K. C. BHANU, J. ( 1 ) THE Manager, Indian Overseas Bank, tirupati, Chittoor District has come up in this revision against the order of acquittal passed by the learned II Additional Sessions judge, Tirupati in Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 1994 dated 29-11-1999 wherein the accused was acquitted for the offence u/sec. 381 IPC. The said appeal was filed by the accused against the conviction and sentence of two years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for four months, passed in C. C. 279 of 1985 on the file of II Additional judicial First Class Magistrate, Tirupathi dated 14-2-1994. ( 2 ) THE brief facts that are necessary for the disposal of the case may be depicted as follows: the accused herein was working as a messenger in Indian Overseas Bank, Tirupati branch by the date of incident. On 29-5-1985 there was no cash transaction. On 28-6-1985 the cash transactions were closed at 4. 30 p. m. On the same day the closing balance was rs. 56,000/ -. On 1-7-1985 P. W. 4 along with p. W. 1 opened the Strong Room wherein an iron Safe was kept for keeping the cash. On verification they found Rs. 60,000/- in 50 rupee denominations and Rs. 10,000/- in 100 rupee denominations missing. Then P. W. 1 lodged Ex. P-1 report with P. W. 13, who registered a case against P. Ws. 4 and 5 under section 409 IPC. P. W. 14 took up investigation and arrested the accused on 23-8-1985 at 5 a. m. and seized M. O. 14 from his possession. In pursuance of his confession, the accused took the police and the mediators to his house and the police seized M. Os. 6 to 12. From the Iron Safe the accused took out m. Os. 13, 14 and 15, which are the currency bundles and they were seized. The police also seized M. Os. 18 to 39 under a cover of seizure report. The police also seized the duplicate key of the Iron Safe and the accused took the police and the mediators to the Bank and opened the Iron Safe with M. Os. 16 and 17, which are the duplicate keys. Ex. P-19 was scribed at that place and after completion of investigation, P. W. 14 filed the charge-sheet. The police also seized the duplicate key of the Iron Safe and the accused took the police and the mediators to the Bank and opened the Iron Safe with M. Os. 16 and 17, which are the duplicate keys. Ex. P-19 was scribed at that place and after completion of investigation, P. W. 14 filed the charge-sheet. ( 3 ) A charge under Section 381 IPC was framed against the accused and when it was explained to him in Telugu, he pleaded not guilty. ( 4 ) TO substantiate the case of the prosecution, it examined 14 witnesses and marked 23 documents besides marking m. Os. 1 to 41. The case of the accused is total denial. According to him, nothing was recovered from him or at his instance and m. Os. 7 to 10, 20 to 40 are his personal properties. On appreciation of the evidence, the learned II Additional Munsif Magistrate, tirupati found the accused guilty under section 381 IPC and convicted the accused to undergo R. I. for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default to suffer S. I. for four months. Aggrieved by the same, the accused preferred an appeal to the III Additional sessions Judge, Tirupati. By the impugned judgment, the accused was acquitted setting aside the conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court. Aggrieved by the same, the present revision is filed by the Bank questioning the legality and correctness thereof. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the petitioner herein contended that the accused was working as a Messenger at the relevant point of time and the evidence of P. Ws. 12 and 14 would clearly indicate that the cash bundles containing the initials of P. Ws. 4 and 5 were seized at the instance of the accused; that the accused was found in possession of m. Os. 16 and 17, which were the duplicate keys with which the accused opened the Iron safe and the Strong Room of the Bank; that there is no other reason for P. Ws. 4 and 5 were seized at the instance of the accused; that the accused was found in possession of m. Os. 16 and 17, which were the duplicate keys with which the accused opened the Iron safe and the Strong Room of the Bank; that there is no other reason for P. Ws. 12 and 14 to implicate the accused falsely leaving the real assailants; that the learned Magistrate after an elaborate consideration of the evidence found the accused guilty of the offence with which he was charged, but the learned additional Sessions Judge set aside the conviction without any reasonable basis; that the accused has not accounted for the possession of cash and therefore the presumption under Section 114-A of the evidence Act can be drawn and, if it is drawn, the accused is thief or receiver of stolen property. Therefore, he prays to set aside the order of acquittal. ( 6 ) ON the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused- respondent contended that there is no reliable evidence to show that the accused has committed the theft of cash from the bank: that all the circumstances even if taken cumulatively, at best raise suspicion against the accused, but, suspicion, however strong, cannot take place of legal proof; that the mediator who acted for arrest and recoveries in pursuance of the confessional statement given by the accused is a stock witness for the police and he deposed on behalf of the police in more than 50 cases and therefore his evidence cannot be relied upon and has to be rejected and that all the recoveries made at the instance of the accused were projected so as to guard P. Ws. 4 