JUDGMENT - VAZIFDAR S.J., J.:—This is a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter the said Act). The acquisition was pursuant to a proposal made by a Divisional Engineer, Phones (P.), Bombay Telephones by his letter dated 17-5-1974 to acquire various parcels of land for the public purpose of staff quarters of Bombay Telephones i.e. for the Government of India, Post and Telegraph Department. 2.Pursuant thereto, the said parcels of land were notified for acquisition under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. The notice under section 4 dated 21-2-1977 was published on 3-3-1977. The notification under section 6 of the Act was issued by the Commissioner on 24-2-1980 and the same was published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette, Part 1 dated 28-2-1998. One of the parcels of land in C.T.S. No. 404/Survey No. 57/3 is the subject matter of the present reference. 3.Three questions were raised before me by Counsel appearing on behalf of the claimant, the S.L.A.O. and the acquiring body. They pertained to the title of the claimant to the said land, the valuation of the said land and the area thereof. I will deal with each of these aspects separately. TITLE 4.On behalf of the S.L.A.O. and the acquiring body, Ms. Geeta Shastri and Mr. Rajguru submitted that the question of the claimant's title ought to be gone into and decided by this Court. They submitted that the claimant had admitted in his cross-examination that he was a tres-passer and that therefore he had no title and was not entitled to receive the amounts in the land acquisition proceedings. Mr. Shah appearing on behalf of the claimant on the other hand submitted that the question of consideration of the title does not arise in the present reference. He submitted that it was well established that only those questions which have been referred under section 18 to the Court can be decided in the reference under section 18. He submitted that in a reference under section 18 the Court is entitled to consider only those objections which are referred to the Court and nothing else. He submitted that it was well established that only those questions which have been referred under section 18 to the Court can be decided in the reference under section 18. He submitted that in a reference under section 18 the Court is entitled to consider only those objections which are referred to the Court and nothing else. The submission is well founded and supported by a judgment of the Privy Council in (Pramatha Nath Mullick Secretary of State for India in Council)1, 1929 Indian Appeals 100 where it was held as under: "Their Lordships have no doubt that the jurisdiction of the courts under this Act is a special one and is strictly limited by the terms of these sections. It only arises when a specific objection has been taken to the Collector's award, and it is confined to a consideration of that objection. Once therefore it is ascertained that the only objection taken is to the amount of compensation, that alone is the "matter" referred, and the Court has no power to determine or consider anything beyond it." 5.The view is also supported by the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in (British India Steam Navigation Company v. Secretary of State for India)2, I.L.R. 1910 Cal. 230. It is necessary therefore to examine firstly whether the question of title and apportionment has been referred to this Court. 6.The reference expressly refers to the question of apportionment. Even the application for reference refers to the question of apportionment. However, in order to appreciate Mr. Shah's contention to the contrary, it is necessary to see how the question developed. 7.The award made by the S.L.A.O. is dated 8-7-1986. The S.L.A.O. determined the area of the land to be 101 sq.mtrs. and fixed the compensation/valuation at Rs. 150/- per sq.mtr. It is necessary to extract the following part of the award verbatim : "S.No. 57/3 C.T.S. No. 404 As per the 7/12 extract on Talathi's record the land under S.No. 57/3 is held by Shri Kashinath Budhaji who is reported to be deceased. In the extract of city survey property card of C.T.S. No. 404, name of Shri Ramjas Ramraj Upadhayay is shown in column of 'Holder' alongwith the name of Shri Kashinath Budhaji. In the extract of city survey property card of C.T.S. No. 404, name of Shri Ramjas Ramraj Upadhayay is shown in column of 'Holder' alongwith the name of Shri Kashinath Budhaji. In reply to the notice of Shri Ramjas Ramaraj Upadhayay states in his written statement dated 13-3-1980 that he is the owner of the land with all the right title and interest and that no other persons besides him has any rights, title or interest in the land. He further states that the structure constructed and owned by him in the land is let out by him to four persons viz. Mataprasad Pandey, Shivprasad Pandey, Bhole Yadav and Hariram Harijan. He states that claim of these persons may be taken into consideration for giving alternative accommodation. However, in a statement recorded by him subsequently on 19-4-1985 the said Shri Upadhyaya has submitted that all the said person whom he had earlier