Judgment KAMDAR S.U., J.:---By the present petition, the petitioners are challenging the judgment dated 22-2-2002 passed by the Industrial Court in Revision Application (U.L.P.) No. 219 of 2001. By this judgment, the learned Industrial Court has exercised jurisdiction under section 44 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the M.R.T.U P.U.L.P. Act, 1971). The brief facts of the case are set out as under:- 2. On 14-7-1991, the petitioner company called two of the employees for maintenance work and were assigned the job of maintaining the cutting machine. It is the case of the petitioner company, that at about 4.45 p.m., the maintenance supervisor after taking trial of the cutting machine left the department and at that point of time the workmen were still in the department. On 15-7-1991 a sabotage was detected in respect of the cutting machine in the very first shift and it was required to repair the said machine. It is the case of the petitioner company, that there was substantial sabotage damaging the said machine by the workmen. 3. On the aforesaid basis, a charge-sheet was issued on 6-8-1991 to the respondent workmen and a departmental enquiry was commenced. During the course of the enquiry, it seems that there were various litigations which have been taken by either of the parties to the Industrial Court and some of them even to this Honble Court. However, they are not relevant for deciding the present writ petition and are therefore not dealt with. Ultimately, the enquiry was concluded and enquiry report dated 18-9-1993 was submitted by the Enquiry Officer holding the workmen guilty of the charges levelled against them. On 1-10-1993, workmen replied to the findings of the Enquiry Officer which were forwarded to them. On 26-8-1993, the petitioner company dismissed the workmen from their employment. 4. This order of dismissal was challenged by the respondent workmen by filing complaints being Complaint (U.L.P.) Nos. 68 and 69 of 1994 on 26-1-1994. During the pendency of the said complaint in the Labour Court, an application was made by the respondent workmen on 18-9-1998 for taking additional documents which were not forming a part of the enquiry proceedings before the Enquiry Officer to be taken on record. The said documents being the attendance register showing the attendance on 13-7-1991 and 14-7-1991 as well as the entry register. The said documents being the attendance register showing the attendance on 13-7-1991 and 14-7-1991 as well as the entry register. The said application was marked Exhibit U-35 by the Labour Court. By an order dated 8-1-1999, the learned trial Court rejected the said application being Exhibit U-35. Simultaneously, the respondent workmen also made an application some time in or about 1997 directing issuance of a summons to one Mr. Ashok Agrawal. The said application was marked Exhibit U-19 and by an order dated 8-12-1997, the said application for issuing summons to Shri Agrawal was also rejected by the trial Court. 5. The petitioner states that thereafter the Labour Court proceeded to hear the main complaints after giving findings in respect of the aforesaid two applications and rejecting both on preliminary grounds. The Labour Court by its decision dated 23-5-2001 held that the enquiry is legal, valid, fair and proper and, therefore, no ground is made out for interfering with the punishment awarded by the petitioner company. 6. On 26-7-2001, a review application was filed being Revision Application (U.L.P.) No. 20 of 2001, inter alia, seeking the review of the order of the trial Court dated 23-5-2001. On 8-10-2001, the said review application was rejected by the Labour Court. 7. Being aggrieved by the said orders, the respondent workers filed a revision application before the Industrial Court on 22-12-2001. The said revision application being Revision Application (U.L.P.) No. 219 of 2001 has been filed under section 44 of the M.R.T.U. P.U.L.P. Act, 1971. The learned Industrial Court while exercising jurisdiction under section 44 of the M.R.T.U. P.U.L.P. Act, 1971, has inter alia allowed the said revision application in part while holding that the findings of the Labour Court on Issue No. 2 i.e. on the point of perversity is liable to be set aside. It has been further held that the finding of the Enquiry Officer is perverse and application Exhibit U-35 filed by the respondent workmen before the Labour Court was allowed and the said documents were taken in evidence. However, the Industrial Court has given liberty to the petitioner company to prove the charges levelled against the workmen before the Labour Court by leading further evidence, if necessary. 8. This order of the Labour Court dated 22-2-2002 is the subject-matter of the present writ petition before me. 9. However, the Industrial Court has given liberty to the petitioner company to prove the charges levelled against the workmen before the Labour Court by leading further evidence, if necessary. 8. This order of the Labour Court dated 22-2-2002 is the subject-matter of the present writ petition before me. 9. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner company has agitated before me that the order passed by the Industrial Court in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under section 44 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971 is ex facie perverse and in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. It has been further contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner company that the jurisdiction conferred under section 44 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971 is a limited jurisdiction and the Industrial Court is not empowered thereunder to reappreciate the evidence and/or to come to a different conclusion than what was arrived at by the Labour Court. It has been further argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner company that the order passed by the Labour Court on Exhibit U-35 is legal, valid and just because the Labour Court can examine the legality and validity of the enquiry conducted by the company only on the basis of the material which was available before the Enquiry Officer and it is not open for the Labour Court to entertain additional documents or evidence for the purpose of determination whether the enquiry conducted by the company was just and fair. It has been further argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the order passed by the Labour Court on Exhibit U-35 was not challenged before the Industrial Court and thus the said order has attained finality and, therefore, the respondent workers are not entitled to agitate the said issue by arguing the revision application before the Industrial Court. In a nutshell, the learned Counsel for the petitioner company has contended that the order passed by the Industrial Court is in excess of jurisdiction and thus requires to be interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and is liable to be quashed and set aside. 10. In a nutshell, the learned Counsel for the petitioner company has contended that the order passed by the Industrial Court is in excess of jurisdiction and thus requires to be interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and is liable to be quashed and set aside. 10. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent workmen while admitting the contention that the jurisdiction conferred by section 44 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1977 on the Industrial Court being revisionary jurisdiction, is undoubtedly limited in nature, however, it is a case of the respondent workmen that the Industrial Court having found that the documents which are relevant for the purpose of enquiry are ignored by the Labour Court and are not permitted to be brought on record, the Industrial Court was justified in interfering with the findings of the Labour Court and in directing the matter to be heard afresh. It has been further argued by the learned Counsel for the respondent workmen that the order of the Industrial Court merely remands the matter before the Labour Court for fresh trial and, therefore, it is not a case in which this Court should exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the present petition should be rejected. 11. In support of the aforesaid contentions both the learned Counsel appearing before me have relied upon a large number of judgments to consider their rival submissions. 12. Firstly I will deal with the judgments which are cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner company in support of his submission. