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2004 DIGILAW 596 (RAJ)

Kishan Agarwal v. Dr. Pitambar Dayal

2004-04-16

A.C.GOYAL

body2004
Judgment A.C. Goyal, J.-The defendant-tenant has filed this appeal against the judgment and decree of eviction passed by learned Additional District Judge No. 8, Jaipur City, Jaipur on 2 2.2002. The parties in this appeal would be referred as arrayed in the plaint. 2. Therelevant facts in brief are that the plaintiff-respondent filed a civil suit for eviction on 18.1998 with the averments that the suit house No. H3, Chitranjan Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur was let-out to the defendant in the year 1962 on monthly rent of Rs. 265/-. Present rate of rent is Rs. 2000/-per month. The plaintiff sought eviction on the grounds of reasonable and bonafide requirement, material alterations, assigning, sub-letting or parting with the possession of some parts of the suit premises giving the details with regard to each of the grounds of eviction. 3. Thedefendant in his written statement while admitting the tenancy denied all the grounds of eviction with pleas that the plaintiff is in possession of his own accommodation which is sufficient and the plaintiff either wants to let out this house on higher rent or wants to sell it out, 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties following issues were framed: ?????????? Hindi Matter ?????????? 5. Evidence of both the parties was recorded and vide impugned judgment dated 2 2.2002 issues No. 4 & 6 were decided against the plaintiff and while deciding remaining issues in favour of the plaintiff a decree of eviction against the defendant was passed. 6. Thedefendant vide this appeal has challenged the findings of the Trial Court on issues No. 1, 2, 3 & 5 while the plaintiff in cross-objections has challenged the findings of the Trial Court on issue No. 4. 7. I haveheard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the entire evidence. On the basis of the submissions made before this Court following points arise for consideration: .(i) Whether the decision of the Trial Court with regard to issues No. 1 to 3 relating to reasonable and bonafide requirement, comparative hardship and partial eviction is justified? (ii) Whether the decision on issue No. 5 on the point of sub-letting, assignment or parting with the possession of the portion of the suit house is justified? (iii) Whether the decision on issue No. 4 with regard to material alterations is justified? (ii) Whether the decision on issue No. 5 on the point of sub-letting, assignment or parting with the possession of the portion of the suit house is justified? (iii) Whether the decision on issue No. 4 with regard to material alterations is justified? .(iv) Whether the plaintiff was estopped on the basis of the acquiescence and waiver in seeking the eviction? 8. First Point:-Section 13 (1) (h) and (h) (i) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (in short the Act) is as under: Section 13. Eviction of tenants :-(l) Notwithstanding anything con- tained in any law or contract, no Court shall pass any decree, make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefore to the full extent allowable by this Act unless it is satisfied; .(h) that the premises are required reasonably and bonafide by the landlord:(h .(i) for the use or occupation of himself or his family. 9. According to the averments made in the plaint, the plaintiff along with his wife his son Jaideep, son’s wife and two daughters is residing in his ancestral house No. 8, Bhagat Niwas, C-Scheme, Jaipur. A family partition of this ancestral house took place in March, 1995 between the plaintiff , his wife and two sons Jaideep and Jayesh. This family partition was oral. The portion marked with red colour on ground floor came to the plaintiffs share and portions on the first floor marked with green, badami and yellow colour respectively came to the shares of Jaideep, plaintiffs wife and Jayesh as shown in the annexed site-plan Annexure-B. The plaintiffs portion on ground floor consists of three bed rooms, one Pooja room and drawing-cum-dining room. One bed room is occupied by the plaintiff and his wife, the other bed room is in possession of the plaintiffs son Jaideep and his wife and the third bed room is occupied by two grand daughters of the plaintiff The remaining portions in the shares of the plaintiffs wife and two sons are on rent. The plaintiff has three daughters-all married. Two daughters and one son Jayesh are residing in America. The plaintiff has three daughters-all married. Two daughters and one son Jayesh are residing in America. They come with their family members and stay with the plaintiff Friends of the plaintiff as well as his son Jaideep also come to the plaintiffs house but the plaintiff has no guest room. Kitchen as well as dining-cum-drawing room are common. Both the daughters of Jaideep are learning music and dance and operate T.V. and thus the atmosphere has become noisy. It is also pleaded that the relations between the plaintiffs wife and daughter-in-law are not cordial for last some time and thus the plaintiff and his wife in old age want to live separately in peace. Open heart surgery was also performed on the plaintiff and thus this noisy atmosphere creates tension. It is also pleaded that the plaintiff is a retired Director, Medical and Health Department, Rajasthan and now is carrying on private