and 5 against whom originally the case was registered and, therefore, after proper appreciation of the evidence the learned Sessions Judge rightly acquitted the accused and that there are no grounds to interfere with the well reasoned judgment under revision. Therefore, he prays to dismiss the criminal revision case. ( 7 ) THERE is no direct evidence in this case. The entire case rests upon circumstantial evidence. The law is well settled that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances must be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Therefore, he prays to dismiss the criminal revision case. ( 7 ) THERE is no direct evidence in this case. The entire case rests upon circumstantial evidence. The law is well settled that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances must be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. In a decision reported in State of haryana v. Jagbir Singh it was held:"it has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances were found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1954 SC 621 ), it was laid down that where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the innocence of the accused and bring the offences home beyond any reasonable doubt. We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court in C. Chenga Reddy and others v. State of A. P. (1996) 10 SCC 193 , wherein it has been observed thus: "in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence. . . . . . " in Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A. P. and others ( AIR 1990 SC 79 ) it was laid down that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests: 1. The circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be brought must be cogently and firmly established. 2. Those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused. 3. The circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be brought must be cogently and firmly established. 2. Those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused. 3. The circumstances taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no scope from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else. 4. The circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. In State of U. P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava (1992 Crl. L. J. 1104), it was pointed out that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. If was also pointed out that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. In Hanumant Govind Nargndkar and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh ( AIR 1952 SC 343 ), it was observed thus: "it is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be in the first instance be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been down by the accused. " a reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1984 SC 1622 ). " a reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1984 SC 1622 ). Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence, it has been held that onus was on the prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in prosecution cannot be cured by false defence or plea. The conditions precedent in the words of this court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned must or should and not may be established; (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused". ( 8 ) BEARING the above principles in mind, it has to be seen whether the prosecution succeeded in establishing case beyond all reasonable doubt against the accused. ( 9 ) ACCORDING to the prosecution, the accused committed theft of cash of Rs. 60,000/- in 50 rupee denominations and Rs. 10,000/- in 100 rupee denominations from the Iron Safe which was kept in the Strong Room of Indian overseas Bank, Tirupati Branch. The same was noticed on 1-7-1985 by P. Ws. 1 and 2. For entering into the strong room, one has to cross the entrance fixed with Iron bars and another entrance with grill doors. Six Iron safes were kept in the Strong Room. In one iron safe, the jewellery, title deeds and documents were kept. As per Ex. P-2 the hand balance was Rs. 22,700-39 ps. and the vault balance was 5,35,706-00 ps. as on 28-6-1985. On 28-6-1985 the strong room was opened till 7. 30 p. m. 29-6-1995 happened to be half yearly closing day and there were no cash transactions. In one iron safe, the jewellery, title deeds and documents were kept. As per Ex. P-2 the hand balance was Rs. 22,700-39 ps. and the vault balance was 5,35,706-00 ps. as on 28-6-1985. On 28-6-1985 the strong room was opened till 7. 30 p. m. 29-6-1995 happened to be half yearly closing day and there were no cash transactions. So also, 30-6-1985 being sunday, there were no cash transactions. On the basis of report given by P. W. 1, originally the police registered a case against P. Ws. 4 and 5 under Section 409 IPC. Later, after arrest of the accused, the Section of Law was altered. The grounds on which the learned sessions Judge acquitted the accused are that in the Bank has not produced any documentary evidence to show that the accused was having access into the Strong room and that the recovery of cash from the possession of the accused in pursuance of his confessional statement is doubtful as P. W. 12 is a stock witness for the police. P. W. 1 was the Manager of the Bank at the relevant point of time. Even the accused did not dispute about the missing of cash from the Iron Safe kept in the Strong Room. ( 10 ) P. W. 2 and the accused were working as Messengers. The evidence of P. W. 2 would go to show that they used to work in the strong Room