D. S. R. VARMA, J. ( 1 ) HEARD the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel for the respondents. ( 2 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 27-11-1995 passed by the First Additional Chief Judge, city Civil Court, Secunderabad in O. S. No. 395 of 1985 dismissing the suit. ( 3 ) FOR the sake of convenience, in this judgment, parties will be referred to according to their array in the suit. ( 4 ) THE plaintiffs are the appellants herein. The suit was filed, informa pauperis, for passing a preliminary decree for partition of an undivided Hindu joint family house property bearing H. No. 6-1-317/2, situate at Venkatapuram Colony, Walker town, Padmaraonagar, Secunderabad, amongst the plaintiffs/defendants No. 2 and 8 and for allotment by metes and bonds and for delivery of possession of respective shares of the plaintiffs; and Defendants 2 and 8 and for declaration that the sale deed, dated 10-9-1970 registered on 15-9-1970, in the office of the Sub-Registrar, secunderabad, which was marked as ex. A-1 in O. S. No. 612 of 1977 on the file of First Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, secunderabad and the decree and judgment dated 30-4-1979 in O. S. No. 642 of 1977 on the file of First Assistant Judge, City Civil court, Secunderabad; and the sale deeds dated 28-12-1979 and 31-12-1979 are not binding on Plaintiffs 1 and 2 and Defendant no. 8, and for a further declaration that the sale deeds and decree are void, invalid and unenforceable and for recovery of future mean profits from the first defendant with interest @12% p. a. from the date of suit till realization. ( 5 ) THE case of the plaintiffs in brief as follows: ( 6 ) THE plaintiffs and the eighth defendant are the children of second and third defendants, who were husband and wife respectively. One E. Nagayya was the father of the second defendant, and he died intestate in the year 1926. During his lifetime, Nagayya worked as a subcontractor under one Goka Rajaiah (father of the third defendant ). Second defendant is no more. During his lifetime, the father of Defendant No. 2, kept some money with the father of Defendant No. 3. One E. Nagayya was the father of the second defendant, and he died intestate in the year 1926. During his lifetime, Nagayya worked as a subcontractor under one Goka Rajaiah (father of the third defendant ). Second defendant is no more. During his lifetime, the father of Defendant No. 2, kept some money with the father of Defendant No. 3. With that amount, the father of Defendant No. 3 purchased the suit plot of land in the year 1960 nominally, alleged with the funds kept with him by the father of the second defendant, in the name of Defendant No. 3 (who is the wife of Defendant No. 2 ). Therefore, the contention of the plaintiffs appears to be that the suit schedule property is the ancestral joint Hindu family property of plaintiffs and Defendants 2 and 8. Subsequently, Defendant No. 3 alienated the property, which was purchased by her father in her name, in favour of Defendant no. 1 for valuable consideration and executed a sale deed and got it registered on 15-9-1970. Subsequently, in the said plot of land, the father of Defendant No. 3 constructed a house somewhere in the year 1961 in the name of Defendant No. 3. Defendant No. 3 subsequently sold the said property through a registered sale deed dated 15-9-1970, in favour of Defendant no. 1. At that time, plaintiffs were minors and after their attaining majority somewhere in the year 1985, they filed the present suit seeking partition of the property along with other reliefs, mainly on the ground that the suit property was an ancestral property and that their mother had no right to sell the said property in favour of Defendant No. 1, inasmuch as it is violative of Section 36 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1964. ( 7 ) THE first defendant filed written statement, denying the averments that the father of second defendant (since died) had kept some money with the father of defendant No. 3 and with that money the suit property was purchased and a construction was raised therein. ( 8 ) ONE crucial fact which was mentioned in the written statement filed by defendant No. l is that she filed O. S. No. 642 of 1977 seeking eviction of defendant No. 2, without making Defendant no. ( 8 ) ONE crucial fact which was mentioned in the written statement filed by defendant No. l is that she filed O. S. No. 642 of 1977 seeking eviction of defendant No. 2, without making Defendant no. 3 as a party to the suit, on the ground that certain terms and conditions of lease deed were violated. It indicates that after defendant No. 3 parted with the property in favour of Defendant No. 1, Defendant No. 3 was residing in the same premises as a tenant along with her deceased husband (Defendant No. 2 ). ( 9 ) THE said suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff therein who is no other than Defendant No. l in the present suit and the judgment and decree therein had remained unchallenged and became final. ( 10 ) DEFENDANT No. 2 filed a separate written statement supporting the case of the plaintiffs. ( 11 ) IN her written statement, Defendant no. 3 while denying the very sale transaction of the suit schedule property in favour of Defendant No. l, inter alia, contended that she was in need of Rs. 20,000. 