his case being, in brief, thus: The Petitioner entered into the service of the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (in short, "ONGC") as a casual employee in November, 1982, and has been working as a casual worker in the Geo-Science Division of ONGC with intermittent lay off, the lay off being so resorted to by the ONGC so that the service of the Petitioner may not be regarded continuous for 240 days or more with the object of depriving the Petitioner's service from being regularized, which amounts to unjust and unfair practice. The Petitioner worked for more than 240 days continuously for several years prior to 1989-90; but the writ Petitioner could not procure any record to support his continuous service for more than 240 days. However, during the period of 1989-90 and 1990-91, the Petitioner, while working continuously for more than 240 days, managed to keep a record in this regard and has accordingly annexed the photocopy thereof to the writ petition. The Petitioner was allowed Contributory Provident Fund also. During the period, when the Petitioner worked for more than 240 days continuously, he was also allowed to enjoy notified holidays including Sundays like regularly employed persons in ONGC. Though the work realized from the Petitioner was of the same nature and responsibility as those of the regularly employed persons, the Petitioner was being paid a renumeration of Rs. 50/- per day, while similarly situated other employees were being accorded regular pay scale. Despite repeated representations made by the Petitioner seeking regularization of his service, the authorities concerned refused to accede to the same; hence, the Petitioner had to approach this Court. 5. The Respondents-Appellants herein filed their counter affidavit in the Civil Rule contending, inter alia, that the Petitioner had not worked for more than 240 days in any given year, the photocopy of the attendance registers produced by him, as Annexure-A series to the writ petition, in this regard, were not authenticated documents and could not be used for determining the issue, the Petitioner had not acquired any statutory right to be absorbed or regularized, the work of the Petitioner was casual in nature and the ONGC did not require his service continuously throughout the year and, hence, he could not be appointed on regular basis. 6. In course of time, the writ Petitioner filed an additional affidavit in the Civil Rule, wherein he stated to the effect, inter alia, that though, while denying that the Petitioner had worked, as asserted by him in the year 1989-90 and 1990-91 for 240 days continuously, the Respondents-Appellants had not produced the original attendance registers in respect of Annexure-A series, which the Petitioner had relied upon in his writ petition, and that the Respondents-Appellants had, vide memorandum, dated 3.1.2000, called the Petitioner for an interview, on 23.1.2000, for recruitment against regular vacancy in the post of Junior Security Guard. A copy of the memorandum aforementioned along with the Circular, dated 6.9.99, issued by the Respondents-Appellants was also annexed by the Petitioner to his said additional affidavit. This Circular indicated that only those workers were eligible for consideration for appointment to the post of Junior Security Guard, who had put in 240 days of continuous service in 12 consecutive months. Thus, the circular aforementioned coupled with the Memorandum aforementioned demonstrate, according to the Petitioner, that he had worked for more than 240 days in 12 consecutive months and that was why, he had been called for the interview. 7. Reacting to the additional affidavit so filed by the Petitioner, the Appellants too filed, as Respondents in the Civil Rule, a supplementary affidavit, wherein they did not deny that the Memorandum, dated 3.1.2000, had been issued to the Petitioner, but they contended, inter alia, that a settlement had been reached with the casual workers represented by their Trade Unions, namely, EBG and CRBC and that in terms of the settlement so reached, the Petitioner cannot claim regularization of his service inasmuch as the Petitioner was also bound by the settlement so reached by the parties concerned, for, the settlement was reached between the ONGC, on one hand, and the Unions aforementioned, on the other, representing the workers, who had worked for 180 days and the Petitioner, being one of the workers, who had put in occasionally not more than 180 days of service, was also covered by the said settlement. 8. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties and materials on record, as indicated herein above, the Civil Rule came up for hearing. Though in the writ petition, a stand was taken by the Respondents that the writ petition was not maintainable on account of the fact that an alternative remedy by way of raising industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act was available to the Petitioner, this ground was not, as transpires from the impugned judgment and order, raised at the time of hearing. Even in the memorandum of appeal presented before this Court, the Respondents have not agitated that the writ petition was not maintainable and/or that the maintainability of the writ petition was raised before the learned Single Judge, but was not dealt with. Even in the memorandum of appeal presented before this Court, the Respondents have not agitated that the writ petition was not maintainable and/or that the maintainability of the writ petition was raised before the learned Single Judge, but was not dealt with. Viewed from this angle, we are, now, required to determine as to whether, on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the materials on record, the impugned judgment and order could have been passed. 9. Unlike a plaint or written statement in a civil suit, a writ petition requires the parties to annex, in addition to what they plead, evidence in support of such pleadings. Reference, in this regard, may be made to Bharat Singh v. The State of Haryana, reported in (1988) 4 SCC 534 , wherein the Apex Court has clearly held that there is a distinction between the pleadings under the writ petition/ affidavit and plaint and that while in a pleading, that is, in a plaint or a written statement, facts and not evidence are required to be pleaded, in a writ petition or a counter affidavit, not only that facts have to be pleaded, but also evidence in proof of such facts are to be annexed thereto. (Also see Zakir Hussain v. State of Assam, reported in 2003 (1) GLT 644). 10. It is also trite that a mere denial cannot be treated as a specific denial. It was the specific case of the Petitioner, in his writ petition, that he had worked for more than 240 days continuously since November, 1982, and he had maintained the record of the service so rendered by him in respect of the years 1989-90 and 1990-91 and in support of this submission, the Petitioner had annexed the photocopy of the attendance registers to his writ petition. The Respondents-Appellants herein did not specifically assert, in their affidavit-in-opposition, that the copies of the attendance register produced by the writ Petitioner were false, forged and/ or fabricated. What they had contended was that the copies were not authenticated documents. In support of their denial that the Petitioner had not put in 240 days of service in the years 1989-90 and 1990-91, the Respondents-Appellants herein did not produce the attendance registers. What they had contended was that the copies were not authenticated documents. In support of their denial that the Petitioner had not put in 240 days of service in the years 1989-90 and 1990-91, the Respondents-Appellants herein did not produce the attendance registers. Even when the Petitioner filed additional affidavit pointing out that the Respondents had not produced the relevant attendance registers, which were the best documents to prove as to whether the Petitioner had really worked for more than 240 days or not, the Respondents chose not to produce the same. This apart, the Respondents also did not assign any reason as to why they had not produced the requisite attendance registers. In fact, no explanation, in this regard, is discernible, even today, from the materials on record. 11. Coupled with the above, the Petitioner contended that he had been called for an interview by a letter, dated 3rd January, 2000 (Annexure-Y) to appear for recruitment in respect of vacancy in the post of Junior Security Guard. The Petitioner also, as indicated hereinabove, stated in his additional affidavit that the said interview made eligible only those departmental candidates, who had worked for 240 days in 12 consecutive months, and the fact that he (i.e. the Petitioner) had been called for an interview for the purpose of selection to the post of Junior Security Guard was an implied admission by the Appellants that the Petitioner had completed 240 days continuous service in 12 consecutive months and had, therefore, became eligible for being considered for selection. Neither any affidavit was filed by the Respondents-Appellants disputing these facts nor was the correctness of those documents challenged at the time of hearing of the writ petition. 12. Normally, a Writ Court will not enter into disputed questions of fact, particularly, when such questions require roving enquiry or detailed investigation. It does not, however, preclude the writ Court from entering even into the disputed questions of fact if the writ Court finds that in the interest of justice, such disputed question needs to be settled. The principle that a writ Court will not enter into a disputed question of fact is really a matter of policy and not of jurisdiction. It does not, however, preclude the writ Court from entering even into the disputed questions of fact if the writ Court finds that in the interest of justice, such disputed question needs to be settled. The principle that a writ Court will not enter into a disputed question of fact is really a matter of policy and not of jurisdiction. As a matter of policy, a writ Court, normally, as mentioned hereinbefore, does not enter into the disputed questions of facts; but disputes with regard to facts cannot be raised for the purpose of merely raising a dispute. 