also and on 1-7-1985 they both attended the duty. On 1-7-1985 he along with p. W. 1 went to the Strong Room and P. W. 1 asked him whether he has taken any money from the Strong Room, for which he pleaded his ignorance. There cannot be any documentary evidence assigning the duties, especially for Messengers. They have to discharge their duties on the instructions of superior Officers in the Bank. The evidence of P. W. 2 remained unchallenged. The fact that they both used to work in the Strong room also is not specifically denied or disputed in the cross-examination of P. W. 2. But the learned Sessions Judge gave a finding that the prosecution failed to establish that the accused has got access to enter into the strong Room and the Cash Chest. But, from the evidence of P. Ws. 1,4 and 5 it is clear that the accused had access to enter into the Strong room. But the learned Sessions Judge gave a finding that the prosecution failed to establish that the accused has got access to enter into the strong Room and the Cash Chest. But, from the evidence of P. Ws. 1,4 and 5 it is clear that the accused had access to enter into the Strong room. The evidence of P. W. 2 is also very clear that they both used to work in the strong Room also. Therefore, the finding of the learned Sessions Judge is not based upon proper appreciation of the evidence. ( 11 ) THE accused was arrestedon 23-8-1985 at about 4. 30 a. m. near Central Bus-Station, tirupati and a wrist watch was seized under ex. P-14 panchanama. Thereafter the accused led the police and the mediator to the house bearing No. 18-1-699, Bhavani Nagar, tirupati, located in II Floor and the accused opened the lock of the house and took m. Os. 6, 11 to 19 from the drawer of the table and produced before the police. There upon, the accused opened a steel almirah and produced one bundle of hundred rupee currency notes containing 100 pieces wrapped with M. O. 1. The accused also produced certain receipts i. e. , Exs. P-8 to P-12 and P-15. The accused also produced m. Os. 21 to 26 from the steel almirah. P. W. 14 seized M. O. 6, M. O. 9, M. O. 11 to M. O. 39 under Ex. P-17. Thereupon the accused led the police and the mediator to the shop of p. W. 11 and M. Os. 7 and 8, which were motor Cycle and Hero Cycle were seized under Ex. P-13 panchanama. Thereupon, the accused led the police and the mediator to the house of one Sivalingam, to whom he gave Rs. 6,500/- for purchasing a tape recorder with cassettes etc. He seized the same under Ex. P-18 panchanama. Then the accused led the police and the mediator to the bank in question and opened the almirah with the help of M. Os. 16 and 17 duplicate keys and locked the almirah. In their presence ex. P-19 was scribed. 6,500/- for purchasing a tape recorder with cassettes etc. He seized the same under Ex. P-18 panchanama. Then the accused led the police and the mediator to the bank in question and opened the almirah with the help of M. Os. 16 and 17 duplicate keys and locked the almirah. In their presence ex. P-19 was scribed. The main ground on which the learned Sessions Judge disbelieved the evidence of P. W. 12 is that P. W. 12 is a stock witness to Central Crime Station and other Police Stations of Tirupati and P. W. 14 did not care to call for any independent mediators of that locality where certain seizures were effected from the house of the accused and Ex. P-17 creates a suspicion about the arrest of the accused. ( 12 ) NO doubt, P. W. 12 stated that he gave evidence in 17 cases of the year 1988 relating to Central Crime Station and as per Ex. D-4, which is the certified copy of deposition of this witness in S. C. 93 of 1992, it is stated that he deposed in 40 or 50 cases as Mahazar witness. It is not the case of the accused that p. W. 12 acted as a mediator in number of :ases in the year 1985. He might have cited as a witness and he might have deposed in several cases subsequent to 1985. Simply because this witness deposed in several cases subsequent to the incident in question, that cannot be taken as a sole ground to disbelieve the evidence of P. W. 12. The police might have taken him as a witness in several cases subsequent to the incident in question. He has no axe to grind against the accused. ( 13 ) THE evidence of P. W. 12 is very clear about the arrest of the accused and the seizure of cash and the duplicate keys from his house under mahazar. Except suggesting that p. W. 12 is deposing falsely, nothing has been elicited to discredit his testimony. If really this man did not go to the house of the accused, there is no possibility for him to give the descriptive particulars of the location of the house. He has categorically stated that there are residential houses in and around the house of the accused and the road runs from east to west. If really this man did not go to the house of the accused, there is no possibility for him to give the descriptive particulars of the location of the house. He has categorically stated that there are residential houses in and around the house of the accused and the road runs from east to west. ( 14 ) THE conditions necessary for the application of Section 27 of the Indian evidence Act are, (1) the fact of which evidence is sought to be given must be relevant to the issue, (2) the fact must have been discovered which is in consequence of some information received from the accused, (3) the person giving the information must be accused of an offence, (4) he must be in the custody of the police officer, (5) the discovery of fact in consequence of information received from an