JUDGMENT The learned counsel for petitioner prays for and is granted permission to withdraw I.A. 3236/04, the same is accordingly dismissed. Heard on I.A. 4954/04. This is an application for taking the corrected certified copy on record. The respondent has no objection. The application is, therefore, allowed and the fresh certified copy of order dated 6.3.2004 is taken on record. Heard on admission. Aggrieved by order dated 6.3.2004 passed by the Controlling Authority, Guna allowing respondents application preferred under section 23-A of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, on the ground of bona fide need of the non-residential premises for the business of one of her major sons, namely, Gyanesh this revision-petition has been preferred by the tenant-petitioner under section 23-E of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The learned Rent Controlling Authority because of non-compliance of the provisions of section 13 (1) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, struck off the defence of the petitioner vide impugned order and thereafter considering the evidence on record allowed the application of the respondent. As far as the striking off defence of petitioner is concerned, it is not disputed that notice of the proceedings was received by the petitioner before 24.4.2002, i.e., the date on which he had sought leave to defend. At that time rent was due from the month of November, 2001. This rent was deposited by him on 5.8.2002 itself together with the arrears of rent uptill August 2002. Thus, the said rent was deposited more than thirty days after the receipt of notice of the proceedings. Hence, there was clearly default in compliance of first limb of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. Thereafter also there were many defaults in depositing the rent of subsequent months and thus there was non-compliance of the second limb of sub-section (1) of section 13 also. The contention of the learned counsel for petitioner that the provisions of section 13 (1) were applicable only to suits instituted on any of the grounds mentioned in section 12 of the said Act and not on an application moved under section 23-A of that Act, is negatived by section 23-H of the said Act. Thus, there was no error in the part of the impugned order relating to striking off the defence of the petitioner. Thus, there was no error in the part of the impugned order relating to striking off the defence of the petitioner. The second ground taken by the petitioner is that as per respondents own testimony she was not the sole owner of the suit premises but her sons including the son for whose requirement she has brought the proceedings were also co-owners with her, therefore, the application by her as a widow under section 23-A of the said Act itself was not maintainable. In this respect also the contention of the petitioner is negatived by the law as settled by Hon. Apex Court in the case of Dhannalal v. Kalavatibai & others, reported in 2003 (1) JLJ 85 = 2002 (4) Supreme 552 . In that case of Dhannalal (supra) also a similar application was moved by a widow mother on the ground of bona fide non-residential need of one of her sons, and the sons alongwith the widow mother were owners of the disputed premises. The Hon. Apex Court on the question of maintainability of proceedings by such widow under section 23-A concluded as follows: "It follows that a widow, who is a co-owner and landlady of the premises, can in her own right initiate proceedings for eviction under section 23-A (b), as analysed hereinbefore, without joining other co-owners/co-landlords as party to the proceedings if they do not object to the initiation of proceedings by such landlady, because she is the owner of the property and requires the tenanted accommodation for the purpose of continuing or starting the business of any of her major sons. The major sons though co-owners/co-landlords may not have been joined as party to the proceedings but it would not adversely affect the maintainability of the proceedings." In these proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority, respondent had submitted her own affidavit as well as the affidavit of her son for whose requirement she had initiated the proceedings. Both of them were also cross-examined by the learned counsel for petitioner. The defence of petitioner was struck off. Otherwise also she and her witness have amply supported her case and there is nothing to demonstrate any infirmity in the decision of the learned Rent Controlling Authority in relying on their testimony. Thus, there was no infirmity or illegality in the impugned order calling for any kind of interference by this Court. The defence of petitioner was struck off. Otherwise also she and her witness have amply supported her case and there is nothing to demonstrate any infirmity in the decision of the learned Rent Controlling Authority in relying on their testimony. Thus, there was no infirmity or illegality in the impugned order calling for any kind of interference by this Court. There is no substance in this revision petition and it is also rightly dismissed at this stage of admission itself. In view of above order, the M.C.P. 749/04 as well as M.C.P. No. 1178/04 both are rendered in fructuous and are accordingly dismissed. The stay granted earlier stands vacated. Thus, this revision-petition is dismissed and the impugned order for eviction of the petitioner passed by the Rent Controlling Authority is hereby maintained with a modification that instead of 6.5.2004 the petitioner shall deliver peaceful vacant possession of the suit premises to the respondent within six months from today subject to monthly deposit of rent by him. Parties shall bear their own costs with respect to this revision petition.