S. ABDUL NAZEER, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner in this revision petition has called in question the order passed by the Principal Civil Judge (Junior Division), Belgaum, in execution Petition No 136 of 1984, dated 20-9-1999, whereby, the executing Court allowed I A No IX filed by the judgment-debtors and recalled the order passed on I A No VII, dated 31-7-1999 ( 2 ) THE petitioner is a decree-holder and the respondents are the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor viz, Bhagawandas Gangaram kamble The petitioner filed a suit against the said judgment-debtor in o S No 291 of 1971 for possession and for mesne profits in respect of property namely, southern half of No. 5, Mutton Butcher Street, Camp. Belgaum, measuring about 464 sq ft Deceased judgment-debtor contested the said suit The Trial Court by its judgment and decree dated 18-9-1974 decreed the suit directing the deceased judgment-debtor to put the plaintiff in actual possession of the suit property and to pay future mesne profits at Rs 9/- per month from the date of suit till the date of delivery of possession of the suit property to the plaintiff and to pay costs Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree, deceased bhagawandas filed an appeal in R A No 63 of 1982 on the file of II additional Civil Judge, Belgaum The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal on 23-6-1984 Bhagawandas challenged the said judgment and decree before this Court in Bhagawandas v Mrs Roasene Jerome d'souza (RSA No 668 of 1984) This Court dismissed the appeal on 28/29th September, 1994 granting the appellant three months' time to vacate the premises in question subject to filing an undertaking Once again, an application was filed seeking further extension of time, which was rejected on 23-12-1994 ( 3 ) IN the meantime, the decree-holder filed Execution Case No. 136 of 1984. After dismissal the second appeal, the execution case was proceeded with by the decree-holder. In the meantime, the original judgment-debtor died and his L. Rs, were brought on record. The L. Rs filed objections and contested the said execution case. The Executing court by its order dated 9-3-1995 issued delivery warrant against the judgment-debtors. It also appears from the records that the possession of the premises was handed over to the decree-holder in the presence of the Panchas on 10-3-1995. The L. Rs filed objections and contested the said execution case. The Executing court by its order dated 9-3-1995 issued delivery warrant against the judgment-debtors. It also appears from the records that the possession of the premises was handed over to the decree-holder in the presence of the Panchas on 10-3-1995. The decree-holder has accepted possession of the property, which is evident from the Mahazar dated 10-3-1995. ( 4 ) THE decree-holder once again filed LA. No. VII before the executing Court seeking issuance of a delivery warrant. It is contended in the application that on the basis of the order passed by the Hon'ble high Court in Bhagawandas case, the Court Bailiff has delivered possession of the property on 10-3-1993 at 2. 00 p. m. However, the judgment-debtor No. l (a) has filed O. S. No. 80 of 1995 before the III additional Munsiff, Belgaum and obtained an order of temporary injunction on 10-3-1995 after 3. 00 p. m. Taking undue advantage of the said interim order, the judgment-debtors have forcibly entered into the suit property by dispossessing the decree-holder. The decree-holder has sought for restoration of the possession of the suit property. The judgment-debtors have filed their objections. They have denied that the court Bailiff has delivered possession of the suit property to the decree-holder on 10-3-1993 at 2. 00 p. m. The Executing Court allowed i. A. No. VII on 31-7-1999 and once again directed issuance of a delivery warrant to deliver vacant possession in favour of the decree-holder. ( 5 ) THE judgment-debtors filed I. A. No. IX seeking withdrawal of the order on I. A. No. VII, dated 31-7-1999. In the said application, it is contended that pursuant to the delivery warrant issued on 9-3-1995, the bailiff has already dispossessed the judgment-debtor on 10-3-1995 at 2. 00 p. m. , and delivered possession to the decree-holder. Bailiffs report and Kabja Pavathi and the Mahazar all dated 10-3-1995 evidences full satisfaction of the decree and that nothing remains for execution. It is their contention that the judgment-debtors have taken possession subsequent to the decree-holder taking possession of the property in execution of the decree in O. S. No. 291 of 1971. Therefore, the judgment-debtors have to take possession of the property again, in accordance with law. Nothing remains for execution of the judgment and decree in O. S. No. 291 of 1971, dated 2-1-1975. Therefore, the judgment-debtors have to take possession of the property again, in accordance with law. Nothing remains for execution of the judgment and decree in O. S. No. 291 of 1971, dated 2-1-1975. ( 6 ) THE decree-holder has filed the objections contending that since the order on I. A. No. VII was not challenged, it has attained finality. Secondly, it is contended that they are in possession of the property pursuant to a Will, dated 18-8-1966; and that they are not dispossessed on 10-3-1995 as contended. ( 7 ) I have heard learned Counsels for the parties and perused the order impugned as also the records. ( 8 ) SRI Vighneshwara S. Shastry, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, argued that the judgment-debtors have not challenged the order passed by the Executing Court on LA. No. VII, dated 31-7-1999. Therefore, the said order has attained finality wherein the Executing court has again directed issuance of a delivery warrant. He submits that the said order requires to be implemented. It is his submission that the judgment-debtors themselves have contended that they were not dispossessed by the Bailiff and that they are in possession of the property in their own right. Therefore, they should not be allowed to contend that they were dispossessed by the Court Bailiff on 10-3-1995. ( 9 ) PER contra, Sri V. R. Datar, learned Counsel for respondent- judgment-debtors argues that even according to the decree-holder, the judgment-debtors were dispossessed on 10-3-1995 at 2. 