JUDGMENT B.K. Sharma, J. 1. By this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioners have assailed the legality and validity of the order dated 13.09.04 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 2, West Tripura, Agartala in Misc. Appeal No. 13/04 setting aside the order dated 09.08.04 passed by the Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Court No. 2, West Tripura, Agartala in Misc. Case No. 83/04 arising out of T.S. No. 88/04. By the impugned order dated 13.09.04 the Additional District Judge has granted temporary mandatory injunction in respect of the order dated 22.07.04 transferring the Respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 along five others from Tripura to Mizoram, directing the Petitioners not to give effect to the said transfer order. The Trial Court had refused to grant the temporary injunction as was prayed for by the said Respondents. 2. Adverting to the facts of the case, the Respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 herein along with five others belonging to Telecom Engineering Service (T.E.S. Group-B) under the Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (BSNL) working in different capacities in the State of Tripura were transferred to Mizoram by an order dated 22.07.04. Being aggrieved, they instituted a Title Suit No. 88/04 in the Court of Civil Judge (Jr. Division), West Tripura, Agartala praying for a decree for declaration that the said order of transfer was illegal and for perpetual injunction restraining the Petitioners from giving effect to the order of transfer and also for a decree of mandatory injunction directing the Petitioners to withdraw the said order. Alongwith the plaint, they also filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for temporary injunction retraining the Petitioners from giving effect to the impugned order of transfer and also for a temporary mandatory injunction against the order of release. 3. The Respondents Nos. 4 to 14 in this proceeding were made proforma Defendant in the suit as well as in the application for injunction. It was the case of the Plaintiffs/applicants that the said Respondents Nos. 4 to 14 belonged to a particular Employees' Organisation whereas the Plaintiffs belonged to another Association. According to the Plaintiffs, 11 Officers namely the Respondents Nos. 4 to 14 in this proceeding were made proforma Defendant in the suit as well as in the application for injunction. It was the case of the Plaintiffs/applicants that the said Respondents Nos. 4 to 14 belonged to a particular Employees' Organisation whereas the Plaintiffs belonged to another Association. According to the Plaintiffs, 11 Officers namely the Respondents Nos. 4 to 14 were promoted to T.E.S. Group-B on 25.07.02 without any vacancy which resulted in excess Officers in Tripura SSA as a consequence of which 8 Officers, i.e., the Plaintiffs had to be transferred to maintain the equilibrium and that, but for the aforesaid illegal accommodation of the Respondents Nos. 4 to 14, the Plaintiffs would not have been transferred. According to the Plaintiffs, the said Respondents were promoted on 25.07.02 showing favour to them having regard to the fact that they belonged to other Association unlike the Plaintiffs who belonged to another Association. 4. The application for injunction was registered as Misc. Case No. 83/04 to which the present Petitioners who are the Defendant in the suit filed objection. According to the Petitioners, the transfer order had to be issued in public interest and out of bonafide administrative exigencies and that it was necessitated because of transfer of 9 Officers from Mizoram SSA resulting in shortage of Officers in Mizoram. It was the case of the Defendant/Petitioners that the Plaintiffs/Respondents Nos. 1, 2, 3 and five others being in transferable service and they having completed 8 years, 10 years and 10 years respectively in the present place of posting in the State of Tripura had been transferred by the impugned order of transfer. The Petitioners refuted the claim of the Plaintiffs/Respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 that the transfer order was issued to favour the Respondents Nos. 4 to 14. They also denied that the said Respondents were promoted without any vacancy. 5. The Civil Judge (Jr. Division) No. 2, West Tripura, Agartala passed the order dated 09.08.04 dismissing the application for temporary injunction. Narrating the entire facts as pleaded by the respective parties, the Trial Court came to the finding that there was no nexus between the promotion of the Respondent Nos. 4 to 14 herein and the impugned order of transfer. The Civil Judge (Jr. Division) No. 2, West Tripura, Agartala passed the order dated 09.08.04 dismissing the application for temporary injunction. Narrating the entire facts as pleaded by the respective parties, the Trial Court came to the finding that there was no nexus between the promotion of the Respondent Nos. 4 to 14 herein and the impugned order of transfer. The argument that the transfer order was issued to oblige a particular Employees' Association also did not find favour with the Trial Court having regard to the fact that the Plaintiffs/Respondents were transferred on completion of a good number of years of service in the State of Tripura. The Trial Court found that the Plaintiffs/Respondents were due for transfer and such transfer was necessitated in view of the transfer of some officers from Mizoram SSA to other SSA. The Trial Court also found that Plaintiffs/Respondents were not transferred in violation of standing norms. It held that the Plaintiffs/Respondents have no right to remain posted in a particular station; more particularly when the service involves transfer from one place to another. As regards the plea of hurriedly releasing the Plaintiffs/Respondents, the Trial Court found that they had to be so released, as such inasmuch as the Officers in Mizoram SSA could be relieved only on joining of the Plaintiffs/Respondents. The Trial Court also found that the Plaintiffs/Respondents did not ventilate their grievance by making approach to the departmental authorities. The Trial Court after discussing all the three principles involving consideration of prayer for temporary injunction declined to grant the same and rejected the application for injunction by order dated 09.08.04. 