referred to as tenants are his workers and that he is not getting any rent and that they have to vacate the accommodation as soon as they leave the service. In view of admission of Shri Upadhyaya the four persons aforesaid do not become persons interested in the land and, therefore, no notices are served to them. Shri Upadhyaya's claim of exclusive ownership cannot be accepted as in the record of rights produced by him, his name appears as person having "Other rights" and in the record of rights name of Kashinath Budhaji appears as "Holder". Shri Upadhyaya has also admitted in the aforesaid written statement that he has not obtained building permission for the structure constructed by him. The structure being unauthorised, no compensation is payable therefore. Thus names of heirs of the late Kashinath Budhaji are not known, neither the interest of Shri Upadhyaya is clear. No dispute is, however, raised by any one about the ownership." 8.Mr. Shah placed considerable emphasis on the last sentence of the award extracted while submitting that his title has not been questioned by the S.L.A.O. I do not think this would be a fair reading of the above extract. The sentence read by itself, support Mr. Shah's submission. That however would be tearing it out of context. Shah placed considerable emphasis on the last sentence of the award extracted while submitting that his title has not been questioned by the S.L.A.O. I do not think this would be a fair reading of the above extract. The sentence read by itself, support Mr. Shah's submission. That however would be tearing it out of context. For after reciting the entries in the revenue records, the S.L.A.O. has observed that the claimant's "claim of exclusive ownership cannot be accepted as in the record of rights produced by him, his name appears as person having "Other rights" and in the record of rights name of Kashinath Budhaji appears as "Holder". Thus, read in context, I am not inclined to accept Mr. Shah's submission that the S.L.A.O. accepted the claimant's title in the award. 9.This is further clear when in the operative part of the order the S.L.A.O. declared a sum of Rs. 36,638/- as due to the claimant and "heirs of Kashinath Budhaji................... deceased". Had the S.L.A.O. accepted the claimant's title to the exclusion of all others, he would not have passed the award in the above terms. 10.The claimant by his letter dated 18-8-1986 called upon the Collector to refer the case under section 18 for the determination of the question of "valuation and apportionment" on the grounds stated therein. Now, had the claimant understood the S.L.A.O. as having accepted his exclusive entitlement to the said property, he would not have called for a reference on the question of apportionment. Let me pause here to clarify, if any clarification is needed that I am at the moment only dealing with the claimant's contention that the S.L.A.O. accepted his exclusive title. Ground (j) of that letter reads as under : "(j) For that the apportionment made by the Collector is entirely wrong." 11.Mr. Shah submitted that this ground was in fact redundant for, according to him, there was no apportionment in the award. It is true that the proportion of apportionment between Kashinath and the claimant were not specified. Ground (j) of that letter reads as under : "(j) For that the apportionment made by the Collector is entirely wrong." 11.Mr. Shah submitted that this ground was in fact redundant for, according to him, there was no apportionment in the award. It is true that the proportion of apportionment between Kashinath and the claimant were not specified. However, the S.L.A.O. by his letter dated 9-7-1986 referring to the award informed the claimant that the compensation would be payable to him "on production of document in proof of your title to the land under reference......" This therefore clearly establishes that the S.L.A.O. did not accept the claimant to be the true owner, much less the exclusive owner of the said property. 12.That the claimant did not understand the S.L.A.O. as having accepted his title to the property, is further clear from the statement of claim filed by him in this Court on 26-6-2001 where in ground "O" the plaintiff objected to the award inter alia on the ground "that the apportionment of compensation made by the authority under the said award is entirely wrong as the claimant alone is entitled to the compensation in respect of the said land under acquisition". 