Research › Search › Judgment

Karnataka High Court · body

2004 DIGILAW 544 (KAR)

TAM TAM PEDDA GURUVA REDDY v. STATE OF KARNATAKA

2004-09-16

RAM MOHAN REDDY

body2004
RAM MOHAN REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner, successful bidder in the tender-cum-auction, held by the Director of Mines and Geology, was granted a lease of 29 acres in Sy. No. 248 of Melmala Village, Chamarajanagar Taluk, to extract black granite. On acceptance of the tender, respondents 1 and 2, having received Rs. 60. 10 lakhs, executed a lease deed for a period of five years w. e. f. 20-8-1996 to 20-8-2001 under Rule 31-A of the Karnataka Minor mineral Concession Rules, 1994 (for short, 'the Rules' ). ( 2 ) THE petitioner in the course of extraction of the mineral noticed that the black granite rock deposit was available only in an area comprising of 5 acres out of 29 acres. The petitioner having brought to the notice of the respondents 1 and 2, the aforesaid fact, evoked no response, was compelled to approach this Court in W. P. Nos. 27179, 27462 and 27463 of 1996 (Tam Tam Pedda Guruva Reddy v State of karnataka ). This Court by order dated 26-5-1998 found fault with the state and its authorities of having practiced "suppressio veri and suggestio - falsi", by not holding out the correct information enabling the bidders to make a correct inference. Having severely condemned the action of the State and its authorities, this Court directed refund of Rs. 59. 50 lakhs with Bank interest prevalent on Fixed Deposit as on the date of deposit of the amount with the respondents, in the alternative to grant a lease of 17 acres of granite quarry, in another Survey Number 248 of Melmala Village or Sy. No. 218 of Gumballi Village and Sy. No. 170 of Yeragamballi Village of Chamarajnagar. The State carried the order in writ appeal which was dismissed and thereafter to the Apex court, by a special leave petition which was allowed and remitted to this court. The State however withdrew the writ appeal. Thus the order of the learned Single Judge in W. P. No. 27179 of 1996, and connected petitions is final and binding on the parties. It is alleged that 1st and 2nd respondents have not complied with the directions till date. ( 3 ) THE lease though for 29 acres reduced to 12 acres by Government order dated 25-10-2000, was for five years, due to expire on 19-8-2001. It is alleged that 1st and 2nd respondents have not complied with the directions till date. ( 3 ) THE lease though for 29 acres reduced to 12 acres by Government order dated 25-10-2000, was for five years, due to expire on 19-8-2001. The petitioner made an application dated 2-5-2001 in the prescribed form R under Rule 31-N of the Rules for renewal of the lease of 12 acres being a part of the entire area of 29 acres earlier granted and reduced in extent. The application was not accompanied by a treasury challan for having paid the difference of amount of security deposit and consideration for the renewal of lease for 12 acres. However, the petitioner was issued with a notice dated 14-8-2001, Annexure-C, by the 2nd respondent, the Competent Authority, quantifying Rs. 31,08,621 as being the amount to be deposited, within a period of 10 days of the said notice, in order to consider the renewal application. The petitioner claims to have deposit the said sum, duly acknowledged by the 2nd respondent in the following manner: 8-8-2001 Rs. 10,00,000/- 17-8-2001 Rs. 10,00,000/- 24-8-2001 Rs. 5,25,000/- 24-8-2001 Rs. 5,83,700/- Total Rs. 31,08,700/- ( 4 ) THE 2nd respondent after receipt of the aforesaid amounts recommended the renewal of the lease, but the State Government, it is alleged, rejected the application by Order dated 10-10-2002 at annexure-P on the sole ground that it was not accompanied by the security Deposit and the consideration, for renewal, which order was communicated to the petitioner by the 2nd respondent through a letter dated 28-6-2003 at Annexure-N. Calling in question the order of rejection of the renewal application by the State and the letter communicating the rejection at Annexures-P and N, respectively the petitioner has filed these writ petitions. ( 5 ) THE petitions are opposed by the respondents by filing their statement of objections 28-8-2003 inter alia contending that the earlier lease under the tender-cum-auction in an extent of 29 acres was reduced to 12 acres pursuant to a Government Order No. CI 171 MMN 98, dated 25-10-2000 and sought to justify the order impugned as well-merited, not calling for interference. However, at para 3 of the said statement of objections, it is stated thus:"3. It is submitted that the petitioner had filed renewal application before the 2nd respondent on 2-5-2001 by remitting application fee of Rs. However, at para 3 of the said statement of objections, it is stated thus:"3. It is submitted that the petitioner had filed renewal application before the 2nd respondent on 2-5-2001 by remitting application fee of Rs. 2,000-00 seeking further renewal of the said lease to an extent of 12 acres only. Inpursuant to the said renewal application a letter was issued to him on 14-8-2001, informing him to furnish the sketch and an amount of Rs. 31,08,621-00 being bid amount calculated for 12-00 acres on the bid amount of Rs. 60. 