R. B. MISRA, J. Heard Sri Devendra Dhama, learned Counsel for the petitioner, and Sri A. K. Misra, learned Counsel for the U. P. Co-operative Federation. In this petition prayer has been made to quash the order dated 6-11-1990 (Annexure 7 to the writ petition) with a further prayer to direct the respondents not to interfere with the service of the petitioner as Extension Officer and to continue to pay his salary and other allowances admissible to him. 2. Counter-affidavit has already been filed long back. The rejoinder affidavit even at this belated stage of 14 years is accepted by the Court and is kept on record and with the consent of the parties this writ petition is decided in reference to Second Proviso to Rule 2 to Chapter XXII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952. 3. According to the petitioner, U. P. Co-operative Sugar Mills Federation in its different mills intended to make deployment of young, courageous and dedicated youths as Extension Officer for one year, for the first year on Rs. 1500 per months consolidated salary with a condition that upper age limit would be 30 years on 1-7-1989, and keeping in view the work, performance and output the employer might consider to give a regular appointment in the establishment. The petitioner, however, was given appointment on 2nd November, 1989 in Kisan Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited, Roopapur, Hardoi on Rs. 1500 per month on consolidated salary absolutely on temporary basis for one year at first instance as an Extension Officer (Sugar) with indication that the service of the petitioner was absolutely temporarily and could be terminated without any notice, with other conditions as indicated in the order of appointment dated 2- 11-1990 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition ). However, during the employment of one year the petitioner was shifted to different units of Sugar Federation and under a policy decision the service of the petitioner was terminated by order dated 6-11-1990 alongwith one other person after one year in consonance to the terms and conditions of employment. However, during the employment of one year the petitioner was shifted to different units of Sugar Federation and under a policy decision the service of the petitioner was terminated by order dated 6-11-1990 alongwith one other person after one year in consonance to the terms and conditions of employment. According to the petitioner, this order of termination was not conveyed to him at late stage in the year 1991 and by that time he has already rendered 240 days uninterruptedly continuously in his deployment and keeping in view his performance as noted in the order dated 28th August, 1990 (Annexure 8 to the writ petition) the petitioner was liable to be regularised in service, however, dispensation of the service of the petitioner being in derogation to the provisions of Articles 14, 16 and 19 of the Constitution of India as well as to the provisions of Section 6-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Rules framed thereunder, was arbitrary, discriminatory and illegal. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the contents of paragraph No. 14 of the writ petition asserting that the petitioner had rendered service of 240 days during deployment and non- observance of the provisions of the Section 6-N of the Industrial Disputes Act before dispensation of his service has not been controverted in the counter-affidavit in the respective paragraphs, therefore, keeping in view non-observance of Section 6-N and assurances given in the advertisement (Annexure 1 to the writ petition) the petitioners service was allowed to be continued in the light of the decision in 1989 (58) FLR 100 Krishna Kumar Dubey v. U. P. State Food and Essential Commodities Corporation and another, where the termination of an employee having rendering 240 days service without complying the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was held to be illegal and was quashed and the writ petitioner was directed to be reinstated into service. 5. Counter-affidavit has been filed indicating that the petitioner has not rendered 240 days of service continuously and the appointment of the petitioner was for the fixed term for one year and in terms of the appointment petitioners service was dispensed with. 5. Counter-affidavit has been filed indicating that the petitioner has not rendered 240 days of service continuously and the appointment of the petitioner was for the fixed term for one year and in terms of the appointment petitioners service was dispensed with. According to the respondents there is no illegality or arbitrariness or discrimination, and if the petitioner was treating himself to be workmen then for alleged non-compliance of Section 6-N of the Industrial Disputes Act he was supposed to resort to the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal for redressal of his grievance inter alia for adjudication of disputed questions of facts of rendering 240 days of service. According to the respondents, the present writ petition is not maintainable as the Mill is neither State Government under Article 12 of the Constitution nor instrumentality of the State Government, therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. 6. According to learned Counsel for the respondents the aspect of rendering work for more than 240 days by the petitioner was only to be relevant when the petitioner approaches labour Court or was persuading before the Industrial Tribunal and the petitioner was not entitled to be regularised merely on the ground that he had rendered 240 days of work. 7. However, in the present facts and circumstances, this Court is not relegating the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy though the same is a potential aspect and is also not throwing the writ petition on the ground of its maintainability. 