6. Being aggrieved, the Plaintiffs/Respondents approached the appellate Court, i.e., the Addl. District Judge, No. 2, West Tripura, Agartala by filing Misc. Appeal No. 13/04. The Appellate Court by impugned order dated 13.09.04 granted temporary mandatory injunction directing the defendant/Petitioners not to give effect to the transfer order dated 22.07.04 and the release order passed on the same date till disposal of the Title Suit. The Appellate Court noticed that except the three Respondents herein, the other officers who were the Plaintiffs alongwith the said Respondents had already joined the Mizoram SSA and observed that the temporary mandatory injunction would not be applicable to them, they having waived their right. 7. The Appellate Court noticed that except the three Respondents herein, the other officers who were the Plaintiffs alongwith the said Respondents had already joined the Mizoram SSA and observed that the temporary mandatory injunction would not be applicable to them, they having waived their right. 7. It is the legality and validity of the said order of temporary mandatory injunction passed by the Appellate Court on 13.09.04 which has been put to challenge by filing this application under Article227 of the Constitution of India. According to the Petitioners, the Appellate Court committed manifest error of law in not considering the settled law that the power of the Appellate Court in the matter of injunction was circumscribed and the Appellate Court having failed to record any findings on that settled law, the appellate order is not sustainable. The Petitioners have urged that no interference was called for to the order passed by the Trial Court inasmuch as there is nothing wrong in the order passed by the Trial Court rejecting the prayer for injunction, so as to interfere with the same in exercise of power in appellate jurisdiction. Further case of the Petitioners is that the transfer being an incident of service and the impugned order having been issued in the exigency of service, the Appellate Court could not have interfered with the same by way of temporary mandatory injunction and that too interfering with the order of the Trial Court by which prayer for injunction was rejected. According to the Petitioners, the Appellate Court exceeded in its jurisdiction and acted in flagrant disregard to law, the rules of procedure resulting in failure of justice and rendering the Petitioners remediless. Hence this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 8. The Respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 have filed an affidavit in opposition opposing the claim of the Petitioners to which the Petitioners have filed their rejoinder affidavit. 9. I have heard Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Mr. A. Deb, learned Counsel for the Petitioners. I have also heard Mr. B. Das, learned Sr. counsel who made submissions on behalf of the Respondents Nos. 4 to 14 Mr. D.K. Biswas, learned Counsel represented and made submissions on behalf of the Respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3. 10. Mr. Bhowmik, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Mr. A. Deb, learned Counsel for the Petitioners. I have also heard Mr. B. Das, learned Sr. counsel who made submissions on behalf of the Respondents Nos. 4 to 14 Mr. D.K. Biswas, learned Counsel represented and made submissions on behalf of the Respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3. 10. Mr. Bhowmik, learned Sr. counsel for the Petitioner, strenuously argued that the Appellate Court exceeded in its jurisdiction and acted beyond the sound principle towards granting an order of injunction in passing the impugned order of temporary mandatory injunction. He submitted that there was nothing wrong in refusing to grant injunction by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court assuming its jurisdiction not vested in it passed the impugned temporary mandatory injunction. He submitted that the Appellate Court even after taking notice of the fact that other officers leaving aside only three Plaintiffs had already joined the Mizoram SSA carrying out the order of transfer ought not have passed the temporary injunction. He submitted that the Appellate Court failed to consider that temporary mandatory injunction can be granted only in rarest of the rare case and that it was not one of such cases. He finally submitted that transfer being an incident of service and the Plaintiffs/Respondents belonging to transferable service having completed their tenure in Tripura, there was nothing wrong in transferring them to Mizoram SSA in the exigency of service. 11. Mr. B. Das, learned Sr. counsel for the Respondents Nos. 4 to 14 supported the case of the Petitioners and submitted that it was wrong on the part of the Appellate Court to assume jurisdiction not vested in it. He submitted that the promotion of the Respondents Nos. 4 to 14 way back in 2002 had no nexus with the impugned order of transfer. He also submitted that in any case, transfer being an incident of service and the disputed question of fact requiring adjudication in the main suit could not have led to grant of temporary mandatory injunction as was granted by the Appellate Court. 12. On the other hand, Mr. D.K. Biswas, learned Counsel for the Respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 supported the impugned order of injunction. Apart from arguing on merit of the case, he also raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of non-joinder of necessary party. 