10 lakhs for 29 acres paid by the petitioner i. e. , Rs. 24,86,896-20 plus 25% of the bid amount i. e. , Rs. 6,21,724-20 amounting to Rs. 31,08,621-00 as required under Rule 31-N (2) of Chapter IV-A of the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1994, within 10 days since this is first renewal". ( 6 ) SRI D. L. N. Rao, learned Counsel for the petitioner would contend that Rule 31-N does not set out consequences for its non-compliance, and the use of the word "shall" in Rule 31-N is directory and not mandatory. Amplifying the said contention, Sri Rao would point out to sub-rule (8) of rule 31-A which sets outs the consequences of non-compliance of the sub-rule (7) for grant of quarrying lease and as Rule 31-N does not prescribe similar such consequences, the rejection of the renewal application is said to be illegal and arbitrary. In addition, Sri Rao would contend that the 2nd respondent-Competent Authority, by notice dated 14-8-2001 at Annexure-C, having called upon the petitioner to deposit rs. 31,08,621/- for considering the renewal application and the petitioner having paid the said sum within the stipulated time, the finding of the State that there was non-compliance of Rule 31-N is characterised as perverse. Lastly, Sri Rao would contend that the State, admittedly, retained Rs. 59,50,000/- paid by the petitioner at the time of grant of lease under the lease-cum-auction, which this Court by Order dated 26-5-1998 in W. P. Nos. 27179, 27462 and 27463 of 1996 directed the State to refund or in the alternate grant a lease of 17 acres of land in sy. 59,50,000/- paid by the petitioner at the time of grant of lease under the lease-cum-auction, which this Court by Order dated 26-5-1998 in W. P. Nos. 27179, 27462 and 27463 of 1996 directed the State to refund or in the alternate grant a lease of 17 acres of land in sy. No. 248 of Gumbahalli and since 17 acres was not leased, the said sum should be treated as if the application was accompanied with the security deposit and consideration for renewal, being due compliance of rule 31-N. ( 7 ) SRI Keshava Reddy, learned High Court Government Pleader for the respondent-State and its authorities would contend that the word "shall" as incorporated under Rule 31-N is to be treated as mandatory since it is prima facie imperative in character, keeping in mind the object and purpose of the statutory provisions for grant of lease by tender-cum-auction, coupled with the provisions for renewal in Chapter iv-A of the Rules. Learned High Court Government Pleader would seek to sustain the order impugned as being well-merited and not calling for interference, ( 8 ) HAVING heard the learned Counsels for the parties, the question for determination in these writ petitions are: 1. Whether the word "shall" occurring in Rule 31-N requiring an application for renewal of lease be accompanied by the deposit of amounts, for consideration of renewal, is mandatory or directory? 2. Whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, the orders impugned are sustainable? ( 9 ) BEFORE proceeding further, it is useful to make a reference to the judicial pronouncements of the Apex Court having regard to interpretation of statutes relevant to subsidiary rules in which the word "shall" is used to mean mandatory or directory. ( 10 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of Bhikraj Jaipuri v Union of india , held that hardship will not change the mandatory nature of a statute. While interpreting Section 175 (3) of the Government of India act, 1935, their Lordships extracted the observations of Lord Campbell in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, Page 376, which reads:"no universal rule can be laid down as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied annullification for disobedience. While interpreting Section 175 (3) of the Government of India act, 1935, their Lordships extracted the observations of Lord Campbell in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, Page 376, which reads:"no universal rule can be laid down as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied annullification for disobedience. It is the duty of the courts of Justice to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed". "where a statute requires that a thing shall be done in the prescribed manner or form but does not set out the consequences of non-compliance, the question whether the provision was mandatory or directory has to be adjudged in the light of the intention of the Legislature as disclosed by the object, purpose and scope of the statute. If the statute is mandatory, the thing done not in the manner or form prescribed can have no effect or validity: if it is directory, penalty may be incurred for non-compliance, but the act or thing done is regarded as good". The Supreme Court in the case of Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari