Judgment 1. Heard Mr. Md. Zeauddin for the appellant, and Mr. Udayan Chaudhary for respondent nos. 1 to 6 (the claimants). The insurer is the appellant against the judgment dated 20.9.2000, passed by the learned 2nd. Additional District Judge-cum- Claims Tribunal, Darbhanga, in Claim Case no. 12 of 1994 (Manjool Devi and others vs. Amrendra Kumar Mishra and others) whereby the claim application of respondent nos. 1 to 6 herein (the claimants), under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has been allowed and the appellant has been directed to pay a sum of Rs. 1,90, 000/- with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of filing the case till realisation. 2. Respondent no. 7 (Amrendra Kumar Mishra) was the owner of Tata Maxi bearing Registration no. O.R.A.-1487. Sheo Shanker Thakur, husband of respondent no. 1 herein (Manjool Devi), was travelling on the roof-top of the vehicle which met with an accident on 2.10.1993 at village Shankar Lohar, district Darbhanga, and died. Baheri P.S. Case No. 92 of 1993, dated 2.10.1993, under sections 279 and 304A I.P.C. was registered against respondent no. 8 (Bajrangi Yadav), the driver of the vehicle. Respondent nos. 1 to 6 filed claim application which has been allowed by the impugned judgment. 3. While assailing the validity of the impugned judgment, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the deceased was travelling on the roof-top and therefore, he is guilty of contributory negligence in terms of Section 123 of the Act. He next submits that the insurance policy had been cancelled from the inception because the cheque conveying the premium amount had bounced which was sought to be proved by exhibits marked A and A/1. He next submits in the alternative that in view of the position that the deceased is guilty of contributory negligence, the amount of compensation ought to be reduced. 4. Learned counsel for respondent nos. 1 to 6 has supported the impugned order. 5. I have perused the lower court records and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. I would first of all observe that the appellant took clear stand before the learned Claims Tribunal that respondent no. 7 had paid the premium amount by cheque bearing no. QVY-644762, dated 26.3.1993, for Rs. 5. I have perused the lower court records and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. I would first of all observe that the appellant took clear stand before the learned Claims Tribunal that respondent no. 7 had paid the premium amount by cheque bearing no. QVY-644762, dated 26.3.1993, for Rs. 5,586/-, which was dishonoured and, therefore, the policy in question had been cancelled from the inception. This has been sought to be proved by the letter dated 26.2.1998 (Ext. A), from the appellant company to one Shri Dhrub Kumar Thakur, Advocate. Exhibit A/1 is an inter-departmental communication on this issue. Both show that the insurance policy was cancelled because the cheque had bounced. I have perused both the documents, neihter of which is a primary and contemporaneous documents to prove the factum of bouncing of cheque and cancellation of the policy. These are letters of a much later date, the first one conveying instructions to the counsel, and the second being an inter-departmental communication, I am, therefore, of the view that these do not constitute adequate evidence to prove the issue. The learned Claims Tribunal has, therefore, rightly held that the appellant, Company has not been able to prove cancellation of policy by cogent, reliable and contemporaneous evidence. 6. The factum of accident and the death of the said Sheo Shankar Thakur is admitted at all hands. Learned counsel for respondent nos. 1 to 6 is right in his submission that the appellant (insurer) had not obtained requisite leave in terms of Section 170 of the Act. They are, therefore, precluded from raising the question of quantification of the amount of compensation. Learned counsel has rightly relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 3350 [: 2002(4) PLJR (SC) 165] (National Insurance Co. Ltd., Chandigarh vs. Nicolletta Rohtagi and others). 7. I must deal with the contention relating to the provision of section 123 of the Act. The same reads as follows : "123. Riding on running board, etc.- (1) No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall carry any person or permit any person to be carried on the running board or otherwise than within the body of the vehicle. (2) No person shall travel on the running board or on the top or on the bonnet of a motor vehicle." 8. (2) No person shall travel on the running board or on the top or on the bonnet of a motor vehicle." 8. It appears to me on a perusal of the materials on record that the deceased was travelling on the roof-top of the vehicle. He therefore, surely contributed to his death by his contributory negligence. Learned counsel for the appellant is, therefore, right in his submission that the amount of compensation should to that extent be reduced. This aspect of the matter has to be considered along with the provisions of Section 17 of the Act which provides for payment of interest on the awarded amount. It appears to me that the interest of justice will be met if I reduce the rate of interest to five per cent from the date of filing of the application. 9. In that view of the matter, this appeal is accordingly disposed of in the manner indicated hereinabove. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that a sum of Rs. 50,000/- has already been paid to the claimants in terms of Section 140 of the Act. Furthermore, let the statutory amount of Rs. 25,000/- deposited by the appellant in this Court be handed over by means of an appropriate instrument in favour of respondent no. 1 (Manjool Devi) and be handed over to her counsel. The appellant shall pay the balance of the decretal amount within a period of two months by means of a demand draft prepared in favour of respondent no. 1 10. This appeal is accordingly disposed of.