COMMON ORDER: By consent, the civil revision are heard and disposed of by this common order. 2. Both the civil revision petitions are filed by the Defendant in the suit. (i) C.R.P.No.939 of 2003 is filed against the judgment and decree dated 25.11.2002 made in O.S.No.150 of 2001 on the file of XII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. (ii) C.R.P.No.1254 of 2003 is filed by the defendant in the suit as against the order and decretal order date 25.11.2002 made in I.A.No.11391 of 2002 in O.S.No.150 of 2001 on the file of XII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. 3. The order passed in O.S.No.50 of 2001 is a consequential to the order passed in I.A.No.11391 of 2002 and therefore, it would be better to deal with the order passed in I.A.No.11391 of 2002. The facts in brief are as follows: The respondent/plaintiff filed the suit on his own behalf and on behalf of the members of Sathyamoorthy Co-operative Building Society Limited, questioning the revised value of the plot claimed by the Society praying for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant Society from demanding more price than the amount originally fixed as the cost of the plot and for other reliefs. The said suit was filed on 24.11.2000 and it was posted for the first hearing on 14.1.2001 and vakalat for the defendant was file don 16.11.2001 and it was adjourned from 20.11.2001 to 27.9.2002 for filing written statement and the written statement was filed on 27.9.2002 and the matter was posted for framing issued from 11.10.2002. That in the meanwhile the plaintiff filed an application, under O.8, Rule 10, C.P.C., on 22.7.2002 praying for the decree of the suit, against the defendant for, non-filing of the written statement within the time as fixed under Rule 1 of O.8, C.P.C. as amended by Act 22 of 2002. 4. The respondent/plaintiff in the affidavit filed in support of the petition has stated that the suit was taken on file on 8.1.2001 and the revision petitioner/defendant entered appearance on 8.1.2001 through advocate and the defendant has not filed written statement for the last one year and six months. When the suit came up for hearing on 8.1.2001, the plaintiff’s advocate brought to the notice of the Court that amended provision of Rule 1, O.8, C.P.C. as amended by the Code of Civil Procedure Act 22 of 2002. When the suit came up for hearing on 8.1.2001, the plaintiff’s advocate brought to the notice of the Court that amended provision of Rule 1, O.8, C.P.C. as amended by the Code of Civil Procedure Act 22 of 2002. Despite the fact, the suit was adjourned to 26.7.2002. The defendant has not chosen to file written statement within the period permitted under O.8, Rule 1, C.P.C. as amended by the Act 22 of 2002 and therefore, the Court should pronounce the judgment as against the defendant as prescribed under O.8, Rule 10, C.P.C. Further, it is stated that the written statement filed by the defendant on 27.9.2002, after the expiry of the statutory period, cannot be received and the written statement, if any, filed would be non-est in law and the same has to be ignored and the Court has to pronounce judgment and decree. 5. The above said application was considered by the trial Court and it came to the conclusion that as per amended C.P.C., under Rule 1, O.8, the written statement has to be filed within a period of 90 days and since the written statement was not filed within the said prescribed time, the defendant also has not chosen to file any counter to the said petition filed by the plaintiff, it was ruled, that the petition under O.8, Rule 1, C.P.C. has got to be ordered and it was allowed. Consequently, the defendant was set ex parte and the suit was decreed as prayed for. Both allowing of the interlocutory application and decreeing the suits are challenged in these civil revision petitions. 6. Heard the learned advocate for the petitioner and the respondent. 7. The case on hand may be one of the peculiar case, which this Court has to deal with. 8. To appreciate the case, certain dates are important. Admittedly, the suit was filed in November, 2000/January, 2001 (both the learned counsel for petitioner and the respondent have not given correct date) But it appears that the suit was filed atleast in January, 2001 prior to the coming into force of the amended Act 22 of 2002 which came into force on 1.7.2002. The defendant was given time for filing written statement upto 29.7.2002, on which date alone the defendant filed the written statement. The defendant was given time for filing written statement upto 29.7.2002, on which date alone the defendant filed the written statement. Time was periodically extended for filing written statement before and after the amended Act 22 of 2002 came into force. The written statement filed on 29.7.2002 was also taken on file by the Court, and the suit was posted for framing of issues upto 25.11.2002. But, in the meanwhile, the plaintiff filed an application under O.8, Rule 10 on 22.7.2002 to decree the suit for non filing of the written statement in time