12. On the other hand, Mr. D.K. Biswas, learned Counsel for the Respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 supported the impugned order of injunction. Apart from arguing on merit of the case, he also raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of non-joinder of necessary party. According to him the Petitioners having not made all the Plaintiffs in the suit as party Respondents except three of the Plaintiffs, i.e., the Respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3, the instant petition is not maintainable. As regards the merit of the case, he submitted that the Appellate Court having found a prima facie case in favour of the Plaintiffs/Respondents, more particularly in view of the fact that the impugned order of transfer had to be issued to accommodate the illegally promoted officers, i.e., the Respondents Nos. 4 to 14, there was nothing wrong in passing the impugned order of temporary mandatory injunction. 13. The learned Counsel for the parties placed reliance on various decisions to buttress their argument. Mr. Bhowmik, learned Sr. counsel for the Petitioners placed reliance on the following decisions: (1) AIR 1982 Guw 69 B.N. Singh v. Managing Committee, Sundarmahal Hindi High School (2) AIR 2004 SC 1265 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Gobardhan Lal (3) (2003) 4 SCC 104 Public Service Tribunal Bar Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh (4) AIR 1995 SC 813 Chief General Manager (Telecom, any Telecom Circular) v. R.C. Bhattacharjee (5) AIR 1986 SC 1955 B. Veradha Rao v. State of Karnataka 14. On the other hand, Mr. D.K. Biswas, learned Sr. Counsel for the Respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 placed reliance on the following decisions: (1) (2003) 6 SCC 675 Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Raj (2) (1998) 3 SCC 341 Rena Draga v. Lalchand Soni (3) AIR 2004 SC 4221 Baseer v. State of Kerala (4) (2003) 4 SCC 104 Public Service Tribunal Bar Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh (5) AIR 1982 Guw 69 B.N. Singh v. Managing Committee, Sundarmahal Hindi High School (6) (1999) 2 SCC 377 Sree Jain Swetambar Terapanthi VID(S) v. Phudan Singh (7) (1990) 2 SCC 117 Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden and Ors. 15. 15. Reminding myself of the proposition of law that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case, because a case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not what logically follows from it (see Lord Halseburry in Queen Leathern -- 1909 AC 495), I now proceed to consider the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties towards examining the legality and validity of the impugned order dated 13.09.04 passed by the Appellate Court granting temporary mandatory injunction. 16. There is no dispute that the Respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 have completed long years of service in Tripura SSA. The Respondent No. 1 has been in Tripura SSA since 23.01.96 (more than 8 years), the Respondent No. 2 since 09.07.94 (more than 10 years) and the Respondent No. 3 since 25.04.94 (more than 10 years) respectively. Out of 8 officers in Mizoram SSA, 5 have already joined there. The transfer affected by the order dated 22.07.04 is for a period of two years only. Thus, this is the case of temporary transfer for a limited period of two years. 17. The plea of the Respondents/Plaintiffs is that the transfer order dated 22.07.04 had to be issued disturbing the Plaintiffs/Respondents only to accommodate the Respondents Nos. 4 to 14 who according to them were illegally promoted without any vacancy on 25.07.02. In this connection, the Respondents/Plaintiffs have referred to certain communications to bring home the submission that the transfer was necessitated to phase out the excess number of Officers. As against such plea of the Respondents/Plaintiffs, it is the case of the Petitioners that transfer was necessitated as there were vacancies in Mizoram SSA which were required to be filled up urgently. According to the Petitioners, six vacancies arose in Mizoram on account of transfer of the incumbents from Mizoram. Two more vacancies arose on transfer of the incumbents to the home State of Tripura. To fill up those 8 vacancies, the Respondents/Plaintiffs had to be transferred by the impugned order of transfer. As regards the simultaneous release of the Respondents, it is the stand of the Petitioners that such course of action had to be adopted in view of acute shortage of staff in Mizoram. This aspect of the matter was considered by the Trial Court providing adequate joining time for the Plaintiffs/Respondents. 18. As regards the simultaneous release of the Respondents, it is the stand of the Petitioners that such course of action had to be adopted in view of acute shortage of staff in Mizoram. This aspect of the matter was considered by the Trial Court providing adequate joining time for the Plaintiffs/Respondents. 