Judgment 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the State. Despite service of notice upon the opposite party no. 2 he has chosen not to appear and to contest the proceeding. This application is thus being disposed off with the consent of the appearing parties after hearing the counsel for the petitioner and opposite party no.1. 2. The present application has been filed for quashing the order dated 1.12.1999 passed by S.D.J.M., Katihar in Case No. B III 2 of 1996 registered under section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Food Adulteration Act). 3. The relevant facts for the purposes of disposal of the present application are that the present petitioner who is a manufacturer of "Dhara Refined Sunflower Oil" was originally not made an accused in the case filed on 28.8.96 a copy whereof is appended at annexure-2 to the present application. This prosecution was initiated in respect of a seized sample of Dhara Refined Sun Flower oil, which upon analysis was found to be adulterated and misbranded. It appears that an application was filed on behalf of the prosecution on 1.12.99 suggesting that the present petitioner, a manufacturer of the seized sample, was one of the accused in the case and that summons had not been issued against him. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the summons were issued to the petitioner only after the wholesale dealer, from whom the oil sample was purchased/seized, was taken into custody and made his statement in the bail application to that effect. 4. The provision with regard to summoning of a manufacturer such as the petitioner as under the provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Food Adulteration Act) are regulated by section 20A of the Food Adulteration Act. 5. 4. The provision with regard to summoning of a manufacturer such as the petitioner as under the provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Food Adulteration Act) are regulated by section 20A of the Food Adulteration Act. 5. Section 20A of the Food Adulteration Act is quoted hereinbelow for convenience: "Power of Court to implead manufacturer, etc."Where any time during the trial of any offence under this Act alleged to have been committed by any person, not being the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food, the court is satisfied, on the evidence adduced before it, that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence, then, the court may, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or in section 20 proceed against him as though a prosecution had been instituted against him under section 20)". 6. It would thus be seen that section 20A of the Food Adulteration Act provides that a manufacturer could also be summoned if the court was satisfied on the evidence adduced before the court during the trial of any offence under the Food Adulteration Act and that such manufacturer was also concerned with that offence. The condition requisite therefore was commencement of the trial and evidence forthcoming during the trial. Thus if the trial had not commenced, the question of any evidence forthcoming during trial simply did not arise. There was thus no occasion for the court to exercise the power under section 20A of the Food Adulteration Act to summon a manufacturer at this pre trial stage. The learned counsel for the petitioner has rightly relied upon a decision reported in 2000 Cr. Law Journal 26 (M/s Omprakash Shivprakash vs. K.I. Kuriakose and others), wherein in paragraph 16 of the decision the Supreme Court has clearly held that the power under section 20A of the Food Adulteration Act cannot be invoked before the stage of adducing evidence in the trial. It is not in dispute in the present case that the trial has not yet commenced. No evidence has yet been led. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case the impugned order dated 1.12.1999 cannot be sustained in law and the same is accordingly set aside. 7. It is not in dispute in the present case that the trial has not yet commenced. No evidence has yet been led. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case the impugned order dated 1.12.1999 cannot be sustained in law and the same is accordingly set aside. 7. It goes without saying that notwithstanding this order, if during the course of the trial on the basis of the evidence adduced, the court would come to the conclusion that the manufacturer (read petitioner) is also required to be summoned to answer the charge, the court shall be at liberty to then proceed in accordance with law. 8. The Court considers it necessary to clarify that the hands of the court below shall not be fettered by reason of the present order by which this Court has quashed the present impugned order, in the event of the circumstances being found as mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. 9. With this direction and observation this application is allowed.