practice but has no room for that purpose. Therefore, the plaintiff requires the suit house reasonably and bonafide. It is also averred that the defendant has constructed a double storied house on plot of 800 sq. yards purchased in C-Scheme, Jaipur and thus no comparative hardship would be caused to the defendant and the defendant mostly resides at Neem Ka Thana where he has got a big house of his own, 10. In written statement all the facts as stated hereinabove have been denied. It has been denied that the house No. 8. Bhagat Niwas is the ancestral house and any oral partition took place as pleaded and the entire facts have been pleaded only for the purpose of evicting the tenant. All the averments with regard to requirements of the plaintiff have been denied in toto. 11. The Trial Court having considered the evidence came to the conclusion that the plot No. 8, Bhagat Niwas was ancestral properly of the plaintiff and it was received by the plaintiff in partition vide partition deed Ex. 16 dated 30.4.1963. This partition took place between the plaintiff and his brothers. This property was further partitioned in March, 1995 between the plaintiff , his wife and two sons and this oral partition was reduced to writing on 17.1995 which is Ex. 1. The shares of the plaintiff , his wife and two sons have been separately marked in the site-plan Ex.2. This partition took place between the plaintiff and his brothers. This property was further partitioned in March, 1995 between the plaintiff , his wife and two sons and this oral partition was reduced to writing on 17.1995 which is Ex. 1. The shares of the plaintiff , his wife and two sons have been separately marked in the site-plan Ex.2. According to learned senior counsel for the defendant the transaction of partition between the plaintiff , his wife and two sons is a sham transaction and the tenant has a right to say so in an eviction suit. Reliance is placed upon Moolchand vs. Prakash Motor Stores, Neemuch Cantt. & Anr. (1), and Devi Das vs. Mohan Lal (2). It was held by M.P. High Court that in an eviction suit tenant’s interest being involved, he could not be precluded from questioning the validity of the genuineness of the gift deed while Hon’ble the Supreme Court held that in eviction suit plea of the tenant that the sale was sham transaction should have been considered by the Court. Thus, the tenant had a right to question the validity of the said partition as pleaded by the plaintiff But according to learned counsel for the plaintiff and rightly so this objection was not pressed by learned counsel for the defendant before the Trial Court as observed at page 26 of the impugned judgment of the Trial Court. Even otherwise, on perusal of the entire evidence-oral as well as documentary the transaction of partition between the plaintiff , his wife and two sons in March, 1995 as pleaded in the plaint is found well proved. The plaintiffs version has been supported by P.W.5 Sh. B.D. Mathur younger brother of the plaintiff and there is no evidence in rebuttal. 12. The Trial Court further came to this conclusion that the premises in the plaintiffs possession consists of three bed rooms one Pooja room, common drawing-cum-dining room, kitchen and store and the plaintiff along with his wife, son, son’s wife and two grand daughters is residing there. It was also found by the Trial Court that the remaining portions of this house were let Out in the year 1993. The portion of plaintiffs son. Jayesh Dayal was first let out in the year 1993 and the same portion was again given on rent to another tenant in 1997. It was also found by the Trial Court that the remaining portions of this house were let Out in the year 1993. The portion of plaintiffs son. Jayesh Dayal was first let out in the year 1993 and the same portion was again given on rent to another tenant in 1997. It was also held by the Trial Court that previously the portion occupied by the plaintiff was sufficient for them but now both the grand daughters of the plaintiff became older and one bed room is occupied by them and the Pooja room is being used now for learning music and dance by the grand daughters and thus premises occupied by the plaintiff fell short. It was also held that on account of noisy atmosphere as pleaded and proved the requirement of the plaintiff to live separately with his wife in the suit house appears to be both reasonable and bonafide and more so when the plaintiff is a heart patient. It was also held that the plaintiffs requirement for guest room is also reasonable and bonafide and the portion of plaintiffs son Jayesh Dayal residing in America is not in possession and control of the plaintiff and the same was and is on rent. It was, thus observed that looking to the living standard of the plaintiff , the Court cannot dictate him to perform his Pooja, meditation and Yoga in his bed room. It was also held that there arises dispute between the plaintiffs wife and daughter-in-law and on account of this noisy atmosphere the plaintiffs requirement to live with his wife separately is both reasonable and bonafide. It was also held that the plaintiff requires one room for consulting his patients. 13. Learned senior counsel Sh. It was also held that there arises dispute between the plaintiffs wife and daughter-in-law and on account of this noisy atmosphere the plaintiffs requirement to live with his wife separately is both reasonable and bonafide. It was also held that the plaintiff requires one room for consulting his patients. 