00 in addition to various other monies which were raised by her as loans from others for construction of the house; that Defendant no. 1 who was doing money lending business lent her Rs. 20, 000. 00 through her husband; as per the practice prevailing in the twin cities, Defendant No. 1 took from her an ostensible sale deed and also a separate rental agreement as security in lieu of interest on the understanding that on due repayment of the said loan amount of rs. 20,000/- within the prescribed time, the house property would be re-conveyed in the name of the third defendant. She further averred that the first defendant gave only a sum of Rs. 17,000. 00, after deducting rs. 3,000/- towards expenses for drafting, stamp registration etc. Defendant No. 3 further averred that in O. S. No. 642 of 1977 she was evicted from the suit schedule house without her knowledge, along with other members of the family, and alleged that the first defendant did not make her a party to the suit in O. S. No. 642 of 1977 which was filed against her late husband (Defendant No. 2 ). ( 12 ) DEFENDANTS 5 and 7 have filed separate written statements denying the plaint averments. ( 12 ) DEFENDANTS 5 and 7 have filed separate written statements denying the plaint averments. ( 13 ) BASED on the above pleadings, the following issues were framed for trial;1. Whether D3 was not the absolute owner of the suit house and whether d1 did not get absolute title over it when she purchased the same from d3 under the registered sale deed dated 10-9-1970?2. Whether the judgment and decree in o. S. No. 642 of 1977 operate as res judicata against the plaintiffs?3. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from contending that D3 is not the absolute owner of the suit house and that D1 has acquired title of the same under the registered sale deed dated 10-9-1970 by virtue of provisions of section 41 of the Transfer of Property act?4. Whether the suit is barred by time?5. Whether D7 is not the absolute owner of the suit house under the registered sale deed dated 31-12-1979 executed in her favour by Dl?6. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration prayed for ?7. To what relief ? ( 14 ) SUBSEQUENTLY, the following additional issues were also framed by the trial Court. 1. Whether the provisions of the Benami transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1985 are applicable to the facts of the case and if so whether the suit is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable?2. Whether the sale deed dated 10-7-1970 said to be executed by the Defendant no. 3 in favour of Defendant No. 1 is hit by the provisions of Section 36 of A. P. Co-operative Societies act, 1964?3. Whether the plaintiffs are barred from raising the question of Section 36 of a. P. Co-operative Societies Act in the suit on account of the principle of res judicata? ( 15 ) ON behalf of the plaintiffs, Plaintiff no. 2 and another were examined as PWs. 1 and 2 respectively and 17 documents were marked as Ex. A-1 to A-17. On behalf of the Defendants No. 1, 3, 5 and 7 four witnesses were examined as DWs. 1 to 4 and Ex. B-2 to B-30 were marked (no document was marked as Ex. B-1 ). ( 16 ) CONSIDERING the oral and documentary evidence adduced by both parties, the Trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs with costs and directing the plaintiffs to pay Court-fee to the government. 1 to 4 and Ex. B-2 to B-30 were marked (no document was marked as Ex. B-1 ). ( 16 ) CONSIDERING the oral and documentary evidence adduced by both parties, the Trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs with costs and directing the plaintiffs to pay Court-fee to the government. ( 17 ) AGGRIEVED by the said judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the present appeal is preferred by the plaintiffs. ( 18 ) THE prime question that falls for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the suit for partition by the plaintiffs is maintainable at all? ( 19 ) IN this regard, it is to be seen that the Trial Court recorded a finding that the plaintiffs have miserably failed to prove that their paternal grand-father gave rs. 40,000/- to their maternal grandfather and a further finding that the suit house was built not with the funds belonging to the joint family. ( 20 ) IT was further pointed out by the trial Court that the judgment and decree passed by the First Assistant Judge, City civil Court, Secunderabad, in O. S. No. 642 of 1977, in favour of Defendant No. 1 (who was the plaintiff therein), operates as res judicata for all purposes. ( 21 ) IT is to be further seen that the plaintiffs are actually fighting on behalf of their mother/defendant No. 3 against defendant No. l only. The first plaintiff in this suit, for reasons not on record, had been transposed as Defendant No. 8, perhaps, as he was not sailing with Plaintiffs 2 and 3. ( 22 ) DEFENDANT No. 3 was examined as d. W. 2. She states that the plot of land on which the suit house was constructed was allotted by the fifth defendant-Society to her and she paid the cost of the plot amounting to Rs. 1,632. 