13.The aforesaid facts, to my mind, make it clear that the S.L.A.O. has not accepted the claimants title to the said property much less has the S.L.A.O. accepted the claimant's exclusive title to the said property. It is however also clear that the S.L.A.O. has not rejected the claimant's claim to the property. This is clear from the letter dated 9-7-1986 where the S.L.A.O. has in fact stated that the claimant would be paid the amount awarded, subject to his proof of exclusive ownership to the property. To my mind, therefore, it is not necessary at this stage for this Court to decide the question of title for the same has in fact not been referred to this Court under this reference under section 18. The claimant is at liberty to make an application for withdrawal of the amount awarded and to the enhanced amount, if any. 14.It is necessary to adopt this course for another reason. Mr. Shah placed strong reliance upon the evidence as recorded by D.G. Deshpande, J., on 11-7-2002. It appears that during the cross-examination of one Mr. Y.S. Kini, witness No. 3 for the claimant, D.G. Deshpande, J., made a note. 14.It is necessary to adopt this course for another reason. Mr. Shah placed strong reliance upon the evidence as recorded by D.G. Deshpande, J., on 11-7-2002. It appears that during the cross-examination of one Mr. Y.S. Kini, witness No. 3 for the claimant, D.G. Deshpande, J., made a note. In addition to the note, I would also set out the two sentences that preceded it and a sentence that succeeded it. This part of the cross-examination reads as under: "If the title is not clear or whether if a man is a trespasser will affect adversely the valuation. I had enquired about the title of the claimant. (Note : Before and after this question was asked Mr. Rajguru was informed that he cannot question the title of the claimant because the LAO had accepted him to be the owner of the property). I had seen the 7/12 extract in respect the suit property vis-a-vis the claimant." 15.Mr. Shah relying upon the above note submitted that it constituted a finding on the question of title to the suit property as being that of the claimant and that the finding was binding on him. Mr. Rajguru on the other hand submitted that this was merely a note and not a conclusive finding on the question of title. He relied upon the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court in (Robert Cameron Chamarette v. Mrs. Phyllis Ethel Chamarette)3, A.I.R. 1937 Lahore 176. There is an observation in that judgment that the order passed on an objection during evidence was merely an interlocutary order. With respect, I must say that I have some reservation about this proposition. It is however not necessary in this case for me to express any final opinion on the question for the reason that I have already held that the question of title has not been referred to this Court and has, by the S.L.A.O.'s letter dated 9-7-1986 been kept expressly open. Further, I am in agreement with Mr. Rajguru's submission that the note extracted above was not a ruling. This is clear from the fact that questions pertaining to the claimant's title have in fact been asked and allowed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the opinion that the note does not constitute a finding on title. Rajguru's submission that the note extracted above was not a ruling. This is clear from the fact that questions pertaining to the claimant's title have in fact been asked and allowed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the opinion that the note does not constitute a finding on title. I understand that this could have caused some prejudice to the claimant had the question of title in fact been deferred. Relying upon the note, the claimant may well have not lead further evidence to establish his title. Conversely, in view of the note, the S.L.A.O. and the acquiring body may have considered themselves as being prevented from either leading evidence or cross-examining the claimant's witnesses on the question of his title. However, considering the view that I have taken, permitting the claimant to prove his title in accordance with the requisition in that behalf contained in the S.L.A.O.'s letter dated 9-7-1986, in the facts and circumstances of this case, no prejudice will be caused to any of the parties. 16.Mr. Shah, relying upon a covering letter forwarding the reference to this Court contended that the S.L.A.O. had accepted the claimant's title to the property. The covering letter dated Nil stated pursuant to the requirements of section 19(1) of the Act inter alia as under : "As required by section 19(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, I beg to state for information of the Hon. Court as under : (a) .......................................................................................... (b) I have reasons to believe that following are the persons interested in the said land. (i) Shri Ramjash Ramraj Upadhyaya." The covering letter by itself, especially in view of the aforesaid facts, indicate that the S.L.A.O. accepted the exclusive title of the claimant. VALUATION 17.By the award, the S.L.A.O. valued the said land at Rs. 250/- per sq.mtr. The claimant seeks enhancement. The burden of proving that the amount awarded is inadequate is on the claimant. 