Judgment :- The order dated 22.10.1996 passed by the second respondent directing to recover the salary paid between the period of 1.6.1984 and 30.6.1987 from the petitioner for his services as a Secondary Grade Teacher is in challenge in this writ petition. 2. This order has been passed by the District Elementary Educational Officer, Nagercoil and it is in the nature of a communication made to the Assistant Educational Officer Kuzhithurai Range, Kuzhithurai Post, Kanyakumari district, directing him to recover the said salary between the aforementioned period from the petitioner. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr.Paul Vasanthakumar has argued on the basis of few facts. The petitioner, on the basis of his Teacher training certificate, was appointed as a Secondary grade teacher on 1.6.1984 and continued to work till 30.6.1987. He was holding a Teachers training diplome frm Karnataka which was evaluated on 30.1.1986 and was found to be good. Later on, the first respondent cancelled this evaluation by his order dated 12.6.1987 and it is an admitted position that the petitioner was not heard before passing this cancellation order. On that basis, the petitioner came to be terminated from service from 1.7.1987. The petitioner did not challenge this order though some others like the petitioner did challenge the orders in the Administrtive Tribunal and also succeeded. The petitioner however took a better course of joining a Teachers training college in Agriculture in Tamil Nadu in 1994. On that basis, he was again offered a job of a Secondary Grade Special teacher and he is thus serving in that post from 1.6.1995. So far so good. Now however, all of a sudden, in the year 1996, the impugned order came to be passed, firstly without hearing the petitioner and secondly, even the courtesy of serving a copy on him has also not been shown. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner says that the order is bad on all counts. Learned counsel firstly argues that the order is passed without hearing the petitioner or without affording him any opportunity. Secondly, there appears to be no reason given while passing the order and a laconic order has been passed directing the third respondent to make the recoveries from the teacher. Thirdly, there is no reason given as to why the salary paid for the actual work done should be recovered at all. No rule is also quoted. 5. Secondly, there appears to be no reason given while passing the order and a laconic order has been passed directing the third respondent to make the recoveries from the teacher. Thirdly, there is no reason given as to why the salary paid for the actual work done should be recovered at all. No rule is also quoted. 5. As against this, the learned Additional Government Pleader says that the certificate on the basis of which the petitioner was employed was found to be false and therefore, the petitioner could never have joined as a Secondary grade teacher and therefore, the Government was well justified in ordering the recovery. On this basis, it is to be seen that as to whether the order can be sustained. 6. It is an admitted position that though the said certificate was found to be false and the evaluation thereof was cancelled on 12.6.1987 by the first respondent, it is a fact that the petitioner actually was working and was on active duty from 1.6.1984 to 30.6.1987. In fact, his certificate was evaluated on 30.1.1986 and was found to be a proper certificate. Therefore, atleast till 12.6.1987, the petitioner was actually working on the basis of a valid certificate duly evaluated by the Government. We will not go into the merits of the order dated 12.6.1987 which also was incidentally passed without hearing the petitioner, but the fact remains that the petitioner did work from 1.6.1984 to 30.6.1987. It is only from 1.7.1987 that he was directed to be terminated. The Government could have woken up by that time. It did not. It waited for good nine years thereafter to order the recovery of salary. This is the first example of unfairness. Secondly, the Government should have realised that the petitioner had actually worked and his services were taken therefore, it was atleast incumbent to hear the petitioner before ordering the recovery. That was also not done. That is the second example of unfairness. Thirdly, the factum of the petitioner's service has not at all been taken into consideration. If the petitioner had actually worked there was really no propriety to recover the salary as if the petitioner has not actually worked. That is the last example of unfairness. 7. In short, on all the counts, the order impugned is unfair. It has to be quashed. It is accordingly quashed. The writ petition is allowed. If the petitioner had actually worked there was really no propriety to recover the salary as if the petitioner has not actually worked. That is the last example of unfairness. 7. In short, on all the counts, the order impugned is unfair. It has to be quashed. It is accordingly quashed. The writ petition is allowed. No costs. WMP 24963 of 1996 is closed.