18. The Trial Court by its order dated 09.08.04 upon consideration of the materials in detail and discussing three ingredients towards granting an order of injunction declined to pass any such order. Dealing with the main two pleas of the Plaintiffs/Respondents that the transfer was necessitated in accommodate the Respondent Nos. 4 to 14 who had been illegally promoted in July, 2002 and that the order of transfer was issued due to interference of the Employees' Association, the Trial Court on perusal of the records, found that 8 officers including the present Respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 had been transferred from Tripura SSA, whereas 8 numbers of Junior Telecom Officers were promoted to T.E.S. Group-B service in newly created division and sub-division. The Trial Court also found that there was no nexus between the promotion effected in July, 2002 and the impugned order issued in July, 2004. As regards the second plea of interference by the Employees' Association, the Trial Court on perusal of the records, held the same to be unfounded. The Trial Court also discussed about the transfer liability of the employees. Referring to certain case laws relating to the principles involvement in the matter of transfer and the presumption in favour of the validity of action of the public officers, unless contrary to as shown and upon discussion of the three ingredients involving grant or refusal of the order of injunction, dismissed the application for temporary injunction. The view adopted by the Trial Court was a plausible one and conforming to the requirement of consideration towards granting or refusal of the order of injunction. 19. The Appellate Court interfered with the order of the Trial Court on the ground that the transfer order was issued on 22.07.04 hastily followed by simultaneous release order requiring the Plaintiffs/Respondents to hand over the charge and that no other incumbents were placed towards replacement of the Plaintiffs/Respondents. 19. The Appellate Court interfered with the order of the Trial Court on the ground that the transfer order was issued on 22.07.04 hastily followed by simultaneous release order requiring the Plaintiffs/Respondents to hand over the charge and that no other incumbents were placed towards replacement of the Plaintiffs/Respondents. According to the Appellate Court, an order of transfer without a substitute signifies something else and cannot be said to be a regular transfer wherein no reliever is shown in place of the transferee. According to the Appellate Court, such a position gives rise to serious doubt as to the bonafide of the order of transfer. According to the Appellate Court the order of promotion effected in July, 2002 in favour of the Respondents Nos. 4 to 14 were without any vacancy. The Appellate Court found favour with the apprehension expressed by the Plaintiffs/Respondents that consequent upon their transfer to Mizoram SSA the vacancies that would arise would be filled up by the excess number of promotees, i.e. the Respondents Nos. 4 to 14. 20. Upon consideration of the above, the Appellate Court found a strong prima facie case in favour of the Plaintiffs/Respondents and granted temporary mandatory injunction, refusal of which according to the Appellate Court would cause miscarriage of justice. As regards the fact that out of 8 officers 5 have already joined Mizoram SSA, the Appellate Court held that those Officers have waived their right. 21. On perusal of the appellate order nothing is discernible as to how the Trial Court committed any error of law in refusing to grant the prayer for injunction. The Appellate Court simply recorded the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and on the aforesaid grounds granted temporary mandatory injunction without recording anything as to how the Trial Court committed any error of law in refusing to grant the prayer for injunction. Altogether separate and independent reasons have been assigned by the Appellate Court towards granting the temporary mandatory injunction. Upon discussion of those independent reasons, the Appellate Court found a strong prima facie case in favour of the Plaintiffs/Respondents. However, without discussing anything about other two ingredients so essential for granting the order of injunction that too a mandatory injunction, the Appellate Court granted the same. Upon discussion of those independent reasons, the Appellate Court found a strong prima facie case in favour of the Plaintiffs/Respondents. However, without discussing anything about other two ingredients so essential for granting the order of injunction that too a mandatory injunction, the Appellate Court granted the same. While doing so, the other two ingredients, i.e. balance of convenience and preventing irreparable loss and injury including the question of public interest discussed by the Trial Court have not at all been discussed by the Appellate Court. Even if the view expressed by the Appellate Court is said to be a reasonable one, unless a categorical finding is recorded that the view expressed by the Trial Court is perverse and illegal and contrary to the principles involving grant or refusal of an order of injunction, the Appellate Court could not have granted the temporary mandatory injunction. The facts on which the Appellate Court assigned its reasons was also discussed by the Trial Court and upon evaluation of the same refused to grant the prayer for injunction. However, the Appellate Court without discussing anything about such finding recorded by the Trial Court and as to how the same resulted in miscarriage of justice or led to violation of the principles involving granting of temporary injunction, granted the temporary mandatory injunction upon assigning the independent reasons on the same set of facts already discussed by the Trial Court. 22. In the Case of B.N. Singh (supra) on which the learned Counsel for both the parties placed reliance, the Division Bench of this Court clearly held that the power of Appellate Court in the matter of injunction is rather circumscribed. The Appellate Court would be slow to interfere with the exercise of discretion and would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter on the trial stage it might have come to contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the Trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the Trial Court's exercise of discretion. It is only when the Trial Court has acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant facts, then it would certainly be open to the Appellate Court to interfere with the Trial Court's exercise discretion. 