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has cited a judgment in the case of (K.M. Sarpabhushana Swamy v. Educational Appellate Tribunal, Bellary others)1, reported in 1997(I) C.L.R. 93, particularly paragraph 6 thereof. The said paragraph 6 reads as under:-- 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made but find no substance in any one of them. In so far as the first ground of challenge is concerned, it is apparent that the order passed by the Tribunal dated 17th April, 1955, by which the charges in question were framed against him was never questioned by the petitioner on the ground that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to do so. In so far as the first ground of challenge is concerned, it is apparent that the order passed by the Tribunal dated 17th April, 1955, by which the charges in question were framed against him was never questioned by the petitioner on the ground that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to do so. As a matter of fact, in the revision petition, which the petitioner filed against the said order the only grievance made was that, the Management was not assigning any work to him nor paying his salary. This Court accordingly, while dismissing the revision petition and upholding the said order, observed that the petitioner had no real grievance to make against the order of the Tribunal and that the grievance actually made was unrelated to the said order and could be agitated elsewhere. This implies that even though the petitioner had an opportunity to question the validity of the order of the Tribunal, he deliberately did not do so and thereby accepted the same. The order passed by the Tribunal having merged in the order passed by this Court in the civil revision petition filed by the petitioner it is not open to the petitioner to question the validity of the said order on the ground that the same was in excess of the jurisdiction vested in the Tribunal. That apart the petitioner is estopped from taking the plea now being urged after having taken a chance at the enquiry and participating in the same without demur. It is well settled that a party cannot sit back, take a chance in the proceedings held against him with a view to get a favourable order in his favour and turn round to assail the procedure and the jurisdiction of the authority conducting the enquiry when he finds that the result of the enquiry has gone against him. The Court in such cases is entitled to refuse relief to the petitioner not because the acquiescence of a party confers jurisdiction which does not inhere in the authority concerned but because the Court need not come to the rescue of a party who has either deliberately or due to lack of diligence on his part failed to point out the error of procedure or lack of jurisdiction at the first available opportunity. Reference in this connection may be gainfully made to (C.Y. Parthasarathy v. Syndicate of the Mysore University, Mysore and another)2, 1994(4) Kar.L.J. 702 : I.L.R. 1994 Kant. 2603, wherein a Division Bench of this Court, dealing with a similar situation, observed thus:-- "19. It is true, that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, of the parties where it does not otherwise inhere in the authority concerned; but it is equally true that the High Court can while exercising its extra-ordinary and discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution decline to interfere with an order of a subordinate authority if it is satisfied that an objection relating to a defect of procedure or jurisdiction which would have been and ought to have been raised at the earliest opportunity was not so raised by the party complaining before it. The rule that acquiescence of the party belatedly making a grievance about the jurisdiction of the subordinate authority disentitles him to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, does not rest on the foundation that acquiescence, confers jurisdiction but on the rationale that the High Court will be justified in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a person who has either by reason of lack of diligence or by design remained on the fence, allowed the authority to pass an order and seeing that the same has gone against him turned round to challenge its competence, to have done so." The aforesaid judgment is cited to contend that having not challenged the order of the Labour Court on application Exhibit U-35 giving a finding on a preliminary issue, the respondent workers have acquiescenced and thus, were disentitled to challenge the same at the time of challenging the final order passed by the Labour Court. 13. Thereafter a judgment was cited of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of (Vithal Gatlu Marathe v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation others)3, reported in 1995(I) C.L.R. 854, particularly paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof which are reproduced hereinunder: "2. After hearing the strenuous arguments of Mr. Sawant for respondent Nos. 1 and 2, we have not been able to persuade ourselves to agree that in exercise of limited jurisdiction under section 44 of the said Act, the Industrial Court can re-appreciate evidence and overturn findings of fact however erroneous those findings may be. 3. After hearing the strenuous arguments of Mr. Sawant for respondent Nos. 1 and 2, we have not been able to persuade ourselves to agree that in exercise of limited jurisdiction under section 44 of the said Act, the Industrial Court can re-appreciate evidence and overturn findings of fact however erroneous those findings may be. 3. It is apparent from the judgment of the Industrial Court that it has overturned the judgment of the Labour Court on findings of facts based on reappreciation of evidence. This, we do not think to be permissible to any Court having such circumscribed jurisdiction. We must accordingly hold that the Industrial Court was wrong in exercising such jurisdiction and overturning the findings and decision of the Labour Court. We accordingly, set aside the order of the Industrial Court and confirm the decision of the Labour Court. Accordingly, appeal is allowed, but without any order as to costs." This judgment was cited to contend that the jurisdiction under section 44 of the M.R.T.U. P.U.L.P. Act, 1971 is limited and Court thereunder cannot appreciate or re-appreciate the evidence which was led before the Labour Court. For the similar submission, another judgment of the Single Judge of this Court was cited in the case of (Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. Employees All India Union others)4, reported in 1994(1) Bom.C.R. 59 : 1994(I) C.L.R. 230, particularly paragraphs 7, 8, 10 and 11 thereof, which read as under:- "7. I have carefully considered this submission. Section 44 of the Act reads as follows: 44. The Industrial Court shall have superintendence over all Labour Courts and may, (a) call for returns; (b) make and issue general Rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and procedure of such courts in matters not expressly provided for by this Act, and in particular, for securing the expeditious disposal of cases; (c) prescribe form in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by officers of any such courts; and (d) settle a table of fees payable for process issued by a Labour Court or the Industrial Court." 8. This section had come up for interpretation before this Court in a number of cases and the scope and ambit of the power of the Court has been fully set out therein. This section had come up for interpretation before this Court in a number of cases and the scope and ambit of the power of the Court has been fully set out therein. In (Mahila Griha Udyog v. Kamgar Congress)5, 1983(46) F.L.R. 244, dealing with the power of the Court, it was observed: "Power of judicial superintendence could be exercised only in cases where errors apparent on the face of the record are evident from the orders passed by the Labour Court and not in findings of fact recorded by it. Obviously, for interfering with the order of the Labour Court, the Industrial Court has no power to embark upon a fresh re-appreciation of evidence." Examining the facts of the case in the light of the above interpretation of section 44 of the Act, it was held in the above case; "In sum, reading the order of the respondent No. 2 as a whole, it is clear that he did not restrict exercise of his power only to the finding of the errors apparent on the face of the record, but wrongly embarked upon a fresh reappreciation of evidence, as if he was sitting as a Court of Appeal on facts. It will be wrong to say that the findings reached by the learned labour Judge on the basis of the materials on records, are unreasonable or perverse. There are no mistakes apparent on the face of the record. As a result we must hold that it is the respondent No. 2, who has exceeded his permissible and legitimate jurisdiction under section 44 of the Act, and as such his order cannot stand." It was, therefore, held that the Industrial Court had clearly acted beyond the permissible jurisdiction under section 44 of the Act in passing the impugned order. 10. Similar views have been reiterated from time to time in a number of other decisions. The position is thus clear that the jurisdiction under section 44 is very limited. It can be exercised only in the circumstances set out in the decisions referred to above. The revisional authority cannot act like an appellate authority and take upon itself the task of re-appreciating the entire evidence to find out whether the decision of the Labour Court was correct or not. It can be exercised only in the circumstances set out in the decisions referred to above. The revisional authority cannot act like an appellate authority and take upon itself the task of re-appreciating the entire evidence to find out whether the decision of the Labour Court was correct or not. It is well settled legal proposition that even if on reappreciation of the evidence such authority comes to a conclusion which is different from the one arrived at by the Labour Court, it cannot disturb the finding of the Court below in exercise of its limited supervisory jurisdiction. 