v Lakshmi narayan Gupta, held thus:"ordinarily the use of the word 'shall' prima facie indicates that the provision is imperative in character. However, the Court while considering whether the mere use of the word 'shall' would made the provision imperative, it would ascertain the intendment of the Legislature and the consequences flowing from its own construction of the word 'shall'. If the use of the word 'shall' makes the provision imperative, the inevitable consequence that flows from it is that the Court would be powerless to grant any relief even where the justice of the case so demands. If the word 'shall' is treated as mandatory, the net effect would be that even where the default in complying with the direction given by the Court is technical, fortuitous, unintended or on account of circumstances beyond the control of the defaulter, yet the Court would not be able to grant any relief or assistance to such a person. If the word 'shall' is treated as mandatory, the net effect would be that even where the default in complying with the direction given by the Court is technical, fortuitous, unintended or on account of circumstances beyond the control of the defaulter, yet the Court would not be able to grant any relief or assistance to such a person. Once a default is found to be of a very technical nature in complying with the earlier order, the Court must have power to relieve against a drastic consequence all the more so if it is satisfied that there was a formal or technical default in complying with its order". The Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v Raghubtr Dayal, held thus:"the use of the word 'shall' is ordinarily mandatory but it is sometimes not so interpreted if the scope of the enactment, on consequences to flow from such construction would not so demand. Normally, the word 'shall' prima facie ought to be considered mandatory but it is the function of the Court to ascertain the real intention of the Legislature by a careful examination of the whole scope of the statute, the purpose it seeks to serve and the consequences that would flow from the construction to be placed hereon. The word 'shall', therefore, ought to be construed not according to the language with which it is clothed but in the context in which it is used and the purpose it seeks to serve. The meaning has to be ascribed to the word 'shall' as mandatory or as directory, accordingly. Equally, it is settled law that when a statute is passed for the purpose of enabling the doing of something and prescribes the formalities which are to be attended for the purpose, those prescribed formalities which are essential to the validity of such thing, would be mandatory. However, if by holding them to be mandatory, serious general inconvenience is caused to innocent persons or general public without very much furthering the object of the Act, the same would be construed as directory. (para 5)". The Supreme Court in the case of Karnal Improvement Trust v Parkash wanti, held that "no particular rule can be laid down in determining whether command is to be considered as a mere direction or mandatory involving invalidating consequences in its disregard. (para 5)". The Supreme Court in the case of Karnal Improvement Trust v Parkash wanti, held that "no particular rule can be laid down in determining whether command is to be considered as a mere direction or mandatory involving invalidating consequences in its disregard. It is further held that fundamentally it depends upon the scope and objective of the enactment it was said that annulification is a natural and usual consequence of disobedience, if the intention is of an imperative character". ( 11 ) IN Mohan Singh and Others u International Airport Authority of india and Others , their Lordships held thus:"if an object of the enactment is defeated by holding the same directory, it should be construed as mandatory whereas if by holding mandatory serious general inconvenience will be created to innocent persons of general public without much furthering the object of enactment, the same should be construed as directory but all the same, it would not mean that the language used would be ignored altogether. Effect must be given to all the provisions harmoniously to suppress to be mischief and promote public justice". ( 12 ) IN order to appreciate the contentions advanced by the learned counsels for the parties, it is necessary to examine Rule 31-N which reads thus:"31-N. Renewal of leases.- (1) An application for renewal of quarrying lease under this Chapter shall be made in Form R to the Director at least ninety days before the expiry of the lease. The application shall be accompanied by a Treasury Challan for having paid the difference of the amount of Security Deposit, if any, to be paid by the lessee at the prevailing rates and a treasury Challan for an amount equal to the amount specified in sub-rule (2) as consideration for the renewal of the lease. 