by the defendant. That in the said petition, the defendant has not chosen to file any counter and ultimately, the trial Court passed the order on 25.11.2002 allowing the said application and decreeing the suit. 9. Now, the question to be decided in these petitions is, whether the trial Court is correct in allowing the application filed by the plaintiff under O.8, Rule 10 and decreeing the suit, in spite of the fact that the written statement has been received by the Court after the expiry of the time stipulated under O.8, Rule 1, C.P.C.? 10. In the above said context, it has become necessary to examine the provision of O.8, Rule 1 prior to the amendment and after the amendment. (i) O.8, Rule 1 states as under: (prior to the amendment): “The defendant shall at or before the first hearing or within such time as the Court may permit, present the written statement of his defence.” No time limit has been prescribed under this Rule, though that the time for filing the written statement it states that ‘at or before within such time as the Court may permit’. The power was given to the Court to permit the defendant to file written statement and is not circumscribed and no time limit has been prescribed. The power was given to the Court to permit the defendant to file written statement and is not circumscribed and no time limit has been prescribed. (ii) O.8, Rule 1 after the amendment of Act 46 of 1999 and Act 22 of 2002, reads as under: “The defendant shall within 30 days from the date of service of summons on him, present the written statement of his defence; (ii) Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of 30 days, he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day as may be specified by the Court, for the reasons to be recorded in writing but shall not later than 90 lays from the date of service of summons.” 11. The amended provisions clamps restriction for granting time for filing written statement. As per the amended rule of Rule 1 O.8, the defendant has to file written statement within 30 days’ from the date of service of summons on him. For filing of written statement, the time runs from the date of service of summons. Initially, the defendant is given 30 days’ time. If for any reason, the defendant is unable to file written statement, within the period of 30 days from the date of service of summons, the defendant shall be allowed to file written statement on such other day as it would be prescribed by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing and in any event , the time that could be extended by the Court, shall not be later than 90 days from the date of service of summons. This provision prescribes outer time limit for granting time by the Court for filing the written statement. In any event, the defendant has to file the written statement within the time extended by the Court, viz., within 90 days from the date of service of summons, and this time limit has been prescribed deliberately to avoid unnecessary adjournment that could be taken by the defendant to file written statement. 12. In our case, both the above said situations were not available as the suit was filed prior to the coming into force of the amended Act 22 of 2002, which came into force on 1.7.2002 and the summons were all received prior to the amended Act came into force. 12. In our case, both the above said situations were not available as the suit was filed prior to the coming into force of the amended Act 22 of 2002, which came into force on 1.7.2002 and the summons were all received prior to the amended Act came into force. In that context, the Court has no occasion to strictly apply the amended provisions of O.8, Rule 1, C.P.C. Therefore, it is argued on behalf of the defendant that the amended provisions is not applicable to the case on hand. 13. On the contrary, learned advocate for the respondent/plaintiff would contend that Civil Procedure Code is Rules of Procedure and it has got retrospective effect and therefore, when the amended Act came into force on 1.7.2002, and the said fact was also brought to the notice of the Court by filing an application by the plaintiff on 22.7.2002, the defendant has not chosen to file written statement, within 30 days from the date of service of summons and the said 30 days expires at the end of July, 2002. 