JUDGMENT By the Court.- The appellants herein were the plaintiffs in special civil suit No.151/84/A ("plaintiffs" for short). The challenge in this appeal is restricted to the sale deed dated 24.5.1977, executed by the mother of plaintiff No.1 in favour of defendant No.1 (since deceased) by which the said mother had sold to respondent No.1 (original defendant No.1 - since deceased and now represented by his heirs) a property known as "Casas de Morada" consisting of a residential house having land registration No.12062 and matriz No.1359 along with movables existing in the house situated in the said property. 2. Some more facts are required to be noted do dispose of the present appeal. Plaintiff No.1 - Francisco de Castro Pereira, Abel Cristovao Castro Pereira. and Terezinha Maria Florinda Castro Pereira are the three children of Maria Miqueline Melo e Castro Pereira and Joao des Remedies Pereira. The said Francisco de Castro was married to Smt. Mariana Elelvina Vaz e Castro Pereira (plaintiff No.2). The father of the said Francisco, the said Abel and said Terezinha died on or about 22.12.1956 and upon his death, their mother initiated inventory proceedings in the year 1962 or thereabout. The said Abel and the said Terezinha on or about 15.2.1963 executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of their said mother, the said mother, the said Maria Miquelina Melo e Castro Pereira, including a power to sell both movable and immovable properties belonging to them. On or about 24.12.1964, the said Francisco along with his wife (deceased plaintiff No.2) sold their share in the paternal estate of his father in favour of their said mother for a sum of Rs.15,000/- and later on by a sale deed dated 24.5.1977 (Exhibit-46), the said mother Smt. Maria Miquelina Melo e Castro Pereira sold to defendant No.1 (since deceased) the said property known as "Casas de Morada" for a sum of Rs. 25,000/-. The said mother died on or about 13.8.1982 and it appears that after the plaintiffs relinquished their share in the paternal estate, the inventory proceedings filed by the said mother in the year 1962 or thereabout, remained dormant, to be revived by the said Francisco after the death of his mother. 25,000/-. The said mother died on or about 13.8.1982 and it appears that after the plaintiffs relinquished their share in the paternal estate, the inventory proceedings filed by the said mother in the year 1962 or thereabout, remained dormant, to be revived by the said Francisco after the death of his mother. In fact, it appears that the said inventory proceedings were abandoned by the said mother, after the plaintiffs relinquished their rights to their paternal estate and, in fact, it was stated by PW 1, Mousinho de Silva Soares, the attorney of the said plaintiffs that the said proceedings were closed and where reopened by plaintiff No.1 upon the death of the said mother who was otherwise acting as the Cabeca de Casal/Administrator in the inventory proceedings initiated by her upon the death of her said husband. All the three children of said Maria Miquelina Melo e Castro Pereira and Joao des Remedios Pereira to whom the suit property belonged, had migrated to Portugal. After the death of said Maria Miquelina Melo e Castro Pereira, the said inventory proceedings were revived by plaintiff No.1. 3. It appears that the said plaintiffs were compelled to file the said special civil suit No.15/84 in view of the order passed by the inventory Court dated 3.9.1984, by which, it was held that since the properties were in possession of a third party, the plaintiffs ought to take action by filing a separate suit. There is no dispute that in the inventory proceedings, upon the death of said Joao des Remedios Pereira, the mother Smt. Maria Miquelina Melo e Castro Pereira was appointed as the Cabeca de Casali Administrator and after the plaintiffs revived the proceedings, after the death of their mother, plaintiff No.1 was appointed as the Cabeca de Casali Administrator. 4. The present appeal filed by the plaintiffs against the judgment and order passed in the special civil suit No.15/841 A is restricted to the validity of the said sale deed dated 24.5.1977 (Exhibit-46) executed by the said Smt. Maria Miquelina Melo e Castro Pereira in favour of defendant No.1 (since deceased). 