2) An amount equal to the amount of the tender or bid, as the case may be, paid as consideration for the grant of the quarry lease, plus twenty-five per cent or fifty per cent of such amount shall be paid for the first and second renewal respectively. (3) A quarrying lease granted under this Chapter may be renewed for two periods, each period not exceeding the period of the original lease. (3) A quarrying lease granted under this Chapter may be renewed for two periods, each period not exceeding the period of the original lease. (4) The application for renewal of the lease shall be disposed of by the Competent Authority before the date of expiry of the lease, failing which the lease shall be deemed to have been extended by a further period till the Competent Authority passes order thereon. (5) The Competent Authority may after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard and for reasons to be recorded in writing and communicated to the applicant, refuse to renew a quarrying lease for the whole or part of the applied area: provided-that where the sanction for renewal is only for a portion of the applied area, the amount payable as consideration for the grant of renewal of the lease under sub-rule (2) shall be in proportion to the area for which the renewal is sanctioned". Rules 31-A to 31-Q are found under Chapter IV-A relating to grant of quarrying lease by tender-cum-auction, inserted by notification dated 6-5-1995. Rule 31-A deals with manner of submission of tender. Sub-rule (8) of Rule 31-A undoubtedly provides for consequences of non-compliance of sub-rule (7 ). In other words, the tender form is liable to be rejected if incomplete or not accompanied by the documents. ( 13 ) THE plain language of sub-rule (1) of Rule 31-N incorporating the word 'shall' admits of only one interpretation that the application for renewal of lease must be accompanied by the amounts stated therein. Sub-rule (2) provides for the amount that is to be paid as consideration for the first or second renewal. Sub-rule (3) specifies that the renewal may be granted for two period each not exceeding the original period of lease. Sub-rule (4) stipulates disposal of renewal application within the set date and on failure, the lease is deemed to have continued until orders are passed on the application. Sub-rule (5) extends an opportunity of hearing and recording reasons in writing in case of refusal to renew the quarrying lease for the whole or part of the applied area. Sub-rule (4) stipulates disposal of renewal application within the set date and on failure, the lease is deemed to have continued until orders are passed on the application. Sub-rule (5) extends an opportunity of hearing and recording reasons in writing in case of refusal to renew the quarrying lease for the whole or part of the applied area. Proviso to sub-rule (5) leaves no doubt that in case of sanction for renewal is only for a portion of the applied area, the amount payable as consideration for the grant of renewal of lease under sub-rule (2) shall be in proportion to the area for which the renewal is sanctioned. The application for renewal in Form R does not contain a column of recording amount paid as consideration for renewal, although column (4) provides for details of area in regard to which renewal is applied for. ( 14 ) THE word 'shall' occurring in Rule 31-N is prima facie indicative of the imperative character of the said provision. Rule 31-N per se makes it mandatory/obligatory for an application for renewal of lease to be accompanied by the amounts stated therein as consideration for renewal. By merely not providing for consequences of non-compliance, could the rule be construed as directory, is the question. ( 15 ) SECTION 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and regulation) Act, 1957 (for short, 'the Act'), provides for the power of the state Government to make rules in respect of minor minerals. Sub-section (1-A) sets out the matters for which rules may be framed. In particular clauses (a) and (g) reads:" (a) The person by whom and the manner in which, applications for quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions may be made and the fees to be paid therefor; (g) The fixing and collection of rent, royalty, fees, dead rent, fines or other charges and the time within which and the manner in which these shall be payable". ( 16 ) THE State of Karnataka, in exercise of its powers under Section 15 of the Act, framed the rules. Chapter III regulates the grant of quarrying lease for specified minor minerals. ( 16 ) THE State of Karnataka, in exercise of its powers under Section 15 of the Act, framed the rules. Chapter III regulates the grant of quarrying lease for specified minor minerals. Section 9 (2) requires that an application for renewal of the lease shall be accompanied by a difference of amount of security deposit in the form of treasury challan for a sum calculated at the rate specified together with an application fee, in Form R. Section 10 provides for exemption or reduction in the amount of security deposit. Chapter IV, regulates the grant of quarry leases for non-specified minor