13. Thus, though it was contended by the Appellants, as Respondents in the writ petition, that the Petitioner had not worked for 240 days continuously in a given year in the establishment of ONGC, the fact remains that except a bald denial, no material was placed or annexed by the Appellants and/or placed before the learned Single Judge to show that the assertion of the writ Petitioner that he had worked for more than 240 days was false and/or that the Petitioner was a person under the category of those employees, who had put in service 180 days in a given year. 14. Situated thus, the learned single Judge was not incorrect in coming to the conclusion that the Petitioner had worked for a period of 240 days continuously in one year in the establishment of ONGC. 15. Turning to the Industrial Settlement, which, according to the Appellants, was binding on the writ Petitioner, it is worth noticing that the said settlement was reached, admittedly, between the Management, on the one hand, and those casual workers, who belonged to the category of employees and had been rendering 180 days of service and not 240 days of service in one year. Since the Appellants herein, as Respondents in the writ petition, miserably failed to show that the Petitioner's assertion that he did not belong to the category of those workers, who rendered 180 days of service and/ or that the Petitioner's assertion that he was a workman, who had put in 240 days of service in a given year, were false or untrue. The industrial settlement, in question, could have been of no avail to the Appellants and was, therefore, correctly not relied upon by the learned single Judge. 16. At the time of hearing, Mr. The industrial settlement, in question, could have been of no avail to the Appellants and was, therefore, correctly not relied upon by the learned single Judge. 16. At the time of hearing, Mr. Barman, learned Counsel for the Appellants-ONGC, in support of the Appellants' plea that the said industrial settlement was binding on all the workers, has placed reliance on Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, reported in (1981) 4 SCC 627 . The decision, so relied upon, is not at all applicable to the facts of the case at hand inasmuch as the question, which was raised in Tata Engineering and Locomotive (supra) was as to whether the denial by some of the workers that they were the signatories to the settlement could have made such workers wriggle out of the settlement. Turning down to the contention, raised on behalf of the workers, the Apex Court has held that if the settlement had been arrived at by a vast majority of the concerned workers with their eyes open and was acceptable to them in totality, it must be presumed to be just and fair and not liable to be ignored merely because the small number of workers were not parties to it or refused to accept it. In the case at hand, since the writ Petitioner could not be proved to be a person belonging to the category of those workers who had put in, for more than 180 days' continuous service, in a given year, the settlement in question did not concern the writ Petitioner and could not have, therefore, been made applicable to him, far less binding on him. 17. The learned single Judge was, therefore, not wrong in holding that the settlement, in question, was not applicable to the writ Petitioner. 18. What emerges from the above discussions and pleadings of the respective parties, and the materials on record is that the learned single Judge was correct in concluding that the writ Petitioner-Respondent herein is one of the persons, who had completed continuous service of 240 days in a given year and he continued to work. 18. What emerges from the above discussions and pleadings of the respective parties, and the materials on record is that the learned single Judge was correct in concluding that the writ Petitioner-Respondent herein is one of the persons, who had completed continuous service of 240 days in a given year and he continued to work. There is no dispute before us that a person, who worked for more than 240 days continuously, in an industrial establishment, is covered by the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, which gives protection to such workman from being retrenched from service by the employer. 19. While preferring the appeal, the Appellants have filed a number of documents in support of their contention that the writ Petitioner had not worked for 240 days in a given year. Apart from the fact that these documents do not relate to the period claimed by the Petitioner, namely, the years 1989-90 and 1990-91, the Appellants have failed to produce the relevant attendance registers, in original, as directed by this Court by order, dated 9.6.04 passed in the present appeal. 