14. In order to substantiate his submission, learned advocate for the plaintiff relied upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Shyam Sundar and others v. Ram Kumar and another, A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 2472, wherein the Honourable Supreme Court had observed that: "We are, therefore, of the view that, where a repeal of provisions of an enactment is followed by fresh legislation by an amending Act such legislation is prospective in operation and does not effect substantive or vested rights of the parties unless made retrospective either expressly or by necessary intendment. We are further of the view that there is a presumption against the retrospective operation of a statute and further a statute is not to be construed to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary, but an amending Act which affects the procedure is presumed to be retrospective, unless amending Act provides otherwise." [Italics supplied] 15. In the case of Commissioner of Wealth tax, Meerut v. Sharvan Kumar Swarup & Sons, (1994)6 S.C.C. 623 , wherein also the Honourable Supreme Court had observed that: "In the Salmond’s Jurisprudence, the distinction between substantive law and law of procedure is indicated in the following words, "What, then, is the true nature of the distinction? In the case of Commissioner of Wealth tax, Meerut v. Sharvan Kumar Swarup & Sons, (1994)6 S.C.C. 623 , wherein also the Honourable Supreme Court had observed that: "In the Salmond’s Jurisprudence, the distinction between substantive law and law of procedure is indicated in the following words, "What, then, is the true nature of the distinction? The law of procedure may be defined as that branch of the law which governs the process of litigation. It is the law of actions - Jus quod ad actions pertinent - using the term action in a wide sense to include all legal proceedings, civil or criminal. All the residue is substantive law, and relates not to the process of litigation, but to its purposes and subject matter. Substantive law is concerned with the ends which the administration of justice seeks. Procedural law deals with the means of instruments by which those ends are to be attained. The latter regulates the conduct and relations of Courts and litigants in respect of the litigation itself; the former determines their conduct and relations in respect of the matters litigated". 16. Relying upon the above quoted decisions, it is argued, on behalf of the plaintiff, that the Civil Procedure Code is only a procedural law and as per the amended Act 22 of 2002 which came into force on 1.7.2002, the defendant had 30 days to file written statement from the date of service of summons and the defendant at best could have only 30 days from 1.7.2002 and the defendant has not chosen to file written statement within the said stipulated time and therefore, the Court below is correct in decreeing the suit for non filing of the written statement within the stipulated time. 17. The above said submissions were swiftly countered by the learned Advocate for the revision petitioners by pointing out that even as per the plaint itself, the suit has been filed prior to the coming into force of the amended Act and 30 days time must be reckoned from the date of service of summons and that day could be reckoned from the date of service of summons and that day could be reckoned from 1.7.2002 on which date the Act came into force and 30 days time expires by the end of July, 2002. But, however, in this case, the Court has been granting time upto 27.9.2002 on which date the defendant has filed the written statement. 18. Proviso to Rule 1, O.8 gives power to the Court to extend the time for filing written statement upto 90 days from the date of summons and we have taken the date of service of summons as 1.7.2002 and 90 days would expire only at the end of October, 2002, whereas the defendant has filed the written statement on 27.9.2002 within the time prescribed under the above said rule. In interpreting the rules of procedure or even for that matter, the provisions of certain acts, the Court should adopt liberal view and the Court cannot adopt a hypertechnical view in taking into consideration all these matters. Therefore, the Court below is not correct in allowing the petition filed by the plaintiff. 19. The other argument advanced on behalf of the revision petitioner is that the Court having received and taken it on file the written statement, and only in the said view of the matter, the Court also adjourned the case for framing issues upto 11.11.2002, but however, allowed the application filed by the plaintiff and decreed the suit on 25.11.2002 and thereby committed serious error and the same has to be set aside. 20. I see some force in the arguments advanced on behalf of the revision petitioner and the dates and events furnished by the revision petitioner would throw much light upon the subject that it is made out that written statement has been filed within the time limit fixed by the Court i.e., 90 days from 1.7.2002. The order passed by the Court below in decreeing the suit, for non filing of the written statement within the stipulated period, is not proper. 