Judgment ( 1. ) THIS is a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of india for quashing order dated 4-1-2001 (Annexure-P-l) of the M. P. State cooperative Tribunal, Bhopal and order dated 30-5-2000 (Annexure-P-12) of the respondent No. l by which the services of the petitioner have been terminated. ( 2. ) IT is not in dispute that respondent No. l M. P. Rajya Sahakari upabhokta Sangh Maryadit, Bhopal is a registered cooperative society under the M. P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1960. The petitioner was appointed as lower Division Clerk/salesman by the respondent No. l by order 24-9-1992 (Annexure-P-4 ). The period of probation mentioned in this order was two years. The services of the petitioner were terminated by order dated 30-5-2000 (Annexure-P-12) mentioning therein that these are no longer required. No other reason for termination of the services of the petitioner is given in this order. The petitioner challenged this order before the M. P. State Cooperative tribunal, Bhopal by filing a revision which has been dismissed by the impugned order dated 4-1-2001. ( 3. ) THE petitioners case is that by serving for about 8 years he became a permanent employee of the respondent No. l and his services could not be terminated in the manner it has been done. The appointment of the petitioner was made in conformity with the recruitment rules against the posts which were vacant as mentioned in the advertisement (Annexure-P-2 ). ( 4. ) THE case of the respondents No. 1 and 2 is that the petitioner was a temporary employee and, therefore, his services could be terminated after giving him the notice for one month. It is stated that the petitioner was not a confirmed employee. According to the respondents No. 1 and 2 the appointment of the petitioner on the above post was irregular as there was no vacant post. ( 5. ) THE learned counsel for both the sides have been heard. Rule 7 (c) of the Madhya Pradesh Rajya Sahakari Upbhokta Sangh, Bhopal Karmchari seva Niyam, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Rules) is as under:- ( 6. ) IT is specifically provided in the rule mentioned above that the probation period would not exceed two years. The rule further provides that thereafter the Administrative Committee would have the power to confirm the employee or to terminate his services. ) IT is specifically provided in the rule mentioned above that the probation period would not exceed two years. The rule further provides that thereafter the Administrative Committee would have the power to confirm the employee or to terminate his services. The petitioner was appointed on probation for two years as mentioned in the appointment letter dated 24-9-1992 (Annexure-P-4 ). This appointment letter has to be read with rule 7 (c) mentioned above. The probation period in terms of this rule could not exceed two years. Therefore, it was necessary for the Management to access the work and conduct of the petitioner during this period of two years. The rule further permits that even after the expiry of period of two years the Administrative committee would have the power to confirm the employee or to terminate his services. There should be a fair and reasonable interpretation of the rule. The assessment of the work and conduct of the petitioner should have been done within the probationary period of two years or within a reasonable time there-after. The fate of the employee could not hang in balance forever or for an unreasonable length of time. It is not the case of the respondents either in the return or in the termination order (Annexure-P-12) that the work and conduct of the petitioner were ever found to be unsatisfactory. The petitioner has been given farewell by simply stating in the termination order that his services are "no longer required". It is not shown that at any point of time his work was found unsatisfactory. As a matter of fact the petitioner had acquired a permanent status after putting in the service of 8 years. ( 7. ) THE petitioners case is covered by the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab Vs. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 . In that case the relevant service rules provided that the probation period "shall not exceed three years". In the present case the service rules provide that the probation period would not exceed two years. The Supreme court in this case observed as under :- ". . . Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 . In that case the relevant service rules provided that the probation period "shall not exceed three years". In the present case the service rules provide that the probation period would not exceed two years. The Supreme court in this case observed as under :- ". . . as in the present case, the service rules fix a certain period of time beyond which the probationary period cannot be extended, and an employee appointed or promoted to a post on probation is allowed to continue in that post after completion of the maximum period of probation without an express order of confirmation, he cannot be deemed to continue in that post as a probationer by implication. The reason is that such an implication is negatived by the service rule forbidding extension of the probationary period beyond the maximum period fixed by it. In such a case, it is permissible to draw the inference that the employee allowed to continue in the post on completion of the maximum period of probation has been confirmed in the post by implication. " ( 8. ) DURING the period of probation the employee has to prove his worth and suitability for confirmation. The employer has a right to assess his work and conduct. The employee can be confirmed or discharged from the service during or at the end of the period