( 1 ) APPELLANTS and third respondent filed a claim petition seeking compensation of rs. 9,00,000/- from respondents 1 and 2 alleging that when Peter Leonard (the deceased) aged 22 years earning Rs. 4,500/- p. m. , and who happened to be the son of the appellants and brother of third respondent, was proceeding on his motor cycle. First respondent while driving the bus belonging to the second respondent corporation in a rash and negligent manner dashed the bus against the motor cycle of the deceased resulting in the death of the deceased. ( 2 ) RESPONDENTS 1 and 2 filed counter inter alia alleging that the accident occurred only due to the negligence or contributory negligence of the deceased and that the compensation claimed is highly excessive and is exorbitant. In support of their case appellants and third respondent examined three witnesses as P. Ws 1 to 3 including the first appellant as P. W. I and marked Exs. A-1 to A-7. On their behalf respondents 1 and 2 examined the first respondent as R. W. I and marked Exs. B-1 to B-3. ( 3 ) THE Tribunal having held that the accident occurred due to 50% negligence of the deceased and 50% negligence of the first respondent, awarded 50% of Rs. 55,580 /- and 50% of Rs. 44,300/- respectively as compensation to the appellants, and dismissed the claim of third respondent. Dissatisfied with the compensation award ed to them and aggrieved by the finding that the deceased was guilty of 50% negligence, claimants 1 and 2 preferred this appeal. ( 4 ) THE points for consideration are- (1) How did the accident occur. Was it due to the negligence of the deceased or due to the negligence of R. W. I or due to the negligence of both? (2) To what compensation are the appellants entitled to ? ( 5 ) POINT No. l: The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that since the evidence of R. W. I does not rebut the presumption that arises under the doctrine res ipsaa loquitur invoked by the tribunal, it has to be held that the accident accurred only due to the negligence of R. W. 1, in view of the evidence of P. Ws 2 and 3. The contention of the learned counsel for second respondent is that in view of Ex. The contention of the learned counsel for second respondent is that in view of Ex. B-1 sketch, read with the evidence of R. W. I, it is clear that the accident occurred only due to the negligence of the deceased and the Tribunal was in error in holding that the accident occurred due to 50% negligence of R. W. 1 and 50% negligence of the deceased and contends that P. Ws. 2 and 3 are not actual witnesses to the accident and so on reliance can be placed on their evidence. ( 6 ) SINCE P. W. I was not the witness to the accident, his evidence is not relevant for deciding this point. The evidence of P. W. 2 is that while he was crossing the road to go to his house from his office, he halted to on seeing a bus and after the bus crossed him, he heard a sound and found that two persons travelling on a bullet motor cycle had fallen down and the bus stopping after going to some distance, and that the people that gathered there took two injured persons, out of whom one was the deceased, to hospital and that the driver of the bus also accompanied them. During cross examination, he stated that his office hours are from 9-00 a. m. to 6. 00 that he did not give a report to the police about the accident; He initially stated that he did not see how the accident occurred and looked at the scene of the accident only after hearing a sound, and later stated that on hearing the sound of collision he turned and found that the motor cyclist is falling after collision with a bus, he stated that he had facial acquaintance with the deceased and that he did not give his name and address to any of the relatives of the deceased. ( 7 ) THE evidence of P. W. 3, an auto driver is that when he was taking some students in his auto from Jagadamba center to Andhra university, he found a bullet motor cycle proceeding ahead of him and an APSRTC bus, being driven at a high speed came in his opposite direction and went to the wrong side of the road and dashed against the bullet motor cycle proceeding ahead of him though it was on the correct side of the road and that he stopped the auto and went to the scene of accident and found both the persons travelling on the motor cycle unconscious, and that the driver of the bus took the injured to King George hospital and that he was examined by the police. During cross- examination he stated that he did not give a report to the police about the accident and that he did not give his address to the relatives of the deceased and that he does not know the address of the deceased and that he did not receive any summons to give evidence in the case. ( 8 ) THE evidence of R. W. I, the driver of the bus involved in the accident is that he stopped the bus at Apsara bus stage for passengers to alight and thereafter when he proceeded to a distance of about 50 to 100 yards he found a jeep and other vehicles coming in his opposite direction and in the meanwhile a motor cycle suddenly overtook the jeep and came to the wrong side of the road and dashed against the right side portion and the right headlight of the bus and so, he stopped and got down from the bus and found a bullet motor cycle and two persons were lying on the road with injuries on the middle of the road and that the accident occurred only due