Judgment ( 1. ) IN this appeal from jail, the accused/appellant (hereinafter referred to as the accused) has called in question the legal propriety of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 2nd March, 2000 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Tikamgarh in Sessions Trial No. 116 of 1999 whereby he has convicted the accused of offences punishable under Sections 450 and 376 (1) of the Indian Penal Code (in short ipc) and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment of 10 years and fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default to suffer further rigorous imprisonment of six months on each count, with a further stipulation that the sentences would be consecutive. ( 2. ) PROSECUTION version, shorn of unnecessary details, is as follows :-On 27-6-1999 at about 11 a. m. , Rani Kachhi, the prosecutrix, a blind woman, who was sustaining herself by receiving alms was inside her house. At that juncture, the accused who was a resident of the locality, entered into the house and tried to offer money to the child of the prosecutrix, which was not appreciated by the prosecutrix and she questioned the accused relating to such act of the accused. The accused, in reply, stated that by giving the money to the child, he was earning Punya and accordingly, he have Rs. 10/-which was snatched away by the prosecutrix who thereafter asked the accused to leave the premises. Despite the protest raised, the accused did not leave the premises and gave money to the 9 year daughter Bhagwati and other children. On receipt of the said money, the children went out and at that point of time, the accused caught hold of the prosecutrix and when she tried to shout, he gagged her mouth and committed rape on her. It is the further case of the prosecution, the prosecutrix though blind was able to identify the accused from his voice. Immediately after the act was committed, the prosecutrix proceeded to the police station and reported the matter. It is the further case of the prosecution, the prosecutrix though blind was able to identify the accused from his voice. Immediately after the act was committed, the prosecutrix proceeded to the police station and reported the matter. The criminal law being set in motion, the Investigating Agency got the prosecutrix medically examined, seized the wearing apparel of the prosecutrix, sent them to the State Forensic Laboratory at Sagar for examination, prepared the spot map, examined certain witnesses under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and eventually placed the charge-sheet in the Competent Court, which, in turn, committed the matter to the learned Trial Judge. ( 3. ) THE accused abjured his guilt and pleaded false implication. The prosecution in furtherance of its case, examined six witnesses. P. W. 1 is Dr. Madhu Jain, who had examined the prosecutrix; P. W. 2 is the prosecutrix herself; P. W. 3 is Bhagwati, the daughter of the prosccutrix; P. Ws. 4 and 5 are Sheela and Kalicharan, who have turned hostile; and, P. W, 6 is the Investigating Officer. Apart from the ocular evidence produced by the prosecution, it also got certain documents exhibited. ( 4. ) ASSAILING the order of conviction, it is submitted by Mr. G. C. Jain, learned Counsel for the accused that when Dr. Madhu Jain (P. W. 1) has opined that no definite opinion could be given with regard to rape, the learned Trial Judge should have acquitted the accused of the charge. It is submitted that no injuries have been found in her private parts or other parts of the body and, therefore, the whole prosecution story lacks evidence. It is his further submission that the version of the prosecutrix is replete with inherent contradictions and that being the position, her statement should have been rejected as incredible, unacceptable and not beyond reproach. It is urged by him that the prosecutrix is a blind lady and, therefore, she could not have seen the accused but has implicated him in the crime out of hostility. It is also submitted by him that the daughter of the prosecutrix who was alleged to have seen the occurrence should not have been believed by the learned Trial Judge as there was no possibility on her part to see the occurrence. It is also submitted by him that the daughter of the prosecutrix who was alleged to have seen the occurrence should not have been believed by the learned Trial Judge as there was no possibility on her part to see the occurrence. Lastly, the learned Counsel submitted that the learned Trial Judge had been governed by emotions while imposing the sentence and this Court, if eventually, agrees with the conclusion, should interfere in the quantum of sentence. ( 5. ) MR. V. Khan, learned Counsel for the State, per contra, has contended that the prosccutrix, a married lady having children, though a widow, was acquainted to sexual intercourse and, therefore, non-finding of injuries in her private parts can not be the sole governing factor to discard her evidence with regard to sexual intercourse by the accused. It is proponed by Mr. Khan that there is no contradiction, worth the name, to discard the testimony of the child witness Bhagwati (P. W. 3) as she has deposed in an unequivocal manner with regard to the act of the accused. ( 6. ) TO appreciate the rivalised submissions raised at the Bar, I have carefully perused the judgment of the learned Trial Judge and scrutinized the evidence brought on record. It is noticeable that the prosecutrix had lodged the FIR in quite promptitude. In the FIR, she has categorically stated that she was able to identify the accused from his voice. In her testimony in Court, she has deposed that the accused was drunk and despite repeated requests, he did not leave the place and spoke in abusive language. She has vividly described how the accused had behaved with her and ravished her. It is in her testimony that there was sperm on her clothes. She has stated that her daughter also could identify the accused as he had come to their house and paid money. ( 7. ) THE aforesaid evidence of the prosccutrix finds corroboration from the evidence of Bhagwati (P. W. 3 ). She has deposed that the accused had come to her house and given her Rs. 10/- and asked her to bring ice. However, she did not go out as her mother had gone on the