18.Mr. Shah placed strong reliance on an agreement dated 25-11-1987 (Exhibit "G"). Under the said agreement, the vendors, a partnership firm, of which the claimant was also a partner, sold the said property for a consideration of Rs. 19,00,000/- of which Rs. 3,00,000/- was payable on execution and the balance was payable in instalments stated therein. Clause 5 thereof further provided that the ten occupants occupying an area admeasuring about 4000 sq.mtrs. Under the said agreement, the vendors, a partnership firm, of which the claimant was also a partner, sold the said property for a consideration of Rs. 19,00,000/- of which Rs. 3,00,000/- was payable on execution and the balance was payable in instalments stated therein. Clause 5 thereof further provided that the ten occupants occupying an area admeasuring about 4000 sq.mtrs. shall be given an area of 4000 sq.ft. as and by way of an alternative accommodation as per the area that may be decided by the vendors on ownership basis and that in such case the vendor shall not be bound to reimburse or pay any consideration or compensation for such area of 4000 sq.ft. to the purchasers. The claimant's case is that the purchasers of Survey No. 57/2 constructed a building on the land and sold the premises therein to various purchasers who in turn formed a co-operative housing society known as Ramjas Co-operative Housing Society Limited. The agreement has been duly deposed to and proved. It is further stated by the claimants in evidence that the purchasers provided for and on behalf of the vendors therein 4000 sq.ft. built-up area. A conveyance however has not been executed. The entire consideration except the last instalment of Rs. 10,000/- had been received. 19.The fact that the agreement dated 25-11-1987 was entered into is not seriously disputed. Ms. Shastri however contended that the agreement was not a genuine agreement. In this regard, she relied upon the fact that the claimant was unable to prove the payment of more than Rs. 2,00,000/- under the agreement. In the cross-examination, the claimant produced an entry only in respect of Rs. 2,00,000/-. The claimant lead the evidence of one Ashok Agarwal, Director of the purchasers M/s. Manish Builders Pvt. Ltd. He was also unable to prove the payment of more than Rs. 2,00,000/-. However, on the basis of this, it is not possible to say that the agreement is not genuine. The records pertain to the year 1987 i.e. 17 years before the evidence commenced. The fact that the vendors owned the property was not seriously disputed. There is nothing in the cross-examination that belied the claimant's case that the purchasers had in fact constructed upon the property and sold the tenements to various purchasers who in turn formed a co-operative housing society. The area of the said land was about 1507 sq. mtrs. The fact that the vendors owned the property was not seriously disputed. There is nothing in the cross-examination that belied the claimant's case that the purchasers had in fact constructed upon the property and sold the tenements to various purchasers who in turn formed a co-operative housing society. The area of the said land was about 1507 sq. mtrs. The consideration does not appear to be absurd. On behalf of the claimant, were produced and proved in evidence a completion certificate, agreement with the flat purchasers, assessments made by the B.M.C., a registration certificate of the society, an assessment bill and a power of attorney issued pursuant to the agreement. Considering all these documents, it is not possible to say that it was a sham transaction. It was not possible to say so despite the fact that the certificate under section 230-A of the Income Tax Act has not been furnished as that would be required at the time of conveyance. Neither the cross-examination of the claimants nor the cross-examination of the purchaser's Director Ashok Agarwal suggested that the actual price/consideration was less than what is reflected in the agreement. 20.Ms. Shastri relied upon the cross-examination of Ashok Agarwal, who stated that all the tenants mentioned in the agreement have been accommodated in five flats. He further stated in cross-examination that the purchasers had not entered into an agreement with all the ten tenants "regarding the flats". He also stated that in all five agreements have been made by the tenants for a total area of 4000 sq.ft. This by itself does not indicate that the agreement is not genuine, agreement. It is not unnatural that only five agreements were entered into. That was a matter of bargaining/adjustment between the tenants and the parties. 21.This however leads to the question of valuation under the said agreement. The claimant lead the evidence of one Kini. His evidence unfortunately is only on the basis of the agreement dated 25-1-1987. He has admittedly not made any independent enquiries himself. He had taken the agreement at its face value and proceeded to assess the actual valuation thereunder. Considering the liability of the purchaser to provide an alternative accommodation to the extent of 4000 sq.fts., he valued the agreement at Rs. 18,00,000/-. He thereafter worked out the proportionate cost of the acquired plot. He had taken the agreement at its face value and proceeded to assess the actual valuation thereunder. Considering the liability of the purchaser to provide an alternative accommodation to the extent of 4000 sq.fts., he valued the agreement at Rs. 18,00,000/-. He thereafter worked out the proportionate cost of the acquired plot. He has thereafter made deductions at the rate of 10% per annum to arrive at the probable cost of the property in the year 1977 i.e. the year of acquisition. 