21. The various provisions contained in the Civil Procedure Code is not exhaustive as the legislature is incapable of contemplating all possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently, for providing procedure for them. The procedure contemplated under the Code is designed to facilitate justice and further ends, not the penal enactment for punishment and penalties and not a thing designed to trip the people up. The Code deals with procedural means and not with substantive right. The procedure contemplated under the Code is designed to facilitate justice and further ends, not the penal enactment for punishment and penalties and not a thing designed to trip the people up. The Code deals with procedural means and not with substantive right. The object of the proposed amendment fixing the period for filing written statement is only to see the pleadings are completed so as to enable the Court to proceed with the suit and decide the matter as early as possible. Such amendment was needed only to avoid the attitude of the parties from taking adjournments for filing written statement any length of time. Some of the Courts granted time for asking without even applying their mind whether such a time is sought for genuine grounds. Only to prevent such mischief, the legislature had thought fit to amend the provision prescribing time limit within which written statement is to be filed, and taken away the unlimited power of the Court to grant time for filing written statement. From the above, it is clear that the object of the amendment is only to have speedy disposal of the suits by providing a time frame to file written statement. As observed earlier, the above said amendment is only a procedure and not vitiated by any penalty or serious of trivial consequences, if the written statement is filed within 90 days from the date of receipt of the summons. 22. It is also incidentally necessary, to consider whether the Courts can extend the period even beyond 90 days for filing written statement, though it was limited to 90 days, as prescribed under Rule 1, O.8. O.8, Rule 9 speaks about the subsequent pleadings which states that: "No pleading subsequent to the written statement of a defendant other than by way of defence to a set off shall be presented except by the leave of the Court and upon such terms as the Court thinks fit, but the Court may at any time require a written statement or additional written statement from any of the parties and fix a time for presenting the same". 23. On the face of it, it may appear that Rule 9 runs contra to Rule of O.8. But Rule 9, O.8 arises in a different circumstance namely, that the power explicitly given to the Court. 23. On the face of it, it may appear that Rule 9 runs contra to Rule of O.8. But Rule 9, O.8 arises in a different circumstance namely, that the power explicitly given to the Court. Only when the Court thinks fit, the filing of written statement and additional written statement is required, obviously for better adjudication of the suit, require the party concern to file a written statement or additional written statement within 30 days from the date of requirement. But the said requirement would cause even better passing of the judgment. As such there is no specific bar in this rule as to when such order has got to be passed by the Court calling the parties to file written statement. But one thing is certain notwithstanding the time limit given O.8, Rule 1, the Court has got further power to call upon the parties concerned to file additional written statement and this would take place at any time as the Court deems fit and proper. 24. That only when the parties concerned did not comply with the requisition of the Court as stated under Rule 1, O.8, the Court shall pronounce judgment against the concerned party as prescribed under Rule 10, O.8. This aspect of the case came for consideration in the case of Vimalkumar Nathmal Goenka v. Vinod Kumar Nathamal Goenka, A.I.R. 1999 Bom. 55, wherein it was held that, "In order to consider the issue in question, it will be meaningful to consider purport of O.8, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that Rule 10 gives discretion to the Court and the Court can permit the defendant to file written statement at any stage prior to pronouncement of judgment. Plain reading of Rule 10 makes it clear that the Court can either pronounce judgment against the defendant in the absence of written statement or pass any order as it thinks fit. Ultimately it was held that it is not possible in the facts and circumstances of the case to hold that the trial Court was not competent to accept the written statement filed by the defendant". 25. Ultimately it was held that it is not possible in the facts and circumstances of the case to hold that the trial Court was not competent to accept the written statement filed by the defendant". 25. Learned advocate for the revision petitioner also relied upon the decision of this Court in Ponnammal v. Subbsuraman and another, (2003)3 C.T.C. 385 , wherein this Court (K.Govindarajan, J.) after having considered the various judgments, relatable to Rule 1, O.8 and also Rules 9 and 10 of O.8, had ultimately ruled, "that in view of the power given under O.8, Rules 9 and 10, it cannot be said that the Courts have no power to permit the defendant to file written statement even in cases posted for judgment. The above said provisions give power to the Courts to receive written statement before pronouncing judgment in cases posted for judgment on the basis that the defendant did not file written statement. Learned Judge (K.G.J.) of this Court came to the above conclusion based upon the decision rendered by the Karnataka High Court in A.V.Purushotam v. N.K.Nagaraj, (2003)7 I.L.D. 737. 