JUDGMENT B.K. Sharma, J. 1. All the above three writ appeals are in respect of the common judgment and order dated August 9, 1996 Reported at [1997] 104 STC 453 (Gau) passed in Civil Rule Nos. 5 of 1996, 10 of 1996 and 11 of 1996 by and between the same parties. The present appellants filed the writ petitions and the same were dismissed by the said common judgment and order. The present writ appeals arising thereof and involving same set of facts and common question of law were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 2. The writ petitioners/appellants M/s. Fatikcharra Tea Estate is a registered dealer under the Tripura Sales Tax Act, 1976. The tea garden became sick and the same along with some other tea gardens was taken over by the Government of Tripura under an ordinance dated November 10, 1986, viz, the Tripura Tea Companies (Taking Over of Management of Certain Tea Units) Ordinance, 1986. The management of properties of the tea garden was also taken over by the Government through Tripura Tea Development Corporation and since November 13, 1986 till July 11, 1992, the tea garden was under the management and control of the Government of Tripura through the said corporation. According to the petitioners/appellants, during the period since 1984 till 1992, there had been no assessment of sales tax for reasons not known to them. It was only in the later part of 1992, the Superintendent of Taxes, Charge-IV, Agartala took up the impugned assessment proceedings against the petitioners/appellants tea garden for the period from March 31, 1985 to March 31, 1993. By a single assessment order dated July 12, 1985 assessment of Rs. 1,09,375; Rs. 1,09,375 and Rs. 68,359 was made pertaining to the years 1984-85,1985-86 and 1986-87 respectively. 3. Being dissatisfied with such assessment made by the Superintendent of Taxes, the petitioners/appellants preferred three appeals before the Additional Commissioner of Taxes, Government of Tripura, Agartala. The appellate authority by its order dated August 7, 1995 passed in the said appeals, viz., Appeal Case No. 124/CH-IV of 1995, Appeal Case No. 125/ CH-IV and Appeal Case No. 126/CH-IV directed for payment of 50 per cent of the aforesaid amount assessed against the petitioners/appellants which stood at Rs. 54,688, Rs. 54,688 and Rs. 34,180 same being the prerequisite under Section 20(1) of the Tripura Sales Tax Act, 1976. 54,688, Rs. 54,688 and Rs. 34,180 same being the prerequisite under Section 20(1) of the Tripura Sales Tax Act, 1976. By the said order the petitioners/appellants was directed to produce the receipt copy of challan as a token of payment of the said amount and the appeals were fixed on August 26, 1995 for consideration of admission of the same. Being aggrieved by such order for depositing the aforesaid amounts as a precondition to hear the appeal on merit, the petitioner/appellant moved revision petition against the said order dated August 7, 1995 passed by the appellate authority. The revision petition, which was entertained by the Commissioner of Taxes was rejected by order dated November 4, 1995 upholding the order of the appellate authority. 4. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, the appellant preferred the aforesaid writ petitions for the aforesaid three assessment years in respect of which the assessment was made. 5. The respondents resisted the writ petitions by filing counter affidavits. Learned single Judge upon hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and on perusal of the materials available on records dismissed all the three writ petitions by the impugned common judgment and order dated August 9, 1996 Reported at [1997] 104 STC 453 (Gau). Hence the present appeals. 6. We have heard Mr. B. Das, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. T.K. Dey, advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant. We have also heard Mr. U.B. Saha, learned Senior Government Advocate assisted by his junior. Mr. Das, apart from making oral submissions, also submitted a written brief consolidating his submissions. According to the submissions made by Mr. Das, the impugned assessment orders could not have been passed upon belated initiation of the assessment proceeding in 1992 for the aforesaid three periods. In this connection he referred to Section 9(1) of the Tripura Sales Tax Act. He submitted that since the assessment was made without any books of account and other materials, the assessment so made was best judgment assessment under Sub-section (4) of Section 9 of the aforesaid Act. He further submitted that the assessment was made on conjectures and surmises and the orders passed by the appellate and revisional authority insisting for payment of 50 per cent of the amount assessed were palpably illegal. He further submitted that the assessment was made on conjectures and surmises and the orders passed by the appellate and revisional authority insisting for payment of 50 per cent of the amount assessed were palpably illegal. As regards the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, when the petitioner/appellant themselves had approached the statutory authorities, he submitted that unless those alternative remedies were exhausted, the writ petitions might not have been entertained. Referring to the decisions of the apex court as reported in Madras Port Trust v. Hymanshu International, 1979 (4) ELT 396 (SC), Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) I LLJ 500 SC, and M.S. Grewal v. Deepchand Sood, AIR 2001 SC 3430, he submitted that technicality cannot and should not outweigh the cause of justice. 