22.This then leads to the question as to whether it is reasonable to rely upon the said agreement as an instance of sale. I think not. Mr. Shah contended that the claimant is entitled to rely upon instances of sale post a section 4 notification. Ms. Shastri disputed this preposition. The authorities cited however indicate that there is no bar to the Court taking into consideration sale transactions after a section 4 notification. In support of this contention that a post section 4 notification sale instance can be considered by the Court, Mr. Shah relied upon a judgment of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in (State of West Bengal v. Secretary, Union Club, Purulia)4, 76 C.W.N. 296 wherein it was held that there is no rule that a post notification transaction of sale of land similar to the acquired land cannot be looked into. He also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Periyar and Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd. v. State of Kerala)5, A.I.R. 1990 Supreme Court 2192. 23.The submission is well founded. If there are no other distinguishing features in the post section 4 notification, transaction sought to be relied upon and the circumstances have not affected the prices/valuation thereof there is no reason why it cannot be looked into for the purpose of determining the value of the acquired property. This is the view taken by the Supreme Court in (Administrator General of West Bengal v. Collector, Varanasi)6, A.I.R. 1988 Supreme Court 943 where it was held as follows : "The sale transaction at Exh. 24 was an year later. Such subsequent transactions which are not proximate in point of time to the acquisition can be taken into account for purposes of determining whether as on the date of acquisition there was an upward trend in the prices of land in the area. 24 was an year later. Such subsequent transactions which are not proximate in point of time to the acquisition can be taken into account for purposes of determining whether as on the date of acquisition there was an upward trend in the prices of land in the area. Further under certain circumstances where it is shown that the marked was stable and there were no fluctuations in the prices between the date of the preliminary notification and the date of such subsequent transaction, the transaction could also be relied upon to ascertain the market value. This Court in (State of U.P. v. Maj. Jitender Kumar)7, See A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 876(877) observed: "..........It is true that the sale deed Exh. 21 upon which the High Court has relied is of a date three years later than the notification under section 4 but no material was produced before the Court to suggest that there was any fluctuation in the market rate at Meerut from 1948 onwards till 1951 and if so to what extent. In the absence of any material showing any fluctuation in the market rate the High Court thought it fit to rely upon Exh. 21 under which the housing society itself had purchased land in the neighbourhood of the land (in) dispute. On the whole we are not satisfied that any error was committed by the High Court in relying upon the sale deed Ex. 21....." 24.Mr. Shah relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Periyar and Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd. v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1990 Supreme Court 2192 to contend that the requirements of such sale instances being within a reasonable time will not apply to instances where the claimant himself is a party to the transaction. He relied upon the following extract from the judgment in support of his contention : "When the courts are called upon to fix the market value of the land in compulsory acquisition, the best evidence of the value of property is the sale of the acquired land to which the claimant himself is a party, in its absence the sales of the neighbouring lands. In proof of the sale transaction, the relationship of the parties to the transaction, the market conditions, the terms of the sale and the date of the sale are to be looked into. In proof of the sale transaction, the relationship of the parties to the transaction, the market conditions, the terms of the sale and the date of the sale are to be looked into. These features would be established by examining either the vendor or vendee and if they are not available, the attesting witnesses who have personal knowledge of the transaction etc. The original sale deed or certified copy thereof should be tendered as evidence. The underlying principles to fix a fair market value with reference to comparable sales is to reduce the element of speculation. In a comparable sales the features are : (1) it must be within a reasonable time of the date of the notification; (2) it should be a bona fide transaction; (3) it should be a sale of the land acquired or land adjacent to the land acquired; and (4) it should possess similar advantages. These should be established by adduction of material evidence by examining as stated above the parties to the sale or persons having personal knowledge of the sale transactions." 