GANGULY, J. ( 1 ) THIS revisional application has been assigned to this bench by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice in view of divergence of judicial opinion expressed by two learned Single Judges on the question of maintainability of a revisional application from an order of injunction issued by an Appellate Court under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure code, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as 'code' ). A learned Single Judge of this Court noted the divergence and opined that the matter should be placed before a larger bench. The learned Single Judge found that two conflicting opinions were expressed by two learned Judges in the following judgments: a) In the case of Gyan Singh and Ors. v. Guljar Singh and Ors. , reported in 1988 (1) Calcutta Law Journal, 389, a learned Judge of this Court was pleased to hold that an appeal is maintainable against an order of the Appellate Court rejecting the application for temporary injunction filed by the plaintiff. b) A different view has been expressed subsequently by another learned Single Bench in the case of Murari Kumar Saraf v. Sri Jagannath Shaw reported in AIR 1994 Calcutta 205. In that decision, the learned Single Judge held that an interlocutory order passed by the First Appellate Court is not appealable and a revisional is maintainable. The learned Judge who subsequently delivered the judgment in Murari Kumar Saraf held that the previous judgment delivered in Gyan Singh (supra) was delivered per inquirium. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case, which led to the aforesaid controversy, are noted below : the petitioner, in this revisional application, claimed that he is a tenant in respect of a portion of Premises No. 44/45, Ekbalpore road (hereinafter referred to as the 'said premises') and, according to the petitioner, the said tenancy includes a garage. The opposite party No. 1 also claimed to be a tenant in respect of a portion of the said premises and claimed the said garage as a part of his tenancy. A suit, being Title Suit No. 320 of 1995, was filed by the opposite party No. 1 before the 6th Munsif's Court at Alipore and, in the said suit, the opposite party No. 1 prayed for a declaration of his title and mandatory injunction against the petitioner in respect of the said premises. A suit, being Title Suit No. 320 of 1995, was filed by the opposite party No. 1 before the 6th Munsif's Court at Alipore and, in the said suit, the opposite party No. 1 prayed for a declaration of his title and mandatory injunction against the petitioner in respect of the said premises. An application for ad-interim order of injunction was ex- parte moved on behalf of the opposite party No. 1, but, no adinterim order was passed and against the said refusal, the opposite party No. 1 filed a Miscellaneous Appeal No. 362 of 1995 before the learned District Judge at Alipore. The learned District Judge passed an ad-interim order on 21. 8. 1995 as prayed for by the opposite party no. 1 and fixed the matter on 11. 2. 1995. ( 3 ) AGAINST the said ad-interim order of injunction, an application under order 39, Rule 4 of the Code for vacating of the said order was filed by the petitioner. ( 4 ) BY an order dated 28. 8. 1995, the learned District Judge, on the petitioner's application for vacating fixed the hearing of the matter on 13. 11. 1995. In the meantime, the opposite party No. 1 moved ex-parte a writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court complaining of police inaction in carrying out the order of the learned District Judge dated 21. 8. 1995. ( 5 ) HOWEVER, we are not concerned with that. ( 6 ) THE present revisional application was filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 21. 8. 1995 and also the subsequent order dated 28. 8. 1995. The opposite party No. 1 raised a preliminary objection about the maintainability of this revisional application and it was contended by the opposite party No. 1 that the order passed by the learned District judge is appealable in view of the decision of the Court in Gyan Singh. In the background of these facts, the divergence of views expressed by two different learned Benches came up for consideration before the learned single Judge. The learned Single Judge, however, held that the said divergence has a bearing in so far as the order dated 21. 08. 1995 is concerned. But, so far as the subsequent order dated 28. 8. In the background of these facts, the divergence of views expressed by two different learned Benches came up for consideration before the learned single Judge. The learned Single Judge, however, held that the said divergence has a bearing in so far as the order dated 21. 08. 1995 is concerned. But, so far as the subsequent order dated 28. 8. 