Judgment Hemant Gupta, J. 1. The plaintiff is in second appeal aggrieved against the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court whereby the suit for possession of land in respect of 3 Kanals out of total land measuring 7 Kanals 2 Marlas was dismissed while granting decree for possession in respect of 4 Kanals 2 Marlas. 2. The plaintiff alleged that he is owner of land measuring 7 Kanals 2 Marlas of land and the defendants have forcibly occupied the land of the plaintiff about four months back and thus sought decree of possession. The defendants controverted the allegations and pleaded that one Charan Singh has been in possession of the suit property for a period of more than 12 years who has acquired title by adverse possession being in possession of the suit property for more than 12 years. It was alleged that the defendants are in possession of the suit land under Charan Singh. 3. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the land in dispute? OPP 2. Whether Charan Singh is a necessary party? If so, what effect? OPD. 3. Whether Charan Singh has acquired title over the suit property by adverse possession? OPD. 4. Relief. 4. In evidence, the plaintiff/appellants have produced Jamabandi exhibit P-2 wherein one Gehna Singh was owner of the land comprising in Khasra No. 39/4 min (3 Kanals), 39/5 min, 39/4 (2K-2M), 39/min (2K). Charan Singh was in possession as superior tenant and Ajit Singh and Piara Singh as inferior tenant in the land measuring 3 Kanals under Charan Singh. There are four mutation entries in this jamabandi. Vide mutation No. 3385, the ownership rights in the land in dispute were inherited by Smt. Dhan Kaur after the death of Gehna Singh. Vide mutation No. 3390, Smt. Dhan Kaur sold the entire land to Milkha Singh and Gulwant Singh. Subsequently, vide Mutation No. 3813, Charan Singh purchased the share of Milkha Singh through a registered sale deed. Mutation No. 3814 is in favour of Gulwant Singh after a suit for pre-emption was decreed against Charan Singh. Thus, Gulwant Singh became the owner of the entire land measuring 7 Kanals 2 Marlas. Subsequently, vide Mutation No. 3813, Charan Singh purchased the share of Milkha Singh through a registered sale deed. Mutation No. 3814 is in favour of Gulwant Singh after a suit for pre-emption was decreed against Charan Singh. Thus, Gulwant Singh became the owner of the entire land measuring 7 Kanals 2 Marlas. Vide jamabandi for the year 1977-78, Exhibit P-l, Gehna Singh is re- corded as owner of the land whereas 3 Kanals of land comprised in Khasra No. 39/4 is in possession of Charan Singh as superior tenant and Ajit Singh and Piara Singh as inferior tenant. On the other hand, there are Khasra Girdawaris Exhibits D-1 to D-4. Exhibit D-1 is the Khasra Girdawari for the period 1961-64 wherein Charan Singh is reflected in possession of land measuring 3 Kanals comprising in Khasra No. 39/4 through his sons Ajit Singh and Piara Singh. Charan Singh is reflected in possession of the land till 1980 with the exception of entry in Rabi 1965-66 wherein Bikar Singh son of the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land. The learned trial Court ignored this fact and held that Charan Singh through his sons is continuously in possession of the suit land from 1961-80. Therefore, Charan Singh has acquired adverse possession of the suit land. 5. The appeal filed by the plaintiff was dismissed. The learned First Appellate Court found that the defendants have not pleaded as to when possession of Charan Singh over the disputed land became adverse to the real owner but the entries in the revenue record support the continuous possession of Charan Singh since the year 1961 of 3 Kanals of land. Though the possession of Charan Singh is described as Gair Maroosi, there is no description of the share of the produce or lease money. Thus, it will be presumed that Charan Singh is in adverse possession of the land measuring 3 Kanals. 6. The learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that the plaintiff has been found to be owner of the suit land but the defendants had neither admitted the ownership of the plaintiff over the suit land nor the defendants have pleaded the necessary ingredients for successful plea of adverse possession. It has not been pleaded that from what date the possession of Charan Singh became hostile, continuous, open and to the knowledge of true owner. It has not been pleaded that from what date the possession of Charan Singh became hostile, continuous, open and to the knowledge of true owner. As per evidence on record, Charan Singh has purchased 1/2 share of the suit land and, thus, it has not been pleaded that Charan Singh at any point of time surrendered the possession as owner. It is, thus, argued that possession of Charan Singh was permissive possession and, thus, the defendants who are sons of Charan Singh cannot successfully claim to be in adverse possession of the suit land. 7. On the other hand, it is the case of the defendants that the defendants are in possession of the entire suit land for the last more than 30 years. The pre-emption decree has not been filed so it cannot be said that the plaintiff pre-empted 1/2 share of the land which ever executed. The respondents have not paid any rent or batai to any person since the time they came into possession and that Charan Singh was a necessary party in the proceedings. 8. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and going through the records of the case, I am of the opinion that following substantial questions of law arise for consideration by this Court:- 1. Whether the defendants can raise the plea of adverse possession without admitting the plaintiff to be owner of the suit land? 2. Whether the defendants have pleaded and proved necessary ingredients of adverse possession to claim ownership on the basis of adverse possession. 9. The plaintiff in Para No. 1 of the plaint has claimed ownership over land measuring 7 Kanals 2 Marias and then sought possession on the basis of title. The defendants have denied the averments made in Para No. l of the plaint and has raised the following plea in Para No. 2 of the written statement. Para No. 2 of the written statement is reproduced hereunder:- "2. That the facts narrated are wrong. The land does not belong to the plaintiff. He was never in possession of it. Actually, one Charan Singh son of Partap Singh has been in possession as an owner for more than 12 years without interruption and adversely holding it. Therefore, Charan Singh acquitted title by adverse possession. The defendants are cultivating the land under Charan Singh. Therefore, Charan Singh is a necessary party". 10. He was never in possession of it. Actually, one Charan Singh son of Partap Singh has been in possession as an owner for more than 12 years without interruption and adversely holding it. Therefore, Charan Singh acquitted title by adverse possession. The defendants are cultivating the land under Charan Singh. Therefore, Charan Singh is a necessary party". 10. The plaintiff has proved his ownership on the basis of jamabandi wherein there is endorsement regarding mutation sanctioned from time to time including the one based on pre-emption decree. The argument raised by learned counsel for the respondents that such-pre-emption decree has not been filed or there is no proof of execution of that decree is meaningless at this stage. It is the concurrent finding of both the Courts below that the plaintiff is, in fact, owner of land measuring 7 Kanals 2 Marlas. The factum of decree passed in favour of the plaintiff is not disputed by the defendants in the evidence. The effect of such decree is that the plaintiff is substituted as a vendee. If the plaintiff stands substituted as a vendee, the plaintiff is entitled to seek possession of the land so pre-empted in accordance with law. 11. In Madhay Krishna and Anr. v. Chandra Bhaga and Ors.1 1997(2) Supreme Court Cases 203, Hon ble Supreme Court has held that if no specific plea disclaiming title from a particular date, the hostile assertion thereof and then setting up of adverse possession from a particular date to the knowledge of the respondents and their acquiescence having not been pleaded and proved, the plea of adverse possession cannot be held proved. The relevant observations from the judgment of the Supreme Court are reproduced hereunder;- "... The plea of adverse possession as against Mansaram was not pleaded. In this case, except repeating the title already set up which was negatived in the earlier suit, namely, that they had constructed the house jointly with Mansaram, there is no specific plea of disclaiming the title of the respondents from a particular date, the hostile assertion thereof and then of setting up adverse possession from a particular date to the knowledge of the respondents and of their acquiescence. Under these circumstances, unless the title is disclaimed and adverse possession with hostile title to that of the Mansaram and subsequently as against the appellant is pleaded and proved, the plea of adverse possession cannot be held proved. In this case, such a plea was not averred nor evidence has been adduced. The doctrine of adverse possession would arise only when the party has set up his own adverse title disclaiming the title of the plaintiff and established that he remained exclusively in possession to the knowledge of the appellants title hostile to their title and that the appellant had acquiesced to the same...." 12. In State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh,2 2000(5) Supreme Court Cases 652, Hon ble Supreme Court has held that classical requirement is nec vi nec clam nec pre-cario i.e. the possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor. Whatever may be the animus or intention of a person wanting to acquire title by adverse possession cannot commence until he obtains actual possession with required animus. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court are reproduced hereunder:- "So far as the question of perfection of title by adverse possession and that too in respect of public property is concerned, the question requires to be considered more seriously and effectively for the reason that it ultimately involve destruction of rightly title of the State to immovable property and conferring upon a third party encroacher title where, he had none. The decision in P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 314, adverted to the ordinary classical requirement-that it should be nec vi nec clam nec precario - that is the possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor. It was also observed therein that whatever may be the animus or intention of a person wanting to acquire title by adverse possession, his adverse possession cannot commence until he obtains actual possession with the required animus. In the decision reported in Secretary of State for India in Council v. Debendra Lal Kha, (1993) L.R. (LXI) LA. It was also observed therein that whatever may be the animus or intention of a person wanting to acquire title by adverse possession, his adverse possession cannot commence until he obtains actual