11. On facts also, I do not find that in this case, the Industrial Court has been able to point out any perversity or apparent jurisdictional error in the order of the Labour Court. I have perused the order of the Labour Court. The Labour Court has examined the evidence of the witnesses produced by the parties twice once in the original order and again on the matter being remanded to it by the Industrial Court and has passed the order rejecting the complaint of the union of unfair labour practice after proper appreciation of the entire evidence on record and the law on the subject. From the order of the Industrial Court it would not be found what in the material evidence which, according to it, the Labour Court has failed to consider or what is the irrelevant material which it has considered. In fact, the Industrial Court exceeded its limits in proceeding to examine the entire controversy in the way it did in the instant case. The complaint was of the Union. The allegations was of unfair labour practice under Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act. It was for the union to prove its allegation that the dismissal of the workmen in the instant case amounted to unfair labour practice within the meaning of said Item 1 of Schedule IV. What is unfair labour practice is clearly set out in various Items of Schedule IV. According to the petitioner, though various clauses of Item (1) of Schedule IV were mentioned in the complaint, the emphasis was only on Clauses (a) and (d): These clauses read: (1) to discharge or dismiss employee; (a) by way of victimisation; (b) for patently false reasons;" 14. According to the petitioner, though various clauses of Item (1) of Schedule IV were mentioned in the complaint, the emphasis was only on Clauses (a) and (d): These clauses read: (1) to discharge or dismiss employee; (a) by way of victimisation; (b) for patently false reasons;" 14. The learned Counsel have thereafter taken me through another judgment of the Single Judge in the case of Kirloskar Cummins Ltd. v. Subbash Shripat Darekar others, in which similar view has been taken by this Honourable Court in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment which are reproduced hereinunder:-- "7. I have been taken through the evidence on record, the order of the Labour Court dated 14th March, 1991 and the impugned order of the Industrial Court dated 28th August, 1991. I have had the benefit it of hearing the submissions of the learned Advocates appearing for both sides. Even a cursory look at the order of the Industrial Court gives the impression that the Industrial Court was under the erroneous belief that it was exercising appellate powers. That there is no appeal provided against an order of the Labour Court under section 28 read with Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act, is the position in law. Though the provisions of section 44 of the Act conferring superintending powers upon the Industrial Court have been interpreted to mean that the power is one of judicial superintendence, similar to the power of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, nonetheless, the powers of judicial superintendence exercisable by the Industrial Court under section 44 of the Act have been held to be limited to ensure that the subordinate Court keeps itself within its jurisdictional limits. The Industrial Courts power do not include the power of interfering with findings of fact, unless there is perversity, see in this connection (Hindustan Prachar Sabha and others v. Dr. (Miss) Rama Sen Gupta and another)6, 1986(1) C.L.R. 77. 8. The Industrial Court has done precisely what it could not have done. It has interfered with the findings of fact under the guise of exercising revisional powers. (Miss) Rama Sen Gupta and another)6, 1986(1) C.L.R. 77. 8. The Industrial Court has done precisely what it could not have done. It has interfered with the findings of fact under the guise of exercising revisional powers. The only reason given by the Industrial Court for disbelieving the entire gamut of evidence led on behalf of the petitioner was that the copper wife in question did not bear any markings and since the right side dicky had no lock, it must have been planted in the dicky by someone else. In this view of the matter, the Industrial Court held that the charge of dishonesty had not been made out. In my view, this reasoning is not only beyond the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court, but is also perverse. That the copper wire was found inside the right side dicky of the motorcycle is not even disputed by the first respondent. The conduct of the first respondent at the time of the search throws a beacon light on his guilty and dishonest mind. First, he denies that the motorcycle had a right side dicky; then, he attempts to open it slightly and immediately shuts it on the ground that it was empty; then, a cloth bundle is seen in the right side dicky and he attempts to explain it away as a piece of bread wrapped in cloth. Even when the cloth bundle is taken out and examined, and found to contain copper wire weighing 2.5 kgs., the first respondent did not say that he was innocent and that it had been planted inside the dicky by some one else. This conduct of the first respondent was correctly appreciated by the Labour Court who rightly came to the conclusion that the first respondent was guilty of the misconduct with which he was charged. The Labour Court was not trying a criminal case where the concept of benefit of doubt could have been made available to the accused. The conclusion in the mind of the Industrial Court arose, presumably, because of import of principles of criminal jurisprudence into industrial jurisprudence without appreciating the fundamentally different roles played by the two. 9. In my view, the order of the Labour Court is fully justified on facts and the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to set aside the factual findings, since it has no appellate powers. 9. In my view, the order of the Labour Court is fully justified on facts and the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to set aside the factual findings, since it has no appellate powers. In the guise of exercising revisional powers (judicial superintendence?), the Industrial Court virtually exercised appellate powers and that too perversely. I, therefore, satisfied that the impugned order of the Industrial Court needs interference in the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India." 15. The learned Counsel for the petitioner thereafter cited before me a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of (Government of Tamil Nadu Another v. A. Rajapndian)7, reported in 1995(I) C.L.R. 167, particularly paragraphs 4 and 5 thereof. This was a case cited to suggest that what was necessary to be examined by the Industrial Court, in that case Administrative Tribunal, is the evidence on record which was produced before the Enquiry Officer to determine whether there was sufficient evidence on record which can sustain or uphold the finding of the Enquiry Officer or not. 16. Thereafter the judgment was cited of the Division Bench in the case of (Central Bank of India Ltd. and Prakash Chand Jain)8, reported in 1969(1) S.C.R. 735 : A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 983. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the following paragraph of the said judgment. "These decisions make it clear that, when an Industrial Tribunal is asked to give its approval to an order of dismissal under section 33(2)(b) of the Act, it can disregard the findings given by the Enquiry Officer only if the findings are perverse. The test of perversity that is indicated in these cases is that the findings may not be supported by any legal evidence at all. This principle was further affirmed in a different context in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Rama Rao (3), where this Court had to consider whether a High Court, in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution, could interfere with the findings recorded by departmental authority in disciplinary proceedings taken against a Government servant. This principle was further affirmed in a different context in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Rama Rao (3), where this Court had to consider whether a High Court, in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution, could interfere with the findings recorded by departmental authority in disciplinary proceedings taken against a Government servant. The Court held:- But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution."In this connection, reference was also made to some cases where this Court has held that a finding by a domestic Tribunal like an Enquiry Officer can be held to be perverse in those cases also where the finding arrived at by the domestic Tribunal is one at which no reasonable person could have arrived on the material before the Tribunal. Thus, there are two cases where the findings of a domestic Tribunal like the Enquiry Officer dealing with disciplinary proceedings against a workman can be interfered with and these two are cases in which the findings are not based on legal evidence or are such as no reasonable person could have arrived at on the basis of the material before the Tribunal. In each of these cases, the findings are treated as perverse. It is in the light of these principles that we have to see whether the Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, in the present case, was justified in refusing to accord approval to the order of dismissal which was passed on the basis of the evidence recorded by the Enquiry Officer, Mr. In each of these cases, the findings are treated as perverse. It is in the light of these principles that we have to see whether the Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, in the present case, was justified in refusing to accord approval to the order of dismissal which was passed on the basis of the evidence recorded by the Enquiry Officer, Mr. Tipnis." The aforesaid judgment was cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner to contend that not only the material which can be looked into by the Labour Court while holding that whether the enquiry was just, fair and proper or not is the only material which was led before the Enquiry Officer but also further contended that the findings of the Enquiry Officer cannot be discarded unless a finding is given that the Enquiry Officers findings are perverse and are based on no material at all and/or that any reasonable person would not arrive at the same conclusion on the material which was led before the Tribunal. 