terrace. It is in her version that when she went up on the terrace, the accused abused her and asked her to leave the place. She has deposed that the accused had come to her house and given her Rs. 10/- and asked her to bring ice. However, she did not go out as her mother had gone on the terrace. It is in her version that when she went up on the terrace, the accused abused her and asked her to leave the place. Being scolded by the accused, she came near the door. Thereafter, as stated by her, accused made himself nude and made her mother naked and physically over-powering her, slept over her. Despite searching cross-examination, nothing has been elicited from him. Submission of Mr. G. C. Jain, learned Counsel for the accused is that the version of the child witness should not be accepted in the case at hand. It is well settled in law that the testimony of a child witness has to be scanned and scrutinized with care, caution and circumspection and if the deposition of the child witness inspires confidence, there is no reason not to give due credence to her testimony. Tested on the aforesaid touch-stone, I do not find there is anything that has been brought in cross-examination despite the searching one to disbelieve or discard the version of Bhagwati (P. W. 3 ). At this stage, I think it seemly to refer to a decision rendered in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Prakash Kewalchand Jain | (1990) 1 SCC 550 ] wherein the Apex Court has held as under :- "a prosecutrix of sex offence can not be put on part with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act no where says that her evidence can not be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the Court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. What is necessary is that the Court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the Court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction of her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality and not circumstances appearing on the record of the cases disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. " The same view has been reiterated in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raghubir Singh [ (1993) 2 SCC 622 ]. I may profitably reproduce a relevant line from the same as under:- "there is no legal compulsion to look for corroboration of the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate her veracity. " At this stage, I think it appropriate to refer to a decision in the case of State of Punjab v. Gurmilsingh ( AIR 1996 SC 1393 ) wherein the Apex Court expressed the view in the following terms:- "seeking Corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl or a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion ? Why should the evidence of a girl or a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion ? The Court while appreciating the evidence of a prosecutrix may look for some assurance of her statement to satisfy its judicial conscience, since she is a witness who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her, but there is no requirement of law to insist upon corroboration of her statement to base conviction of an accused. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost at par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. Just as a witness who has sustained some injury in the occurrence, which is not found to be self inflicted, is considered to be a good evidence of a victim of a sexual offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. Corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape. Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. It must not be over-looked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another persons lust and it is improper and undesirable to lest her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. Inferences have to be drawn from a given set of facts and circumstances with realistic diversity and not dead uniformity lest that type of rigidity in the shape of rule of law is introduced through a new form of testimonial tyranny making justice a casuality. Courts can not cling to a fossil formula and insist upon corroboration even if, taken as a whole, the case spoken of by the victim of sex crime strikes the judicial mind as probable. " If the testimony of P. W. 2, the prosecutrix is adjudged on the backdrop of aforesaid enunciation of law, I am of the considered view, the conviction recorded by the learned Trial Judge can not be flawed inasmuch as the prosecutrix has stood embedded in her version and not taken recourse to any kind of transliteration. " If the testimony of P. W. 2, the prosecutrix is adjudged on the backdrop of aforesaid enunciation of law, I am of the considered view, the conviction recorded by the learned Trial Judge can not be flawed inasmuch as the prosecutrix has stood embedded in her version and not taken recourse to any kind of transliteration. Quite apart from the above, her daughter has also lent corroboration to her agonized experience. Hence, recording of conviction by the learned Trial Judge is bound to be treated as impeccable deserving the stamp of approval of this Court, which is hereby given. ( 8. ) SECOND submission of the learned Counsel for the accused relates to quantum of sentence. At the time of commission of offence, the petitioner was a young man in his twenties. Submission of Mr. Jain is that the learned Trial Judge was moved by emotion to impose the sentence of 10 years R. I. on both the scores and directing the same to be consecutive, though there was no justification for the same. It is propounded by him, true it is the accused succumbed to the inferior endowment of a nature but to punish him for a period of 10 years was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances and what has emerged in the case at hand, I am of the considered opinion that the minimum sentence of seven years rigorous imprisonment would meet the ends of justice on both the counts. This is not a case where there should have been direction for making the sentences consecutive. While reducing the sentences on both the counts. I am inclined to direct that the same shall be concurrent and accordingly I so direct. ( 9. ) WITH the modification in the order of sentence, the criminal appeal stands dismissed.