7. Further submissions made by Mr. Das was that the very provision under which deposit of 50 per cent of the assessed amount was insisted by the appellate authority was put to challenge and the said provisions were struck down by this court in the reported judgment in Monoranjan Chakraborty v. State of Tripura, [1991] 81 STC 291 (Gau) : [1990] 1 GLR 147. Although an appeal was preferred by the State before the Supreme Court against the judgment of this court and a stay was granted, according to Mr. Das, the stay order ipso facto did not nullify the judgment and the impugned action could not have been resorted to. Referring to the decisions as reported in State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd. : [1953] 4 SCR 1069, Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh : [1954] 1 SCR 1122, M.G. Abrol, Additional Collector of Customs v. Shantilal Chhotelal & Co. : [1966] 1 SCR 284, Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa : [1983] 142 ITR 663 (SC), Filterco v. Commissioner of Sales Tax : 1986 (24) ELT 180 (SC) Mr. Das submitted that alternative remedy in respect of the grievance cannot take away the writ jurisdiction under Article226 of the Constitution of India. Referring to the merit of the case, Mr. Ltd. v. State of Orissa : [1983] 142 ITR 663 (SC), Filterco v. Commissioner of Sales Tax : 1986 (24) ELT 180 (SC) Mr. Das submitted that alternative remedy in respect of the grievance cannot take away the writ jurisdiction under Article226 of the Constitution of India. Referring to the merit of the case, Mr. Das submitted that the petitioner/appellant never sold the tea leaves produced by them within the State of Tripura and that the produced tea leaves were sent to Tea Auction Market either at Calcutta or at Gauhati and thus as per provisions of Section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, the State Legislature has no legislative and executive competence to make any assessment in such sale same being inter-State sale. In this connection he placed reliance on the decisions as reported in State of A. P. v. National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. : [2002] 3 SCR 278, Buishi Yada Motors v. State of Arunachal Pradesh [2004] 135 STC 438 (Gau) : [2003] 3 GLR 550, Hindustan Paper Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxes [2003] 1 GLR 221 and Universal Luggage Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, [2004] 136 STC 379 (Gau) : [2004] 1 GLR 178. 8. Mr. U.B. Saha, learned Senior Government Advocate, on the other hand resisted the claim of the appellant and submitted that no interference is called for to the judgment of the learned single judge. Referring to the provisions of Section 20 of the Tripura Sales Tax Act, 1976, Mr. Saha submitted that the petitioner/appellant having preferred statutory appeal, they were bound to pay at least 50 per cent of the tax assessed before the appeal could be entertained. He submitted that in absence of such payment, the appeals as well as the revision petition were rightly not entertained and that there is no infirmity in the impugned orders. He further submitted in reference to the decision of the apex court as reported in State of Tripura v. Manoranjan Chakraborty : (2001) 10 SCC 740 that the aforesaid appeal preferred by the State of Tripura against a decision of this court has since been allowed upholding the aforesaid provisions under which at least 50 per cent of the assessed amount is required to be deposited before entertaining an appeal against an order of assessment. He further submitted that in view of the stay order granted by the apex court in that appeal which was in operation till the aforesaid final decision, there was nothing wrong on the part of the respondents in making the assessment pertaining to the aforesaid years and insisting for 50 per cent deposit of the said amount under the provisions of Section 20 of the Act. 9. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and have perused the materials available on records. We have also meticulously gone through the judgment of the learned single Judge. There is no dispute that a party aggrieved by an order of assessment or penalty under the provisions of the Act may prefer an appeal before the appellate authority as provided for under Section 20 of the Act. There is also no dispute that under proviso to Section20(1) of the Act, no appeal shall be entertained by the appellate authority unless, the said authority is satisfied that the amount of tax assessed or the penalty levied has been paid. However, a discretion has been vested on the said authority to waive 50 per cent of such amount towards entertaining an appeal for reasons to be recorded in writing. The provision was put to challenge by filing writ petition and the same was struck down by a division Bench of this court by the decision as reported in Monoranjan Chakraborty v. State of Tripura [1991] 81 STC 291 : (1990) 1 GLR 147. The State of Tripura being aggrieved preferred an appeal before the apex court and the apex court granted stay order in respect of the said judgment of this court. Eventually, the appeal has been allowed setting aside the said decision of this court upholding the aforesaid provisions of the Act. The said decision of the apex court is reported in State of Tripura v. Manoranjan Chakraborty [ (2001) 10 SCC 740 as has been indicated above. 