26. It is, therefore, now clear that notwithstanding the time stipulated under Rule 1, O.8 for filing written statement, or the Court as per O.8, Rule 9 has to permit another party to file written statement or additional written statement by fixing time, which time shall not be more than 30 days from the date of said order. 27. In fact, the words ‘may’ and ‘shall’ employed in O.8, Rule 1, O.8, Rule 9 and O.8, Rule 10 have been considered in the case of State of U.P v. Manobodhan Lal, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 912. In the said case, O.41, Rule 27 of the Code came for consideration and it was held that: "An examination of the terms of Art.320 shows that the word ‘shall’ appears in almost every paragraph and every clause or sub-clauses of that article. In the said case, O.41, Rule 27 of the Code came for consideration and it was held that: "An examination of the terms of Art.320 shows that the word ‘shall’ appears in almost every paragraph and every clause or sub-clauses of that article. If it were held that the provisions of Art.320(3)(c) are mandatory in terms, the other clauses or sub-clauses of that article, will have to be equally held to be mandatory If they are so held any appointments made to the public services of the Union of a State, without observing strictly, the terms of these sub clauses in Clause (3) of Art.320, would adversely affect the person so appointed to a public service, without any fault on his part and without his having any say in the matter. This result could not have been contemplated by the makers of the Constitution. Hence, the use of the words ‘shall’ in a statute though generally taken in a mandatory sense, does not necessarily mean that every case it should have that effect that is to say, that unless the words of the statute are punctuliously followed, the proceeding or the outcome of the proceeding, would be invalid". 28. On the other hand, it is not always correct to say that there were the word ‘may’ has been used, the statute is only permissible or directory in the sense that non-compliance with those provisions will not render the proceeding invalid. In that connection, the following quotation from Crawford on ‘Statutory Construction’ Art.261 is pertinent: "The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the Legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the Legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other..." 29. The meaning and intention of the Legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other..." 29. The amended Acts 46 of 1999 and 22 of 2002 which came into force on 1.7.2002, were intended only to avoid unnecessary adjournments granted for filing written statement, however, to safeguard the rights of the parties, learned advocate for the revision petitioner pointed out that Sec.32 of the amended act 1989 (Act 46 of 1999) Sub-clause (10) which reads: "the provisions of Rules 1 and 1-A of O.8, of the first Schedule, as substituted or inserted by Sec.18 of this Act, shall not apply to a written statement filed and presented before the Court immediately before the commencement of Sec.18. By pointing out this provision, learned advocate is trying to state that the commencement of Sec.18 came into force from 1.7.2002 on which date the amended act came into force and therefore, though the Court had extended time for filing written statement periodically even after 1.7.2002, and the Court is empowered to extend time for a period of three months under proviso to Rule 1, O.8, and the defendant has filed the written statement within the stipulated time and therefore, the Court below is not correct in allowing the petition filed by the plaintiff to decree the suit. This argument also has got some force. 30. This argument also has got some force. 30. By taking into consideration all these aspects of the case, (i) that the present suit has been filed prior to the coming into force of the amended Act; (ii) that the time was extended by the Court, for filing written statement even after coming into force of the amended Act on 1.7.2002; (iii) that the written statement was filed on 27.2.2002, which is within 90 days from the date of commencement of the Amended Act; (iv) that the Court had also received the written statement and taken it on file and posted the case for framing issues; and therefore the application filed by the plaintiff to decree the suit for non filing of the written statement within stipulated period, i.e., within 30 days, as stated in Rule 1, O.8, is not sustainable and the decree passed by the Court below is vitiated and liable to be set aside. 31. In the result, both civil revision petitions are allowed and the orders impugned are set aside. The Court below is hereby directed to frame the issues, and proceed with the matter further, and dispose of the suit, in accordance with law as expediously as possible. No costs. Consequently, connected C.M.P. and V.C.M.P. are closed.