JUDGMENT Dipak Misra, J. 1. In this appeal preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent the plaintiffs-appellants (hereinafter referred to as 'the appellants') have called in question the penetrability of the judgment dated 6-3-1998 passed by the learned single Judge in First Appeal No. 432/95 whereby the learned Single Judge has affirmed the Judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Bhopal, dated 19-9-1995 wherein the original Court had dismissed the suit of the-plaintiffs for eviction which was instituted against the respondent, namely, Bhopal Wholesale Consumers Co-operative Stores Limited (hereinafter referred to as 'the tenant') on the ground of bona fide need for the non-residential accommodation under section 12(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 [for brevity 'the Act']. 2-3. The facts as have been set forth in the suit are that the plaintiff had owned the ground floor of the suit premises jointly and had let out to the tenant for running a co-operative store prior to 1971. Originally there were two plaintiffs and they put forth the plea that they required the accommodation for commencing a wholesale business in hardware and sanitary-ware with the help of their sons. The tenant resisted the eviction proceeding stating that the need set up was not genuine inasmuch as both the plaintiffs and their sons were busy in their business as A-Class contractors and they did have industries in their names. It was further pointed out by the tenants that two portions in the first and second floor of the same building were also let out to the tenants for their business and office purposes and hence, the plea canvassed in regard to bona fide need did not deserve consideration as such need was negatived by the conduct of the plaintiffs. The learned trial Judge accepted the plea put forth by the tenants and dismissed the suit holding that the landlords had failed to make out a case for eviction. Against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge First Appeal No. 432/95 was preferred before this Court. It was urged before the learned single Judge that the trial Court was in palpable error in holding that as some portions of the first and second floor were let out to the tenant there would be no bona fide need of the landlords. It was urged before the learned single Judge that the trial Court was in palpable error in holding that as some portions of the first and second floor were let out to the tenant there would be no bona fide need of the landlords. It was also canvassed by the landlords that the wholesale business of hardware and sanitaryware items cannot be carried out in the upper portion of the building and the same can be understood from common knowledge and hence, letting out the same was not a relevant factor to annihilate the plea of bona fide requirement on the part of the landlords. It was also argued before the learned Single Judge that during the pendency of the eviction proceeding Ashok Kumar Gandhi, son of co-landlord, Madanlal Gandhi got himself registered as a Class-A contractor and had started a new business and the co-landlord being in advance age, they were desirous of starting the business of wholesale hardware and sanitary items, as the starting of such business had become necessary for them. 4. Contentions raised by the landlord were combated by the tenant supporting the finding recorded by the learned trial Judge and propounding that all the circumstances had been taken into consideration by the original Court and the need set up by the landlord was a subterfuge to get the accommodation vacated to earn more rent. Emphasis was laid on the factum that the accommodation was situated in a prominent market place. It was further urged that it was noticeable that the learned trial Judge came to hold that the pleadings put forth by the plaintiffs were utterly vague inasmuch as no particular son's need for starting business was mentioned to seek eviction; and that the only plea put forth was that at the time of letting out of the premises the family was small and the sons had grown up. It was argued that they were involved in the business and they had become 'A' Class contractors and had industries in their names and hence, it had not become necessitous to have a further area; that the tenant had pointed out and led evidence to the effect that there are two portions in the first and second floor in the same building in which the said accommodation is situated and that was also let out to the tenants for their business and office purpose which countered the plea of bona fide requirement and created a dent in genuineness of the plea. Resisting the aforesaid stance, it was contended by the Learned Counsel for the landlords before the learned single Judge that the trial Judge had failed to appreciate that the wholesale business of hardware and sanitary items cannot be carried out in the upper portion of