10. From the aforesaid factual aspect of the matter, there is no escape from the conclusion that the appellate authority is bound to insist for at least 50 per cent of the amount assessed before entertaining an appeal. Thus there was no infirmity in the impugned appellate order and so also in the impugned revisional order. 10. From the aforesaid factual aspect of the matter, there is no escape from the conclusion that the appellate authority is bound to insist for at least 50 per cent of the amount assessed before entertaining an appeal. Thus there was no infirmity in the impugned appellate order and so also in the impugned revisional order. The said authorities were obliged to pass the impugned orders having regard to the provisions of Section 20 of the Act. However, it is the case of the petitioner/appellant that since the very assessment order is under challenge, the writ court is empowered to grant appropriate relief irrespective of the appellate and revisional orders. It is in this context, Mr. Das, learned Senior Counsel strenuously argued that mere existence of alternative remedy will not be a bar for entertaining a writ petition and that merely because the appellant exhausted the alternative remedies by way of preferring appeal and revision petition, the writ court will not be reluctant to entertain the contentions of the appellant on merit. 11. There cannot be any quarrel as regards the proposition that mere availability of an alternative remedy may not universally put an absolute bar to invoke writ jurisdiction. In the instant case, the appellant in fact wanted to exhaust the alternative statutory remedy by preferring an appeal under Section 20 of the aforesaid Act. However, when the appellate authority by the impugned order dated August 7, 1995 insisted for statutory payment for 50 per cent of the assessed amount under Section20(1) of the aforesaid Act, the petitioner/appellant preferred revision application before the revisional authority which was also a remedy available under the Act. The revisional authority by the impugned order dated November 4, 1995 found nothing wrong with the appellate order in insisting payment of 50 per cent of the amount in question. The revisional authority extended the time-limit fixed by the appellate authority for making the deposits. However, the petitioner/appellant instead of complying with the same filed the aforesaid writ petitions challenging the legality and validity of the assessment order, appellate order and the revisional order. The grounds towards assailing the assessment order have been indicated above. 12. The moot question involved in these writ appeals is whether the appellate authority committed anything wrong in insisting for compliance of the pre-requisites towards entertaining the appeal. The grounds towards assailing the assessment order have been indicated above. 12. The moot question involved in these writ appeals is whether the appellate authority committed anything wrong in insisting for compliance of the pre-requisites towards entertaining the appeal. On this count, learned Counsel for the appellant fairly conceded that there was nothing wrong on the part of the appellate authority in passing the impugned order as he was bound to act as per the provisions of the Act. He also fairly submitted that the revisional authority was also within its competence and jurisdiction in passing the impugned order upholding the appellate order. However, as extensively argued by him, it is the case of the appellant that irrespective of the aforesaid appellate and revisional orders, when the very basis of the order of assessment is under challenge, the writ court will not refrain itself from judging the same. 13. Learned single Judge after referring to the provisions of the Act and recording the elaborate submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and referring to various decisions on merit of the case, held that the power under Article 226 being not in the nature of appellate or supervisory, the contentions raised by the writ petitioner that the assessment order was passed without relying upon any relevant documents and without any evidence or that the same was barred by limitation, etc., cannot be gone into in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned single Judge recorded definite finding that the petitioner/appellant approached the writ court to avoid the statutory deposit towards entertaining the appeal. The learned single judge has also held that the assessment order cannot be said to be passed by the authority without jurisdiction warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Having regard to the fact that the appellant has preferred three appeals against the assessment orders and the appellate authority only insisted for compliance of statutory requirement, refused to entertain the writ petitions and passed the impugned judgment and order dismissing the writ petitions observing that such dismissal would not stand on the way of the appellate authority to decide the appeals on merit. 14. The view taken by the learned single Judge is plausible one and cannot be said to be erroneous. 