13. Learned senior counsel Sh. Agarwal contended that the accommodation available with the plaintiff is sufficient for the plaintiff and his family members; that the requirement of the plaintiff can be considered only with reference to the require- ment of the plaintiff and his wife and not for his son, son’s wife and grand daughters as plaintiffs son has got his separate portion in Bhagat Niwas; that it is the case of mere desire and not reasonable and bonafide requirement, otherwise the remaining portions of Bhagat Niwas would not have been let out to the tenants; that the plaintiffs desire either is to enhance the rent or to sell it out and in support of his contention he referred agreement of lease Ex.3 dated 17.1993 that the property on lease was given on monthly rent of Rs. 16, 500/-; that the portion in the share of the plaintiffs son Jayesh Dayal was given on rent to other tenant in 1997 and in case the plaintiffs requirement was genuine, there was no occasion to let it out again; that according to the statement of P.W.10 Brijesh who is music teacher, he is imparting training for music and dance only for one hour in the evening and thus this room can be used for Pooja purpose; that the statement of the plaintiff that on account of noisy atmosphere in the house and casual quarrels between his wife and the daughter-in-law and on account of that they want to live separately from his son and grand daughters is not natural and reliable as in this old age of about 80 years every person including the plaintiff would like to stay with his family members; that the statements of the plaintiff that he requires one room for consulting his patients is also not reliable as in this old age it is not believable that he carries on his private practice as a doctor. 14. In support of his contentions reliance was placed upon some of the judgments. In Mst. Bega Begum & Ors. vs. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by L.R’s & Ors. 14. In support of his contentions reliance was placed upon some of the judgments. In Mst. Bega Begum & Ors. vs. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by L.R’s & Ors. (3), it was held that the words “reasonable requirement” which undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. The distinction between the desire and need should be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire. Learned senior counsel Sh. Agarwal referred para 14 of the judgment wherein it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Phiroze Bamanji Desai vs. Chandrakant N. Patel (4), that the true meaning of the word ‘requires’ is that there must be an element of need before a landlord can be said to require premises for his own use and occupation. It is not enough that the landlord should merely desire to use and occupy premises. What is necessary is that he should need them for his own use and occupation. In M.M. Quasim vs. Manohar Lal & Ors. (5), the observations of the First Appellate Court were that ‘It is for the plaintiffs to decide whatever they think fit and proper. It is not for the defendant to suggest as to what they should do.” But the defendant has led evidence to show that the plaintiffs have got some more houses and they have got a decree for eviction with respect to the other house. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that this approach betrays a woeful lack of consciousness relatable to circumstances leading to enactment of Rent Acts in almost all States of the country. The plea that the landlord has unfettered right to re-enter premises of his choice is not maintainable. He must prove that available vacant premises is not suitable for his purpose. In Dattatraya Laxman Kamble vs. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkune & Anr. (6), it was held that reasonable and bonafide requirement means really genuine requirement from any reasonable standard, but not on standard of dire need. In Deena Nath vs. Pooran Mal (7), it was held that the finding of the Trial Court with regard to bonafide requirement of the landlord must be consonant with the statutory mandate. (6), it was held that reasonable and bonafide requirement means really genuine requirement from any reasonable standard, but not on standard of dire need. In Deena Nath vs. Pooran Mal (7), it was held that the finding of the Trial Court with regard to bonafide requirement of the landlord must be consonant with the statutory mandate. If the court does not apply the statutory provisions to the evidence on record in its proper perspective then a finding regarding bonafide requirement ceases to be a mere finding of fact. Such an erroneous and illegally arrived at finding would vitiate the entire judgment. Where it is proved that the landlord had alternative available accommodation in the same building and also an allotted shop room in a local market complex, the requirement of the landlord could not be termed bonafide within the meaning of Section 12 (1) (f) of M.P. Rent Act, 1961 which stipulates that only a landlord having no alternative accommodation in the town concerned may file for eviction. 