5. Learned counsel Shri M.B. D'Costa, on behalf of the plaintiffs, has submitted that the said Smt. Maria Miquelina Melo e Castro Pereira as Cabeca de Casal/Administrator during the pendency of the said inventory proceedings sold one of the properties, which she, as the administrator. could not have sold. 5. Learned counsel Shri M.B. D'Costa, on behalf of the plaintiffs, has submitted that the said Smt. Maria Miquelina Melo e Castro Pereira as Cabeca de Casal/Administrator during the pendency of the said inventory proceedings sold one of the properties, which she, as the administrator. could not have sold. Shri D'Costa has placed reliance on Articles 2085 of the Civil Code and has further submitted that the learned trial Court lost sight of the fact that the plaintiffs would also have been the heirs of their mother who were entitled to succeed to her estate. Shri D'Costa has further submitted that the said mother sold the said property claiming to be the sole owner and not as the attorney of her other two children and that the plaintiffs were subsequently allotted the said property in the inventory proceedings. On the other hand, Shri Fernandes, the learned Advocate for the said defendant has submitted that the plaintiffs had relinquished their rights in favour of their mother by deed dated 24.12.1964 and the said mother had otherwise power to sell the said property on behalf of her two other children. Shri Fernandes has further submitted that it is true that the said deed dated 24.5.1977 does not make a mention that the said property was sold by the said mother as attorney of her other two children, but the fact remains that the said mother did not sell the suit property in her capacity as Cabeca de Casali Administrator in the inventory proceedings filed by her upon death of her husband. 6. Article 2085 of the Civil Code, reads as follows : "The administrator, as administrator of the estate, shall receive all fruits and income of the properties, of which he is having possession, and shall satisfy all the normal liabilities, with obligation to render the accounts in case the unufruct of the said properties does not belong to him; but he shall not alienate any properties of the estate except the fruits and other objects which cannot be preserved with fear of deterioration." (emphasis supplied) 7. Admittedly, the plaintiffs had sold their rights in the paternal estate of their father in favour of their mother by deed dated 24.12.1964. Admittedly, the plaintiffs had sold their rights in the paternal estate of their father in favour of their mother by deed dated 24.12.1964. Admittedly also the said other son Abel Cristovao Castro a Pereira along with his wife Maria Ivone and sister Terezinha, who was then a spinster, had given their power of attorney to the said mother to sell the properties belonging to them. There is no dispute that after the said relinquishment by the plaintiffs in favour of their said mother, the inventory proceedings were not pursued by the said mother and, in fact as stated by PW 1 the said inventory proceedings were closed and it appears that the said inventory proceedings were revived by the plaintiffs to partition the estate of their said mother. There is no dispute that the inventory proceedings initiated by the said mother upon the death of her husband were the proceedings between the parties who were all majors. It is true that the said mother in the sale deed dated 24.5.1977 did not specifically recite that she was selling the suit property pursuant to the deed of relinquishment executed by her one son and daughter-in-law and pursuant to tile power of attorney executed by her other son and daughter-in-law as well as her daughter who was then spinster, but the question is whether she had power to sell the suit property to defendant No.1 (since deceased). It is to be noted that the said mother did not sell the suit property in her capacity as the administrator appointed in the said inventory proceedings but in her capacity as the moiety-holder who had purchased the plaintiffs' share and in her capacity of being attorney of her other children. In other words there was no legal bar to prevent her to sell the suit property in favour of the defendant No.1 as on the date of sale, i.e. to say on 24.5.1977. What Article 2085 of the Civil Code prohibits is a sale by the administrator. The said mother, while selling the suit property to defendant No.1 (since deceased) did not sell the same in her capacity as the administrator but as co-owner of the same and as attorney of her other two children namely the said Abel and his wife and the said Terezinha. The said mother, while selling the suit property to defendant No.1 (since deceased) did not sell the same in her capacity as the administrator but as co-owner of the same and as attorney of her other two children namely the said Abel and his wife and the said Terezinha. In the circumstances therefore, Article 2085 of the Civil Code cannot come in the way of the sale deed executed by her in favour of defendant No.1 (since deceased). The submission that the plaintiffs would become the heirs of the mother after her death. was of no consequence because by then the suit property was already sold by the said mother as co-owner of the same as well as attorney of her other two children. In my opinion the plaintiffs had no locus standi to challenge the said sale deed after they had sold their rights in their father's inheritance to their mother by Deed of Relinquishment dated 24.12.1964. The fact that the plaintiffs have subsequently got the said property allotted to them which was no longer a part of the estate of their father or their mother, is of no consequence to the case of the plaintiffs because the said property was already sold by the mother during her life time as a co-owner of the same and as an attorney of other co-owners. In this view of the matter, the suit of the plaintiffs was rightly dismissed by the learned trial Court. 