14. The view taken by the learned single Judge is plausible one and cannot be said to be erroneous. Even if two views are possible, the writ court in exercise of its power of judicial review under Article226 of the Constitution of India cannot take one view of the matter in preference to the other view. As per the provisions of Section 20 of the aforesaid Act, depositing at least 50 per cent of the amount assessed is the rule and dispensation thereof cannot be made. Even in case of ordering for 50 per cent deposit instead of depositing the entire amount towards entertaining the appeal, the appellate authority will have to form an opinion and assign reasons thereof. Whatever may be the ground of attack against the order of assessment, the petitioner/appellant is bound to deposit the amount in question as contemplated under Section 20(1) of the Act. The amount insisted upon by the appellate authority as per statutory requirement will have to be deposited first as a rule before the appeal could be entertained. 15. The apex court in the case of Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd. as reported in : 1985 ECR 4 (SC) deprecating the practice of granting interim orders in revenue matters observed as follows: Now coming to the facts of the present case, the respondent, Dunlop India Limited is a manufacturer of tyres, tubes and various other rubber products. By a notification dated April 6, 1984 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, tyres, falling under item No. 16 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, were exempt from a certain percentage of excise duty to the extent that the manufacturers had not availed themselves of the exemption granted under certain other earlier notifications. The department was of the view that the company was not entitled to the exemption as it had cleared the goods earlier without paying central excise duty, but on furnishing bank guarantees under various interim orders of courts. The company claimed the benefit of the exemption to the tune of Rs. 6.05 crores and filed a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court and sought an interim order restraining the central excise authorities from the levy and collection of excise duty. The company claimed the benefit of the exemption to the tune of Rs. 6.05 crores and filed a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court and sought an interim order restraining the central excise authorities from the levy and collection of excise duty. The learned single Judge took the view that a prima facie case had been made out in favour of the company and by an interim order allowed the benefit of the exemption to the tune of Rs. two crores ninety three lacs and eighty five thousand for which amount the company was directed to furnish a bank guarantee, that is to say, the goods were directed to be released on the bank guarantee being furnished. An appeal was preferred by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent and a division Bench of the Calcutta High Court confirmed the order of the learned single judge, but made a slight modification in that the Collector of Central Excise was given the liberty to encash 30 per cent of the bank guarantee. The Assistant Collector of Central Excise has preferred this appeal by special leave. By our interim order dated November 15, 1984, we vacated the orders granted by the learned single Judge as well as by the division Bench. We gave two weeks' time to the respondent company to file a counter. No counter has, however, been filed. Shri F.S. Nairman, learned Counsel, however appeared for the respondent. We do not have the slightest doubt that the orders of the learned single Judge as well as Division Bench are wholly unsustainable and should never have been made. 16. We may also gainfully refer to the decision of the apex court under similar circumstances as reported in State of Haryana v. Maruti Udyog Ltd., [2001] 124 STC 285. Referring to Section 39 of the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 under which also as in the instant case the assessee is required to deposit the tax assessed towards entertaining an appeal, held that the object of Section39 of the Act is to ensure the deposit of amount claimed from an assessee in case of an appeal filed against the tax demanded. It exclusively quoted with approval the considerations made by the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Emerald International Ltd., [2001] 122 STC 382 and held that where matters of public revenue are concerned, it is of utmost importance to realise that interim orders ought not to be granted merely because a prima facie case has been shown. In the instant case also, it is the case of the petitioner/appellant that there is a prima facie case in their favour and irrespective of the statutory remedies, which is the petitioner/appellant wanted to avail, the writ court should examine the matter on merit in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court inter alia observed: The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the rarest of the rare cases in the given facts and circumstances, can grant stay and waive the condition of pre-deposit of tax and the existing alternative remedy in such circumstances would be no ground to refuse interference. 