JUDGMENT - KHARCHE S.T., J.:­-By invoking jurisdiction of this Court under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, the original plaintiff has filed this second appeal being aggrieved by judgment, dated 31st March, 1990, passed by learned Additional District Judge in Regular Civil Appeal No. 357 of 1985, whereby the appeal came to be allowed and judgment and decree passed by trial Court on 31st July, 1985, directing the respondents (defendants) to deliver the possession of the suit house has been set aside. Brief facts required to be stated are as under:- 2. At the outset, the genealogy of the parties, which is not disputed, can be described as under:- Sadoba (dead) __________________________|________________________ | | Ramchandra Gangaram (dead) (dead) | Vithoba (plff.) (died during pendency of first appeal) ____________________________________|_____________ | | | Narayan Mahadeo Kantabai (Plff.) (Deft. No. 1) (wife) (Deft. No. 5) _____________________|__________________________ | | | Umakant Kiran Dilip (Deft. No. 2) (Deft. No. 3) (Deft. No. 4) 3. The plaintiff filed suit for possession on the basis of the title acquired to the suit house, situated on Plot No. 130, Nazul Sheet No. 14/B, Ward No. 30 at Achalpur, on the contention that the suit house is the self- acquired property of deceased Vithoba. The plaintiff further contended that at the time of partition, dated 27th May, 1938, the suit house was divided into two shares and one share was allotted to Ramchander and the other share was allotted to plaintiff Vithoba. It is contended that the portion of the suit house, which was allotted in the share of plaintiff, was allowed to be used by defendant No. 1 Mahadev as a licensee since 1972. It is contended that the defendant No. 1 Mahadev was called upon to vacate the suit house after revocation of the licence, but in vain. It is contended that defendant No. 1 constructed bathroom on the portion of the house without permission and the possession of the defendants is unlawful. It is contended that the defendants refused to vacate the house and, therefore, the plaintiff filed suit for possession of the same. 4. The defendants strongly resisted the claim of plaintiff and contended that some additional alterations in the suit house were made on 24th June, 1980, with the permission of the plaintiff. It is contended that the defendants refused to vacate the house and, therefore, the plaintiff filed suit for possession of the same. 4. The defendants strongly resisted the claim of plaintiff and contended that some additional alterations in the suit house were made on 24th June, 1980, with the permission of the plaintiff. The defendants claimed that there pairs and alterations were made by them as owners of the suit house and that the suit house being ancestral property, it was received by the plaintiff in partition. It is contended that the suit house was purchased by Ramchandra as a "Karta" of Hindu Joint Family in his own name by payment of consideration from joint family funds. It is contended that the defendants have shares in the suit house by their birth and since there were frequent quarrels between defendant No. 1-Mahadev and his elder brother-Narayan as well as their mother, in order to avoid the quarrels, plaintiff-Vithoba had made oral partition in 1964 and the suit house was allotted to the shares of defendant No. 1 and his mother and since 1964, the defendant No. 1-Mahadev and his mother were residing in the suit house as owners. The plaintiff was residing in another house separately. The marriage of defendant No. 2 was celebrated in the suit house on 26th June, 1980. The suit is false and vexatious and liable to be dismissed. 5. On the aforesaid pleadings, the trial Court framed issues and thereafter the parties adduced evidence in support of their contentions. The trial Court, on consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties, recorded the finding that the suit house is the self-acquired property of the plaintiff received in partition, dated 27th May, 1938 and that the suit house was given to defendants for their residence as licensees. The trial Court negatived the contention of the defendants that they have become owners of the suit house by virtue of adverse possession. Consistent with this finding, the trial Court decreed the suit and directed the defendants to deliver possession to the plaintiff. Being aggrieved by this judgment and decree, the defendants carried appeal to the District Court. The trial Court negatived the contention of the defendants that they have become owners of the suit house by virtue of adverse possession. Consistent with this finding, the trial Court decreed the suit and directed the defendants to deliver possession to the plaintiff. Being aggrieved by this judgment and decree, the defendants carried appeal to the District Court. The learned Additional District Judge on hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, allowed the appeal on 31st March, 1990, and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and held that Narayan, who is the son of original plaintiff Vithoba, is entitled to establish his title to the suit house by filing a separate suit, because plaintiff-Vithoba, died during the pendency of the appeal and his son Narayan was substituted in his place in the First appeal. This judgment of the Appellate Court is under challenge in this second appeal. 