8. At the time of arguments learned Advocate Shri Fernandes drew my attention to an unreported order dated 16th July, 2001 of this Court in Mr. Francisco Xavier de Piedade de Castro Pereira and another v. Mr. Jeronimo Souza (since deceased) through his legal representatives and another (Letters Patent Appeal No.8/2001), to say that the controversy now raised by the plaintiffs was settled in the said letters patent appeal. However, learned counsel Shri D'Costa submitted that the points raised in this appeal regarding the capacity of the Cabesa de Casal/Administrator to sell the property was not raised in the said letters patent appeal and I agree with him. 9. Defendant No.1 (since deceased) also filed cross objections regarding the dismissal of his counter-claim to the extent of Rs. 17.913.57. However, learned counsel Shri D'Costa submitted that the points raised in this appeal regarding the capacity of the Cabesa de Casal/Administrator to sell the property was not raised in the said letters patent appeal and I agree with him. 9. Defendant No.1 (since deceased) also filed cross objections regarding the dismissal of his counter-claim to the extent of Rs. 17.913.57. It was the case of the defendant No.1 (since deceased) that he being a family friend and under the instructions consent and contract with said Smt. Maria Miquelina Melo e Castro Pereira and her children including the plaintiffs looked after the properties left behind by said Maria Miquelina and had carried out the maintenance and other works of car No.GDT 2407 and landed properties and paid liabilities and made funeral expenses upon the death of the said Maria Miquelina. Defendant No.1 stated that as per the schedule annexed to the written statement. he purchased spares and repaired and got painted the said car and paid an amount of Rs. 9.405.95 and a sum of Rs. 332.95 towards postage and telegrams. towards communications and correspondence with the children and relations of the said Maria Miquelina. paid funeral expenses of Rs. 3.556/- of the said Maria Miquelina. paid house tax and land tax in respect of the property at Nagoa in the sum of Rs. 40.60. and a sum of Rs. 4.578.46 for the repairs of the house at Nagoa and travelling expenses. In all he paid the said sum of Rs. 17.913.57. It was the case of defendant No.1 that the said expenses were incurred in 'the interest of the properties left behind by the said Maria Miquelina. Defendant No.1 stated that the cause of action for the recovery of the said amount arose in the second fortnight of June. 1984 when the plaintiff failed to pay the said amount and demanded possession of the car. 10. The plaintiffs. in answer to the said counter-claim of defendant No.1. stated that the children of said Maria Miquelina never consented defendant No.1 to carry out the maintenance and other works of the said car of the landed properties and funeral expenses. The plaintiffs stated that defendant No.1 used the money belonging to the said Maria Miquelina both for the purpose of liabilities and funeral expenses and that in any event they were not admitting the extent of the liabilities and the funeral expenses. The plaintiffs stated that defendant No.1 used the money belonging to the said Maria Miquelina both for the purpose of liabilities and funeral expenses and that in any event they were not admitting the extent of the liabilities and the funeral expenses. The plaintiffs stated that said defendant No.1 is not entitled to recover the said amount of Rs. 17.913.57 from the plaintiffs. 