15. Per contra learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that the findings of the Trial Court are based on proper appreciation of the entire evidence; that (he available accommodation with the plaintiff has been found insufficient in all for the six members including the plaintiff ; that in view of the entire evidence it is not a case of mere desire of the plaintiff , rather it is well proved that the plaintiffs requirement is both reasonable and bonafide; that no portion of the accommodation available with the plaintiff was let out by him and the portions of the plaintiffs wife and both sons which fell to their respective shares were also let out in the year 1993-much before the filing of the present suit; that the portion of Jayesh Dayal residing in America was also let out in the year 1993 to Coates Vayella and on vacating of the same in the year 1997 it was let out to Rahul Tea Company; that the plaintiff had no control and possession over the portion of Jayesh Dayal and the plaintiff has submitted income-tax returns of his wife and his son which are Ex. 18 & Ex. 18 & Ex. 19 showing the income from house property; that there is no evidence that the plaintiff ever pressurised the defendant to enhance the rent and this fact is evident from these undisputed facts that the suit house was let out to the defendant in January or February, 1962 at monthly rent of Rs. 265/-and now the monthly rent is only Rs. 2000/ -payable w.e.f 2.1995 and the present suit was filed after a period of more than 36 years from the commencement of the tenancy; that the plaintiff never expressed his desire to sell this house to the defendant or anybodyelse; that there is nothing unnatural when the plaintiff states that he along with his wife wants to reside separately in a peaceful atmosphere as the defendant himself about 80 years of age admitted in his statement that he resides alone in the suit house and he does not want to live with his two sons at Jaipur as he cannot carry on well with them and thus the plaintiffs requirement was rightly found proved by the Trial Court. He placed reliance upon some of the judgments. In Prativa Devi (Smt.) vs. T.V. Krishnan (8), it was held that the landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the courts to dictate to the landlord how and in what manner he should live. The High Court was rather solicituous about the age of the appellant and thought that because of her age she needed to be looked after. That was a look out of the appellant and not of the High Court. There is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of the property. The High Court was in error in laying down that the test is availability of alternative accommodation and not the legal right of such occupation in adjudging the bonafides of the claim of the landlord. Similar view was taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ragavendra Kumar vs. Firm Prem Machinery & Co. (9), In Ram Pratap Sharma vs. Smt. Rukmani Devi (10), it was held that the landlord’s requirement for separate Pooja room is bonafide requirement as in present day society landlord cannot be compelled to have Pooja room in a dining room or bed room. (9), In Ram Pratap Sharma vs. Smt. Rukmani Devi (10), it was held that the landlord’s requirement for separate Pooja room is bonafide requirement as in present day society landlord cannot be compelled to have Pooja room in a dining room or bed room. In Siddalingamma vs. Mamtha Shenoy (11), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held on the point of bonafide requirement of the landlord that the trial Judge should put himself in place of the landlord and then decide the question of bonafide requirement whether the need of the landlord was natural, real, sincere and honest. If the landlord wishes to live with comfort in a house of his own, the law does not command or compel him to squeeze himself and dwell into lesser premises so as to protect the tenant’s continued occupation in the tenancy premises. In Sarla Ahuja vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. (12), it was held that the tenant cannot dictate how landlord should adjust himself Facts like cordial relationship between the landlady and her son and daughter-in-law and that the landlady living comfortably in present accommodation are not relevant. Development of discord in relationship is also not pre-requisite for proving bonafide requirement when a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation. In Devi Ram vs. Ram Kapoor (13), the Delhi High Court held that additional accommodation required for three minor children cannot be rejected on the ground that minor children can be accommodated with elders as the landlord cannot be dictated the way he shall reside nor the mode of division of rooms can be prescribed for each family member. In Madan Mohan Kaphai vs. Amar Nath Malhotra (14), facts were that the landlord was 85 years old living in Delhi with his son. The landlord was not having good relations with his son and daughter-in-law and wanted to live in his own house at Ambala. In view of these fact the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that need of the landlord is bonafide and his testimony could not be disbelieved as it is not unusual in modern trend of society that the concept ofjoint family living is not liked now and grown up children like to live independently. In R.C. Tamrakar & Anr. In view of these fact the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that need of the landlord is bonafide and his testimony could not be disbelieved as it is not unusual in modern trend of society that the concept ofjoint family living is not liked now and grown up children