1995 is concerned, the learned Single Judge set aside the said order, as the said order, according to the learned Single Judge, did not comply with the provisions of Order 39, Rule 3a of the Code. ( 7 ) NOW coming to the question of divergence of judicial view, this court finds that the view taken by the learned Single Judge of this Court in gyan Singh (supra) is not the correct view. The reason why the Court is of the aforesaid opinion is given below. ( 8 ) IT is a settled position in law that an appeal is always a creature of statute. No one has an inherent right of appeal unless it is clearly conferred by law. ( 9 ) IN the case in question, the right of appeal has to be gathered from the provisions of the Code. It is also not in dispute that the order, which is sought to be appealed, is not a decree. An appeal from orders under the Code is dealt with under Section 104 of the Code. Section 104 of the Code runs thus : 104. Orders from which appeal lies : (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders, and save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any law for the time being in force, from no other orders : [cis. (a) to (f) Rep. By Arbitration Act 10 of 1940. Section 49 and Schedule III] ; [ (ff) an order under Section 35a]. (a) to (f) Rep. By Arbitration Act 10 of 1940. Section 49 and Schedule III] ; [ (ff) an order under Section 35a]. [ (ff) an order under Section 91 or Section 92 refusing leave to institute a suit of the nature referred to in Section 91 or Section 92, as the case may be; (g) an order under Section 95; (h) an order under any of the provisions of this Code imposing a fine or directing the arrest or detention in the civil prison of any person except where such arrest or detention is in execution of a decree; (1) Any order made under rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by rules; provided that no appeal shall lie against any order specified in clause (ff) save on the ground that no order, or an order for the payment of a less amount, ought to have been made. (2) No appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this section. ( 10 ) IN this context, sub-section (2) of Section 104 is of very considerable importance. ( 11 ) FROM a perusal of Section 104, it appears that the language of the said section is very peremptory in nature. In other words, the opening words of sub-section (1) of Section 104 make it clear that an appeal shall lie from orders enumerated therein and save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of the Code or by any law for the time being in force, but, from no other orders. Under Section 104 (1), clause (i), it has been made clear, that an appeal would lie from any order under rules from which the appeal is expressly allowed by rules. ( 12 ) NOW, Order 43, Rule 1 enumerates a category of orders, which are appealable. Order 43, Rule 1 starts with the provisions that appeals from these orders lie under the provisions of Section 104. Therefore, categories of orders mentioned in various sub-clauses of Order 43, Rula 1 are appealable only because appeals from them are expressly allowed under clause (i) of Section 104 (1 ). ( 13 ) SO, sub-section (2) of Section 104 in this context cannot be ignored. This sub-section makes it very clear that no appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this section. It is not in dispute that the order dated 21. 08. ( 13 ) SO, sub-section (2) of Section 104 in this context cannot be ignored. This sub-section makes it very clear that no appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this section. It is not in dispute that the order dated 21. 08. 1995, by which the ad-interim order of injunction was granted by the learned District Judge, was an order passed in an appeal. The learned District Judge delivering the judgment in Gyan Singh (supra)held that the said mandate of sub-section (2) of Section 104 bars only a second appeal and not a first appeal (see page 391 ). But the learned Judge unfortunately made an error by not appreciating that the order passed by the District Judge is an order passed as the First Appellate Court in a first appeal. So, by the very reasoning of the learned Judge, any further appeal is not maintainable. ( 14 ) THE learned Judge relied on an unreported judgment of this hon'ble Court in case of Mrs. Anjali Sengupta v. A. K. Das and Ors. decided by a Division Bench on 31. 03. 1976. Even though, the learned Judge found that in the said Division Bench Judgment the provision of Section 104 (2)of the Code was not considered, but the learned Judge held that the intention of the legislature as expressed in Section 104 (1) and Section 104 (2) read with Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code is to prevent a further appeal or a second appeal against orders, but, the same does not prohibit a first appeal. The error in such reasoning has been pointed out above. ( 15 ) THE learned Judge took the said view in view of the provisions of the old Code which were considered by a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Goor Bux Sakoo v. Brij Lal Beeka reported in ILR 26 Calcutta 275. ( 16 ) THE facts in Goor Bux Sakoo (supra) were that there was an order under