Judgment : B.K. Sharma, J. 1. This revision application is directed against the order dated 15.10.2004 and 2.12.2004 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 1 Jorhat, in Title Execution Case No. 19/2004 dismissing the application filed by the judgment debtors petitioners. 2. Heard Mr. D. Das, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Mr. A. Sarma, learned Counsel for the respondents. 3. The present proceeding is in respect of the title suit being Title Suit No. 63/1980 which was instituted by Late Salima Khatun during her lifetime for declaration of right, title and interest over and also for recovery of Khas possession of the suit property. The respondents are the legal heirs of Late Salima Khatun. The title suite was decreed in favour of the plaintiff. Being aggrieved, the defendant Late Tamijuddin Ahmed preferred Title Appeal No. 52/82 which was also dismissed. The Second Appeal being S.A. No. 100/85 was also dismissed by this Court Judgment and Order dated 7.8.1992. 4. The petitioners are the legal heirs of Late Tamijuddin. According to them, they were not aware about the pendency of the aforesaid Second Appeal. Their further case is that during the pendency of the Second Appeal, Late Salima sold out the suit property on 14.8.1985 to one Shri Pranab Hatibaruah by executing a sale deeds (unregistered) of 1985 and 1995 could not have been oblivious of the pendency of Second Appeal. According to the petitioners, the said deals took place without their knowledge and as such no step could be taken during the pendency of the Second Appeal. According to them said Sri Hatibaruah convinced the petitioner No. 2 that the decree holder had already settled the dispute and no appeal was pending. Thus, here is a case in which the petitioner No. 2 could be convinced by said by Sri Hatibaruah even to the extent of furnishing the information that no appeal was pending, but the same very petitioner did not get the information from her husband that an appeal was pending. It is really surprising as to what prevented the petitioner No. 2 to pass on the information to her husband relating to the alleged sale deed executed in 1985, during the pendency of the Second Appeal. It is really surprising as to what prevented the petitioner No. 2 to pass on the information to her husband relating to the alleged sale deed executed in 1985, during the pendency of the Second Appeal. Thus, on the face of it, the story made out by the petitioners is not at all believable and the same has been made only to gain time by way of frustrating the lawful decree obtained by the decree holders/respondents. It is also on record that the petitioners and for that matter the legal heirs of the judgment debtors were substituted in the proceeding. 5. The learned Civil Judge has also noticed the inherent contradictions on the aforesaid plea raised by the petitioners. The alleged sale deeds are unregistered, which needless to say cannot bestow absolute ownership and title over immovable property as has been claimed by the judgment debtors/petitioners. The learned Civil Judge has also noticed that the petitioner No. 1 in his application stated about the purported sale made by Sri Hatibaruah to the petitioner No. 2, but on the other hand the petitioner No. 2 in her petition stated about such sale to both the petitioners. Thus, on the face of it, the learned Civil Judge found and rightly so that Tamijuddin and (ii) in view of the sale of the suit property by Late Salima firstly to said Sri Hatibaruah and thereafter the sale of the same to the petitioners by Sri Hatibaruah, the decree is not executable. 6. As regards the first issue, the learned Civil Judge making a reference to the provisions of Order 21 Rule 22(iii) CPC adopted by the Gauhati High Court in the light of the amendment adopted by the Calcutta High Court has held that the non-service of notice under Order 21, Rule 22 CPC was a minor irregularity and the same by itself would not render the proceeding a nullity, more particularly when the members of the same family had already been served with notice and has filed their objections. Mr. Das, learned Counsel for the petitioners strenuously argued making a reference to Order 21, Rule22 and the amendments adopted by various High Courts that the learned Civil Judge made a wrong reference to the amendments adopted by the Bombay High Court to be the reference of the Calcutta High Court which was adopted by the Gauhati High Court. Mr. Das, learned Counsel for the petitioners strenuously argued making a reference to Order 21, Rule22 and the amendments adopted by various High Courts that the learned Civil Judge made a wrong reference to the amendments adopted by the Bombay High Court to be the reference of the Calcutta High Court which was adopted by the Gauhati High Court. The learned Civil Judge in his impugned order placed reliance on the amendment to Order 21, Rule 22(iii) of the CPC as follows: Order 21 Rule 2(3) CPC Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-rules 1 and 2 above, no order for the execution of a decree shall be invalid merely by reason of the omission to issue a notice under this rule, unless the judgment debtor has sustained injury by reasons of such omission. 7. According to Mr. Das, learned Counsel for the petitioners, such wrong reference to the amendment adopted by the Bombay High Court to be the amendment of the Calcutta High Court adopted by the Gauhati High Court resulted in wrong appreciation of the entire matter pertaining to service of notice on the legal heirs of the judgment debtors I have considered the submissions so made. The Calcutta amendment reads as follows: Omission to issue a notice in case where notice is required under Sub-rule 1, or to record reasons in a case where notice is dispensed with under Sub-rule 2, shall not affect the jurisdiction of the Court executing the decree. 