accused in custody must be deposed to and there upon that proof only of the information which relates distinctly to the fact discovered can be proved. By the date of arrest of the accused a case was also registered against him and he was in the custody of the police, the accused led the police and the mediator to his house and produced the duplicate keys of the Strong Room. ( 15 ) IN the light of the above, now it has to be seen whether the cash under M. Os. 13 and 14 belonged to the Indian Overseas Bank. P. Ws. 12 and 14 have categorically stated that they seized M. Os. 13 to 17 under a mahazar. The learned counsel for the accused contended that there is no proof to show that these bundles were found missing from the bank and this type of bundles will be available with any person and therefore mere seizure of these currency notes does not lead to irresistible conclusion that the accused committed theft from the bank. ( 16 ) THE descriptive particulars of these notes have not been mentioned in the seizure report, but at the time of seizure, these bundles contained the initials of the bank officials and P. W. 4 categorically stated that m. 0. 1 is dated 28-6-1985, M. 0. 2 is the slip of their bank stapled to 100 pieces of 50 rupee notes and M. O. 3 is another slip stapled to the bundle of fifty rupee notes containing 100 pieces. 1 is dated 28-6-1985, M. 0. 2 is the slip of their bank stapled to 100 pieces of 50 rupee notes and M. O. 3 is another slip stapled to the bundle of fifty rupee notes containing 100 pieces. M. O. 3 contains his initials and the initials of P. W. 5, who is the Accountant. No doubt, these two witnesses were figured as accused 1 and 2 originally, but that does not mean they were determined to give evidence against the accused to escape their liability. P. W. 5 also stated that M. Os. 2 and 3 were counted, checked and initialed by him and P. W. 4. The learned Additional sessions Judge disbelieved the seizure panchanama that no numbers of currency notes were mentioned and that those bundles contained the initials of the bank officials. Another reason is that the cash was kept with P. W. 14 for more than one month and therefore there was every possibility of tampering with the cash. It is not the case of the accused that P. W. 14 tampered with the cash and produced some bundles to implicate the accused. Another reason given by the learned Sessions Judge to disbelieve the arrest of the accused is that by 12-8-1985 itself every body knows that the accused was arrested and some of the stolen property was recovered from his house and, therefore, the arrest of the accused on 23-8-1985 and the recovery of certain property cannot be accepted. The accused as D. W. 1 stated that on 10-8-1985 he was confined in wrongful custody and in bail application under Ex. D-6 he got mentioned that he was kept in police custody from 10-8-1985. It is in the evidence of P. W. 4 that on 11-8-1985 he came to know that the accused was taken to Central Crime station by the police, but again he stated that he did not know the details of it. So, basing on the inadvertent admission made by p. W. 4 it cannot be said that the accused was arrested on 10-8-1985. ( 17 ) ADMITTEDLY the accused was present for his duties till 10-8-1985; thereafter, it was marked as absentfrom 10-8-1985 onwards. If the evidence of P. Ws. 12 and 14 is found to be correct, then it is clear that the accused was arrested on 23-8-1985. ( 17 ) ADMITTEDLY the accused was present for his duties till 10-8-1985; thereafter, it was marked as absentfrom 10-8-1985 onwards. If the evidence of P. Ws. 12 and 14 is found to be correct, then it is clear that the accused was arrested on 23-8-1985. Relying upon the minor discrepancies elicited in the cross- examination of these two witnesses, their evidence was disbelieved. But, the learned magistrate after an elaborate consideration of the evidence of P. Ws. 12 and 14 came to the conclusion that the accused was arrested on 23-8-1985 and in pursuance of the confessional statement given by the accused certain properties of the bank were recovered from him from his house. There is no other reason for disbelieving the evidence of p. Ws. 12 and 14, whose evidence inspires confidence. There was absolutely no reason for them to speak false against the accused leaving the real assailants. Some minor discrepancies are bound to occur not affecting the main core of the accused due to lapse of time. The witnesses were deposing after a lapse of five years after the date of incident. Therefore, those discrepancies with regard to location of the house whether it is a ground floor or I Floor do not affect the main substratum of the prosecution case. If really the accused was arrested on 10-8-1985 as contended by him, certainly the said fact would not have been omitted by the accused to inform the Magistrate on 23-8-1985 when he was produced. So, it is an afterthought to say that he was arrested by the police on 10-8-1985 for the first time to make a mention in the bail application filed by him one week after the arrest. Therefore, the evidence of d. W. 1 cannot be believed. Admittedly the accused did not give any report to the higher officials about the seizure of properties belonging to him. ( 18 ) ANOTHER witness was examined on behalf of the accused as D. W. 2 who stated that he used to bring Tiffin and Meals to the accused who was in the police station from 11-8-1985 on wards. The accused did not say that D. W. 2 used to bring Tiffin and Meals to him while he was in the custody. The accused did not say that