like to live independently. In R.C. Tamrakar & Anr. vs. Nidi Lekha (15), it was held that the landlord himself is the best judge of his own requirement and he cannot be compelled to reside with her son. 16. I have considered the rival submissions in the light of the judgments relied upon and the evidence on the record. The facts with regards to accommodation available with the plaintiff and the number of his family members residing there are not in dispute. Now at this time the age of both the grand daughters of the plaintiff comes to respectively 14 & 9 years, The accommodation available with the plaintiff is situated on the ground floor of Bhagat Niwas. The statement of the plaintiff has rightly been relied upon by the Trial Court that the remaining portions of Bhagat Niwas situated on first floor fell to the shares of his wife and two sons and those portions were let out in the year 1993 and thus no other accommodation in Bhagat Niwas was available with the plaintiff when the present suit for eviction was filed in August, 1998. The submissions made by learned counsel for the plaintiff appear to be justified that the plaintiff has no control over the portions of his son Jayesh Dayal residing in America. It is not in dispute that portion belonging to son Jayesh fell vacant in 1997 but in the same year it was let out to other tenant and this portion of Sh. Jayesh Dayal cannot be said to be available to the plaintiff The plaintiff reiterated in his statement before the Trial Court what was pleaded on the point of reasonable and bonafide requirement. It is not the case of mere desire of the landlord as contended by learned senior counsel Sh. Agarwal. Rather the Trial Court has rightly came to this conclusion that the plaintiffs need has been proved both reasonable and bonafide. It is not the case of mere desire of the landlord as contended by learned senior counsel Sh. Agarwal. Rather the Trial Court has rightly came to this conclusion that the plaintiffs need has been proved both reasonable and bonafide. The plea taken by the defendant that the plaintiff either wants to let out this house after getting the vacant possession on higher rent or he wants to sell it out is not proved at all. There is no evidence that the plaintiff ever put any pressure upon the defendant to enhance the rent. The submissions in this regard made by learned counsel for the plaintiff appear to be justified that the suit house was let out more than 42 years ago at monthly rent of Rs. 265/-and the rent at the rate of Rs. 2000/-per month is being paid from February, 1995 and this fact in itself is sufficient to show that there was no motive of the plaintiff to get the rent enhanced. According to the statement of the defendant the plaintiff had a conversation with him in the year 1976 for selling this house and still friends of the plaintiff and property dealer come to him. The defendant did not disclose the names of any of the friends of the plaintiff or the property dealer and according to his own statement it is clear that the plaintiff had a talk in this regard in the year 1976 and the present suit was filed in the year 1998. Therefore, the statement of I he defendant on this point is not reliable at all that the plaintiff wanted to sell the suit house. D.W.2 Sh. Ghasi Ram Gupta is an employee of the defendant. At the end of his cross-examination he stated that the plaintiff told him that he is going to America alter selling the suit house and for the last time he met with the plaintiff in the year 1996 and at that time this fact was told by the plaintiff But even the defendant did not state like that and further there was no occasion of the plaintiff to had such a conversation with D.W.2 Ghasi Ram Gupta. D.W.3 Sh. Shanker Lal is the son-in-law of the defendant, although he denied this suggestion in cross-examination that he has come to support the defendant only on account of being his son-in-law. D.W.3 Sh. Shanker Lal is the son-in-law of the defendant, although he denied this suggestion in cross-examination that he has come to support the defendant only on account of being his son-in-law. He also stated that the plaintiff expressed his desire to sell this house for a sum of Rs. 2 lacs in the year 1976 in his presence as well as in the presence of the defendant, but this statement cannot be relied upon as within a period of about 22 years from 1976 to 1998 when the suit was filed no further step was taken in this regard by the plaintiff D.W.3 has gone to this extent that this conversation took place in the dining hall in the afternoon. His statement was recorded on 30.10.2001 and such statement to remember such conversation after such a long time does not appear to be reliable at all. He further stated that deal of this house for a sum of Rs. 2 lacs was settled but he is not aware as to why the sale deed was not executed. Thus, his statement on this point cannot be relied upon at all. This submission made by learned senior counsel Sh. Agarwal is also not acceptable that in view of the statement of P.W.10 Sh. Brijesh music teacher that he imparts training for musi and dance only for one hour in the evening, Pooja room is available with the plaintiff Further this submission is also not acceptable that the plaintiff at the age of 80 years is unable to do private practice. On the basis of the entire evidence available on the record the Trial Court came to this conclusion and rightly