23. It is only when the Trial Court has acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant facts, then it would certainly be open to the Appellate Court to interfere with the Trial Court's exercise discretion. 23. The above case squarely covers the instant case. As has been observed above, nothing is indicated in the appellate order as to how the order passed by the Trial Court is unreasonable or capricious or has ignored the relevant facts. The Trial Court exercised its discretion reasonably and in a judicial manner. Merely because the Appellate Court took a different view, same could not justify passing an order of injunction and that too mandatory in nature. 24. The other cases on which Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned Sr. Counsel placed reliance are all in respect of reluctant approach of the Court in the matter of transfer which is the incident of service. 25. In the case of Surya Dev Rai (Supra) on which Mr. D.K. Biswas, learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs/Respondents placed reliance is in respect of the recent amendment to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, vis-a-vis the jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the constitution of India. In that case the Apex Court held that such jurisdiction being part of the basic structure of the Constitution, same cannot be tempered not even by a constitutional amendment much less by an Act of legislature. In that case the Apex Court held that an aggrieved party as in the instant case can invoke the power of the superintendence of a High Court. Even the interlocutory orders as in the instant case which are no longer reviewable under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure are reviewable under the Certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and227 of the Constitution of India. This case was pressed into service to buttress the argument that this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution would not misuse such power for correcting mere errors of fact or law and that the power is available only when error is manifest and apparent on the face of record, and grave injustice or gross failure of justice has been occasioned thereby. 26. 26. In the aforesaid case the Apex Court interpreted the phrase "error apparent on the face of the record" and held that the same is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard to the provision of law, the one that can be perceived or demonstrated without involving lengthy or complicated argument or a long drawn process or reasoning. 27. In the instant case, as noticed above, the Appellant court interfered with the order of the Trial Court without assigning any reason as to why the view expressed by the Trial Court is not a reasonable view. The Appellate Court has also not indicated as to what was the error on the part of the Trial Court in exercise of its discretion towards refusal to grant the prayer for injunction. The Appellate Court granted the temporary mandatory injunction on assignment of its reasons without holding anything against the order passed by the Trial Court and as to how the same was unreasonable or capricious. As has been held by the Apex Court in the case of State v. Navjot Sandhu as reported in J.T. (2003) 4 SC 605 and relied on by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case of Surya Dev Rai, the supervisory jurisdiction is wide and can be used to meet the ends of justice, also to interfere even with an interlocutory order. 28. In the instant case against the clear finding of the Trial Court upon discussion of the ingredients of granting or refusing an order of injunction and rejection of the prayer for injunction made by the Plaintiffs/Respondents, the Appellate Court without discussing anything as to the legality and validity of findings recorded by the Trial Court, passed the temporary mandatory injunction upon assessment of the alleged fact situation of its own without holding anything adverse against the order passed by the Trial Court. It is in this context, the aforesaid Division Bench decision of this Court in B.N. Singh (Supra) comes into operation wherein it has been laid down while holding that the power of the Appellate Court in the matter of injunction is rather circumscribed that the Appellate Court would normally be not justified in interfering with the exercise of the discretion by the Trial Court solely on the ground that the Appellate Court would have taken the different view of the matter. 29. 29. In the case of Rena Draga (supra) the Apex Court while discussing the scope of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court held that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the finding of fact arrived at by the fact finding authority upon evidence on record. There is no dispute relating to the said proposition of law. However, the use of such power in the instance case is altogether in a different fact situation, rather the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the said case is applicable in respect of the impugned appellate order. What is applicable to the High Court towards exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is also applicable to the Appellate Court as in the instant case. As has already been held, the Appellate Court lightly interfered with the finding of fact arrived at by the Trial Court and that too without holding anything adverse against the discretion exercised by the Trial Court. It is under these circumstances, the jurisdiction under Article 227 is required to be exercised in the instant case. 30. The case of Baseer (supra) has also been pressed into service by the learned Counsel for the Respondents to bring home the same argument. Mr. Biswas, learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs/Respondents has also placed reliance on the aforesaid decision in B.N. Singh of this Court wherein the Division bench held that the Appellate Court is empowered to interfere with the Trial Court's exercise of discretion towards granting or refusing of an order of injunction if it appears to the Appellate Court that in exercising its discretion, the Trial Court has acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored the relevant facts. As observed above, nothing is discernible from the order of the Appellate Court as to in what manner the discretion exercised by the Trial Court was capricious, unreasonable or devoid of relevant facts. Thus, this case also does not help the case of the Plaintiffs/Respondents. 