17. Thereafter a Division Bench judgment of this Honourable Court in the case of (Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and S.E. Phadtare others)9, reported in 1995(I) L.L.J. page 70 was cited particularly paragraph 13 thereof which reads as under:- "13. The last reason furnished by the Appellate Authority is that the statement of Sub-Inspector Kamble is not admissible in view of section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The reasoning is entirely fallacious. The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not attracted in respect of a statement recorded by the police and which is to be used in a departmental enquiry. Apart from the fact, in the present case, it is not the statement recorded by the police which is produced but the witness himself is examined both before the Enquiry Officer and the Labour Court. In our judgment, the Labour Court had misdirected in considering the testimony of Kamble both on facts and in law. It appears that the appellate authority had pre-determined that the testimony of Kamble is to be discarded, and then found different reasons which are unsustainable. In our judgment, the testimony of Kamble requires to be accepted as it does not suffer from any infirmity. The Appellate Authority also observed that unless the testimony is corroborated by other witnesses, it is not possible to place reliance. In our judgment, the testimony of Kamble requires to be accepted as it does not suffer from any infirmity. The Appellate Authority also observed that unless the testimony is corroborated by other witnesses, it is not possible to place reliance. We are unable to share the view of the Appellate Authority. There is no rule of evidence which requires that the testimony cannot be accepted without corroboration. In our judgment, the appellate authority was clearly in error in discarding the testimony of Kamble and holding that the undertaking failed to establish the charges levelled against respondent No. 1. The testimony of Kamble conclusively established the participation of respondent No. 1 both in the act of rioting and in damaging BEST buses at the relevant time." 18. Thereafter the judgment is cited before me of the Division Bench of third Honourable Court in the case of Mahila Griha Udyog Lijjat Papad and Kamgar Congress and others, reported in 1983(46) F.L.R. 244, particularly the observation quoted hereunder. "Power of judicial superintendence could be exercised only in cases where errors apparent on the fact of the record are evident from the orders passed by the Labour Court and not in findings of fact recorded by it. Obviously, for interfering with the order of the Labour Court, the Industrial Court has no power to embark upon a fresh reappreciation of evidence." 19. Thereafter a judgment of the learned Single Judge in the case of Hindustan Prachar Sabha others v. Dr. (Miss) Rama Sen Gupta another, reported in 1986(I) C.L.R. 77 was cited particularly paragraph 8 thereof, which reads as under:- "8. Section 44 of the Act reads thus: "The Industrial Court shall have superintendence over all Labour Courts and may,- (a) call for returns; (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and procedure of such courts in matters not expressly provided for by this Act, and in particular, for securing the expenditious disposal of cases; (c) prescribe form in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by officers of any such courts; and (d) settle a table of fees payable for process issued by a Labour Court or the Industrial Court." It is a provision on pari materia with Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The power of superintendence do not include the power to review evidence on record. The power of superintendence do not include the power to review evidence on record. The power of the superintending Court in so far as evidence is concerned is limited to setting aside an order where the evidence could never justify the conclusion, in other words where the order is perverse. I need only refer in this behalf to the decision of the Supreme Court in (M/s. Parry Co. Ltd. v. P.C. Pal)10, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1334." In a nutshell, the judgments cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner raises the following three principles:- (1) That the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under section 44 of the M.R.T.U. P.U.L.P. Act, 1971 being revisional in nature is very limited and it is not permissible while exercising such revisionary jurisdiction to appreciate or re-appreciate the evidence before the Labour Court nor it is permissible for the Industrial Court to interfere with the findings of fact which otherwise can be sustained on the material before the Enquiry Officer and/or Labour Court. (2) That normally the findings which are given by the Enquiry Officer are judged on the basis of material available before the Enquiry Officer and the Labour Court in its enquiry has to ascertain whether such a finding could be arrived at by the Enquiry Officer on true and correct assessment on the basis of material before him. (3) This Honble Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, normally applies restraint and the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under section 44 is equivalent to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India the Industrial Court also has similar limitation on exercise of its power. 20. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent workmen has contended and has relied upon various authorities before me. Summary thereof is briefly enumerated as under:- 21. The learned Counsel has cited before me the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of (The Mumbai Kamgar Sabha v. M/s. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai and others)11, reported in A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1455, particularly paragraph 7 of the said judgment. Summary thereof is briefly enumerated as under:- 21. The learned Counsel has cited before me the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of (The Mumbai Kamgar Sabha v. M/s. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai and others)11, reported in A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1455, particularly paragraph 7 of the said judgment. By relying upon the said judgment it has been agitated before me that the procedure which has been followed for the resolution of the industrial disputes is not a strict procedure as followed under the Civil Procedure Code but it is a liberal approach where procedural prescriptions are handmaids and not mistresses of justice. It had been argued therefore that the Court has to look into the correctness of the findings of the Industrial Court on the basis whether there has been miscarriage of justice by applying over strict view or procedure and thus this Court should not interfere because the Industrial Court has done a substantial justice in the matter. The learned Counsel has thereafter relied upon the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of (Consolidated Pnenumatic Tools Company (India) Limited v. The President, The Association of Engineering Workers others)12, reported in 2001(1) C.L.R. 394, particularly paragraphs 9 and 10 of the said judgment which are reproduced hereunder:- "9. It was the simple say of the workman that he had forgotten to return the instrument on 19th October, 1985 and therefore it was in his possession on the next date. To falsify his version, the statement of token would have been a clinching documentary evidence which was part of regular business transaction in the storage department. It is most surprising that the aforesaid crucial document was not produced by the petitioner company, not only before the Enquiry Officer, but also before the Labour Court. From this statement of token, the defence of the workman would have been either proved or falsified. Since the petitioner company has deliberately not produced the said statement of token at any stage of the proceedings, adverse inference would have to be drawn against the company, as had it produced the said statement of token it would have definitely falsified its case and would have gone against it and would have proved the defence of the workman true that on 19th October, 1985 he had not returned the instrument in the stores department. If the said statement of token would have shown the entry of receipt of the instrument back in that case, the workman would have been placed in a very tight and vulnerable corner and he would have been required to prove how on 20th October in the morning he got the instrument, whether against a token or by theft. Since the petitioner company has deliberately not produced the most crucial documentary evidence which was in the custody and possession, it must be held that the workman was authoritatively in possession of the said instrument against his own token which was lying in the stores department and not in any surreptitious manner or dishonestly. According to me, he, therefore cannot be accused or charged of theft or dishonesty of the said instrument as he was carrying the same as against his own token which was lying in the stores department. No doubt, the petitioner company has examined store keeper Shri Pednekar but his oral testimony is no substitute for the documentary evidence which deliberately appears to have been suppressed from the Enquiry Officer as well as from the Labour Court. 