Section 57 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882 for return of the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. ( 16 ) THE facts in Goor Bux Sakoo (supra) were that there was an order under Section 57 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882 for return of the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. An appeal was filed against that order in which a preliminary objection about the maintainability of the appeal was taken on the ground that no appeal lies to the High Court under Section 588 of the old Code from the District Judge's order directing the presentation of the plaint to the proper Court. The objection was on the question of forum of appeal and not on its maintainability. ( 17 ) THE learned Judge considered the scope of Section 582 of the code of 1882 which are similar to the provisions of Section 107 of the code of 1908. ( 18 ) BUT the decision was given considering the scope of Section 589 of the Code of 1882. Section 589 of the Code dealt with the question of forum as in Section 106 of the present Code. The learned Judges held that the forum will be High Court. But here we are not concerned with the question of forum. The prohibition contained in Section 588 was considered in the context of the provision of Section 589 of the Code. The terms of section 588 of the old Code as quoted in the judgment show that they are considerably different from the provisions of Section 104 (2) of the Code of 1908. So, the ratio in Goor Bux cannot be applied to the present situation in which differently worded Section 104 (2) is attracted and specially when the question in Goor Bux was different. ( 19 ) THE learned Judge in Gyan Singh also held that the two decisions rendered by the Kerala High Court and the Madras High Court in Chellappal v. K. P. Varughese, reported in AIR 1964 Kerala 23 and C. Kalahasti v, p. C. M. Chetti, reported in AIR 1975 Madras 3 were wrongly decided. ( 20 ) IN the judgment given by the other learned Single Judge in Murari kumar Saraf (supra), the learned Judge held that the decision in Gyan singh (supra) was given per inquirium. ( 20 ) IN the judgment given by the other learned Single Judge in Murari kumar Saraf (supra), the learned Judge held that the decision in Gyan singh (supra) was given per inquirium. The learned Judge in Murari Kumar found that the previous Judgment of this Court in the case of Shakti Charan chatterjee v. Hindustan Steel Limited reported in 73 CWN was not cited before the learned Single Judge, who delivered the judgment in Gyan Singh (supra ). The learned Judge then referred to the decision of the Madras high Court in the case of C. Kalahasti (supra) and held that the said decision in Kalahasti decided correctly the same question which fell for consideration before his Lordship. ( 21 ) THE learned Judge in Murari Kumar (supra) also considered the judgment of the Kerala High Court in the case of Chellapal (supra ). The learned Judge then referred to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and after detailed discussions, the learned Single Judge held that just because the petition under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code was filed before the first Appellate Court during the pendency of a Miscellaneous appeal that does not and cannot mean that, as a result of such filing of an application, the Appellate Court has become a Court of original jurisdiction or that the order passed on such application, is an original order. ( 22 ) THE learned Judge further held that a final order in such miscellanous proceeding is not an appealable order, so it is difficult to accept that an interlocutory order passed before the final disposal of such miscellaneous appeal would become an appealable order and would not be hit by Section 104 (2) of the Code. This Court is in respectful agreement with those reasoning. ( 23 ) GIVING these reasons, the learned Judge agreed with the decision of thie Court in the case of Shakti Charan Chatterjee (supra) and also with the decision of the Madras and Kerala High Courts. After saying so, the learned Judge held that the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Gyan singh (supra) was delivered per inquirium. ( 23 ) GIVING these reasons, the learned Judge agreed with the decision of thie Court in the case of Shakti Charan Chatterjee (supra) and also with the decision of the Madras and Kerala High Courts. After saying so, the learned Judge held that the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Gyan singh (supra) was delivered per inquirium. ( 24 ) THIS Court is in respectful agreement with the view taken by the learned Judge in Murari Kumar (supra) that an interlocutory order, passed by the learned District Judge in a Miscellaneous appeal, is an order, which is covered under the prohibition of Section 104 (2) of the Code and against such an order, further appeal does not lie. In this connection, reference may be made to a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of