to the rash and negligent driving of the motor cyclist and that the width of the road at the scene of accident is about 80ft and that he took the injured to the King George hospital and went to the police station and gave a report and that he was acquitted in the criminal case, filed against him in connection with the accident. He produced Ex. B-1 sketch of the scene of accident. He produced Ex. B-1 sketch of the scene of accident. During cross-examination, he stated that the road from Apsara hotel to jagadamba junction has a down gradient and that after the accident both the vehicles involved in the accident were not at the scene of accident and that the motor cycle was lying at distance of about one yard from the bus from the place where he stopped the bus,and that he was not present when the police went to the scene of accident and that the jeep that came in his opposite direction was proceeding on the correct side of the road and denied the suggestion that the accident occurred only due to his negligent driving of the bus. ( 9 ) SINCE Ex. A-5, First Information Report issued in connection with the accident, is illegible, I am not able to find out therefrom as to who gave the report to the police about the accident and what the allegations therein are. Appellants ought to have produced a legible copy of the FIR, because no useful purpose would be served in producing a document like Ex. A-5. Be that as it may since the evidence of R. W. I is that he was acquitted in the criminal case, it is clear that police filed a charge sheet against R. W. 1 in connection with the accident. But for the reasons best known to them, appellants did not produce a copy of the charge sheet which would have contained the names of the witnesses cited as eye witnesses. It is not known if P. Ws. 2 and 3 were cited as eye witnesses to the accident. From the evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 3 it is clear that appellants were not aware of the fact that they were witnesses to the accident p. W. I did not explain as to how he or the appellants came to know about P. Ws. 2 and 3 being witnesses to the accident. There is no corroborative material on record to show that P. Ws. 2 and 3 were examined by police as eye witnesses to the accident, as claimed by them. Therefore unless appellants explain as to how they came to know about P. Ws. 2 and 3 being eye witnesses to the accident it is difficult to believe that they, i. e. P. Ws. 2 and 3 were examined by police as eye witnesses to the accident, as claimed by them. Therefore unless appellants explain as to how they came to know about P. Ws. 2 and 3 being eye witnesses to the accident it is difficult to believe that they, i. e. P. Ws. 2 and 3 were in fact witnesses to the accident. Be that as it may, even assuming that P. W. 2 was present at the scene of accident at the time of accident, he could not have seen the accident when it actually took place, because admittedly he diverted his attention to the scene of offence only after hearing the sound of impact. So, he could not have noticed as to whose fault the accident actually took place. Since according to him he had facial acquaintance with the deceased, he tried to help the appellants by giving evidence in their favour. The evidence of P. W. 3 looks artificial. The accident took place about 8 p. m. It is difficult to believe the evidence of p. W. 3 that the driver of the bus went to the wrong side of the road and caused the accident because Ex. B-1, sketch of the scene of accident, which is not denied or disputed by the appellants, shows that the accident took place on the middle of the road. Ex. A-6, Motor Vehicle Inspector report, shows that the right side front portion on the front wheel, head light and bumper of the bus (involved in the accident) were damaged, and that the right side front mudguard, headlight, front guard bar, both the front shock absorbers, front brake lever, gear wheel, rim, fuel tank handle bar, left side foot rest and peddle of the motor cycle (involved in the accident) were damaged and the left side foot rest was broken, and that the accident was not due to any mechanical defect of the vehicles involved in the accident. If the bus went to the wrong side of the road when the motor cycle was on its correct side, the collision would have been either on the left or middle portion of the bus, but not on its right side, as found in ex. A-1. Obviously because the accident took place on the middle of the road, the right portion of the vehicles involved in the accident were damaged. A-1. Obviously because the accident took place on the middle of the road, the right portion of the vehicles involved in the accident were damaged. Even if one of the drivers of the vehicles involved in the accident were careful, they could have easily averted accident. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal observing that the accident occurred due to 50% negligence of the deceased and due to 50% negligence of the driver is correct and needs no interference. This is not a case for invoking the doctrine of resipsaloquitur as erroneouslyopined by the Tribunal. For the reasons mentioned above, I hold that the accident occurred due to 50% negligence of the deceased and due to 50% negligence of the driver of the bus belonging to the second respondent. The point is answered accordingly. ( 10 ) POINT No. 2 According to the appellants the deceased was earning about rs. 4500/- or Rs. 4,000/- p. m. as salary etc. Since the accident took place on 07-12-1987, if the deceased was earning Rs. 4000/- or rs. 4500/- per month, he should have been an Income Tax assessee. Appellants did not produce any documents to show that the deceased was either submitting returns of income tax or was assessed to income tax. The fact that the deceased subscribed his signature to the Memorandum and Articles of Association of Roy Marine Foods and private Limited as a Director of that company, incorporated under the provisions of the companies Act, as evidenced by Ex. A-4 is of no help in finding out the income of the deceased. ( 11 ) EXS-A-1 to A-3 Salary certificates of the deceased cannot be taken into consideration because the person who issued them is not examined. As stated earlier if the deceased was in fact drawing the amounts mentioned therein as salary he should have been assessed to income tax and there is nothing on record to show that the deceased was an income tax assessee. By the accounting year 1987-1988 any person whose net income exceeded Rs. 18,000/- was liable to pay income tax. All these apart since appellants are the parents of the deceased who was unmarried by the date of his death as a result of the accident even assuming that he was earning a salary about Rs. By the accounting year 1987-1988 any person whose net income exceeded Rs. 18,000/- was liable to pay income tax. All these apart since appellants are the parents of the deceased who was unmarried by the date of his death as a result of the accident even assuming that he was earning a salary about Rs. 2,000/- p. m. or something more since he, admittedly, was living away from the appellants the deceased must be spending a considerable amount from his earning towards his room rent and boarding charges etc. So even if he was contributing a sizable amount to the appellants for their maintenance by the date of his death, he would not have continued to contribute the same amount to them in future, because had he been alive he would have got married and begotten children and would be spending a major portion of his earnings towards the maintenance of his wife and children. From the evidence of P. W. I it is seen that appellants have one more son. It cannot be said that they would entirely depend on the earnings of the deceased alone. In spite of all this the Tribunal took the contribution of the deceased to the appellants at Rs. 2,000/ - p. m. which is not correct. In the facts and circumstances of the case the average contribution of the deceased to the appellants can be taken as Rs. 1,000/- p. m or rs. l2,000/-p. a. ( 12 ) SINCE the appellants are the parents of the deceased who was unmarried, the age of the mother is relevant for fixing the appropriate multiplier. Appellants, for the reasons best known to them, did not adduce evidence with regard to their ages. In the claim petition, they described themselves as persons aged 58 years and 50 years respectively. Assuming that the ages mentioned therein are correct, the multiplier can be taken as 9, keeping in view the age of the second appellant. So the pecuniary damages payable to the appellants would come to Rs. l2,000/- X9 =rs. 1,08,000/- or rs. 1,10,000/ -. ( 13 ) IN view of the decision reported in y. Varalakshmi v. M. Nageswara Rao appellants are also entitled to Rs. 15,000/- towards non pecuniary damages. ( 14 ) THUS appellants would have been entitled to Rs. 1,10,000/- + Rs. 15,000/- = rs. l2,000/- X9 =rs. 1,08,000/- or rs. 1,10,000/ -. ( 13 ) IN view of the decision reported in y. Varalakshmi v. M. Nageswara Rao appellants are also entitled to Rs. 15,000/- towards non pecuniary damages. ( 14 ) THUS appellants would have been entitled to Rs. 1,10,000/- + Rs. 15,000/- = rs. 1,25,000/-, but since I held that deceased was 50% negligent at the time of accident, they are entitled only to 50% thereof that is rs. 62,500/ -. The pointanswered accordingly. ( 15 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that since the Tribunal awarded Rs. 25,000/- towards the marriage expenses of the third respondent to the first appellant, appellants are entitled to rs. 25,000/- more. Question of awarding any amount towards marriage expenses of an unmarried sister of the deceased victim in a motor accident case, apart from the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages usually awarded, does not arise. Tribunal did not award any compensation to third respondent but in fact dismissed the claim of the third respondent. She did not join the appellants in preferring this appeal. So it is clear that third respondent was not aggrieved by the dismissal of her claim. So appellants are not entitled to any further compensation that too towards marriage expenses of the third respondent. ( 16 ) IN the result, the appeal is allowed in part and the award of the Tribunal is modified. An award is passed for rs. 62,500 / - in favour of the appellants against respondents 1 and 2 with interest @ 12% on rs. 49,940/- from the date of filing of the petition till the date of deposit and with interest @ 9%p. a. on Rs. 12,560/- from the date of award of the Tribunal i. e. 03-03-1993 till the date of deposit, with proportionate costs in the Tribunal. Rest of the claim of the appellants is dismissed without costs. Parties are directed to bear their own costs in this appeal.