17. In the above case of Maruti Udyog Ltd., [2001] 124 STC 285 the apex court noticed that the division Bench of the High Court even failed to mention the circumstances, which justified the passing of the order for allowing the writ petition with direction to the Tribunal for disposal of the appeal on furnishing of the bank guarantee by the company. It held that merely because the Tribunal had insisted upon the payment of the amount in terms of proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 39 of the Act, should not have annoyed the court while granting the relief in exercise of its powers under Article226 of the Constitution. In that case the impugned order was held to be contrary to settled principles of law. The observations made by the apex court towards setting aside the judgment of the division Bench of the High Court are worth quoting: 7. ...There cannot be any dispute that right of appeal is the creature of the statute and has to be exercised within the limits and according to the procedure provided by law. It is filed for invoking the powers of a superior court to redress the error of court below, if any. No right of appeal can be conferred except by express words. It is filed for invoking the powers of a superior court to redress the error of court below, if any. No right of appeal can be conferred except by express words. An appeal, for its maintainability, must have a clear authority of law. Sub-section (5) of Section 39 of the Act vests a discretion in the appellate authority to entertain the appeal if it is filed within sixty days and the amount of tax assessed along with penalty and interest, if any, recoverable from the persons has been paid. The aforesaid restrictions subject to the proviso conferring discretion upon the appellate authority to dispense with the deposit of the amount only on proof of the fact that the appellant was unable to pay the amount. Before deciding the appeal, the appellate authority affords an opportunity to the party concerned to either pay the amount or make out a case for the stay in terms of proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 39 of the Act. Once the conditions specified under Sub-section (5) of Section 39 are complied with, the appeal is born for being disposed of on merits after hearing both the sides. 8. Interpreting the word 'entertain' in relation to the filing of an appeal, as is also the mandate of Sub-section (5) of Section 39 of the Act this court in Lakshmiratan Engineering Works Ltd, v. Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) I, Sales Tax : [1968] 1 SCR 505 observed: To begin with it must be noticed that the proviso merely requires that the appeal shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the amount of tax admitted by the appellant to be due. A question thus arises what is the meaning of the word "entertained" in this context? Does it mean that no appeal shall be received or filed or does it mean that no appeal shall be admitted or heard and disposed of unless satisfactory proof is available? The dictionary meaning of the word "entertain' was brought to our notice by the parties, and both sides agreed that it means either "to deal with or admit to consideration". We are also of the same opinion. The question, therefore, is at what stage can the appeal be said to be entertained for the purpose of the application of the proviso? We are also of the same opinion. The question, therefore, is at what stage can the appeal be said to be entertained for the purpose of the application of the proviso? Is it "entertain" when it is filed or is it "entertain" when it is admitted and the date is fixed for hearing or is it finally "entertained" when it is heard and disposed of? Numerous cases exist in the law reports in which the word "entertained" or similar cognate expressions have been interpreted by the courts. Some of them from the Allahabad High Court itself have been brought to our notice and we shall deal with them in due course. For the present we must say that if the Legislature intended that the word "file" or "receive" was to be used, there was no difficulty in using those words. In some of the statutes which were brought to our notice such...under Order 41, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is stated that a memorandum shall not be filed or presented unless it is accompanied, etc. In Section 17 of the Small Causes Courts Act, the expressions is "at the time of presenting the application". In Section 6 of the Court-fees Act, the words are "file" or "shall be received". It would appear from this that the Legislature was not at a loss for words if it had wanted to express itself in such forceful manner as is now suggested by counsel for the State. It has used the word "entertain" and it must be accepted that it has used it advisedly. This word has come in for examination in some of the cases of the Allahabad High Court and we shall now refer to them.... In our opinion, these cases have taken a correct view of the word "entertain" which according to dictionary also means "admit to consideration". It would therefore appear that the direction to the court in the proviso to Section 9 is that the court shall not proceed to admit to consideration an appeal which is not accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the admitted tax. This will be when the case is taken up by the court for the first time. It would therefore appear that the direction to the court in the proviso to Section 9 is that the court shall not proceed to admit to consideration an appeal which is not accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the