D. W. 2 used to bring Tiffin and Meals to him while he was in the custody. He is a friend of the accused D. W. 2 did not give any report to the higher officials for illegal detention of the accused. So no credence can be given to the evidence of D. W. 2. D. W. 3 is the Junior Executive in eenadu and he produced the eenadu daily newspaper dated 12-8-1985 and 13-8-1985 under Ex. D-7 to show that the accused was arrested on 10-8-1985. Unless the person who got that information is examined, it cannot be said that the accused was arrested on 10-8-1985 as published in Ex. D-7. ( 19 ) ONCE the cash is found to be the property of the bank, then the presumption under Section 114-A of the Evidence Act can be drawn. The nature of stolen articles, the manner of its acquisition, the nature of the evidence about its identification, the manner in which it was dealt with by the accused, the place and circumstances of its recovery, the ability or otherwise of the accused to explain the possession of the said articles are factors which are to be taken into consideration in arriving at a decision to draw a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. Before a presumption under this Section can be drawn, it must be proved that the articles found in the possession of the accused have been stolen. Proof that an article which is traced to the possession of the accused was stolen is a condition precedent for presumption under this Section. Even the accused himself admitted in the cross- examination that he had seen the operation of the keys of Strong Room and the door of the Iron Safe as he was going inside the strong Room also. After opening the Strong room, the accused used to bring the books from the Strong Room and keep them again in the evening. Therefore, the accused has got an access to the Strong Room. This is also in conformity with the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 4. Admittedly the keys of the Iron Safe will be in the custody of the Cashier and the accountant i. e. , P. Ws. 4 and 5. Therefore, the accused has got an access to the Strong Room. This is also in conformity with the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 4. Admittedly the keys of the Iron Safe will be in the custody of the Cashier and the accountant i. e. , P. Ws. 4 and 5. so, both of them have to open the Iron Safe if they want to take out any cash. With the duplicate keys the accused opened the Iron Safe and alleged to have committed theft of Rs. 70,000/ -. The duplicate keys were seized from the possession of the accused in pursuance of his confessional statement and the accused also led the police and the mediator to the bank and opened the cash cup board with the help of M. Os. 16 and 17. Ex. P-19 is the Mahazar scribed. The evidence of P. W. 1 is very clear that with M. Os. 16 and 17 the accused opened the cash cup board and again locked it. He also gave the original keys. Therefore the accused has got a clear opportunity to commit theft of cash from the bank. The slips on the bundles contained the initials of P. Ws. 4 and 5. ( 20 ) THE other evidence is that the accused purchased one gold chain from P. W. 6 and one gold ring from P. W. 7 and also purchased a motorcycle under Ex. P-10 and a Hero Cycle. P. Ws. 8 and 9 speak about the same. Under ex. P-12 the accused purchased M. O. 9 suitcase from P. W. 10. In the presence of p. W. 11 M. O. 7 was seized. Even according to d. W. 1, he purchased M. O. 12 under Ex. P-8 and M. O. 6 under Ex. P-9. M. O. 8 under Ex. P-ll and suitcase under Ex. P-12. Ex. P-15 is the policy which stands in the name of the accused. So, all these articles which were purchased by him were subsequent to the date of committing theft from the bank. If m. Os. 7 to 10, 20 to 40 are his personal properties, there must be some explanation from him as to how he purchased the said properties. P-15 is the policy which stands in the name of the accused. So, all these articles which were purchased by him were subsequent to the date of committing theft from the bank. If m. Os. 7 to 10, 20 to 40 are his personal properties, there must be some explanation from him as to how he purchased the said properties. Though he claims to have stated that he married one Vijaya on 22-2-1985 and certain gold and cash ornaments were presented to him at the time of marriage and that he was having 15 acres of land with pump-set and dairy, there is absolutely no evidence to show that he was affluent person so as to purchase all the items that were seized from his possession. The presumption under Section 114-A of the Evidence Act is a rebuttable presumption, but the accused must prove it by preponderance of probabilities. After 1-7-1985 the accused started purchasing the articles which are beyond his capacity. ( 21 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, I have no qualm in arriving at the conclusion that the prosecution established its case beyond all reasonable doubt against the accused for the offence under Section 381 IPC. The learned magistrate after appreciating the evidence on record elaborately, found the accused guilty. But, unfortunately, the learned III additional Sessions Judge reserved the order of conviction and sentence without proper appreciation of evidence of giving undue importance to the minor variations in the evidence. ( 22 ) IN the result, the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge is set aside and the judgment of the II Additional munsif Magistrate, Tirupati in C. C. 279 of 1985 dated 14-2-1994 is affirmed. ( 23 ) THE revision is allowed accordingly.