10. In the aforesaid circumstances in addition to the reasoning recorded by the Labour Court in its final award, it is not possible for me also to hold that the workman was guilty of the charge of theft and dishonesty with the company's property. The Labour Court has already absolved the workman of the charge of theft but has held him guilty of charge of dishonesty with the company's property. In my opinion, from the record it is crystal clear that in the absence of the documentary evidence of statement of token it cannot be held that the workman was guilty of any of the charges levelled against him, neither of theft nor of dishonesty nor of any subversive act. Had the Labour Court given due importance to this crucial fact, it would have been very difficult for it and it is very difficult for any reasonable man to come to a conclusion that the workman was guilty of even dishonesty with the company's property; as held by the learned Presiding Officer of the 6th Labour Court. There is nothing unusual or unnatural in the say of the workman that on 19th October he had just forgotten to return the instrument to the stores department. There is nothing unusual or unnatural in the say of the workman that on 19th October he had just forgotten to return the instrument to the stores department. We need not ridicule or mock every time at the explanation of forgetting to do a certain thing. There are slips in the memory of every human being. It is not a case of instantly disbelieving the workman. The only evidence available with the company has been withheld by it. The statement of token would have perhaps clinched the case of the company instrument in the stores department and that he had not forgotten to return it. In that case, the burning ball would have in the Court of the workmen to explain how he came in possession of the instrument on 20th October. I am, therefore, not able to sustain the findings of the Labour Court that the workman was guilty of dishonesty with the company's property. I agree with the conclusion of the Labour Court that the workman had not committed any theft of the instrument. There is not a an iota of evidence on record to prove that on 20th October, 1985 he had opened the stores department and had taken away the instrument wrongfully. The charge of theft is a very serious charge against anyone and it cannot be levelled lightly without any sufficient evidence. The petitioner company has miserably failed to prove the charge of theft and dishonesty against the workman." By relying upon the said judgment it was contended that if the material is not produced by the company within whose possession the said material was, then the workers cannot suffer. Not only Court should show adverse inference on that account but in fact if the same goes to the root of the matter then the Court is entitled to direct the company to produce the evidence which was in their possession and/or in their custody. 22. The learned Counsel for the respondents has thereafter relied upon a judgment in the case of (D.N. Banerji, Administrator, Budge Municipality and P.R. Mukherjee, Chairman, Industrial Tribunal and others)13, reported in A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 58 and has relied upon the following observation. 22. The learned Counsel for the respondents has thereafter relied upon a judgment in the case of (D.N. Banerji, Administrator, Budge Municipality and P.R. Mukherjee, Chairman, Industrial Tribunal and others)13, reported in A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 58 and has relied upon the following observation. "Whether on the facts of a particular case the dismissal of an employee was wrongful or justified is a question primarily for the Tribunal to decide, and here the Tribunal held that the dismissals were clear cases of victimisation and hence wrongful. Unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention, it is not for the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere. Points (a) and (b) are interlaced. The dismissal of the two employees was taken up by the municipal workers' union who challenged it as grossly improper. Thus, it is clear that there was dispute between the employer, viz, the Municipality on the one side and the workmen represented by the union on the other. But what is urged by the Municipality is that it was not an 'industrial dispute, within the meaning of the Act, and hence there was no jurisdiction in the Government to refer the dispute to a Tribunal. It is contended on their behalf that the Municipality in discharging its normal duties connected with local self Government is not engaged in any industry as defined in the Act. It is this question that we have to consider, and for this purpose it becomes necessary to examine rather closely some of the provisions in the Act to ascertain their true scope and meaning," On the basis of the aforesaid judgment it has been contended that unless there is any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law, this Court cannot intervene in the matter and exercise jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 23. Thereafter the learned Counsel for the respondent workmen has relied upon the judgment in the case of (Hardwari Lal v. State of U.P. others)14 reported in 2000(I) C.L.R. 73, particularly paragraphs 3 and 4 thereof. The said paragraphs 3 and 4 are reproduced hereinunder. "3. Before us the sole ground urged is as to the on observance of the principles of natural justice in not examining the complainant, Shri Virender Singh, and witness, Jagdish Ram. The said paragraphs 3 and 4 are reproduced hereinunder. "3. Before us the sole ground urged is as to the on observance of the principles of natural justice in not examining the complainant, Shri Virender Singh, and witness, Jagdish Ram. The Tribunal as well as the High Court have brushed aside the grievance made by the appellant that the non-examination of those two persons has prejudiced his case. Examination of these two witnesses would have revealed as to whether the complaint made by Virender Singh was correct or not and to establish that he was the best person to speak to its veracity. So also, Jagdish Ram, who had accompanied the appellant to the hospital for medical-examination, would have been an important witness to prove the state or the condition of the appellant. We do not think the Tribunal and the High Court were justified in thinking that non-examination of these two persons could not be material. In these circumstances, we are of the view that the High Court and the Tribunal erred in not attaching importance to this contention of the appellant. 4. However, Shri Goel, the learned Addl. Advocate General, State of Uttar Pradesh, has submitted that there was other material which was sufficient to come to the conclusion one way or the other and he has taken us through the same. But while appreciating the evidence on record the impact of the testimony of the complainant cannot be visualised. Similarly, the evidence of Jagdish Ram would also bear upon the state of inebriation, if any, of the appellant." 24. The learned Counsel for the respondent workmen has thereafter relied upon the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of (Hotel Oberoi Towers and Gopal Naidu)15, reported in 2002(4) Bom.C.R. (O.O.C.J.)58 : 2002(94) F.L.R. 779, particularly paragraph 9 of the judgment where this Court while dealing with the jurisdiction under section 44 of the M.R.T.U. P.U.L.P. Act, inter alia held that the jurisdiction under section 44 is limited still the Industrial Court can re-examine the conclusion arrived at by the Labour Court and such power is vested in the Industrial Court. It has been further held that in appropriate cases, the Industrial Court may even in exercise of power under section 44 over rule the order under revision when its conclusion on evidence is perverse. 25. It has been further held that in appropriate cases, the Industrial Court may even in exercise of power under section 44 over rule the order under revision when its conclusion on evidence is perverse. 