00 p. m. The bailiffs report, Mahazar, drawn by the Bailiff, Kabja Pavathi, all dated 10-3-1995, support the same. Therefore, the execution petition filed by the decree-holder requires to be closed. He further argues that the Order on I. A. No. VII was passed by a mistaken notion. The Executing Court has very rightly recalled the said order in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He further submits that the Executing Court has not acted in excess of its jurisdiction while allowing I. A. No. IX. It has only corrected on erroneous Order passed by it on an earlier occasion. Such an order should not be revised by this court in exercise of its power under Section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure. ( 10 ) IN the light of the rival contentions, the points for consideration in this revision are as under: 1. It has only corrected on erroneous Order passed by it on an earlier occasion. Such an order should not be revised by this court in exercise of its power under Section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure. ( 10 ) IN the light of the rival contentions, the points for consideration in this revision are as under: 1. Whether the judgment-debtors have been dispossessed on 10-3-1995 at 2. 00 p. m. , in execution of the judgment and decree in O. S. No. 291 of 1971, dated 2-1-1975? 2. If possession is delivered as above, whether a second application for delivery of possession in execution of a decree is maintainable? 3. Whether the Executing Court is justified in withdrawing/recalling the order passed on I. A. No. VII, dated 31-7-1999, in exercise of its inherent power? ( 11 ) REGARDING Point No. 1.-As stated above, the Executing Court has rejected the objections of the judgment-debtors and has passed an order on 9-3-1995 whereby delivery warrant was issued against the judgment-debtors to handover physical and vacant possession of the suit property to the decree-holder. The Bailiff was permitted to take police help if necessary from the nearest police station. The execution petition was also accompanied by a sketch of the property. The delivery warrant contains the description of the suit property. The mahazar as also the bailiffs report and the Kabja Pavathi dated 10-3-1995 makes it clear that the decree was executed and the decree-holder has received vacant possession of the suit property at 2. 00 p. m. , on 10-3-1995. The decree-holder also does not dispute the same. In the affidavit filed in support of LA. No. VII, the decree-holder states that possession of the suit property was given by the Court Bailiff as per the mahazar. It is her contention that, pursuant to an ex parte Order in O. S. No. 80 of 1995, after 3. 00 p. m. , once again she was dispossessed. It is relevant to state that the decree-holder has filed O. S. No. 80 of 1995 in the Court of III additional Civil Judge (Junior Division), Belgaum, for declaration and injunction, in respect of the suit property she has claimed title to the suit property pursuant to a Will said to have been executed by Vyankoji alias Uchyakamble dated 18-8-1966. It is relevant to state that the decree-holder has filed O. S. No. 80 of 1995 in the Court of III additional Civil Judge (Junior Division), Belgaum, for declaration and injunction, in respect of the suit property she has claimed title to the suit property pursuant to a Will said to have been executed by Vyankoji alias Uchyakamble dated 18-8-1966. In the objections to I. A. No. IX, it is admitted that possession was delivered to the decree-holder on 10-3-1995 at 2. 00 p. m. Thus, it is clear that possession of the property was delivered to the decree-holder and the decree-holder has accepted possession of the property on 10-3-1995 at 2. 00 p. m. Hence, I am of the view that there is a legal, complete and effectual delivery of possession of the property to the decree-holder. ( 12 ) REGARDING Point No. 2.-In the case of Shew Bux Mohata and another v Bengal Breweries Limited and Others, it is held that once possession has been delivered to the decree-holder and the decree-holder accepting possession the decree has been fully satisfied and it cannot be executed again. The relevant portion reads as follows.-"under Order 21, Rule 35 a person in possession and bound by the decree has to be removed only if necessary, that is to say, if necessary to give the decree-holder the possession he is entitled to and asks for. But it is open to the decree-holder to accept delivery of possession under that rule without actual removal of the person in possession. If he does that, then he cannot later say that he has not been given that possession to which he was entitled under the law. Where the decree-holders of their own accepted delivery of possession with defendant remaining on the premises with their permission, and they granted a receipt acknowledging full delivery of possession, and permitted the execution case to be dismissed on the basis that full possession had been delivered to them by defendant, they are bound to the position that the decree has been fully executed and the decree cannot be executed any more". ( 13 ) IN the case of K. Ramalingam and Others v K. N. Krishna Reddi and Another , it is held that once possession has been legally delivered, a second application for delivery will not lie unless there has been no legal, complete and effectual delivery of possession on the earlier occasion. It is further held that delivery of possession according to delivery Athakshi, amounts to actual possession and it cannot be termed as paper delivery. The relevant portion reads as follows.