admitted tax. This will be when the case is taken up by the court for the first time. In the decision on which the Assistant Commissioner relied, the learned Chief Justice (Desai, C.J.) holds that the words "accompanied by" showed that something tangible had to accompany the memorandum of appeal. If the memorandum of appeal had to be accompanied by satisfactory proof, it had to be in the shape of something tangible, because no intangible thing can accompany a document like the memorandum of appeal. In our opinion, making "an appeal" the equivalent of the memorandum of appeal is not sound. Even under Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the expressions "appeal" and "memorandum of appeal" are used to denote two distinct things. In Wharton's Law Lexicon, the word "appeal" is defined as the judicial examination of the decision by a higher court of the decision of an inferior court. The appeal is the judicial examination; the memorandum of appeal contains the grounds on which the judicial examination is invited. For purposes of limitation and for purposes of the rules of the court it is required that a written memorandum of appeal shall be filed. When the proviso speaks of the entertainment of the appeal, it means that the appeal such as was filed will not be admitted to consideration unless there is satisfactory proof available of the making of the deposit of admitted tax. 9. The object of Sub-section (5) of Section 39 of the Act is to ensure the deposit of amount claimed from an assessee in case of an appeal filed against the tax demanded. However, power is given to the Appellate Tribunal to relieve him from the rigor of above restriction under the circumstances spelt out in the proviso of the aforesaid section. Sub-section (5) regulates the exercise of right of appeal conferred upon an assessee under Section 39 of the Act, the object being to keep in balance the right of the aggrieved person and the right of the State to speedy recovery of tax.... 11. Sub-section (5) regulates the exercise of right of appeal conferred upon an assessee under Section 39 of the Act, the object being to keep in balance the right of the aggrieved person and the right of the State to speedy recovery of tax.... 11. The Act has been enacted and the right of appeal provided with a dual purpose of protecting the interest of the assessee and also to safeguard the interest of the revenue. The provision appears to have been made to explore further sources for raising revenue of the State. This court in Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd. : 1985 ECR 4 (SC) observed that 'No Governmental business or for that matter no business of any kind can be run on mere bank guarantee. Liquid cash is necessary for the running of a Government as indeed any other enterprise. We consider that where matters of public revenue are concerned it is of utmost importance to release that interim orders ought not to be granted merely because a prima facie case has been shown. More is required.' 12. In the instant case the prayer was made to grant stay on the ground that 'the petitioner has not collected any additional tax from the customers and is unable to deposit the amount of additional demand created by patently illegal order.' The respondent-company nowhere mentioned to or referred to its inability to pay the amount on account of its alleged financial difficulties or incapacity to make the requisite payment. The legality of the additional demand created could not be made the basis for insisting to entertain the appeal without prior payment, as that would have required the determination on the merits of the appeal. Relying upon the Full Bench judgment of the jurisdictional court in Emerald International Ltd.'s case, the Tribunal was competent in passing the order (annexure-P8) which was impugned in the High Court. The division Bench of the High Court was not justified in ignoring the Full Bench judgment and the judgment of another Bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction while allowing the writ petition of the company. The division Bench even failed to mention the circumstances which justified the passing of the order for allowing the writ petition with direction to the Tribunal for disposal of the appeal on furnishing of the bank guarantee by the company. The division Bench even failed to mention the circumstances which justified the passing of the order for allowing the writ petition with direction to the Tribunal for disposal of the appeal on furnishing of the bank guarantee by the company. Merely because the Tribunal had insisted upon the payment of the amount in terms of proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 39 of the Act, should not have annoyed the court while granting the relief in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. The impugned order being contrary to settled principles of law cannot be sustained and is accordingly set aside. 