the building and, therefore, letting out of upper portion was totally irrelevant and inconsequential for the purpose for which the eviction was sought in respect of the ground floor and further that though the specific need of Ashok Gandhi, son of Madanlal Gandhi, plaintiff No. 1 had been put forth during the evidence, that would not disentitle the plaintiffs to get the premises on the technical bedrock that the plea of Ashok Gandhi was not specifically put in the plaint. It was urged before the learned Single Judge that though the need was not specifically put that the plaintiff No. 1, Madanlal Gandhi was not unemployed and the accommodation was required yet bona fide need for the business of the sons was putforth and such a plea having been set forth the same cannot be regarded as totally irrelevant. The stand of the tenant that there was no material on record to come to hold that upper portion of the house was not suitable alternative accommodation for the wholesale business of hardware was wholly untenable. It was also canvassed that there was evidence on record to show that the upper portions would not be suitable for the business which is sought to be undertaken. 5. The learned Single Judge concurred with the reasons ascribed by the learned trial Judge and agreed with the submissions put forth by the Learned Counsel for the tenant and dismissed the appeal with the stipulation that the parties would bear their own respective costs in the appeal. 6. 5. The learned Single Judge concurred with the reasons ascribed by the learned trial Judge and agreed with the submissions put forth by the Learned Counsel for the tenant and dismissed the appeal with the stipulation that the parties would bear their own respective costs in the appeal. 6. We have heard Mr. Ravish Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel with Mr. Pranay Verma for the appellants and Mrs. J. Choudhary, Learned Counsel for the respondent. 7. It is submitted by Mr. Agrawal that the learned trial Judge as well as the learned Single Judge has erred in law that the pleadings are not specific with regard to need of the sons though it was precisely and specifically put forth that there is need for the sons and hence, the parties were well aware about the need of the son of the landlord and went to trial with that knowledge. It is canvassed by Mr. Agrawal that need of the family has to be taken cognizance of as sons are not expected to sit idle. The learned Senior Counsel has laid emphasis on the practical approach and realities of life and not on the spacious plea put forth by the tenant that when two floors have been let out eviction from ground floor was unwarranted. It is urged by Mr. Agrawal that non mention of exact nature of business and absence of plea in that regard is not a fetter for a case of this nature but the said aspect has not been taken note of either by the learned trial Judge or by the learned Single Judge which makes the judgment vulnerable. It is also canvassed by him that availability of alternative site is always not the sine qua non as that would depend upon many a factor which are to be taken note of but the same have been totally ignored by the learned Single Judge. The learned Senior Counsel has also commended us to Ex. P/1 to show the nature of business and he has also highlighted that the first floor is not equivalent to the ground floor and further there has been number of admissions in the evidence of DW-1, M. K. Rai in that regard. It is proponed by Mr. The learned Senior Counsel has also commended us to Ex. P/1 to show the nature of business and he has also highlighted that the first floor is not equivalent to the ground floor and further there has been number of admissions in the evidence of DW-1, M. K. Rai in that regard. It is proponed by Mr. Agrawal that if the evidence of M. K. Rai, DW-1 and Madanlal Gandhi, PW-1 are properly scrutinised and understood there can be no iota of doubt that a case for bona fide need has been made out and the learned single Judge has fallen into error by expressing the opinion that conduct of landlords makes ihe plea of bona fide need a doubtful one. 8. Mrs. Chowdhary, Learned Counsel appearing for the tenant has submitted that the learned trial Judge as well as the learned Single Judge has correctly held that the bona fide requirement by the landlord had not been proved inasmuch as during the pendency of eviction of suit the landlord leased out the premises which he could not have. The Learned Counsel has submitted that when bona tide need by two Courts have been concurrently negatived and there is recording of finding on proper ratiocination there should not be reassessment of evidence in intra Court appeal. It is also highlighted by Mrs. Chowdhary that when there is absence of plea evidence could not have been led and even if the same has been led the same cannot be considered. It is put forth by her that when a specific plea is not raised at a precise point adducing of evidence on that score is absolutely unacceptable, for the evidence in the absence of pleading cannot be looked into. It is also contended by her that no new ground is permissible but in the appeal the landlord has specifically and precisely tried to do so and, therefore, the learned Single Judge is absolutely justified in discarding such pleas raised by the appellant therein. Learned Counsel has also propounded that when there has been concurrent findings of fact this Court in intra Court appeal should not unsettle the same as that would not be the warrant in exercise of appellate jurisdiction of this nature. 