-"once possession has been legally delivered, a second application for delivery will not lie, unless there has been no legal, complete and effectual delivery of possession on the earlier occasion In the latter case a subsequent application will be maintainable Such an application cannot be called a "second application" But where only a paper delivery has been made it cannot be said that the decree has been executed unless the Court satisfies itself that actual physical delivery has been effected". ( 14 ) IN the case of President, Roshan Mosque and Durgaha v Smt sharfunnissa, this Court has held that even if the dispossession was a result of high handed action, the only remedy available to the party dispossessed is to file a suit for possession"9 Section 144 of the CPC would come into play if as a result of the decree passed the party has taken possession of the property and if that decree has been subsequently varied or set aside or modified The dispossession contemplated by Section 144 of the cpc is dispossession by executing the process of the Court section 144 of the CPC does not contemplate a case where the party has taken the law into his own hands and has brought about dispossession If the party has acted high-handedly out of Court and has taken possession, the only remedy available to the party dispossessed is to file a suit for possession The question of restitution does not arise in such cases". (emphasis supplied) ( 15 ) IN the case of Tavanappa Hambanna Sangani (dead) by L Rs and others u Veerabhadrappa Tippanna, this Court has held as follows - "it is not competent for the judgment-debtor to challenge before the Execution Court that the delivery effected is only a paper delivery, where a decree entitling the decree-holder to take delivery of actual possession is executed through process of Court and the decree-holder accepts the delivery given to him by the Bailiff (emphasis supplied) ( 16 ) FROM the decisions referred above, it is clear that if the judgment-debtors have taken possession of property illegally after decree-holder was put in possession of the said property in execution of a decree, the remedy available to the decree-holder is to again take possession in accordance with law There cannot be a second execution when there is legal, complete and effectual delivery of the property on the earlier occasion A restitution as provided under Section 144 of the code of Civil Procedure, is also not permissible in law I answer the second point accordingly ( 17 ) REGARDING Point No. 3.-While discussing Point No 2, I have already held that the order on IA No VII is erroneous The said order is dated 31-7-1999 On 6-8-1999, the judgment-debtors have filed IA no IX seeking withdrawal of the order on IA No VII No doubt the judgment-debtors have not challenged the order on IA No VII The question for consideration is whether the Court in exercise of its inherent power can recall an order erroneously passed earlier? ( 18 ) IN the case of Keshardeo Chamria v Radha Kissen Chamria and others, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering a similar question in that case, the Subordinate Court had dismissed the execution petition by mistake The Subordinate Court has ordered restoration of the said execution case, dismissed earlier erroneously It is recorded by the subordinate Court that it had committed a mistake in dismissing the execution petition without informing the decree-holder's Counsel The hon'ble Supreme Court has held that as subordinate Judge was correcting its own error in exercise of his inherent powers, it was not necessary for him to investigate into the correctness of the various allegations and counter-allegations made by the parties The relevant portion of the order reads as follows -"it is unnecessary to consider all the points taken in these appeals because, in our opinion, the point canvassed on behalf of the decree-holder that the order of remand was without jurisdiction and that all the proceedings taken subsequent to the order the Executing Court reviving the execution were void, have force The sole ground on which the Subordinate Judge had ordered restoration of the execution was that he had himself made a sad mistake in dismissing it at the same time that he dismissed the adjournment application without informing the decree- holder's Counsel that the request for adjournment had been refused and without calling upon him to state what he wanted done in the matter in those circumstances As the subordinate judge was correcting his own error in the exercise of his inherent powers, it was not necessary for him to investigate into the correctness of the various allegations and counter-allegations made by the parties He was the best Judge of the procedure that was usually adopted in his Court in such cases and there is no reason whatsoever for the supposition that when the subordinate Judge said that he had not given any opportunity to the decree-holder's pleader to take any steps in execution of the decree after the dismissal of the adjournment application he was not right It could not be senously suggested that such an opportunity was given to the decree-holder, the dismissal order of the execution having been made at the same moment of time as the order dismissing the application for adjournment It is quite clear that the interest of justice demanded that the decree-holder's pleader should have been informed that his request for adjournment had been refused, and further given opportunity to state what he wanted done in that situation It was wholly unnecessary in such circumstances to speculate what the pleader would have done when faced with that situation. The solid fact remains that he was not given that opportunity and that being so, the order dismissing the execution was bad and was rightly corrected by the Court on its own initiative in the exercise of its inherent powers". (emphasis supplied) ( 19 ) THE Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said decision has further held that the Trial Court has not acted in excess of its jurisdiction and therefore, the High Court was not right in interfering with the said order. The relevant portion is as follows.