minerals. Under Section 21 (2), the application for renewal, shall be in Form R and shall be accompanied by a security deposit calculated at the rate specified therein. The proviso to the aid section, stipulates payment of security deposit at a reduced rate in case of economically weaker section. Chapter IV-A regulates the grant of quarrying lease by tender-cum-auction. Sub-clause (6) of Rule 31-B stipulates and mandates the payment of EMD along with the tender forms failing which the tender would not be considered. Rule 31-F (4) (b) stipulates that the non-payment of the EMD would entail in riot including the name of the tenderer in the list of consideration by tender-cum-auction. ( 17 ) ON a careful examination of the scope of the rules, the purpose being regulation of the grant or renewal of quarrying lease of specified and non-specified minor minerals. Chapters III and IV of the Rules prescribe the manner in which the application for renewal, in Form R is required to be made, the fee payable and the security deposit to accompany the application. Insofar as it relates to renewal of a lease granted under a Tender-cum-Auction it prescribes the payment of an amount equal to the tender or bid for consideration of the application. The grant of lease under Chapter IV-A, by way of a tender-cum-auction, is to secure the highest bidder to quarry the mineral. If that be so, the imposition of the condition that the application for renewal shall accompany the necessary amount for considering the grant of renewal, is only to eliminate applicants for renewal who are unable to pay the said sum so as to extend an opportunity to others to secure the grant of lease. If that be so, the imposition of the condition that the application for renewal shall accompany the necessary amount for considering the grant of renewal, is only to eliminate applicants for renewal who are unable to pay the said sum so as to extend an opportunity to others to secure the grant of lease. So it is reasonable to assume that the State has imposed the condition with a purpose, failure to abide would result in rejection of the renewal. Keeping in mind the purpose of the rules and the prescribed consideration to accompany the application for renewal, essential for its validity, the word 'shall' is to be treated as mandatory. ( 18 ) IN keeping with the principles of interpretation of the word 'shall', in a statute, applying the rule of subject and object i. e. , ascertainment of the subject of the enactment where the word or expression occurs and having regard to the object which the rules are framed, by treating the word 'shall' as mandatory, net effect would be the Court would not be in a position to grant any relief to the person who is a defaulter. In answering the first question, I hold that the word 'shall' occurring in rule 31-N is mandatory. ( 19 ) IN the facts and circumstances of this case, the petitioner, a successful bidder in the tender-cum-auction for grant of quarrying lease under Rule 31-A was granted a lease of 29 acres in Sy. No. 248 of melamala Village, on receipt of a sum of Rs. 60 lakhs by the State. In view of the dispute that an extent of 12 acres out of 29 acres in Sy. No. 248 contained black granite though notified that the entire extent of 29 acres contained black granite, which in fact, was not, having induced the petitioner to submit his bid for the entire extent of 29 acres, the petitioner, approached this Court in W. P. Nos. 27179, 27462 and 27463 of 1996. This Court by Order dated 26-5-1998, came down heavily on the action of the State and its authorities in making a false claim that the entire 29 acres was covered by black granite. 27179, 27462 and 27463 of 1996. This Court by Order dated 26-5-1998, came down heavily on the action of the State and its authorities in making a false claim that the entire 29 acres was covered by black granite. This Court further held that the notification calling for bids did not disclose the true information about the actual area covered by black granite and having found that it was only 12 acres, directed the State and its authorities to refund the sum of Rs. 59,50,000/- in deposit, belonging to the petitioner or in the alternative to grant a lease of 17 acres of land identified by the petitioner. It is not in dispute that the State and its authorities have not complied with the said order even as on the date. The State and its authorities have maintained, in deposit, Rs. 59,50,000/- in respect of Sy. No. 248 of Melmala Village, being excess of the monies which they are not entitled to in terms of Rule 31-A of the Rules. ( 20 ) THIS Court cannot turn a blind eye to a very relevant fact that the 2nd respondent after having received the application for renewal, issued a notice Annexure-C calling upon the petitioner to make payment of Rs. 31,08,621/- being the amount calculated for the area sought to be renewed in accordance with sub-rule (1) of Rule 31-N. The petitioner, on receipt of the notice and within the time frame, made the payments which were duly acknowledged and as evident