8. From the above, it will be seen that omission to issue notice shall not affect the jurisdiction of the Court in executing the decree. The comma with or between the phrases, make it abundantly clear that the letter requirement is disjunctive of the first requirement making the position same to that of the Bombay Amendment. If that be so, non-service of notice on all the legal heirs shall not render the order for the execution of a decree and for that matter shall affect the jurisdiction of the Court in executing the decree. Law is well settled that mere wrong mentioning of a particular clause of a statute in an order without there being any change to the order itself will not render the order invalid. Thus, the first ground on which the impugned order dated 15.10.2004 has been assailed falls through. 9. Law is well settled that mere wrong mentioning of a particular clause of a statute in an order without there being any change to the order itself will not render the order invalid. Thus, the first ground on which the impugned order dated 15.10.2004 has been assailed falls through. 9. As regards the second ground relating to the alleged sale of the suit property by the original plaintiff way back in 1985 and 1995, such a belated plea after loosing the real battle on three occasions naturally creates a doubt. The learned Civil Judge in his elaborate discussion in the impugned order has taken not of the ground urged by the petitioners and the said ground did not find favour with him. According to the petitioners, they were not aware about the pendency of the Second Appeal before this Court, which is hardly believable. The petitioners who could trace out the alleged sale deed for a consideration of Rs. 6,000. Said Sri Hatibaruah could never take possession of the suit property and consequently, sold out to the present petitioners by executing a sale deed on 1.7.1995 for consideration of Rs. 6,000. 10. When the judgment debtors, i.e., the present respondents instituted the aforesaid Title Execution Case No. 19/2004 before the Trial Court for execution of the decree, the petitioners entered appearance in the case and filed two applications purportedly under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure for dismissing the execution case filed by the respondents. In the first petition, they inter alia contended that in view of the fact that the suit property was sold out to said Sri Hatibaruah by Late Salima on 14.8.1985 who in turn sold out the land to the present petitioners, the decree obtained by Late Tamijuddin Ahmed got extinguished. In the second petition, the plea of the petitioners was that apart from the petitioners, there are other legal heirs of Late Tamijuddin requiring them to be substituted in the execution case and to issue notice to them. In the said petition the plea raised in the first petition was also reiterated. 11. The respondents filed their written objection against the said two applications filed by the petitioners. They also filed a separate application under Order 21 Rule 22 of the CPC. In the said petition the plea raised in the first petition was also reiterated. 11. The respondents filed their written objection against the said two applications filed by the petitioners. They also filed a separate application under Order 21 Rule 22 of the CPC. The petitioners filed two other application seeking to examine the witnesses in support of their plea relating to the purported sale of the suit property firstly Sri Hatibaruah and them to them. 12. Learned Civil Judge by the impugned order dated 15.10.2004 has rejected the said two applications filed by the judgment debtors/petitioners. By the said applications, basically two issues were raised by the petitioners, i.e., (i) the decree holders/respondents have not substituted all the legal heirs of Late falsification was writ large on the face of it. He also found that the petitioner No. 1 in his application stated that the petitioner No. 1 was the absolute owner, possessor and titleholder of the suit property on and from 1.7.1995 when the second sale deed was allegedly executed. Thus, the petitioner No. 1 is himself not sure about his case. Moreover, nothing has been stated as to why the judgment debtors/petitioners remained silent from 1.7.1995 to assert their ownership the property. 13. In view of the above, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned order dated 15.10.2004. as regards the order dated 2.12.2004 same is relating to rejection of the prayer of the petitioner for stay of the execution proceeding till 3.11.2004 enabling them to prefer appeal before this Court. The learned Civil Judge refused to grant such stay and rightly so. However, the legality or otherwise of the impugned order dated 2.12.2004 need not be judged any further, when the order dated 15.10.2004 has been upheld on merit. 14. In view of the above findings on merit I need not deal with the objections raised by the leaned counsel for the respondents regarding very maintainability of the instant petition and the scope and ambit of interference with the execution proceeding. However, I place on record the decisions on which Mr. Sarma, learned Counsel for the respondent pressed into service in support of his submissions opposing the prayer made by the petitioner. They are 1. 1998 (4) GLT 302. Nirmal Ch. Roy v. Commandant, Manipur Rifles and Ors. 2. [2001] 3 SCR 1129. Dharandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University and Ors. 3. Sarma, learned Counsel for the respondent pressed into service in support of his submissions opposing the prayer made by the petitioner. They are 1. 1998 (4) GLT 302. Nirmal Ch. Roy v. Commandant, Manipur Rifles and Ors. 2. [2001] 3 SCR 1129. Dharandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University and Ors. 3. AIR 2002 SC 2603 . Narinder Singh v. Kishan Singh (Dead) by LRS and Ors. 4. [2003] 3 SCR 762. Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, and Ors. 5. (2003) 8 SCC 289 . Rabindra Kaur v. Ashok Kumar and Ors. 6. AIR 1993 Ori 259 . Kishore Chandra Patel v. State of Orissa 15. In all the above cases, the Apex Court and the High Court has emphasised the need for the vigilance to see through the diabolical plans of the judgment debtors to deny the decree holder the fruit of the decree obtained and that the Courts should endeavour to execute decree expeditiously and should not take technical or tangential approach. The Apex Court has also emphasized that the power under Section 47, CPC can be exercised only within a narrow spectrum. 16. The petition is dismissed, without, however, any orders to costs. Petition dismissed