JYOTESH BANERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THE present hearing arises out of an application for recalling and/or modification and/or setting aside of the order dated May, 21st, 2004 passed by me disposing an application under. Section 482 of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973, which was registered as C. R. R. 243/2003. ( 2 ) SHORTLY put the facts and circumstances leading to the filing of the instant application are as follows : the petitioners filed the application under Section 482 of the Code with a prayer for quashing of the criminal proceedings in Park Street PS. Case No. 126 dated 19. 4. 2001 (G. R. Case No. 1190 of 2001 ). On the basis of the application under Section 482, the learned Single Judge of this Court passed the first order on 19. 2. 03 directing the learned Counsel for the petitioners to give notice to the O. P. within six weeks and with a further direction to list the application after 15 days of notice. The said order further disclosed that till that time all further proceeding in G. R. Case No. 1190 of 2001 pending before the 9th Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta was stayed. The next order was made on 7. 3. 2003 when the learned Single Judge indicated that the matter was heard in part and directed the matter to be listed on 10. 3. 2003 and extended the interim order earlier granted till that time. On 10. 3. 2003 record shows that the learned Counsel for the petitioner was present and the learned judge directed the matter to be listed next day and further indicated in the order that the interim order earlier granted should continue. On the next day that is to say 11. 3. 2003 leave was given to the learned Counsel for the petitioners to amend the cause title of the petition so as to implead the complainant as O. P. and also directed to give notice to the complainant/o. P. within 7 days from that day and to file affidavit of service. The learned Single judge directed the matter to be listed after two weeks for motion. The order dated 11. 3. 2003 further indicated that meanwhile interim order earlier passed fwould continue. The order dated 31. 3. 2003 indicated that the learned counsel for the petitioners and the State/o. R were present but there was none for the de facto complainant. The learned Single judge directed the matter to be listed after two weeks for motion. The order dated 11. 3. 2003 further indicated that meanwhile interim order earlier passed fwould continue. The order dated 31. 3. 2003 indicated that the learned counsel for the petitioners and the State/o. R were present but there was none for the de facto complainant. The learned Single Judge directed the matter to be listed on 3. 4. 2003, further indicating that the interim ordqr passed earlier should continue. Next order dated 17. 4. 2003 indicates that the learned single Judge directed the matter to come up for hearing as a contested application four weeks hence. He further directed the petitioners to serve copy of the application upon the State, service through the learned Public prosecutor, High Court and to file affidavit of service at the time of hearing. The said order further indicated that till disposal of the application, stay granted on 19. 2. 2003 would continue. Thereafter the matter was listed before me and record goes to indicate that on 7. 5. 2004, 14. 5. 2004 none appear for "any of the parties. Finally the matter was adjourned till the next sitting of the bench and on 21. 5. 2004 the learned Counsel for the de facto complainant o. P. 2 and also for the O. P. /state were present. But none appeared on behalf of the petitioners even that day. In that background, the matter was heard and on consideration of the merits I dismissed the application and vacated the interim order. ( 3 ) NOW through this application, the petitioners have alleged in para-10 that on or about second week of June, 2004 they heard the rumours in the locality and from few tenants of their building that they would be arrested in few days. Further enquiry revealed that source of such rumours was the de facto complainant. Then the petitioners caused searches in the court of learned 9th Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta but could not find anything and thereafter they contacted the learned Advocate in this Court and the learned Advocate by filing an inspection slip came to know that the said application had already been dismissed after considering the case of the petitioners in their absence. Then the petitioners caused searches in the court of learned 9th Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta but could not find anything and thereafter they contacted the learned Advocate in this Court and the learned Advocate by filing an inspection slip came to know that the said application had already been dismissed after considering the case of the petitioners in their absence. it is the case of the petitioners that on the relevant dates that is to say 7th May, 2004 and 14th May, 2004 and 21st May, 2004 the matter appeared with a wrong cause title in the cause list. it is their specific case that the name of the petitioner No. 1 was printed as Musammad rabbani Khatun, in place of her correct name which was given in the application as Mst. Rabbani Khanam. it is the further case of the petitioner that on all the aforesaid dates when the matter was listed, note was also printed at the bottom of the relevant page of the cause list to the effect that files were lying in D. R. (Court) chamber. In this background, the petitioners could not take any step and none appeared on behalf of the petitioner when the matter was disposed of by the order dated 21st May, 2004. ( 4 ) IN the instant proceeding this Court is required to decide the following points : (I) whether the instant application is maintainable ? (ii) if so whether the petitioners were prevented by any sufficient cause from attending the Court on the date when the matter was disposed of. At the very outset, it transpires that Section 362 of the Criminal Procedure code creates a bar in maintaining the instant application. To appreciate the position I should set out the Section as a whole,, which reads as follows :- 362-Court not to alter judgementsave as otherwise provide of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. "the language of Section 362 is clear to indicate that since the judgment or final order disposing of a case is signed the Court has no jurisdiction to set aside or review its own judgment or final order which has already been signed except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error which is not the case here. it is to be noted here that Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has made a departure from the old Section 369 and has made it clear that Section 362 is equally applicable to the High Courts and other courts, except of course, in cases where this Code or other law provides otherwise. Therefore, once the High Court passed'its judgment and signed, it becomes functus officio and neither the Judge who passed the judgment nor any other Bench of the High Court has any power to review or reconsider or alter it except for correcting a clerical error. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has referred a Full Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court, habu. . . Petitioner v. State of Rajasthan. . . Respondent, reported in AIR 1987 raj 83 , wherein the said Court has held that the power of recall is different than the power of altering or reviewing the judgment and therefore powers under Section 482, Cr. P. C. can be and should be exercised by the High Court for recalling the judgement in case the hearing is not given to the accused and the case falls within one of the three conditions laid down under Section 482, Cr. P. C. That is to say to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent an abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. in the instant case, learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the petitioners for the reasons stated in the petition was prevented by a sufficient cause from attending the Court on the date the application was heard and disposed of in the absence of the petitioners and therefore they should be given a chance to agitate their case to secure the ends of justice. The learned Counsel for the O. Ps. The learned Counsel for the O. Ps. including the State on the other hand have contended firstly that the instant application is not maintainable because of the bar created by Section of the Cr. P. C. in support of their contention that the instant application is (not maintainable they have relied on a reported decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mosst. Simrikhia. . . Appellant v. Smt. Dolley Mukherjee alias smt. Chabbi Mukherjee and Anr. . . . Respondents reported in AIR 1990 SC 1605 1990 C Cr LR (SC) 106. Secondly, it is contended that the petitioners have failed to allege that they were actually prevented by any sufficient cause from attending the Court on the date of the disposal of the proceeding, and the allegation raised in the petition does not stand scrutiny. ( 5 ) HAVING heard the contentions of the learned Counsel in this way and on going through the reported decisions that in the Rajasthyan case (supra) relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, the question before the Full Bench of the Court was "whether the judgment given in the absence of the appellant or his Counsel but the case decided on merits can be recalled by the Court in its inherent power under Section 482, Cr. P. C. ? in answering the question, the said High Court in Para-38 of the judgement observed that there are two views available on the point. According to one view Section 362, Cr. P. C. has been held to be mandatory and puts complete bar and it has been therefore, held that Section 482, Cr. P. C. can also not be invoked for the purposes of reviewing or altering the judgment. The other view is that recalling is different than reviewing and altering and if the Court is of the opinion that gross injustice has been done, then Section 482, Cr. P. C. should be invoked to recall the judgement and re-hear the case. The High court also noted that the Apex Court in Sankatha Singh's case ( AIR 1962 SC 1208 ) held that the appellate Court had no power to review or restore an appeal which was disposed, under Sections 424 and 369, Cr. P. C. (old ). P. C. should be invoked to recall the judgement and re-hear the case. The High court also noted that the Apex Court in Sankatha Singh's case ( AIR 1962 SC 1208 ) held that the appellate Court had no power to review or restore an appeal which was disposed, under Sections 424 and 369, Cr. P. C. (old ). The said Court further noted that Sakantha Singh's case was referred to in Sooraj devi's case ( AIR 1981 SC 736 ), wherein also the Apex Court held that the inherent powers could not be invoked when there was a complete bar. Further discussing the aforesaid cases, the said High Court noted the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, were as under : (1) That the power to deal with the case must flow fro the statute. (2) That the powers given under Section 362, Cr. P. C. (Section 369, cr. P. C. old) given to the Court for reviewing or altering was limited only for correcting an arithmetical or clerical error and specifically prohibited courts from touching the judgement by taking away the powers altering or reviewing the judgement or the final order and as such principle of functus officio had been accepted. (3) That the prohibition contained in Section 362, Cr. P. C. (Section 369, cr. P. C. old) was not only restricted to the trial Court but also extended to appellate Court or the revisional Court. (4) That the inherent powers of the Court could not be invoked where there was an express prohibition and in other words Section 482, cr. P. C. could not be invoked. So it is explicit from the judgment relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the Apex Court through various decisions laid down that once the judgment and order was signed by the Court, such Court cannot alter such order. Further that the inherent powers of the Court cannot be invoked when there is an express prohibition in the Code. In the case of Mosst. Simrikhia. . . Appellant v. Smt. Dolley Mukherjee @ Smt. Chabbi Mukherjee and anr. (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court once again reiterated the position of law in the following language : at Para-6 :- "the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override bar of review under Section 362. In the case of Mosst. Simrikhia. . . Appellant v. Smt. Dolley Mukherjee @ Smt. Chabbi Mukherjee and anr. (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court once again reiterated the position of law in the following language : at Para-6 :- "the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override bar of review under Section 362. It is clearly stated in Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal, (1981)1 SCC 500 ; ( AIR 1981 SC 736 ) that the inherent power of the Court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code. The law is therefore clear that the inherent power cannot be exercised for doing that which cannot be done on account of the bar under other provisions of the code. The Court is not empowered to review its own discission under the purported exercise of inherent power. " that being the position of law I feel no difficulty in holding that the instant application is not maintainable. ( 6 ) REGARDING the second point, I find after due consideration that the petitioners have failed to allege sufficient reasons for their absence on the date of disposal of the matter. True it is that there was misprint of the name of the petitioner No. 1. But for such misprint, the petitioners could not be misdirected as the misprint related to the word like 'mst'. Mst. is a prefix indicative of sex, status of a person. if such prefix is misprinted, it is unlikely, that a person of ordinary prudence will be misdirected. it has also been alleged that the petitioners due to some noting in the Cause List were under the impression that the records were to sent to the Court. Here it should be noted that it is not the allegation that the Cause List gave an indication that the records were to available. Admittedly the case was listed for hearing in the cause List on the date when the matter was disposed of. In that background, it is not available to the petitioners to allege that under certain erroneous impression they did not take any step. Thus the petitioners are not in a position to show that they were prevented by a sufficient cause from attending the Court on the date when the matter was disposed of and therefore the instant application should also be dismissed on consideration of merits. Thus the petitioners are not in a position to show that they were prevented by a sufficient cause from attending the Court on the date when the matter was disposed of and therefore the instant application should also be dismissed on consideration of merits. ( 7 ) IN the result, the application fails and it is dismissed but having regard to the circumstances I make no order as to costs.