of probation. ( 9. ) IT is argued on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner was not made permanent by any specific order and, therefore, it would not be deemed that he continued as a permanent employee. It must be borne in mind that the petitioner continued to work for 8 years. There is not even faint whisper from the side of the respondents No. l and 2 that during this period the work and conduct of the petitioner were found to be unsatisfactory. The respondents no. 1 and 2 cannot claim any premium over their inaction. As mentioned above it was necessary for the Management to assess the work and conduct of the petitioner during the period of probation or within a reasonable time thereafter to ascertain whether the petitioner is fit for confirmation or his services should be dispensed with. The respondents no. 1 and 2 cannot claim any premium over their inaction. As mentioned above it was necessary for the Management to assess the work and conduct of the petitioner during the period of probation or within a reasonable time thereafter to ascertain whether the petitioner is fit for confirmation or his services should be dispensed with. In the facts and circumstances of the present case and keeping in view the language of rule 7 (c) of the Rules mentioned above the petitioner would be deemed to have been confirmed and he was having a permanent status when his services were dispensed with. ( 10. ) IN the High Court of M. P. Vs. Satya Narayan Jhavar, (2001) 7 SCC 161 the entire case law on the question of deemed confirmation has been considered. In that case the work and conduct of the officer concerned were assessed from time to time and it was found that he was not fit for confirmation. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that in such a situation there is no question of deemed confirmation. In the present case no such exercise was done. The petitioner continued in service for 8 years. The rule specifically provided that the probationary period would not exceed two years. Even after the expiry of the probationary period of two years the petitioners work and conduct were not assessed within a reasonable time to ascertain whether he is fit to be confirmed or his services should be dispensed with. Therefore, the petitioner must be deemed to have been confirmed after the lapse of probationary period of two years and a reasonable time thereafter. The period of 8 years cannot by any stretch be held to be a reasonable time for ascertaining whether an employee is fit for confirmation or his services should be dispensed with. It is well settled that the action of the Management should not be arbitrary and it must satisfy the well established test of "fairness in action". The action of the Management in terminating the services of the petitioner after the expiry of the period of 8 years is arbitrary and illegal. ( 11. ) THE M. P. State Cooperative Tribunal, Bhopal as per impugned order went into the question whether the initial appointment of the petitioner was in conformity with the sanctioned strength or not. The action of the Management in terminating the services of the petitioner after the expiry of the period of 8 years is arbitrary and illegal. ( 11. ) THE M. P. State Cooperative Tribunal, Bhopal as per impugned order went into the question whether the initial appointment of the petitioner was in conformity with the sanctioned strength or not. It must be borne in mind that this was not a ground for termination of the services of the petitioner. Para 7 of the impugned order shows that the Tribunal put certain queries to the management and called some information. It was then stated by the Management that the sanctioned strength at the time of the appointment of the petitioner in the year 1992 was not such against which he could be appointed. The Tribunal could not go to the length of digging out some ground to justify the termination of the services of the petitioner. As already mentioned the advertisement (Annexure-P-2) which was issued clearly stated that there were vacant posts. The petitioner and other persons applied for those posts. There was a regular selection process. The petitioner was selected and then he was appointed. Therefore, it is reasonable to presume that there were vacant posts against which the petitioner was appointed. The petitioner could not have access to the internal record of the Management to ascertain whether vacancies really existed or not. The petitioner could safely rely upon the advertisement. Therefore, the Tribunal has wrongly held that the termination can be justified on the ground that there was no sanctioned post at the time of initial appoint-ment. The petitioner continued for 8 years and he was drawing the salary. It must have been within the knowledge of the Management that the petitioner and other persons have been appointed and were drawing the salary. But no one raised any objection for 8 years. Therefore, the termination of the services of the petitioner could not be justified on the ground that there was no existence of the vacancy at the time of initial appointment. ( 12. ) THE writ petition is allowed. The order dated 4-1-2001 (Annexure-P- 1) of the M. P. State Cooperative Tribunal, Bhopal is quashed. The order dated 30-5-2000 (Annexure-P-12) of the respondent No. l is also quashed. ( 12. ) THE writ petition is allowed. The order dated 4-1-2001 (Annexure-P- 1) of the M. P. State Cooperative Tribunal, Bhopal is quashed. The order dated 30-5-2000 (Annexure-P-12) of the respondent No. l is also quashed. The petitioner will be deemed to continue in service from 30-5-2000 and he will be entitled to the salary and other benefits from that date onwards as if he is actually in service. Writ Petition allowed.