00 to the society and that the society had executed a sale deed in her favour on 19-6-1970. According to her, she constructed the house on the plot of land after taking necessary permissions from the municipality. She further admitted that for the past 13 years she was not staying in the suit house since she was evicted from the suit house as per the decree and judgment in O. S. No. 642 of 1977. According to her, she constructed the house on the plot of land after taking necessary permissions from the municipality. She further admitted that for the past 13 years she was not staying in the suit house since she was evicted from the suit house as per the decree and judgment in O. S. No. 642 of 1977. ( 23 ) THE most important aspect to be noted is that she asserted that the plot was allotted to her by the fifth defendant society upon the cost borne by her only, and she alone got the house constructed. ( 24 ) AT the outset, I am of the considered view that, when it is the assertion of Defendant No. 3 that out of her funds only she purchased the plot which was allotted by the fifth defendant society and that she alone got the house constructed in the said plot in the year 1961, it is incomprehensible as to how the plaintiffs could aver in the plaint that the suit property is the property of the joint Hindu family, having the nucleus of a joint Hindu family. ( 25 ) TO establish joint Hindu family nucleus, and in order to maintain the suit for partition on that basis, the plaintiffs took a specific stand that during the lifetime of their father (late Defendant No. 2), their paternal grand-father kept some money with the late father of Defendant No. 3 and with those funds only the suit schedule property was purchased by the father of defendant No. 3 nominally in the name of defendant No. 3 and, therefore, the suit schedule property is a joint Hindu family property. ( 26 ) THERE was no evidence available on record at all to establish that the suit schedule property was purchased from out of the funds ear-marked by the paternal grand-father of the plaintiffs and with those funds only the father of Defendant No. 3 purchased the property in the name of defendant No. 3 except the oral evidence. On the other hand, the evidence of defendant No. 3 (mother of the plaintiffs) was absolutely contrary to the case pleaded by the plaintiffs. She stated in her cross-examination as under:"the suit house is situated in Venkatapuram co-operative Housing Society Limited, padmaraonagar, Secunderabad. I am a member of this Society. On the other hand, the evidence of defendant No. 3 (mother of the plaintiffs) was absolutely contrary to the case pleaded by the plaintiffs. She stated in her cross-examination as under:"the suit house is situated in Venkatapuram co-operative Housing Society Limited, padmaraonagar, Secunderabad. I am a member of this Society. It is true that I am allotted a plot because of a member of this society. I have paid cost of this plot amounting to Rs. 1,632-00 to the Society. It is true that the Society executed a sale deed in my favour dated 19th June, 1970. I constructed house over this plot. I took municipal permission and constructed this house. The Municipal Corporation allotted no. 6-1-317/2, after the construction. "in other words, though she (D. W. 2, who is defendant No. 3) supported the case of the plaintiffs in her written statement, the evidence given by her during trial demolished not only her case but also the very basis of the case of the plaintiffs for filing of the present suit for partition. ( 27 ) WHEN admittedly the suit schedule property was purchased by Defendant no. 3 and construction of house therein was also made by her, and when the property stood in her name, wherefrom the concept coparcenery rights as pleaded and claimed by the plaintiffs, would arise? in other words, it is totally indiscernible in this case as to how the property of a lady can be subjected to partition by the plaintiffs, as a matter of right, by invoking their rights as coparceners, more particularly when the property stood in the name of defendant No. 3 way back from 1961 onwards and was disposed of by her to defendant No. 1? In my considered view, this could be the simple ground to dismiss the suit of the plaintiffs. As already pointed out, there was no evidence let in by the plaintiffs to establish that the property was purchased from out of the funds of the paternal grandfather of the plaintiffs and, therefore, it constitutes a joint Hindu family property. In my considered view, this could be the simple ground to dismiss the suit of the plaintiffs. As already pointed out, there was no evidence let in by the plaintiffs to establish that the property was purchased from out of the funds of the paternal grandfather of the plaintiffs and, therefore, it constitutes a joint Hindu family property. ( 28 ) EVEN if the averment made by the plaintiffs in the plaint to the effect that the property was purchased in favour of defendant No. 3 out of the funds of paternal grand-father of the plaintiffs is established, in my considered view, it is rudimentary that, when once it is established that the property stood in the name of a lady, in any capacity whatsoever, through any source or means, may be from