possession with the required animus. In the decision reported in Secretary of State for India in Council v. Debendra Lal Kha, (1993) L.R. (LXI) LA. 78 (P.C.), strongly relied for the respondents the Court laid down further that it is sufficient that the possession be overt and without, any attempt at concealment so that the person against whom time is running, ought if he exercises due vigilance, to be aware of what is happening and of the rights of the crown have been openly usurped it cannot be heard to plead that the fact was not brought to its notice. In Annasaheh Bapusaheb Patil and Ors. v. Balwant Alias Balasaheb Babusaheb Patil (Dead) by L.Rs. etc., A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 895, it was observed that a claim of adverse possession being a hostile assertion always on the person who assert such a claim to prove by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and in deciding such claim, the courts must have regard to the animus of the person doing those acts." 13. In Achal Reddi v. Rama krishna Reddiar and Ors. A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 553, it has been held that the adverse possession implies that it commenced in wrong and is maintained against right. When the commencement and continuance of possession is legal and proper, referable to a contract, it cannot be adverse. If a person is in actual possession and has a right of possession under a title involving a due recognition of the owners title his possession will not be regarded as adverse in law. Hon ble Supreme Court held to the following effect:- "In the conception of adverse possession there is an essential and basic difference between a case in which the other party is put in possession of property by an outright transfer, both parties stipulating for a total divestiture of all the rights of the transferor in the property, and in case in which there is a mere executory agreement of transfer both parties contemplating a deed of transfer to be executed at a later point of time. In the latter case the principle of estoppel applies estopping the transferee from contending that his possession, while the contract remained executory in stage, was in his own right and adversely against the transferor. Adverse possession implies that it commenced in wrong and is maintained against right. When the commencement and continuance of possession is legal and proper, referable to a contract. It cannot be adverse." 14. In Annasaheb Babusaheb Patil and Ors. v. Balwant alias Balasaheb Babusaheb Petal (Dead) by L.Rs. and heirs etc.,4 A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 895. Hon ble Supreme Court has held that where possession could be referred to a lawful title, it cannot be considered to be adverse. The reason being that a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to anothers title. 15. In view of the principles of law laid down above, it is required to be examined whether the defendants have pleaded and proved the plea of adverse possession. As per facts on the record, Charan Singh purchased 1/2 share of Milkha Singh. The suit land was pre-empted by the plaintiff. Thus, Charan Singh entered into the possession on the basis of sale deed. It was a permissive possession. Such permissive possession cannot be said to ripen into full ownership by way of adverse possession unless the defendants prove on the record that he asserted adverse possession to the knowledge of true owner with sufficient publicity. 16. Still further, the defendants have not pleaded the date from which the possession of the defendants can be said to be adverse to the knowledge of the true owner. Except using the word adverse possession, the defendants have led no evidence nor raised any pleadings of hostility in possession and to the knowledge of the owner. Mere long possession is not sufficient to hold that it is adverse which can perfect into title. 17. The learned First Appellate Court has partly dismissed the suit on the basis of presumption that the defendants have perfected their title by adverse possession. There is no equity in favour of a person pleading adverse possession since he is trying to defeat the right of a true owner. It was held in Dr. 17. The learned First Appellate Court has partly dismissed the suit on the basis of presumption that the defendants have perfected their title by adverse possession. There is no equity in favour of a person pleading adverse possession since he is trying to defeat the right of a true owner. It was held in Dr. Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Raj Kumari Sharma (Smt.) and Ors.,5 1996(8) Supreme Court Cases 128, to the effect that the parties pleading adverse possession must state with sufficient clarity as to when adverse possession commenced and the nature of its possession. In Para No. 37 of the judgment, Supreme Court held as under:- "In this connection, we may emphasis that a person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all the facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. For all the above reasons, the plea of limitation put forward by the appellant, or by defendants 2 to 5 as the case may be, is rejected." 18. In view of the above, the finding of the learned First Appellate Court that the defendants have perfected their title by adverse possession in respect of 3 kanals of land is not sustainable in law. Therefore, while setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court to the extent of 3 kanals of suit land, is set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is decreed in its entirety with costs.