20. It is, at this stage, imperative to note that the scope of the Appellate Court to admit additional evidence is, somewhat, circumscribed. There are three circumstances in which additional evidence may be allowed to be adduced in appeal. These contingencies are broadly described in Order 41, Rule27, Code of Civil Procedure. 21. In the present case, it is not the Appellants' case that any of the documents, which they have, now, sought to rely upon, were refused to be admitted in the Civil Rule aforementioned. It is also not their case that the Appellants could not produce the evidence, which, now, they seek to adduce, in the form of additional evidence, for, the existence of the documents were not within their knowledge and/or that despite exercise of due diligence, they could not produce the same at the time of hearing of the Civil Rule. So far as this Court is concerned, this Court sitting, as an appellate Court, shall not require, or enter into, such documents to pronounce the judgment in this appeal, for, this appeal, as we have already pointed out at the very outset, is only an appeal in principle and not a statutory appeal. So far as this Court is concerned, this Court sitting, as an appellate Court, shall not require, or enter into, such documents to pronounce the judgment in this appeal, for, this appeal, as we have already pointed out at the very outset, is only an appeal in principle and not a statutory appeal. Hence, even if two views are possible and a view, which is reasonable and logical, has been adopted by the learned single Judge, the other view, howsoever appealing such a view maybe to the Division Bench, it is the view adopted by the learned single Judge, which should, normally, be allowed to prevail. 22. In view of the fact that in the face of the materials on record, the learned Single Judge took the view that the Petitioner-Respondent herein was one of the workmen, who had put in 240 days of continuous service in a given year and that his case was not covered by the industrial settlement aforementioned and in view of also of the fact that we agree that on the basis of the pleadings and the materials on record, the view was correctly taken by the learned single Judge, we find no reason to interfere with the findings reached by the learned single Judge, particularly, when the Appellants have not been able to produce the attendance registers, in original, nor have they assigned any reason for such non-production. 23. What crystallizes from the above discussions is that the writ Petitioner-Respondent herein has convincingly proved that he was one of the workmen serving in the establishment of ONGC putting in 240 days of continuous service and, therefore, his case is covered by Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. 24. By referring to a common judgment, dated 31.7.2000, passed by a Division Bench of this Court, in a batch of cases, viz., Civil Rule No. 7 of 1993, 31 of 1993, 240 of 1993 and 163 of 1995, the learned single Judge, in the present Civil Rule, observed and held as follows: 11. 24. By referring to a common judgment, dated 31.7.2000, passed by a Division Bench of this Court, in a batch of cases, viz., Civil Rule No. 7 of 1993, 31 of 1993, 240 of 1993 and 163 of 1995, the learned single Judge, in the present Civil Rule, observed and held as follows: 11. In the aforesaid decided cases, this Court directed the Respondent ONGC to make an exercise for absorbing the Petitioners of those cases subject to availability of sanctioned vacancies, of course, having regard to the qualification and other eligibility required under the related service rules and it was further ordered in those cases that till the services of the Petitioners of those cases are regularized, their contingent/casual employment should be allowed to continue and no fresh recruitment should be made against any sanctioned vacancy for which one or other of the Petitioners of those cases are found to be eligible. 12. Under the aforesaid factual and legal position, I am of the considered opinion to hold that the Petitioner acquired a right not to be terminated without following the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and in case of availability of sanctioned vacancy the Petitioner's absorption must be considered against the said vacant post, of course, subject to qualification eligibility as prescribed by the related service law/Recruitment Rules. 25. Because of what have been discussed above, we find no infirmity either in the observations made by the learned single Judge, in paragraphs 11 and 12 hereinabove, nor we find that in the facts and circumstances of the present case the directions given therein were impermissible or not sustainable in law. 26. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in this appeal and, accordingly, the same is dismissed. However, considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left the bear their respective costs all throughout. Appeal dismissed