25. The learned Counsel for the respondent workmen has thereafter relied upon a judgment in the case of (Abbot Laboraties (India) Ltd. v. J.D. Jamdar another)16, reported in 1995(II) C.L.R. 887. The learned Single Judge of this Court has, inter alia, held therein that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code applies to the industrial adjudication. Paragraph 4 of the said judgment reads as under:- "4. The only question, which falls for my consideration, is whether the course adopted by the learned Judge in disposing off the complaints solely on the basis of the affidavits is in accordance with the provisions of Order XIX(1) and (2) of Civil Procedure Code." 26. The learned Counsel for the respondent workmen has thereafter relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Babulal Nagar and others v. Shree Synthetics Ltd. and others)17, reported in 1984(Supp.) S.C.C. 128, particularly paragraph 17, relevant portion of which reads as under:- "The non-application of mind of the Inquiry Officer was pointed out by referring to that part of the final order which manifestly overlooked the material piece of evidence which would go to the root of the matter. The Industrial Court observed that the Inquiry Officer quietly skipped over very material portion of the evidence of Balchand which went a long way to falsify the charges relating to the incidents which preceded the actual assault on Verma. The Industrial Court then pointed out that report (Ex. D-18) purporting to have been made by victim Verma to the factory Manager on the day following the date of the occurrence when properly scanned appears to be a highly suspicious evidence because "it is not dated and does not bear the endorsement of the officer to whom it was presented". This is permissible because the revisional jurisdiction enables the authority to point something which on evidence legally speaking or in the eye of law. It was pointed out that Verma did not identify the report. The Industrial Court concluded that the possibility of this report being introduced at a later stage to strengthen the case against the five appellants cannot be ruled out. It was pointed out that Verma did not identify the report. The Industrial Court concluded that the possibility of this report being introduced at a later stage to strengthen the case against the five appellants cannot be ruled out. After referring to other infirmities in the approach of the Labour Court, the Industrial Court concluded that the entire approach of the Manager in arriving at the findings of misconduct in his inquiry "appear to be biased and unfair", and "the conclusions are neither fair nor reasonable and any order of dismissal based thereon cannot be sustained". Can it ever be said that in reaching this conclusion, the Industrial Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction? The whole approach of the Labour Court dealing with the report of the enquiry as also the inquiry itself clearly disclosed material irregularity and thereby the Labour Court failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it namely, to examine the propriety of the order which it failed to do. The Industrial Court, in our opinion, was perfectly justified in interfering with the order of the Labour Court. Even then the approach of the Industrial Court, being conscious of the severe constraints on its jurisdiction was of dignified restraint and just. It merely set aside the award of the Labour Court and did not proceed to reappreciate evidence but remitted the case to the Labour Court for a fresh decision. It was thus an eminently just order." 27. Thereafter the learned Counsel for the respondent workmen relied upon a judgment in the case of (Billa Jagan Mohan Reddy another v. Billa Sanjeeva Reddy others)18, reported in 1994(4) S.C.C. 659 in which it has been inter alia held that additional evidence can be received even by exercising power under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code. 28. The learned Counsel has also relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Management of the Northern Railway Co-operative Credit Society Ltd., Jodhpur v. Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur another)19, reported in A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1182. By relying upon the said judgment the learned Counsel has sought to urge that it was open to the respondent to support the order of the Tribunal even on ground decided against the respondent or grounds which were not urged before the learned Tribunal even though respondents have not challenged the said order. By relying upon the said judgment the learned Counsel has sought to urge that it was open to the respondent to support the order of the Tribunal even on ground decided against the respondent or grounds which were not urged before the learned Tribunal even though respondents have not challenged the said order. It was further pointed out by the said judgment that in such a case also the Supreme Court applies the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 22 of the Civil Procedure Code. The learned Counsel has relied upon particularly paragraphs 10 and 11 of the said judgment, which read as under:-- "(10) On behalf of the respondents, this plea was challenged and it was urged that it was open to the respondents to support the order of the Tribunal even on grounds decided against the respondents or grounds not urged before the Tribunal which might be apparent on the face of the record, even though the respondents have filed no appeal. Reliance for this proposition was placed on a decision of this Court in (Ramanbhai Ashabhai Patel v. Dabhi Ajitkumar)20, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 669. In that case, an appeal was brought to this Court against the judgment of an Election Tribunal, and one of the respondents wanted to support the order of the Tribunal on grounds which had been negatived by the Tribunal. On behalf of the respondent, reliance was placed on the principle laid down in Order XLI, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This Court took notice of the fact that in the rules of this Court there was no rule analogous to Rule 22 of Order XLI, C.P.C., but held that the provisions nearest to it was the one contained in Order XVIII, Rule 3 of the Rules of this Court which required parties to file statements of cases. Sub-rule (1) of that Rule provides that Part I of the statement of the case shall also set out the contentions of the parties and the points of law and fact arising in the appeal. It further provides that in Part II a party shall set out the proposition of law to be urged in support of the contentions of the party lodging the case and authorities in support thereof. It further provides that in Part II a party shall set out the proposition of law to be urged in support of the contentions of the party lodging the case and authorities in support thereof. The Court held that there is no reason to limit the provisions of this rule only to those contentions which dealt with the points found in favour of that party in the judgment appealed from. The Court further proceeded to hold that "apart from that, we think that, while dealing with the appeal before it, this Court has the power to decide all the points arising from the judgment appealed against and even in the absence of an express provision like Order XLI, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it can devise the appropriate procedure to be adopted at the hearing. There could be no better way of supplying the deficiency than by drawing upon the provisions of a general law like the Code of Civil Procedure and adopting such of those provisions as are suitable. We cannot loose sight of the fact that normally a party in whose favour the judgment appealed from has been given will not be granted special leave to appeal from it. Considerations of justice, therefore, require that this Court should, in appropriate cases, permit a party placed in such a position to support the judgment in his favour even upon grounds which were negatived in that judgment." (11) In an appeal brought up against a judgment of the Labour Court, in (Powari Tea Estate v. Barkataki (M.K.))21, 1965(2) Lab.L.J. 102(S.C.) this Court was examining the correctness of the decision reached by the Labour Court and, while doing so, it appeared that the decision of Labour Court could be justified on a ground to which the Labour Court had not made any reference. The Court held: "But it appears from the record that the decision reached by the Labour Court can be justified on another ground to which the Labour Court has not referred, but which is patent on the record." After expressing this view, the Court proceeded to examine this ground which was patent on the record and upheld the order of the Labour Court on that ground. In these circumstances, we consider that learned Counsel for the respondents is justified in urging before us that the respondents are entitled to support the decision of the Tribunal setting aside the order of Kanraj even on grounds which were not accepted by the Tribunal or on other grounds which may not have been taken notice of by the Tribunal while they were patent on the fact of the record." 29. Lastly, the learned Counsel for the respondent workmen has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of (M. Shankaraiah another v. State of Karnataka others)22 reported in 1993 Supp.(4) S.C.C. 596, particularly paragraphs 18 and 19 thereof. The said paragraphs 18 and 19 of the said judgment are reproduced as under:-- "18. Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way. The order of the Court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered for consistency but it is not as inflexible in Administrative Law as in Public Law. Even the law bends before justice. Entire concept of writ jurisdiction exercised by the higher courts is founded on equity and fairness. If the Court finds that the order was passed under a mistake and it would not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice then it cannot on any principle be precluded from rectifying the error. Mistake is accepted as valid reason to recall an order. Difference lies in the nature of mistake and scope of rectification, depending on if it is of fact or law. But the root from which the power flows is the anxiety to avoid injustice. It is either statutory or inherent. The latter is available where the mistake is of the Court. In Administrative Law the scope is still wider. Technicalities apart if the Court is satisfied of the injustice then it is its constitutional and legal obligation to set it right by recalling its order. Here as explained, the Bench of which one of us (Sahai, J.) was a member did commit an error in placing all the stipendiary graduates in the scale of first division assistants due to State's failure to bring correct facts on record. Here as explained, the Bench of which one of us (Sahai, J.) was a member did commit an error in placing all the stipendiary graduates in the scale of first division assistants due to State's failure to bring correct facts on record. But that obviously cannot stand in the way of the Court correcting its mistake. Such inequitable consequences as have surfaced now due to vague affidavit filed by the State cannot be permitted to continue. 19. Review literally and even judicially means re-examination or re-consideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provisions and no rules were framed by the highest Court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Chaudhury v. Sukhraj Rai the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest Court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh that an order made by the Court was final and could not be altered: ".. nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments, by errors have been introduced, these courts possess, by common law, the same power which the courts of record and statute have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in .... The House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority. The House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority. The Lords have however gone a step further, and have corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have applied manifest defects in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies." Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under: "It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a Court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard." Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the Constitution. Our Constitution makers who had the practical wisdom to visualise the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And Clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this power Order XL had been framed empowering this Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds analogous to Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The expression, for any other sufficient reason in the clause has been given an expanded meaning and a decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been held to be sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order XL, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of Court. The Court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice." 30. The Court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice." 30. After perusing the aforesaid judgments cited by both the parties before this Court and looking to the facts of the present case, I am of the opinion that the order of the Tribunal is just, fair and proper and requires no interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This view I have taken on the basis of the facts of this case which are very material. In the present case, it is the case of the respondent workman that there were certain documentary evidence which was within the knowledge and possession of the petitioner company but the petitioner company did not deliberately produce the same before the Enquiry Officer because production of the said document would have falsified the evidence of the main witness Parab who has deposed to the guilt of the respondent workmen. It is the further case of the respondent workmen that the said documents came to their knowledge only after the enquiry was concluded and punishment was awarded and during the pendency of the complaint before the Labour Court since the said documents were produced in the enquiry of another workman who is not party to the present proceedings. The documents which were sought to be thereafter produced before the Labour Court but it has refused to permit the respondent workmen to bring the said documents on record and the application made for bringing the additional document by way of Exhibit U-35 has been rejected. Also an application to examine the said Mr. Agrawal to establish the veracity of the documents was also rejected by the Labour Court. The Labour Court while rejecting the said application has based its view only on the basis that the Labour Court is not entitled to look into any other evidence or material save and except which was produced before the Enquiry Officer. The said finding of the Labour Court has not found favour with the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court while considering the aforesaid findings has given its order directing the said documents to be admitted and brought on record with further liberty to the respondent company to cross-examine the witnesses in the light of the additional evidence brought on record. The said finding of the Labour Court has not found favour with the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court while considering the aforesaid findings has given its order directing the said documents to be admitted and brought on record with further liberty to the respondent company to cross-examine the witnesses in the light of the additional evidence brought on record. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner company that such exercise is not permissible in revisional jurisdiction under section 44 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971 does not impress me because the jurisdiction conferred on the Industrial Court by way of revision under section 44 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971 has to be exercised when there is a manifest injustice and/or there is an apparent error on the face of the record. It can also be exercised to prevent miscarriage of justice. The interference by the Industrial Court in the present case to bring additional documents on record cannot be termed as an appreciation or reappreciation of evidence. It is an exercise of power to prevent an ex facie injustice and affording a proper opportunity to the workman to establish their innocence. This is an issue which arises basically on the basis of not affording sufficient opportunity to the respondent workman to establish their case. The view of the Labour Court refusing to permit the documents to be brought on record is equally erroneous and incorrect because as seen from the authorities cited before this Court that though the provisions of Civil Procedure Code does not apply to the industrial adjudication and the principles of natural justice are made applicable it only means that not only all the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code can be made applicable but even the Court's jurisdiction is wider and is empowered to take into consideration what is not permissible even under the Civil Procedure Code. This view has been recently propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of (Allahabad Bank, Calcutta v. Radha Krishna Maity and others)23, reported in 1999(6) S.C.C. 755 particularly paragraph 9 thereof which reads as under: "9. This view has been recently propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of (Allahabad Bank, Calcutta v. Radha Krishna Maity and others)23, reported in 1999(6) S.C.C. 755 particularly paragraph 9 thereof which reads as under: "9. The scope and the extent of the powers of the Tribunal are mainly referred to in sub-section (1) of section 22 of the Act which says that the Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice. As stated in Grapco by this Court, the Tribunal can exercise powers contained in the Code of Civil Procedure and can even go beyond the Code as long as it passed orders in conformity with the principles of natural justice. We may add that section 19(6) does not in any manner limit the generality of the powers of the Tribunal under section 22(1). It merely states that certain types of injunction of stay orders may be passed by the Tribunal. It is to be noticed that sub-section (6) of section 19 starts with the words-- "The Tribunal may make an interim order ....." The provision is an enabling provision and merely states that certain types of injunction or stay orders mentioned therein can be passed by the Tribunal but such an enumeration cannot, in our opinion, be deemed to be exhaustive nor restricting the Tribunal's powers only to those types of injunction or stay orders. The width and amplitude of the powers are to be gathered from section 22(1) as stated in Grapco. In addition, Rule 18 enables the Tribunal to pass orders to secure the ends of justice." 31. The width and amplitude of the powers are to be gathered from section 22(1) as stated in Grapco. In addition, Rule 18 enables the Tribunal to pass orders to secure the ends of justice." 