-"we are therefore of the opinion that in reversing the order of the executing Court dated the 25th April, 1945, reviving the execution, the High Court exercised jurisdiction not conferred on it by Section 115 of the Code. It is plain that the order of the subordinate Judge dated the 25th April, 1945, was one that he had jurisdiction to make, that in making that order he neither acted in excess of his jurisdiction nor did he assume jurisdiction which he did not possess. It could not be said that in the exercise of it he acted with material irregularity or committed any breach of the procedure laid down for reaching the result. All that happened was that he felt that he had committed an error in dismissing the main execution while he was merely dealing with an adjournment application. It cannot be said that his omission in not taking into consideration what the decree-holder's pleader would have done had he been given the opportunity to make his submission amounts to material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. This speculation was hardly relevant in the view of the case that he took. The Judge had jurisdiction to correct his own error without entering into a discussion of the grounds taken by the decree-holders or the objections raised by the judgment-debtors. We are satisfied therefore that the High Court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it entertained an application in revision against the order of the Subordinate Judge dated the 25th April, 1945, and set it aside in exercise of that jurisdiction and remanded the case for further enquiry". We are satisfied therefore that the High Court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it entertained an application in revision against the order of the Subordinate Judge dated the 25th April, 1945, and set it aside in exercise of that jurisdiction and remanded the case for further enquiry". (emphasis supplied) ( 20 ) IN the case of Tagatmal Kesavji Marwadi v Shivaram gangaramji (dead) by L. Rs and Others, this Court has held that the court has inherent jurisdiction to correct its own error and restore the parties to possession which they would have occupied had not the Court made the wrong order. ( 21 ) IN the case of Kanyanna v Isthun Subbaiahsetty and Others , this Court has held that Executing Court has power to correct its own mistake in any order made by it The relevant portion is as follows -"under Sections 151, 152 and 153 the Executing Court has jurisdiction and power to correct own mistake if it factually found that there was a mistake in any order made by it The Court is bound to correct its own mistake when once the same is brought to its notice and it would be failing in its duty if it does not do so and sticks to its previous order as if it is infallible". (emphasis supplied) ( 22 ) THE principles that emerge from the above decisions is that a judge has jurisdiction to correct his own mistake in exercise of inherent powers, if it is factually found that there was a mistake in his order needless to say that the Court is bound to correct its mistake ( 23 ) IT is clear that in execution proceedings, once possession is given through process of Court and subsequently dispossessed forcibly, question of filing a second execution petition does not arise The order on i A No VII thus was erroneous and was without jurisdiction Therefore, on the facts and circumstances of this case, I do not find any fault in the order passed by the Trial Court rectifying its mistake in exercise of its inherent power The third point is answered accordingly ( 24 ) IN the case of Uma Shanker (dead) and Others v Sarabjeet (dead) by L Rs and Others, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if there is a subsequent dispossession after the decree for possession was complied with a suit to obtain possession is not barred simply because there was an earlier decree obtained by the plaintiff for possession The relevant portion is as follows -"8 On assessment of evidence, the Trial Court was right in coming to the conclusion that on account of the dispossession of damri Lal after the compromise decree, a fresh cause of action arose in his favour There was no occasion for Damri Lal to have the compromise decree executed since he has given possession under the compromise decree It was his dispossession, thereafter which gave rise to the next round of litigation Such litigation is not barred under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code Section 47 bars a separate suit only in respect of questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree If there is a subsequent dispossession after the decree for possession is complied with, a suit to obtain possession is not barred simply because there was an earlier decree obtained by the plaintiff for possession which decree had been complied with In fact there will be no question of execution the earlier decree when it has already been complied with". (emphasis supplied) therefore, I hold that the application I. A. No. VII for delivery of possession of the property is not maintainable in law. (emphasis supplied) therefore, I hold that the application I. A. No. VII for delivery of possession of the property is not maintainable in law. I am also of the view that the Execution Court is not justified in allowing I. A. No. VII since the decree-holder was already put in possession of the property, according to law. It is made clear that this order will not preclude the decree-holder from taking action against the judgment-debtors or any person in illegal possession of the property either for possession or for any other relief, in accordance with law. ( 25 ) I do not find any merit in this revision petition Accordingly, it is dismissed subject to the above observations. No costs. --- *** --- .