18. In the case of Vijay Power Generators Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax as reported in [2000] 120 STC 377 a division Bench of the Delhi High Court under similar circumstances, while refusing to interfere with the order passed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax towards depositing the amount in question, held that the right of appeal is a creation of statute but in exercise of such right, there is no inherent or constitutional right to file an appeal. Referring to the decisions of the apex court in Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat as reported in : [1975] 3 SCR 220 and State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. as reported in : [1960] 3 SCR 640, held that Legislature can, while granting right of appeal lay down a condition for deposit of tax as it is creation of statute and that there is nothing wrong if under same statute, a right of appeal is given and then some restrictions put over it. It further observed that such right is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice and that it must be conferred by statute and can be exercised only as permitted by statute. Referring to many fiscal statutes like Central Excises and Salt Act, Customs Act, Sales Tax Act of various States and many other similar statutes, which mandate deposit of disputed amount as a condition precedent for entertaining appeal, it held that such deposits merely regulates exercise of right of appeal. 19. As regards the merit of the case the court observed that any expression finally on merits would not be desirable and proper. 19. As regards the merit of the case the court observed that any expression finally on merits would not be desirable and proper. Noting that the prescribed authority is conferred with discretion to dispense with pre-deposit conditionally or in full or in part the court observed that such discretion is governed by the maxim "discretio est discernere per legem quid sit justum" (discretion consists a knowing what is just in law). It further observed that the discretion in general is the discernment of what is right and proper. It denotes knowledge and prudence, that discernment which enables a person to judge critically of what is correct and proper united with caution, to discern between falsity and truth, between shadow and substance, between equity and colourable glosses and pretences and not to do according to the will and private affections and ill will. It has to be done according to the rules of reasons and justice, not according to private opinion. It has to be done according to law and not humour. It is not arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular. 20. While it is true that existence of alternative remedy may not be a bar to entertain a writ petition, but such discretion cannot be applied mechanically. In the instant case, the petitioner/appellant themselves took recourse to the statutory remedy by preferring an appeal against the order of assessment. However, while doing so they refused to comply with the statutory requirement of making the pre-deposits and instead insisted for hearing of the appeal on merit without such deposit. In such a situation, the appellate authority had no other alternative than to insist for the pre-deposits towards entertaining the appeal. The appellant even after noticing the statutory provisions under which they were bound to deposit the amount insisted by the appellate authority preferred the revision application before the revisional authority. The said authority rightly rejected the revision application upholding the order of the appellate authority. It was under those circumstances the writ petitions were filed making challenge to all the three orders, i.e., the assessment order, the appellate order and the revisional order. Thus the cause of action for filing the writ petitions had arisen for the petitioner/appellant only after passing the orders by the appellate and the revisional authority. 21. It was under those circumstances the writ petitions were filed making challenge to all the three orders, i.e., the assessment order, the appellate order and the revisional order. Thus the cause of action for filing the writ petitions had arisen for the petitioner/appellant only after passing the orders by the appellate and the revisional authority. 21. The petitioner/appellant were fully aware about the statutory alternative remedy and in fact wanted to exhaust the same, but refused to fulfil the pre-conditions towards exhausting the said remedy. Coming to the writ court and more particularly in the present set of appeal, the petitioner/appellant have even disowned their persuasion for the alternative remedy. A submission was made, as pointed out above, that there was no infirmity on the part of the appellate and revisional authority in passing the impugned orders, however, it was argued that independent of those orders, the writ court ought to have considered the merit of the case in the touchtone of the legality and validity of the order of assessment. Thus, here in a case, in which the petitioner/appellant even after approaching the alternative statutory authority towards redressal of their grievance, but upon insistence of compliance of pre-requirements seek to abandon those remedy, although, such insistence on the part of the said authority has been put to challenge. 22. In the aforesaid background of the case, we are of the considered opinion that the decision cited by Mr. Das, learned Senior Counsel reminding this court about the ambit and scope of writ jurisdiction is of no consequence. Once it is found that the petitioner/appellant themselves invoked the alternative remedy by way of preferring appeal and revision petition, the writ court will not assume jurisdiction, merely because the statutory authorities before whom the alternative remedy was sought to be availed insisted for compliance of the pre-requisites. In this connection we may gainfully refer to the decision of the apex court as reported in Transmission Corporation of A.P. v. Ch. Prabhakar : (2004) 5 SCC 551 : Rajureshwar Associates v. State of Maharashtra : AIR 2004 SC 3770 and A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan : AIR 2000 SC 3032 . 