31. The case of Sree Jain Swetambar Terapanthi VID(S)(supra) on which Mr. Biswas placed reliance also does not help the case of the Plaintiffs/Respondents. Thus, this case also does not help the case of the Plaintiffs/Respondents. 31. The case of Sree Jain Swetambar Terapanthi VID(S)(supra) on which Mr. Biswas placed reliance also does not help the case of the Plaintiffs/Respondents. In that case, the Apex Court while discussing the scope of interference with the granting of temporary injunction by the Trial Court held that the Appellate Court can set aside the order of the Trial Court when the same is passed without recording its prima facie satisfaction on merit. At the same time the Apex Court held that when the Trial Court does so, the Appellate Court cannot set aside the order of the Trial Court on the ground that the Trial Court erred in recording prima facie satisfaction because of non consideration of the relevant material or erroneously reaching the findings or conclusion on the facts established. 32. In the Case of Dorab Cawasji (supra), the Apex Court issued guidelines as regards the passing of interlocutory mandatory injunction, same being an equitable relief. In that case, the Apex Court held that temporary mandatory injunction being essentially an equitable relief, the granting or refusal of the same shall rest in the sound judicial discretion of the Court to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case. In the instant case it cannot be said that the Appellate Court granted the temporary mandatory injunction in exercise of its sound judicial discretion, rather it lightly interfered with the order passed by the Trial Court. 33. I may gainfully refer to the recent decision of the Apex Court as reported in (2004) 7 SCC 478 Matro Marins and Anr. v. Bonus Watch Co.(P) Ltd. and Ors. in which the Apex Court found that the facts of that case did not warrant issuance of interim mandatory injunction which amounted to pretrial decree. In that case the Apex Court quoted the observations of the Apex Court in the aforesaid case of Dorab Cawasji (supra) in paragraph 16 of the judgment which is as follows: 16. in which the Apex Court found that the facts of that case did not warrant issuance of interim mandatory injunction which amounted to pretrial decree. In that case the Apex Court quoted the observations of the Apex Court in the aforesaid case of Dorab Cawasji (supra) in paragraph 16 of the judgment which is as follows: 16. The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunction are thus granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo or the last non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining. But since the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right as the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm, courts have evolved certain guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are: (1) The Plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction. (2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money. (3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief. 34. In the aforesaid case of Dorab Cawasji (supra), the Apex Court held that an interim mandatory injunction can be granted only in exceptional cases coming within the explanation noticed in the judgment. In my considered opinion the case of the Respondents/Plaintiffs does not come under any of the those exceptions and even on facts it is not a case of issuance of an interim mandatory injunction directing the Respondents/Petitioners restraining from giving effect to the order of transfer. 35. The law relating to transfer is well settled. There is no dispute that the Plaintiffs/Respondents are involved in transferable service. They have been transferred to Mizoram for a limited period of two years. 35. The law relating to transfer is well settled. There is no dispute that the Plaintiffs/Respondents are involved in transferable service. They have been transferred to Mizoram for a limited period of two years. Various administrative exigencies are involved in the matter of transfer as has been observed by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. N.K. Singh reported in (1994) 6 SCC 98 . The Apex Court observed as follows. The tendency of anyone to consider himself indispensable is undemocratic and unhealthy. Assessment of worth must be left to the bona fide decision of the superiors in service and their honest assessment accepted as a part of service discipline. Transfer of a government servant in a transferable service is a necessary incident of the service career. Assessment of the quality of men is to be made by the superiors taking into account several factors including suitability of the person for a particular post and exigencies of administration. Several imponderable requiring formation of subjective opinion in that sphere may be involved, at times. The only realistic approach is to leave it to the wisdom of that hierarchical superiors to make that decision. Unless the decision is vitiated by mala fides or infraction of any professed norm or principle governing the transfer, which alone can be scrutinized judicially, there are no judicially manageable standards for scrutinizing all transfers and the courts lack the necessary expertise for personnel management of all government departments. This must be left, in public interest, to the departmental heads subject to the limited judicial scrutiny indicate. 