31. In the aforesaid view and particularly in view of the judgment cited by the respondent, inter alia in the case of Abbot Laboratories (India) Ltd. v. J.D. Jamdar and another, reported in 1995(II) C.L.R. 887 in the case of The Mumbai Kamgar Sabha v. M/s. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai and others, reported in A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1455 in the case of M. Shankaraiah and another v. State of Karnataka and others, reported in 1993 Supp(4) S.C.C. 596 and in the case of Hotel Oberoi Towers and Gopal Naidu, reported in 2002(94) F.L.R. 779, I am of the view that the Industrial Court while exercising jurisdiction under section 44 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971 is entitled to see that whether the Labour Court has followed valid procedure and/or that the view taken by the Labour Court or the approach adopted by the Labour Court is neither perverse or not based on the extraneous material before him. In the present case, the learned Labour Court has come to the conclusion that the refusal to permit the additional documents to be brought on record by the Labour Court has led to a substantial miscarriage of justice and, therefore, interfered with in its jurisdiction under section 44 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971. This is not a case of appreciation or re-appreciation of evidence as contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner company nor is the case of substituting the finding of the Labour Court on merits by the Industrial Court. The learned Industrial Court having held that the said documents ought to have been permitted to be brought on record has admitted the said documents and permitted the company to cross-examine the employees and further evidence has to be led before the Labour Court and for that purpose remanded the matter before the Labour Court. I am, therefore, not impressed with the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner company that the Industrial Court has exceeded its jurisdiction under section 44 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971. I am of the opinion that the order passed by the Industrial Court in the facts and circumstances of the present case is proper. I am, therefore, not impressed with the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner company that the Industrial Court has exceeded its jurisdiction under section 44 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971. I am of the opinion that the order passed by the Industrial Court in the facts and circumstances of the present case is proper. Further the Industrial Court has given full opportunity to the respondent employees to establish that they are not guilty. Such a finding or such an order passed by the Industrial Court cannot be interfered with in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 32. This leads me to the next submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner company that it is the only material which was before the Enquiry Officer which could be looked into by the Labour Court and no other material. It is true that while ascertaining the correctness or otherwise of the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the Labour Court must see and look into the material which was produced and/or the record which was before the Enquiry Officer and cannot substitute the finding of the Enquiry Officer by relying upon extraneous material or extraneous evidence. However, in the present case, the case of the respondent workers was that the documents which are being produced were deliberately withheld by the company though they were in the possession of the petitioner company and the respondent employees have sought to bring the said documents on record. The respondent workmen have sought to produce these documents before the Labour Court as and by way of additional evidence. I am of the view that in such case the Labour Court can consider whether the material now sought to be brought as and by way of additional evidence could have been produced by the party before the Enquiry Officer or not and secondly whether the said documents are so relevant that consideration thereof could have led to a totally different result before the Enquiry Officer. If the aforesaid two conditions are satisfied then in that event it was open for the Labour Court to permit the additional documents to be produced before the Labour Court and/or the Labour Court could have remanded the matter before the Enquiry Officer for reconducting of the enquiry in the light of the additional evidence or the Labour Court itself could have conducted the enquiry afresh. I am, therefore, of the view that to lay down a law that the documents which are not produced before the Enquiry Officer for any reason whatsoever cannot be considered by the Labour Court or the Industrial Court would tantamount to inflict a total injustice on the parties to the litigation who for certain reasons which are beyond their control could not produce this material. As it has been held by the Supreme Court in the judgments cited before me that the procedure has to be given a back seat so far as the Industrial adjudication is concerned and the broad principles of natural justice should be looked into. I am of the view that in view of the aforesaid situation and facts, there is a clear cut breach of principles of natural justice. There is no denial of the fact that the documents were in the possession of the company thus non production of the same would defeat the justice in the matter. Thus, in my view, the order of the Labour Court on Exhibit U-35 refusing to entertain the said available document tantamounts to inflicting injustice on the respondent workers and the Industrial Court has therefore rightly interfered with the said order passed by the Labour Court and has taken the said documents on record with a further opportunity to the petitioner company to carry out the exercise of cross-examination before the Labour Court. I do not find any substance in the argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner company that in no circumstance of any nature whatsoever any new material can be brought before the Labour Court. I am of the view that this aspect of the matter depends on the facts of each case. I do not find any substance in the argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner company that in no circumstance of any nature whatsoever any new material can be brought before the Labour Court. I am of the view that this aspect of the matter depends on the facts of each case. It is for the Labour Court to ascertain and determine whether in a particular given case the material or evidence sought to be produced at the stage of complaint ought to be entertained or not and for that purpose the Labour Court would take into consideration the aforesaid two aspects as set out hereinabove, namely whether it was possible to produce such documents by the respondent workmen and secondly whether it materially alters the result of the enquiry proceedings. 33. This leads me to the third contention advanced by the petitioner that the said order on Exhibit U-35 was not challenged by the respondent workman at the stage of passing of the order itself and, therefore, could not have been challenged by them while challenging the final order on the complaint. This argument is without any substance at all because the order on Exhibit U-35 was a preliminary order and every preliminary order can also be challenged at the time of challenging the final order passed by the Labour Court and secondly because the said preliminary order on Exhibit U-35 has been in fact challenged in the present revision application which has been preferred by the workers. The Industrial Court has considered this aspect and has held that there is no period of limitation prescribed for challenging the order in revision application. The learned Labour Court therefore has found that there is no abnormal delay in challenging the order on Exhibit U-35 which was an earlier order passed by the Labour Court. In that view of the matter, I do not fine any infirmity with the view taken by the Industrial Court and thus the said view taken by the Industrial Court is legal and valid and requires no interference in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Furthermore, by the impugned judgment the Industrial Court has merely remanded the matter back to the Labour Court for reconsideration and giving an opportunity to the petitioner employer to further cross-examine the witnesses and lead all necessary evidence. Furthermore, by the impugned judgment the Industrial Court has merely remanded the matter back to the Labour Court for reconsideration and giving an opportunity to the petitioner employer to further cross-examine the witnesses and lead all necessary evidence. In view thereof I am of the opinion that no prejudice is caused to the petitioner save and except that there may be some delay in the present proceedings. 34. In the circumstances aforesaid, I dismiss the present writ petition. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 35. The learned Counsel for the petitioner seeks continuation of the ad interim order dated 10-6-2002. By this interim order the prayer Clause (b) of the petition has been granted. The learned Counsel for the respondent leaves it to the Court. The ad interim order dated 10-6-2002 to continue till 28-6-2004. Parties to act on ordinary copy of this order duly authenticated by the Private Secretary of this Court. Petition dismissed. -----