new Kenilworth Hotel Pvt. Limited v. Orissa State Finance Corporation and ors. , reported in 1997 (3) SCC 462. ( 25 ) AT page 466 of the report, the learned Judge held that 'since section 104 (2) expressly prohibits an appeal, against an order passed by the appellate Court under Order 43 Rule 1 read with Section 104 (1) no appeal would lie. ' ( 26 ) IN that case, the question was whether an appeal in the facts of that case would lie under the Letters Patent. The learned Judge held that no appeal would lie under the Letters Patent and the learned Judges affirmed the views taken by the two High Courts on this aspect, viz. the view of the Gujarat High Court in Madhusudan Vegetable Products Co. Ltd. v. Rupa Chemicals, reported in AIR 1986 Gujarat 156 and Chinulal laxman Prasad v. Agarwala and Co. , reported in AIR 1987 Madhya Pradesh 172. ( 27 ) THE views in Kenilworth (supra) were subsequently approved by the Supreme Court in Hemlata Panda, reported in 2000 (2) SCC 218 . ( 28 ) THE provisions of the Letters Patent are admittedly not attracted to this case. , reported in AIR 1987 Madhya Pradesh 172. ( 27 ) THE views in Kenilworth (supra) were subsequently approved by the Supreme Court in Hemlata Panda, reported in 2000 (2) SCC 218 . ( 28 ) THE provisions of the Letters Patent are admittedly not attracted to this case. Both the High Courts of Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh held in the aforesaid two judgments that against the orders passed in appellate proceedings by the High Court, no further appeal can be filed in view of the provisions Section 104 (2) of the Code and both the Courts held that the express provisions of the Code to the contrary will override the jurisdiction under the Letters Patent. ( 29 ) HERE even though the provisions of Letters Patent are not attracted, but one thing is clear that an order passed in appellate proceeding by the learned District Judge cannot be further made the subject matter of another appeal ignoring the provisions of Section 104 (2) of the Code. The provision of Section 107 of the Code merely provides for the powers of an appellate Court. The powers of an Appellate Court would come into play in an appeal, which is otherwise competent. But, the powers of the Appellate court, however wide they may be, cannot confer on the litigant a right to prefer an appeal from an order when the legislature not only does not create such a right, but prohibits the same. ( 30 ) AT the cost of repetition, this Court further records that the right of appeal is always a creature of statute. Whether an order is appealable or not depends primarily on three considerations viz (a) the nature of the order; (b) the subject matter, which is dealt with in the order and (c) the court passing the order. The aforesaid proposition can be illustrated with reference to the provisions of the Code. If we look at the list of the appealable orders under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code, it appears that an order under Rule 4, Order 47 of the Code, viz. an order granting review is appealable. But, an order dismissing a review application is not appealable. If we look at the list of the appealable orders under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code, it appears that an order under Rule 4, Order 47 of the Code, viz. an order granting review is appealable. But, an order dismissing a review application is not appealable. Both the orders are passed under Order 47 Rule 4 of the Code, Similarly, an order under Order 9 Rule 13 rejecting an application for setting aside a decree passed ex-parte is appealable, but, an order allowing such an application is not appealable. ( 31 ) THIS is the legislative policy in matters of making orders appealable. There are some orders like orders passed under Order 39 rules 1 and 2 and Rule 4. Here, an order granting an order of injunction is appealable and order refusing to grant an injunction is also appealable and an order vacating the injunction is appealable and the order refusing to vacate the injunction is also appealable. This is again a matter of legislative policy. Similarly, Section 104, Rule 1 makes it clear that some orders are appealable, but, sub-section (2) of Section 104 makes it clear if those orders are passed in the Appellate Forum viz. by the learned Appellate court, those orders will not be appealable. ( 32 ) THIS clear legislative dispensation cannot be disturbed on the basis of an interpretative process, which runs counter to the legislative scheme. ( 33 ) SO for the reasons aforesaid, this Court holds that in this case, the revisional application is maintainable and the judgment of the learned single Judge in the case of Gyan Singh (supra) was not correctly rendered and this Court affirms the views taken by the learned Single Judge in the case of Murari Kumar Saraf (supra ). The revisional application may now be placed for hearing before the appropriate Bench. No order as to costs. Talukdar, J. : I agree. S. K. G. .