36. The Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. H.N. Kritania as reported in 1989 (3) SLJ (SC) 46while dealing with the jurisdiction of the High Court/Tribunal in the matter of transfer found in that case that the Tribunal lost sight of that fact that the Respondents therein had already been released from the Calcutta Office w.e.f. 15.03.85 and therefore, there was no question of issuing any fresh release order allowing the Appellant to continue. The Apex Court set aside the order of the Tribunal holding that when one has already been released on transfer, there cannot be any order to rejoin giving rise to a situation in which the incumbent can again rejoin in his original place of posting. The Apex Court set aside the order of the Tribunal holding that when one has already been released on transfer, there cannot be any order to rejoin giving rise to a situation in which the incumbent can again rejoin in his original place of posting. The Apex Court time and again has reiterated that ordinarily there should not be any interference with the orders of transfer which is an incident of service unless any malafide or any statutory violation is established. In the instant case no malafide has been attributed. There is also no indication about any violation of any statutory rules. 37. The primary plea of the Plaintiffs/Respondents in the instant case is that the impugned transfer order has been resorted to only to accommodate the Respondents Nos. 4 to 14. The Trial Court on the basis of the materials available on record found the same to be not established. It held that there was no nexus between the promotion of the Respondents Nos. 4 to 14 effected in July, 2002 with that of the impugned order of transfer passed two years thereafter in July, 2004. The Appellate Court lightly interfered with such findings without assigning any reason as to how such findings arrived at by the Trial Court was erroneous. 38. Even in the case of Silpi Bose (Mrs.) and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. as reported in 1991 Spp.(2) SCC 659, the Apex Court found fault with the High Court in interfering with the order of transfer which the High Court did so on the ground that the impugned order of transfer was issued to accommodate the Appellants. The Apex Court held that if the competent authority issued transfer orders with a view to accommodate the public servants to avoid hardship, the same cannot or should not be interfered by the Court merely because the transfer orders were passed on the request of the employees concerned. The Apex Court in that case found that the Respondents had continued to be posted on their respective places for the last several years and that they had no vested right to remain posted at one place. The observations of the Apex Court in that case are quoted below: 3. The Apex Court in that case found that the Respondents had continued to be posted on their respective places for the last several years and that they had no vested right to remain posted at one place. The observations of the Apex Court in that case are quoted below: 3. After hearing learned Counsel for the parties and having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the High Court committed serious error in interfering with the transfer orders of Primary School teachers. The High Court held that the District Education Establishment Committee had no jurisdiction to transfer the Primary School teachers on their request. We find no justification for this conclusion. There is no dispute that the District Education Establishment Committee is competent to transfer Primary School teachers from one place to the other but merely because such transfers were made on the request of teachers, the Committee is not divested of its jurisdiction. The Director of the Primary Education had issued directions that lady teachers posted in distant areas or rural areas may be accommodated the place of their request to avoid hardship to them. These directions are reasonable, and the District Education Establishment Committee followed the same principles in transferring the Appellants on their requests to avoid hardship which was being caused to them. The Respondents challenged the validity of the transfers before the High Court on another ground also that Primary School teachers posted in the urban areas were not liable to be transferred to rural areas though the State Government had issued circular on March 30, 1984 permitting transfers from urban areas to rural areas. The High Court did not interfere with the order of the transfer on this ground instead it held that the transfer orders were without jurisdiction as the same had been made on the Appellants' request with a view to accommodate them. We fail to appreciate the reasoning recorded by the High Court. If the competent authority issued transfer orders with a view to accommodate a public servant to avoid hardship, the same cannot and should not be interfered by the Court merely because the transfer orders were passed on the request of the employees concerned. The Respondents have continued to be posted at their respective places for the last several years, they have no vested right to remain posted at one place. The Respondents have continued to be posted at their respective places for the last several years, they have no vested right to remain posted at one place. Since they hold transferable posts they are liable to be transferred from one place to the other. The transfer orders had been issued by the competent authority which did not violate any mandatory rule, therefore the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the transfer orders. 