25.I am unable to agree with Mr. Shah's submission. There is nothing in the judgment or even in the above extract which supports his submission. What the Supreme Court has said is that sale instance where the claimant himself is a party is the best evidence of the value of the plot. The subsequent ration laying down the essential features in a comparable sale are not restricted to instances of sales where the claimant himself is not a party. For instance, surely it cannot be suggested that the Supreme Court in its second condition requires the comparable sale to be a bona fide transaction only where the claimant himself is not a party to such sale but that the requirement of a sale being a bona fide transaction is not necessary when the claimant himself is a party to such a transaction. 26.The judgments however uniformally lay down that the sale instances should be within a reasonable period. Now, naturally, what is a reasonable period has not been and indeed cannot be specified as a universal inflexible rule. It must depend on the facts of each case. 27.The question therefore is whether the agreement dated 25-11-1987 is a reliable instance of sale. I think not. Now, naturally, what is a reasonable period has not been and indeed cannot be specified as a universal inflexible rule. It must depend on the facts of each case. 27.The question therefore is whether the agreement dated 25-11-1987 is a reliable instance of sale. I think not. There is a period over ten years between the section 4 notification issued on 3-3-1977 and the agreement dated 25-11-1987. A lot of changes have occurred in the meantime. The claimant's witness Kini-a valuer, admitted in his cross-examination that there was considerable change in the acquired land during the period 1977-2000-2002. Considerable development had taken place in the area during this period and that the rate of development had been very fast during the said period. He further admitted that in 1977 the area in which the acquired land was situated was not developed as a commercial shopping centre. Thus, the claimant's own witness has admitted that the fact situation as it existed in 1977 was not the same as it existed in the year 1987. 28.In Administrator General of West Bengal (supra) the Supreme Court immediately after the portion I have extracted above, held: "But this principle could be appealed to only where there is evidence to the effect that there was no upward surge in the prices in the interregnum. The burden of establishing this would be squarely on the party relying on such subsequent transaction. In the present case appellant did not endeavour to show that between the date of preliminary notification i.e. 4-7-1959 and the date of Ext. 24 i.e. 18-8-1960 there was no appreciation in the value of the land in the area. Therefore, Ext. 24 cannot be relied upon as affording evidence of the market value as on 4-7-1959." 29.Thus, the agreement dated 25-11-1987 is not reliable for two reasons. Firstly, it was not entered into within a reasonable period of time from the date of the section 4 notification. Secondly, the claimant has not discharged the burden of establishing as required by the Supreme Court in Administrator General of West Bengal (supra) that there was no upward trend in the prices. In fact, the cross-examination of the claimant's valuer Kini establishes that the circumstances had undergone a drastic change. 30.Mr. Shah meticulously drew comparisons between the acquired plot and the property relating to the agreement dated 27-11-1987. In fact, the cross-examination of the claimant's valuer Kini establishes that the circumstances had undergone a drastic change. 30.Mr. Shah meticulously drew comparisons between the acquired plot and the property relating to the agreement dated 27-11-1987. In view of what I have held, it is not necessary for me to deal with his submissions in that regard for they related to the physical features of the two properties relating to the shape, location, encumbrances, access and nature of tenure i.e. agricultural. 31.The claimant has therefore failed to produce any evidence to establish that the amount awarded is inadequate. Mr. Shah however submitted that he was entitled to rely upon the evidence produced by the S.L.A.O. He admitted, in the alternative, that the S.L.A.O. ought to have considered the sale instances relating to Plot Nos. 19 and 20 instead of relying upon those relating to Plot Nos. 1 to 4. The prices in respect of Plot Nos. 19 and 20 was higher than those of Plot Nos. 1 to 4. The agreements relating to Plot Nos. 19 and 20 are of April, 1972. The agreements of all these plots viz. Plot Nos. 1 to 4, Plot Nos. 19 and 20 are of the year 1972. Mr. Shah relied upon the fact that Plot Nos. 19 and 20 were smaller in size and therefore more comparable than Plot Nos. 1 to 4 which are larger in size. Mr. Shah placed considerable reliance upon the cross-examination of Kulkarni, a valuer whose evidence was lead by the S.L.A.O. Kulkarni, in his cross-examination stated as under: "The locations of the land of sale instances are comparable to the land under acquisition and not comparable to the plot Nos. 19 and 20. The distance between land