8. For this purpose learned Counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court passed on 8th October, 2003 in Civil Appeal No. 5466 of 2002 General Manager, Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. , Sultanpur, U. P. v. Satrughan Nishad and others, which was decided alongwith large number of civil appeals, where the Supreme Court while allowing the Civil Appeals of Mills was pleased to set aside the decisions of High Court adjudicating the disputed questions of facts instead by relegating the matter for adjudication under Industrial Disputes Act. The observations of the Supreme Court in Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills (supra) are given as below: "writ applications were contested by the Mill on the grounds, inter alia, that the Mills, which is co- operative society, was neither State nor instrumentality or agency of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, hence, the writ jurisdiction of the High Court could not be invoked. According to them service conditions of the contesting respondents, who were the workmen, were governed by standing orders of the Mill and the dispute raised by them related to enforcement of rights and obligations created under the Act, as such the remedy available to them was to raise an industrial dispute under the provisions of the Act. Further ground of contest was that although the workmen had claimed to have worked between the years 1980-84 to 2000-01 but in not a single year, the Mill was operational for a period of 240 days inasmuch as the period of operation of the Mill during the aforesaid period was from 45 days to 199 days. According to them, the contesting respondents were seasonal workers and as they did not work for a period of 240 days in any year, were not entitled to claim protection under Section 6n of the Act. The learned Single Judge of the High Court overruled preliminary objection raised on behalf of the Mill, came to the conclusion that the Mill, which is a society, was State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution as it was instrumentality of the State and there was infraction of the provisions of Section 6n of the Act. Accordingly, the writ applications were allowed, orders of termination of the contesting respondents were quashed and it was directed that their services shall be regularised in a phased manner within a period of two years. The said order has been affirmed by the Division Bench on appeals being preferred by the Mill. Hence, these appeals by special leave. Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Advocate appearing in support of the appeals, submitted that the contesting respondents could not have been allowed to invoke writ jurisdiction of the High Court as the Mill, which is a registered co-operative society, was not State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution as it was neither instrumentality nor agency of the Government of Uttar Pradesh. On the other hand, Shri Sunil Gupta, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents, submitted that the Mill was an instrumentality of the Government, as such it was an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The point raised is no longer res integra as the same is concluded by decisions of this Court. In the case of Ajay Hasia and others v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and ors. , (1981) 1 SCC 722 , a Constitution Bench of this Court, while approving the tests laid down in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India & ors. , (1979) 3 SCC 489 , as to when a corporation can be said to be an instrumentality or agency of the Government, observed at page 736 which runs thus: "the tests for determining as to when a corporation can be said to be an instrumentality or agency of Government may now be culled out from the judgment in the International Airport Authority case. These tests are not conclusive or cleaning, but they are merely indicative indicia, which have to be used with care and caution, because while stressing the necessity of a wide meaning to be placed on the expression "other authorities". It must be realized that it should not be stretched so far as to bring in every autonomous body which has some nexus with the Government within the sweep of the expression. A wide enlargement of the meaning must be tempered by a wise limitation. We may summarise the relevant tests gathered from the decision in the International Airport Authority case as follows: (1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government (SCC p. 507, para 14 ). (2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation, being impregnated with Governmental character. (SCC p. 508, para 15 ). (3) It may also be a relevant factor. . . . . . whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected. (SCC p. 508, para 15 ). (3) It may also be a relevant factor. . . . . . whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected. (SCC p. 508, para 15) (4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corporation is a Stage agency or instrumentality. (SCC p. 508 para 15 ). (5) If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to Governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government. (SCC p. 509, para 16 ). (6) "specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference" of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government. (SCC p. 510, para 18 ). If on a consideration of these relevant factors it is found that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government, it would, as pointed out in the International Airport Authority case, be an authority and, therefore, state within the meaning of the expression in Article 12". In the case of Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and others, (2002) 5 SCC 111 , a Bench of seven Judges of this Court in para 27 of its judgment has noted and quoted with approval in extenso the aforesaid tests propounded in International Airport Authority case (supra) and approved in the case of Ajay