11. In the center of the controversy was an agreement dated 29th July. 1982 executed between the said mother and defendant No.1 (since deceased), the relevant clauses of which. read as follows : "( 1) That the first party (the said Maria Miquelina) shall give a General Power of Attorney to the Second Party (defendant No.1 - since deceased) granting powers, inter alia, to sell all her properties situate in any part of India at the prices, clauses and conditions which may be deemed proper. (2) That the Second Party (defendant No.1 - since deceased) shall utilize the proceeds realized from the sale of properties of the First Party, as the Second Party deems proper. (3) That the Second Party shall made all the expenses for the maintenance of the First Party, meet medical bills, pay taxes and meet other eventual expenses, till her death. (4) That the Second Party, after the death of the First Party, shall perform funeral rites, burial and all other post-death religious rites according to catholic religion." The learned trial Court came to the conclusion that the said mother expired shortly after executing the said agreement and, therefore, defendant No.1 was not given power of attorney to sell her properties. The learned trial Court also concluded that defendant No.1 had performed all other acts mentioned in the agreement only on humanitarian ground also looking to the relations between them. The learned trial Court also concluded that the plaintiffs had not consented to the said agreement and the only way to recover the amount was to sell the properties after obtaining the power of attorney. The learned trial Court further observed that it was a fact that other properties were never sold and as far as other expenses incurred by the said defendant No.1 were concerned, no one had authorised him to repair the car. The learned trial Court ultimately came to the conclusion that defendant No.1 had failed to establish that he was entitled to claim the said amount from the plaintiffs. The learned trial Court ultimately came to the conclusion that defendant No.1 had failed to establish that he was entitled to claim the said amount from the plaintiffs. In the above background, it has been submitted by learned Advocate Shri Fernandes that the counter-claim of defendant No.1 was based on the said agreement dated 29.7.1982 and the letters written by plaintiff No.1, and her daughter Terezinha. Learned Advocate Shri Fernandes has further submitted that the claim of defendant No.1 was based under Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act and if at all the expenditure was incurred by defendant No.1, it was for the benent of the estate and the plaintiffs cannot be allowed to enrich themselves illegally at the costs of defendant No.1. Learned Advocate Shri Fernandes has conceded that defendant No.1 did not sell any of the properties of the said mother of the plaintiff because she died soon after the execution of the said agreement. Reliance has been placed by Shri Fernandes on the case of Pannalal v. Dy. Commissioner, Bhandara and another etc., AIR 1973 SC 1174 . 12. On the other hand learned senior counsel Shri M.B. D'Costa has submitted that in case defendant No.1 had incurred the said expenditure for the benefit of the estate then the said defendant No.1 ought to have filed a suit against all the heirs of the said mother. Shri O'Costa has further submitted that what the said agreement contemplated was that defendant No.1 would sell the properties and incur the expenditure only after the said mother executed a power of attorney in his favour which power was never executed and if at all defendant No.1 had incurred any expenditure, he did the same without any authority of the legal heirs. 13. I am inclined to agree with the submission made on behalf of the plaintiffs by the learned Advocate Shri D'Costa that in terms of the said agreement defendant No.1 would not be entitled to recover the expenses made by him towards the estate of the said mother because what was contemplated under the said agreement was that the said mother would execute a power of attorney and defendant No.1 would sell her properties and meet expenses and keep the balance obtained by him. The fact remains that the said power of attorney was never executed by the said mother, as a result of which the said defendant No.1 was unable to sell any of her properties and recover the said expenses. The question, therefore is whether defendant No.1 is entitled to recover the said expenses made by him de hors the said agreement dated 29th July, 1982. 14. Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act provides that :- "Where a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered." The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pannalal v. Dy. Commissioner. Bhandara and another (supra), referring to its earlier decision in the case of State of West Bengal v. B.K. Mondal, AIR 1962 SC 779 . observed that the real basis of the liability under Section 70 is the fact that the person for whom the work has been done, has accepted the work and has received the benefit thereunder, a and that what Section 70 prevents is unjust enrichment and it applies as much to individuals as to corporations and Government. 15. Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act, as it is well known, embodies the equitable principle of restitution and prevention of unjust enrichment. Voluntary acceptance of the benefits of the work done or things delivered is the very foundation of a claim under Section 70 of the said Contract Act. Once the benefit of the work done or things delivered, are accepted, it has got to be presumed that the said work was done or thing was delivered, without intention to do so gratuitously and the persons for whose benefits the same is done is expected to pay for the same. Admittedly the said mother and defendant No.1 became close friends, as can be seen from the recitals of the said agreement the said mother not having any of her close relations at the place where she was living with her said three children with their spouses having migrated to Portugal or having got married there subsequently. Admittedly the said mother and defendant No.1 became close friends, as can be seen from the recitals of the said agreement the said mother not having any of her close relations at the place where she was living with her said three children with their spouses having migrated to Portugal or having got married there subsequently. On behalf of defendant No.1, my attention was drawn to the letter dated 22.9.1983, written by the said daughter Terezinha to the said defendant- No.1 wherein said Terezinha acknowledged to defendant No.1 that his friendship mean t a great deal to their mother and that he ought to be not only thanked, but also be grateful to it. My attention has also been drawn to another letter dated 15.12.1983, written by none other than plaintiff No.1 in which plaintiff No.1 thanked defendant No.1 probably for the first death anniversary mass given by him for the soul of the said mother on 13th August, 1983. In the said letter, the plaintiff had thanked defendant No.1 for all payments he made regarding the taxes. Plaintiff No.1 in the said letter further requested defendant No.1 to continue to do the necessary as he had done the same till then. The said Terezinha by yet another letter thanked defendant No.1 for taking care of their house at Nagoa and for paying the taxes, which is a clear indication that whatever expenditure was being done by defendant No.1 for the said mother or after her death towards the estate or inheritance left by her, had necessary approval of the children of the said mother, particularly plaintiff No.1 and it was certainly not expected that defendant No.1 would incur the said expenditure without expecting payment from either plaintiff No.1 or her other two children. As far as quantum of expenditure incurred by defendant No.1, no dispute has been raised. The plea that defendant No.1 had to file the counter-claim against all the heirs of the said mother is a plea which has been belatedly raised for the first time at the stage of arguments before this Court and as the same was not raised by the plaintiffs in their written statement to the counter-claims or before the trial Court or at any time thereafter the same need not be considered. The Court is bound to reject the same. The Court is bound to reject the same. In my opinion, the plaintiffs are liable to defendant No.1 to pay for the said expenditure incurred by defendant No.1 for the benefits of their mother or upon her death for the benefits of the estate since the plaintiffs could not expect defendant No.1 to incur the said expenditure and not to pay for the same. The plaintiffs are liable to pay for the said expenditure because the same was done with the tacit approval of plaintiff No.1, as reflected in the said letters, particularly in letter dated 15.12.1983 and otherwise also on the principle underlying Section 70 of the Contract Act. The plaintiff would certainly be entitled to recover the proportionate share of the same, if entitled to under the law, from the other heirs of the said mother. There is no dispute that plaintiff No.1 has got some of the estate of his mother, particularly the said car allotted to him and which is presently in his possession. In my opinion, the learned trial Court ought to have decreed the counter-claim based on the principle of Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act. 16. In view of the above discussion, the appeal filed by the said plaintiffs deserves to be dismissed. The cross objections filed on behalf of defendant No.1 deserve to succeed and consequently, the counterclaim filed by defendant No.1. The plaintiffs, therefore, are hereby directed to pay to defendant No.1 (now represented by his legal heirs) the said sum of Rs. 17,913.57 paise with pending and future interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of suit until payment. The appeal is hereby dismissed. The cross objections are, hereby, allowed. No order as to costs. Both the parties did not object to the appeal being heard by me. Appeal dismissed.