C. Y. SOMAYAJULU, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal by the 2nd respondent (insurer) in O. P. No. 498 of 1994 on the file of the Motor Accidents claims Tribunal-cum- 2nd Additional District judge, Guntur questioning the finding of the tribunal on the issue relating to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle, belonging to the 1st respondent in the O. P. , and the quantum of compensation awarded to the claimants, without obtaining permission under Section 170 of the Motor vehicles Act, 1988 (for short act ). ( 2 ) SINCE in National Insurance company v. Nicolleta Rohtagi, 2002 (6) ald 1 (SC) = 2002 (7) SCC 456 , it is held that an insurer cannot maintain an appeal, without obtaining permission under Section 170 of the Act, questioning the quantum of compensation or the finding as regards negligence of the offending vehicle, the maintainability of the appeal is questioned. ( 3 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that since the award under appeal was passed on 8-12-1997 and since Nicolleta Rohtagi s case (supra) was decided on 17-9-2002, the ratio therein applies to appeals filed after 17-9-2002 only but not to the appeals filed prior to the rendition of that decision i. e. , the said decision, can have prospective effect only but not retrospective effect, and so this appeal filed long prior to that judgment is maintainable. It is also her contention that since the evidence of P. W-1 shows that the driver of the vehicle intentionally killed the deceased, and since police charge-sheeted the driver of the offending vehicle for an offence under Section 304 of Indian Penal code, but not under Section 304-A I. P. C. , claim for compensation under Section 166 of the Act is not maintainable. ( 4 ) I am unable to agree the first contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant, because Section 96 (1) and (2) of motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short 1939 act) correspond to Section 149 (1) and (2) of the Act. Similarly Section 110-C (2a) of 1939 Act corresponds to Section 170 of the Act. Section 110-D of 1939 Act corresponds to Section 173 of the Act. Similarly Section 110-C (2a) of 1939 Act corresponds to Section 170 of the Act. Section 110-D of 1939 Act corresponds to Section 173 of the Act. In nicoletta Rohtagi s case (supra) the Apex court after considering Sections 149, 170 and 173 of the Act with reference to the corresponding provisions in 1939 Act, held in Para 15"if we permit the insurer to take any other defence other than those specified in subsection (2) of Section 149, it would mean we are adding more defences to insurer in the statute which is neither found in the act nor intended to be included. "in Para-18 of the said judgment it is held"the consistent view of this Court had been that the insurer has no right to file an appeal to challenge the quantum of compensation or the finding of the Tribunal as regards negligence or contributory negligence of the offending vehicle. "so it is clear that even when 1939 Act was in force insurer cannot maintain an appeal questioning the quantum of compensation or the finding relating to negligence of the driver without obtaining permission under section 110-C (2a) of the 1939 Act. That is the situation even after the coming into force of the Act also. That should be treated as the law declared by the Supreme Court in this decision. As the law declared by the supreme Court, as per Article 141 of the constitution, is binding all the Courts in india, an insurer cannot, without obtaining permission under Section 170 of the Act, maintain an appeal questioning the quantum of compensation on the finding of the tribunal on the negligence of the driver. Question of a decision of the Supreme Court having prospective effect, and not having or binding effect on the cases pending prior to rendition of that decision, does not arise, moreso when the decision does not say so. The said decision, therefore, applies to all the pending appeals filed by insurance companies, and so this appeal is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable. ( 5 ) I do not find any force in the second contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant also that a claim petition under the act is not maintainable if the driver of an offending vehicle knowingly causes death or bodily injury to a person. ( 5 ) I do not find any force in the second contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant also that a claim petition under the act is not maintainable if the driver of an offending vehicle knowingly causes death or bodily injury to a person. In this case since the death of the deceased occurred due to the use of a motor vehicle, claimants have a right to make a claim under Section 166 of the Act, as Tribunals under the Act are established to adjudicate the claims for compensation in respect of the death or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or damage to any property a third party or both. Intentionally killing a man by using a motor vehicle is but using the motor vehicle in a rash and negligent manner for causing the death of the victim. So the claim petition under the act is maintainable. ( 6 ) SINCE I do not find force in both the contentions of the learned Counsel for the appellant, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.