Hasia (supra) for determining as to when a corporation cans be said to be an instrumentality or agency of the Government so as to come within the meaning of the expression authority in Article 12 of the Constitution. There the Bench referred to the case of Chander Mohan Khanna v. NCERT, (1991) 4 SCC 578 , where, after considering the memorandum of association and the rules, this Court came to the conclusion that NCERT was largely an autonomous body and its activities were not wholly related to Governmental functions and the Government control was confined only to the proper utilization of the grants and since its funding was not entirely from Government resources, the case did not satisfy the requirements of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution. Further, reference was also made in that case to the decision of this Court in Mysore Paper Mills Ltd. v. Mysore Paper Mills Officers Association and another, (2002) 2 SCC 167 , where it was held that the company was an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution as it was substantially financed and financially controlled by the Government, managed by a Board of Directors nominated and removable at the instance of the Government and carrying on important functions of public interest under the control of the Government. From the decisions referred to above, it would be clear that the form in which the body is constituted, namely, whether it is a society or co-operative society or a company, is not decisive. The real status of the body with respect to the control of Government would have to be looked into. The various tests, as indicated above, would have got to be applied and considered cumulatively. There can be no hard and fast formula and in different facts/situations, different factors may be found to be overwhelming and indicating that the body is an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution. In this context, Bye Laws of the Mill would have to be seen. In the instant case, in one of the writ applications filed before the High Court, it was asserted that the Government of Uttar Pradesh held 50% shares in the Mill which fact was denied in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State and it was averred that majority of the shares were held by cane growers. Of course, it was not said that the Government of Uttar Pradesh did not hold any share. Before this Court, it was stated on behalf of the contesting respondents in the counter- affidavit that the Government of Uttar Pradesh held 50% shares in the Mill which was not denied on behalf of the Mill. Therefore, even if it is taken to be admitted due to non traverse, the share of the State Government would be only 50% and not entire. Therefore, even if it is taken to be admitted due to non traverse, the share of the State Government would be only 50% and not entire. Thus, the first test laid Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant in the alternative submitted that in the present batch of appeals, there are disputed questions of facts as according to the contesting respondents they had worked for more than 240 days whereas stand of the Mill was that from the day the contesting respondents joined, in not a single year, the Mill was functioning for a period of 240 days and during the years in question the functioning of the Mill was between 45 days to 199 days. Further, according to the contesting respondents, some of them were permanent and others seasonal but according to the Mill, all the employees were seasonal workmen. In our view, these ate disputed questions of facts which cannot be decided in writ jurisdiction and the same can be decided by the Courts constituted under the provisions of the Act. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified and the same can be decided by the Courts constituted under the provisions of the Act. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in entertaining the writ applications. " 9. Rejoinder affidavit has been filed controverting the contents of the counter-affidavit and reiterating the stand of the writ petition. 10. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties. I find that the petitioner was initially appointed for one year in terms and conditions of the appointment order and the petitioner was shifted to different units of Sugar Federation and in terms of the appointment order the petitioner was kept on contractual deployment for one year, which was liable to be extended keeping in view his work and performances, however, the contractual deployment was not extended for subsequent another year. Non-renewal of the contractual deployment is not retrenchment or illegal and fatal in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in 1997 (11) SCC 521 , Escorts Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, which has been passed following the judgment in (1994) 2 SCC 323 , M. Venugopalan v. Divisional Manager, LIC. Non-renewal of the contractual deployment is not retrenchment or illegal and fatal in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in 1997 (11) SCC 521 , Escorts Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, which has been passed following the judgment in (1994) 2 SCC 323 , M. Venugopalan v. Divisional Manager, LIC. The petitioner shall not be entitled for regular service merely on the ground that a candidate has rendered work continuously for more than 240 days in a calendar year in consonance to verdict of Supreme Court in 1995 Suppl. (4) SCC 182, Khagesh Kumar v. Inspector General Registration, where registration clerks while working as daily wagers were held not entitled to regularisation merely because they had served for 240 days. In view of the above observations, the disengagement of the petitioner is not illegal, therefore, there is no occasion to invoke extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 of the Constitution. The writ petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed. .