from Annexure-D. The competent Authority, on being satisfied with the due compliance of sub-rule (1) of Rule 31-N made its recommendation to the State government, for grant of renewal. ( 21 ) FACTS are not in dispute. The application for renewal of lease for quarrying in an area of 12 acres filed by the petitioner is rejected by the state Government on the ground of non-compliance of sub-rule (1) of rule 31-N, in that, it is said, that the application was not accompanied by the requisite Security Deposit and the amount specified in sub-rule (2 ). ( 22 ) SRI D. L. N. Rao, learned Senior Counsel would place reliance or the following authorities: (i) R. K. Saxena v Delhi Development Authority, the facts of the said case relate to deemed extension of time to pay the balance of amount in respect of an auction sale of a plot. ( 22 ) SRI D. L. N. Rao, learned Senior Counsel would place reliance or the following authorities: (i) R. K. Saxena v Delhi Development Authority, the facts of the said case relate to deemed extension of time to pay the balance of amount in respect of an auction sale of a plot. It was held that the minimum payment with interest on delayed payment was accepted, there was deemed extension of time. (ii) Administrator, Municipal Committee, Charkhi Dadri v ramji Lal Bagla, is the case relating to prescription of time under Section 44-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (as applicable in Haryana), amendment for execution of improvement scheme, it is held not mandatory but directory. (iii) Krishna Kumar Mediratta u Phulchand Agarwala and other, the Apex Court while interpreting Section 9 (2) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, held that though the word 'shall' is used under the Rules, but the use of the word in imposing a duty is not conclusive on the question whether the duty imposed is mandatory or directory. It was further held that a bona fide application accompanied by a deposit if calculated incorrectly or by oversight, cannot be void and on acceptance of the deficiency in the fee, it is to be assumed that the application was valid". In addition, it was held thus:"the filing of the application is one thing and completion of some annexed duty, which is legally separable, is another unless a statute or a rule provides otherwise". ( 23 ) HAVING carefully read and understood the principles laid down in the decision, I am of the considered view that the same do not come to the aid of the petitioner and has no application to the statutory provision sought to be interpreted in this writ petition. It is no doubt true that the State and its authorities have in deposit a sum of Rs. 59,50,000/- paid by the petitioner as against the lease of portion of the land in Sy. No. 248 of Melmala Village which was ordered to be refunded to the petitioner by this Court in W. P. No. 27179 of 1996 and connected writ petitions by Order dated 26-5-1998. The renewal sought for by the petitioner is in respect of the very same land in Sy. No. 248 of Melmala Village which was ordered to be refunded to the petitioner by this Court in W. P. No. 27179 of 1996 and connected writ petitions by Order dated 26-5-1998. The renewal sought for by the petitioner is in respect of the very same land in Sy. No. 248 of Melmala village, however restricted to the extent of 12 acres on which extent black granite is said to be existing. Rs. 59,50,000/- in deposit with the state, it cannot be said that the petitioner's application for renewal of lease not being accompasnied by the required amount of Rs. 31,08,621/- as consideration, could be treated defective. The 2nd respondent-Competent Authority having accepted the payments by the petitioner, after notice, it cannot be said that the application was incomplete. It was only after the Competent Authority was satisfied about the due compliance of sub-rule (1) of Rule 31-N that the recommendation was made to the State. The 2nd respondent accepted the bona fides of the petitioner in filing the application for renewal without being accompanied by the requisite amount for its consideration. The State having not refunded Rs. 59,50,000/- in deposit with it from the year 1996 onwards despite a direction by this Court, is a circumstance that goes against the State and its authorities. The respondent-State could not have rejected the application or renewal on the sole ground that it was not accompanied with the deposit of monies. The order impugned is illegal, arbitrary and without any justification. In the result, these writ petitions are allowed, the order impugned dated 10-10-2002 at Annexure-P and the communication dated 28-6-2003 of the 2nd respondent at Annexure-N are quashed. Consequently, the rejection of the application for renewal of lease being grounded only on-non-compliance of Rule 31-N, it is declared that the petitioner is entitled to renewal of lease. The respondents-State and its authorities are directed to execute the documents of renewal of lease, in any event, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this Order. --- *** --- .