23. In the aforesaid decisions the court consistently reminded that the writ court will refrain to exercise it jurisdiction inasmuch as the proceeding under Article 226 is not a substitute for statutory appeal. 23. In the aforesaid decisions the court consistently reminded that the writ court will refrain to exercise it jurisdiction inasmuch as the proceeding under Article 226 is not a substitute for statutory appeal. Compared to statutory appeal, the scope and ambit of the writ jurisdiction is necessarily circumscribed. Though no hurdle can be put against the exercise of the constitutional powers of the High Court, it is a well recognised principle, which gained judicial recognition that the High Court should direct the party to avail himself of alternative remedies one or the other before he resorts to constitutional remedy. As observed in the case of Ch. Prabhakar : (2004) 5 SCC 551 , in proceedings under Article 226, the High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal to re-appreciate the evidence for itself or to correct an error of fact, however, apparent it might be on the ground that the evidence on which it was based was not satisfactory or sufficient. The apex court further observed that the proceedings under Article 226 are not a substitute for an appeal. 24. In the case of Rajureshwar Associates, the apex court upholding the order of the High Court upon noticing the fact that the legality of the order passed by the Collector was the subject-matter of challenge in another proceeding held that the same issue could not be adjudicated in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the instant case also, the petitioner/appellant themselves having initiated the appellate proceeding, could not have invoked the writ jurisdiction, merely because the appellate authority insisted for compliance of the statutory requirements towards entertaining the appeal. 25. The petitioner/appellant will get all the opportunity to explain their case before the appellate authority. On their failure before the said authority they will have another channel open by way of preferring revision application before the revisional authority. Thereafter also they will have other remedies open. Merely because the petitioner/appellant feel that they have a good case on merit, they cannot bypass the statutory alternative remedy by way of invoking the writ jurisdiction. In fact, they had invoked the jurisdiction of the statutory authority and it was only upon insistence of compliance of the pre-requisites, they invoked the writ jurisdiction of this court. 26. Merely because the petitioner/appellant feel that they have a good case on merit, they cannot bypass the statutory alternative remedy by way of invoking the writ jurisdiction. In fact, they had invoked the jurisdiction of the statutory authority and it was only upon insistence of compliance of the pre-requisites, they invoked the writ jurisdiction of this court. 26. The appellate as well as the revisional order being founded on the mandatory requirement of the provisions of the Section 20 of the aforesaid Act and has fairly agreed by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner/ appellant, we do not find any infirmity with the same. As regards the impugned order of assessment, the petitioner/appellant having already invoked the alternative remedy by way of preferring appeal and even otherwise also there being alternative statutory remedy exhausting which the petitioner/appellant can very well establish their case, we are not inclined to accept the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner/appellant to entertain the writ petitions on merit dehors the aforesaid orders of the appellate and revisional authority. Even in the aforesaid case of Monoranjan Chakraborty, [2001] 122 STC 594, the apex court while upholding the impugned provisions of Sections 20 and 21 of the Act observed that notwithstanding the alternative remedy, a writ court can in an appropriate case exercise its jurisdiction to do substantive justice only when it is shown that gross injustice has been done. In the instant case, we do not find any infirmity with the reasons assigned by the learned single Judge. We also do not find it to be a case in the category of "gross injustice". We are of the opinion that it will be a sound discretion to refrain from entertaining the writ petitions in view of the statutory alternative remedy, which the petitioner/appellant have already pursued. The aforesaid observation of the apex court relating to exercise of writ jurisdiction in appropriate case will have to be understood. 27. For the foregoing reasons and discussions, we do not find any merit in the appeals warranting any interference in the impugned judgment and order dated August 9, 1996 Reported at [1997] 104 STC 453 (Gau) passed by the learned single Judge in Civil Rule Nos. 5 of 1996, 10 of 1996 and 11 of 1996. Consequently, the writ appeals stand dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. In favour of Department