under acquisition and plot Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 shown in purple colour in the map is about 150 metres. The distance between the land under acquisition and Plot Nos. 19 and 20 shown in green is around 300 to 400 metres. It is correct that plot No. 19 and 20 are not situated at the junction of any road. It is correct that Plot Nos. 19 and 20 are not abutting main road. For approaching Plot Nos. 19 and 20, one has to approach the bylane starting from Mandepeshwar Road. It is correct that land under acquisition is not abutting any road. It is correct that Plot Nos. 19 and 20 are not abutting main road. For approaching Plot Nos. 19 and 20, one has to approach the bylane starting from Mandepeshwar Road. It is correct that land under acquisition is not abutting any road. Even approach bylane to the land under acquisition is not possible as no road to the land." 32.The S.L.A.O. produced the Award in evidence. The award in this regard is also important and reads as under: "The land under sales are situated almost adjoining the land under Acquisition to the east thereof. Plot Nos. 1 to 4 are plots of comparatively large area, 923 to 1088 sq. m. which have been agreed to be sold at Rs. 119.60 per sq.m. while plot Nos. 19 and 20 are smaller plots of areas 459 and 524 sq.m. which have fetched rates of Rs. 140.11 and Rs. 146.08 per sq.m. The plots compare well with the land under acquisition in respect of situation. The agreements are made in March, April and July, 1972." 33.I see the force in Mr. Shah's submission that Plot Nos. 19 and 20 being smaller are more comparable. The size of the plot no doubt an aspect to be taken into consideration. It is however not the only aspect. Unfortunately, the claimants neither produced nor called upon the S.L.A.O. to produce the agreement in respect of Plot Nos. 19 and 20. If the claimant wanted to rely upon the sales in respect of Plot Nos. 19 and 20, it was for him to have the same produced in evidence. It is only when the agreement is before the Court, is it possible for the Court to examine whether they are more comparable to the acquired land. There may be several features in the agreements which may show that they are comparable. On the other hand there may be several features in the agreement which may indicate the contrary. I am not sitting in appeal over the award. The claimant is not entitled to succeed merely because the award has not specified why the S.L.A.O. chose one transaction instead of the other. 34.Ms. On the other hand there may be several features in the agreement which may indicate the contrary. I am not sitting in appeal over the award. The claimant is not entitled to succeed merely because the award has not specified why the S.L.A.O. chose one transaction instead of the other. 34.Ms. Shastri's reliance in this regard upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona another)8, 1988(3) S.C.C. 751 (Vijay Singh Liladhar v. Special Land Acquisition Officer)9, 1988(3) S.C.C. 760 and (Nathumal Rajmal Baldota v. Special Land Acquisition Officer)10, A.I.R. 1988 Supreme Court 1652 is well founded. In paragraph 4 the Supreme Court held inter alia as under: "4. The following factors must be etched on the mental screen: (1) A reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is not an appeal against the award and the Court cannot take into account the material relied upon by the Land Acquisition Officer in his Award unless the same material is produced and proved before the Court. (2) So also the award of the Land Acquisition Office is not to be treated as a judgment of the trial Court open or exposed to challenge before the Court hearing the reference. It is merely an offer made by the Land Acquisition Officer and the material utilised by him for making his valuation cannot be utilised by the Court unless produced and proved before it. It is not the function of the Court to sit in appeal against the award, approve or disapprove its reasoning, or correct its error or affirm, modify or reverse the conclusion reached by the Land Acquisition Officer, as if it were an Appellate Court. (3) The Court has to treat the reference as an original proceeding before it and determine the market value afresh on the basis of the material produced before it. (4) The claimant is in the position of a plaintiff who has to show that the price offered for his land in the award is inadequate on the basis of the materials produced in the Court. Of course, the materials placed and proved by the other side can also be taken into account for this purpose." 35.There is therefore no basis to hold that for the purpose of valuation the sale transactions in respect of plot Nos. Of course, the materials placed and proved by the other side can also be taken into account for this purpose." 35.There is therefore no basis to hold that for the purpose of valuation the sale transactions in respect of plot Nos. 19 and 20 should be taken into consideration rather than those in respect of plot Nos. 1 to 4. 36.Mr. Shah submitted that the deduction of 20% and 5% on account of the land being landlocked and on account of it is being recess land respectively was unjustified. He addressed me at some length on this issue. 