4. In our opinion, the courts should not interfere with a transfer order which is made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory rule or on the ground of mala fide. A government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer order is passed in violation of executive instructions or orders, the courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the department. If the Courts continue to interfere with day-to-day transfer orders issued by the government and its subordinate authorities, there will be complete chaos in the administration which would not be conducive to public interest. The High Court overlooked these aspects in interfering with the transfer orders. 39. The Apex Court in a recent decision as reported in (2004) 7 SCC 405 State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Siya Ram and Anr. while once again reiterating that transfer is not only an incident of service but a condition of service as well and is necessary in public interest and efficiency in public administration observed as follows. 5. The High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India had gone into the question as to whether the transfer was in the interest of public service. That would essentially require factual adjudication and invariably depend upon peculiar facts and circumstances of the case concerned. 5. The High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India had gone into the question as to whether the transfer was in the interest of public service. That would essentially require factual adjudication and invariably depend upon peculiar facts and circumstances of the case concerned. No government servant or employee or a public undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place or place of his choice since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the Courts or the Tribunals normally cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they were appellate authorities substituting their own decision for that of the employer/management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned. This position was highlighted by this Court in National Hydroelectric Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Shri Bhagawan. 6. The above position was recently highlighted in Union of India v. Janardhan Debnath. It has to be noticed that the High Court proceeded on the basis as if the transfer was connected with the departmental proceedings. There was no an iota of material to arrive at the conclusion. No mala fides could be attributed as the order was purely on administrative grounds and in public interest. 7. In view of the settled position in law the judgment of the High Court is indefensible and is set aside. 40. I now consider the plea raised on behalf of the Plaintiffs/Respondents in the present proceeding that the writ petition is not maintainable due to non-joinder of parties. According to the Plaintiffs/Respondents the present petition having not impleaded the other Plaintiffs in the suit, is bad for non-joinder of parties. I am of the considered opinion that such a plea is wholly untenable. All other officers except the present three Plaintiffs/Respondents have joined the Mizoram SSA in compliance of the order of transfer. According to the Plaintiffs/Respondents the present petition having not impleaded the other Plaintiffs in the suit, is bad for non-joinder of parties. I am of the considered opinion that such a plea is wholly untenable. All other officers except the present three Plaintiffs/Respondents have joined the Mizoram SSA in compliance of the order of transfer. In fact, the Appellate Court while granting the temporary mandatory injunction has observed that the other Plaintiffs who have already joined the Mizoram SSA have waived their right. Moreover, it is the legality and validity of the impugned order of the Appellate Court by which the temporary mandatory injunction has been granted, has been examined by this Court. The said order itself has recorded that the Plaintiffs have waived their right in so far as the injunction matter is concerned and the present proceeding being confined to the injunction matter, those Plaintiffs who have already joined the Mizoram SSA have got nothing to do with the present proceeding. In that view of the matter and for the purpose of the interlocutory stage, I am of the considered opinion that those Plaintiffs are not necessary parties to the present proceeding. The merit of the case will be judged in its entirety by the Trial Court in the suit in which the said Plaintiffs continue to be party. 41. For the foregoing reasons and discussions, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned appellate order dated 13.09.04 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 2, West Tripura, Agartala in Misc. Appeal No. 13/04 is liable to be set aside and quashed which I accordingly do. Consequently, the order dated 09.08.04 passed by the Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Court No. 2, West Tripura, Agartala in Misc. Case No. 83/04 arising out of Title Suit No. 88/04 gets restored and shall hold the filed till disposal of the Title suit No. 88/04. 42. Any opinion expressed in this Judgment and order must not be construed to be opinion expressed on merit of the main suit. The opinions are primarily in respect of the interlocutory order involving the main suit. Same will have no bearing in the merit of the suit and the learned Trial Court will decide the same on the basis of the evidence which might be adduced during trial. The opinions are primarily in respect of the interlocutory order involving the main suit. Same will have no bearing in the merit of the suit and the learned Trial Court will decide the same on the basis of the evidence which might be adduced during trial. It is expected that having regard to the short duration of the impugned transfer order which is for two years, the Trial Court shall expeditiously decide the main suit. 43. The petition stands allowed, without, however, any order as to costs. Petition allowed