so that the plaintiff has no room for consulting his patients and for that he sits in the Varandah. This statement of the plaintiff was corroborated by P.W.2 Sh. Ganpal Lai, P.W.3 Sh. Dilip Singh, P.W.4 Sh. Tara Singh, P.W.5 V.D. Mathur and P.W.8 Smt. Vimla Dayal who is wife of the plaintiff . It is no ground that the plaintiff after retirement of 25 years and at the age of 80 years cannot carry on private practice. This statement of the plaintiff was corroborated by P.W.2 Sh. Ganpal Lai, P.W.3 Sh. Dilip Singh, P.W.4 Sh. Tara Singh, P.W.5 V.D. Mathur and P.W.8 Smt. Vimla Dayal who is wife of the plaintiff . It is no ground that the plaintiff after retirement of 25 years and at the age of 80 years cannot carry on private practice. The Trial Court further arrived at this conclusion that relations between the plaintiffs wife and daughter-in- law are not cordial and a” account of playing T.V., coaching of dance and music noisy and uncomfortable atmosphere exists in Bhagat Niwas and thus the plaintiff along with his wife wants to reside separately in the suit house. The findings of the Trial Court on this point are based on evidence available on the record. The statement of the plaintiff in this regard has been corroborated by his brother P.W.5 Sh. V.D. Mathur and his wife P.W.8 Smt. Vimla Dayal and there is nothing unnatural in the statement of the plaintiff as the defendant himself admitted this fact that till 1990 his sons were residing with him in the suit house and thereafter they shifted to their own newly constructed house in C-Scheme over a plot of 800 sq. yards. He further admitted this fact that his wife expired in the year 1996 and he is residing alone in suit house. He categorically admitted this fact that he is not living with his sons as he is not carrying on well with them. According to the statement of the defendant his two sons along with their wives and two sons and one daughter-in all seven family members are residing in newly constructed house in C- Scheme. If the defendant himself at the age of about 80 years cannot live with his sons and grand sons and daughter, how the statement of the plaintiff in this regard can be treated to be unnatural as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prativa Devi (Smt)’s case (supra), that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement and it is not for the tenant or the Court to say that the landlord needs to be looked after in the old age. According to the judgment in Ram Pratap Sharma’s case (supra), the landlord’s requirement for separate Pooja room is bonafide requirement as in present day society landlord cannot be compelled to have Pooja room in a dining hall or bed room. The landlord cannot be compelled to squeeze himself and dwell into lesser premises so as to protect the tenant’s continued possession in the tenancy premises. In view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarla Ahuja’s case (supra), facts like cordial relationship between the landlord and his son and daughter-in-law are not even relevant while in the instant case, there is evidence that the relations between the plaintiffs wife and daughter-in-law are not so cordial and Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in Madan Mohan Kaphai’s case (supra), held that the requirement of the landlord who was 85 years old to live separately from his son and daughter-in-law was found to be reasonable and bonafide and further the Hon’ble Supreme Court also held in R.C. Tamrakar & Anr.’s case (supra), that the landlord is the best judge of his own requirement and he cannot be compelled to reside with her son. Thus, in view of the entire discussion made hereinabove, I find no reason to interfere with the findings of the Trial Court on this point. 17. Second aspect on this point relates to comparative hardship. It is not in dispute that the defendant alone is living in the suit house. It is also not in dispute that according to own statement of the defendant his two sons have got double storied house in C-Scheme in plot area of 800 sq. yards. He further admitted that he did not make any search for any other house. Further on the basis of the evidence of the defendant and his witnesses it is well proved that the defendant is a rich man. He is Managing Director or Chairman of a number of private limited companies according to his own statement. According to the statement of D.W.4 Sh. Shambhu Dayal he has been the advocate of the defendant since 1962 and the defendant has engaged 5 or 6 drivers, 4 servants and has got 5 or 6 cars and he has engaged about 25 employees in various companies at Neem Ka Thana. Thus, there is no doubt that the defendant is a well to do person. Shambhu Dayal he has been the advocate of the defendant since 1962 and the defendant has engaged 5 or 6 drivers, 4 servants and has got 5 or 6 cars and he has engaged about 25 employees in various companies at Neem Ka Thana. Thus, there is no doubt that the defendant is a well to do person. The plaintiff is a retired Director, Medical and Health Department and is a person of more than 80 years of age and thus keeping in view the entire facts and circumstances as stated hereinabove, the question of comparative hardship was also rightly decided in favour of the plaintiff 18. As far as the partial eviction is concerned, learned senior counsel Sh. Agarwal submitted that at the most requirement for one room as guest room may be taken to be reasona