37.Let me assume that this submission is justified. The S.L.A.O.'s witness admitted at page 99 of the evidence that on the date of acquisition there was access to the acquired land from the road through the claimant's adjoining properties. 38.Ms. Shastri tried, without success, to rely upon the evidence to show that there was, in fact, no access. This however was contrary to her witnesses statement. The evidence on behalf of the S.L.A.O. at the highest would only go to establish that the evidence on record does not show any access. The evidence does not show that there was no access. The two are materially different. 39.However, it is clear that, in fact, a deduction of only 10% is made, from the instances of sale relied upon by the S.L.A.O. viz. the instances of sale of Plot Nos. 1 to 4. It is important to note that Plot Nos. 1 to 4 had a frontage whereas, the acquired plot admittedly has no frontage. The access, at the highest, of the acquired plot is through the claimant's adjoining plot. This has its own complications. The plot having its frontage of the nature in the present case would definitely fetch a higher valuation than a plot which does not have a frontage. On account of this, the deduction which is factually, only to the extent of 10% cannot be said to be absurd or unjustified. Moreover, as compared to Plot Nos. 1 to 4 the shape of the acquired plot is irregular. This, even if I were to accept the argument that on account of the property being landlock and on account of the plot being recess law, the deduction of 25% is not justified. In fact the deduction was of only 10%. I see no justification to interfere to reduce the amount further. This, even if I were to accept the argument that on account of the property being landlock and on account of the plot being recess law, the deduction of 25% is not justified. In fact the deduction was of only 10%. I see no justification to interfere to reduce the amount further. AREA 40.This brings me to the last question viz. whether the area of the plot is 101 sq. mtrs. as alleged by the S.L.A.O. or 131 sq. mtrs, as alleged by the claimants. 41.Mr. Shah relied upon the Property Register Card and N.A. Assessment order dated 28-9-1980 both of which state the area to be 131 sq. mtrs. It is however important to note that the property registered card does not indicate that any enquiry was made regarding the area. It is based on the 7/12 extract. It is further important to note that 7/12 extract states the area to be 101 sq. mtrs. only. 42.It is further important to note that the claimants in a suit filed in the Bombay City Civil Court being Suit No. 4858 of 1986 (Exh. 3 Collectively) stated the area of the acquired property at several places as 101 sq. mtrs. I am not impressed by Mr. Shah's submission that the figure 101 was prefaced by the word "about". The word "about" would indicate a marginal difference not a substantial difference of 30%. 43.Mr. Shah further stated that the nature of the suit did not warrant the mention of the exact area. The suit was to protect the structures on the land. I am not impressed by this argument either in this regard. It is further pertinent to note that in paragraph 5 of the plaint it is stated that the award was going to be challenged with respect to the quantum thereof. Nothing was mentioned about the area being incorrect. 44.Moreover, Mr. Shah's submissions were not backed or based on any evidence. If the claimant desired to offer these explanations to the clear admission in the plaint, he ought to have done so by leading evidence. Failing this, the claimant must be bound by his admissions. 45.Lastly, the notices issued under the Act clearly refer to the acquisition of 101 sq. mtrs. Ms. Shastri and Mr. Rajguru made a statement that whatever be the area of the said plot their clients would not acquire more than 101 sq. mtrs. Failing this, the claimant must be bound by his admissions. 45.Lastly, the notices issued under the Act clearly refer to the acquisition of 101 sq. mtrs. Ms. Shastri and Mr. Rajguru made a statement that whatever be the area of the said plot their clients would not acquire more than 101 sq. mtrs. and that if more than 101 sq. mtrs. are to be acquired, they will do so in accordance with law. 46.In the circumstances, the reference is answered as follows: i) The area of the plot is 101 sq. mtrs. Ms. Shastri and Mr. Rajguru states that whatever be the area of the acquired plot, they shall not acquire more than 101 sq. mtrs. and if the area is more than 101 sq. mtrs. and if they desire to acquire the same they shall do in accordance with law. ii) The value fixed by the S.L.A.O. is accepted as correct. iii) The question of title is not decided in this reference. It shall be open to the appellant to claim the compensation in accordance with the S.L.A.O's letter dated 9th July, 1986. iv) The claimant shall pay the cost of this reference to the S.L.A.O. and the acquiring bodies fixed at Rs. 5000/- each. Parties to act on an ordinary copy of this order duly authenticated by the Sheristedar/Court Stenographer of this Court. -----