6. Mr. Talmale, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff, contended that the trial Court was perfectly justified in coming to the conclusion that the suit house is the self-acquired property of the plaintiff and that he has established his title to the suit house, which was received in partition, dated 27th May, 1938. He contended that the trial Court also recorded correct finding that the defendants did not perfect their title by virtue of adverse possession and, therefore, the trial Court decreed the suit and directed the defendants to deliver the possession. He contended that the defendants cannot claim any right, title or interest in the suit house. The defendant No. 1 was allowed to occupy the suit house for the purpose of education of his children by granting licence and that his possession is a permissive possession. He contended that the Appellate Court has committed an error in recording the finding that the suit house is not the self-acquired property of deceased Vithoba (original plaintiff). He contended that since defendant No. 1 was allowed to occupy the suit house for the purpose of education of his children, after revocation of the licence, his possession becomes unauthorized and unlawful. He contended that the defendants were not entitled to make any additions or alterations in the suit house by making construction and, therefore, under these circumstances, the impugned judgment and order passed by the Appellate Court cannot be sustained in law. 7. None appeared for the respondents. 8. He contended that the defendants were not entitled to make any additions or alterations in the suit house by making construction and, therefore, under these circumstances, the impugned judgment and order passed by the Appellate Court cannot be sustained in law. 7. None appeared for the respondents. 8. This Court has given thoughtful consideration to the contentions canvassed by Mr. Talmale, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff. It is not in dispute that the suit house has been purchased by virtue of sale-deed, dated 28th April, 1929, in the name of Ramchandra. It is also not in dispute that there was family partition in between Ramchandra and plaintiff Vithoba on 27th May, 1938 and one portion of the house was allotted to the share of Vithoba, whereas other portion of the house was allotted to the share of Ramchandra. It would clearly reveal from the aforesaid circumstances that the suit house was purchased from the joint family funds in the name of Ramchandra and, therefore, it was made subject-matter of the partition on 27th May, 1938 and in such circumstances, it is not possible to accept the contention of learned Counsel for the plaintiff that the suit house is the self-acquired property of Vithoba. The portion of the house, which has been allotted to the share of Vithoba, was consequent upon the partition, dated 27th May, 1938, and since the suit house was joint family property, it did not follow that Vithoba has acquired that property from his own funds. 9. The defendant No. 1-Mahadev is the son of deceased Vithoba. Defendants-Umakant, Kiran and Dilip are the grand sons of Vithoba and defendant Kantabai is the wife of defendant No. 1 Mahadev. Vithoba died during the pendency of the appeal and, therefore, his second son by name Narayan has been substituted in the place of plaintiff Vithoba. It is relevant to note that Narayan was not impleaded as a party to the suit and since the suit house was allotted to the share of Vithoba by virtue of partition, dated 27th May, 1938, the Appellate Court was perfectly justified in directing the plaintiff Narayan to establish his own title to the suit house by filing a separate suit for partition and separate possession of his share. 10. 10. By no stretch of imagination, it could be said that the defendant No. 1 Mahadev was allowed to occupy the suit house as licensee and the Appellate Court was perfectly justified in making the observation that the father would not create a licence in favour of his son and grand sons, that too for unlimited period. In such circumstances, question of grant of licence in favour of co-owners does not arise and since the suit house is not the self-acquired property of Vithoba, the suit filed by him for possession is liable to be dismissed. There is no reason for this Court to interfere into the findings recorded by the Appellate Court. On close scrutiny, it would reveal that there is no error or illegality in the impugned judgment passed by the Appellate Court and consequently this appeal is dismissed with no costs. Appeal dismissed. -----