the paternal side or maternal side of the plaintiffs, in normal course and subject to certain exceptions, the property should be understood and construed as belonging to that lady only. Obviously, the property was purchased in the year 1960 i. e. , subsequent to the coming into force of the Hindu Succession act, Therefore, at any stretch of imagination, the property held by Defendant No. 3, who is no other than the mother of the plaintiffs, cannot be subjected to partition by the plaintiffs as coparceners , which claim of the plaintiffs is something unknown to the canon of law, unless proved contra and as pointed out already subject to some exceptions and no such exceptional circumstances are present in this case. On this short ground alone, the suit of the plaintiffs has to be dismissed. ( 29 ) THE other ground urged by the learned Senior Counsel Sri Imtiaz Ahmed, is that under Section 36 of the Andhra pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, the property allotted to a member of a Cooperative housing Society cannot be alienated to third parties without prior permission of the Society, even after full payment of the sale consideration. It is his contention that since no such prior permission was obtained from the society by Defendant no. 3 to sell the suit property to the first defendant, the sale of the suit property by defendant No. 3 to Defendant No. 1 is void. Though, this submission appears to be appealing, in fact is not. This is a simple technicality. It is his contention that since no such prior permission was obtained from the society by Defendant no. 3 to sell the suit property to the first defendant, the sale of the suit property by defendant No. 3 to Defendant No. 1 is void. Though, this submission appears to be appealing, in fact is not. This is a simple technicality. In this context, the evidence of DW-3, who represents fifth defendant-society is to the effect that the society had become defunct somewhere in the year 1985 and no records of the society are available. Therefore, from the above evidence, what is explicit is that the plaintiffs could not substantiate this part of their pleading also. There is no material or evidence available on record to show that Defendant no. 3 did not seek any permission from the concerned authorities or the same was rejected or otherwise. Furthermore, nothing affirmatively was spoken to by Defendant no. 3 in this regard. Further, it is to be seen that if there was any violation of Section 36 of the provisions of the A. P. Co-operative societies-Act, 1964, it is only Defendant no. 3, who could have been aggrieved by the sale transaction, and could have raised a dispute invoking the provisions of the A. P. Co-operative Societies Act. Therefore, this submission of the learned senior Counsel cannot be sustained. ( 30 ) THE next aspect to be considered is the effect of the judgment and decree in o. S. No. 642 of 1977 rendered by the First assistant Judge, City Civil Court, secunderabad. As already pointed out, that suit was filed by Defendant No. l herein against Defendant No. 2 herein i. e. , the husband of Defendant No. 3, seeking eviction from the suit schedule property in that suit. In that suit, all these objections, which are taken in the present suit, have already been taken and the same have been turned down by the said Court. The said judgment and decree in O. S. No. 642 of 1977 have become final since no appeal had been filed. The result of the said judgment and decree in the above suit is that Defendant No. 2 and Defendant No. 3 i. e. , the husband and wife, were declared as tenants of the suit schedule property in that suit. The issue of title had never fallen for serious consideration in that suit. The result of the said judgment and decree in the above suit is that Defendant No. 2 and Defendant No. 3 i. e. , the husband and wife, were declared as tenants of the suit schedule property in that suit. The issue of title had never fallen for serious consideration in that suit. Even otherwise, since no appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree in O. S. No. 642 of 1977, the said judgment and decree have become final, leaving the status of the D2 and D3 (father and mother of plaintiffs) as tenants of the suit property. ( 31 ) A close scrutiny of the averments made in the respective plaints, both in earlier suit as well as the present suit, would only reveal that the very-same averments have been made in both the suits. In other words, the nature of defence in both the suits is almost similar. ( 32 ) A perusal of the judgment of i the Trial Court would reveal that the Trial court had elaborately dealt with all the aspects of the case on merits, in right perspective, basing on the oral and documentary evidence available on record, and very rightly dismissed the suit. ( 33 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, I do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is hereby dismissed, confirming the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. The appellants/plaintiffs are liable to pay Court-fee payable on the plaint, as ordered by the Court below while dismissing the suit, if not already paid. However, there shall be no order as to costs in this appeal.