9. Learned Counsel has also propounded that when there has been concurrent findings of fact this Court in intra Court appeal should not unsettle the same as that would not be the warrant in exercise of appellate jurisdiction of this nature. 9. Before we appreciate the specific issues which are necessary to be dwelled upon for the purpose of adjudication of this appeal it is thought appropriate to refer to certain pronouncements of law which deal with the scope of intra court appeal. In the case of Smt. Asha Devi vs. Dukhi Sao and another, AIR 1974 SC 2048 a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court held thus : The power of a Division Bench hearing a Letters Patent Appeal under CI. 10 from the Judgment of a Single Judge in first appeal is not limited only to a question but it has the same power which the Single Judge has as a first Appellate Court in respect of both questions of fact and of law. The limitations on the power of the Court imposed by sections 100 and 101, Civil Procedure Code cannot be made applicable to an Appellate Court hearing a Letters Patent Appeal for the simple reason that Single Judge of the High Court is not a Court subordinate to the High Court. 10. In the case of Baddula Lakshmaiah and others vs. Sri Anjaneya Swami Temple and others, (1996) 3 SCC 52 it has been held as under : Against the orders of the trial Court, first appeal lay before the High Court, both on facts as well as law. It is the internal working of the High Court which splits it into different 'Benches' and yet the Court remains one. A Letters Patent Appeal, as permitted under the Letters Patent, is normally an intra-Court appeal whereunder the Letters Patent Bench, sitting as a Court of Correction, corrects its own orders in exercise of the same jurisdiction as was vested in the Single Bench. Such is not an appeal against an order of a subordinate Court. In such appellate jurisdiction the High Court exercises the powers of a Court of Error. So understood, the appellate power under the Letters Patent is quite distinct, in contrast to what is ordinarily understood in procedural language. Such is not an appeal against an order of a subordinate Court. In such appellate jurisdiction the High Court exercises the powers of a Court of Error. So understood, the appellate power under the Letters Patent is quite distinct, in contrast to what is ordinarily understood in procedural language. That apart the construction of the two documents involved, in the very nature of their import, a mixed question of law and fact, was well within the powers of the Letters Patent Bench to decide. The Bench was not powerless in that regard. 11. Recently a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Laxminarayan vs. Shivlal Gujar and others, 2003 (1) MPU (FB) 10 : AIR 2003 MP 49 has expressed the view as under : 11. In the case of Jagatguru Shri Shankaracharya Jyotish Peethadhishwar Shri Swami Swaroopanand Saraswati vs. Ramji Tripathi, 1979 MPU 305 : AIR 1979 MP 50 , a Division Bench expressed the view that a Bench hearing the Letters Patent Appeal has the same power as the Single Judge has as a first Appellate Court in respect of both cases of fact and of law. 12. Yet in another decision rendered in the case of Shrichand vs. Tejinder Singh, 1979 MPU 170 : AIR 1979 MP 76 , another Division Bench unequivocally held the limitation on the power of the Court imposed under sections 100 and 101 of the Code cannot be made applicable to an appellate Court hearing a Letters Patent Appeal. A Division Bench of the High Court of Orissa expressed the similar view in the case of Smt. Annapurna Devi vs. Akbar Patel, AIR 1974 Orissa 162. 13. In view of the aforesaid premises it is clear as day that when an appeal is filed from a judgment and decree passed in First Appeal by a learned Single Judge there is no restriction and a finding of fact recorded by a learned single Judge is also subject to assail before the Division Bench. Conditioning the appeal to the narrowness or coarctation that of a second appeal or review is unwarranted. In a Letters Patent the Court has the power to allow the appeal in entirety, particularly modify the judgment or the order which is the subject-matter of assail, remand the matter or pass such order as may be permissible in law. Conditioning the appeal to the narrowness or coarctation that of a second appeal or review is unwarranted. In a Letters Patent the Court has the power to allow the appeal in entirety, particularly modify the judgment or the order which is the subject-matter of assail, remand the matter or pass such order as may be permissible in law. Thus, the whole cyclorama is open and to give a comatose to the same is impermissible. 12. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law there remains no trace or iota of doubt that Court hearing a Letters Patent Appeal can appreciate the facts as well as law and there are no fetters or impediments in doing so. Thus, the contention raised in this regard by Mrs. Chowdhary is absolutely unacceptable and accordingly stands rejected. 13. The second aspect which arises for consideration is whether there has been pleading with regard to bona fide need in proper perspective or there is total absence of pleading. At this juncture, it is worthwhile to notice certain decisions in the field. In the case of Sujan Singh vs. Lalsahab and another, 1993 JU 552 it has been held that a point which has not been pleaded evidence in that regard cannot be considered and the Court cannot render a decision which is based on new ground never pleaded to arrive at the said conclusion. In the aforesaid case reliance was placed on the decisions rendered in the cases of Troja and Company vs. RM. N. N. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235 and Sheodhari Rai and others vs. Suraj Prasad Singh and others, AIR 1954 SC 758 . In this context, Mrs. Chowdhary has commended us to the decision of the Apex Court reported in the case of Chander Kali Bail and others vs. Jagdish Singh and another, 1978 MPU (SC) 96 : 1978 JU 1. In the aforesaid case the Apex Court has held that where a claim has never been made no amount of evidence can be looked upon a plea which was never put forward. In this regard Mr. Ravish Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance upon two decisions rendered in the cases of Patny and Company Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dundoo Balakrishnamborthy and others, (1994) 4 SCC 734 and Murugesan and another vs. Ramalingam Pillai (dead) and others, 1995 Suppl (3) SCC 107. In this regard Mr. Ravish Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance upon two decisions rendered in the cases of Patny and Company Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dundoo Balakrishnamborthy and others, (1994) 4 SCC 734 and Murugesan and another vs. Ramalingam Pillai (dead) and others, 1995 Suppl (3) SCC 107. In Patny and Company Pvt. Ltd. (supra) in paragraph 4 the Apex Court expressed the view as under : 4. Concerning the second ground, no doubt, there was no specific plea that the landlord was not occupying a non-residential building of his own nor that he was entitled to possession of any such building. Nevertheless, the parties had adduced evidence with full knowledge relating thereto and understood the scope of their case and took the trial. Hence, it is too late for the tenant to resile and urge the ground of non-pleading.In the case of Murugesan (supra) the Apex Court took the view that a tenant when fully knows the case set up by the appellant he has to meet the plea by producing evidence in support of his defence. We may hasten to clarify that we have referred to the aforesaid judgment only for the limited purpose that when the plea is known to title tenant-defendant, what is the effect and purpose of such plea. 14. At this stage we think it condign to refer to another decision in the field which relates to the absence of plea. In the case of Raghunath G. Panhale (dead) by LRs vs. Chaganlal Sundarji and Company, (1999) 8 SCC 1 their Lordships dealing with the said facet laid down as under : .......The eviction case was filed in 1986 and we note that the tenant had full opportunity to meet the case of the heirs as per the amended pleading. In our view, they suffered no prejudice whatsoever because of the amendment. We, therefore, think that in our discretion, we should not drive the heirs to file a fresh suit on the plea that the amendment was wrongly allowed. 15. At this juncture we may refer to the concept of bona fide requirement and how the same is to be governed by practical approach and duly instructed by the conception of pragmatism. The realities of life cannot be totally ostracised. The bona fide need should be determined keeping in view the essential and acceptable actualities of life. 15. At this juncture we may refer to the concept of bona fide requirement and how the same is to be governed by practical approach and duly instructed by the conception of pragmatism. The realities of life cannot be totally ostracised. The bona fide need should be determined keeping in view the essential and acceptable actualities of life. In this regard we may refer with profit to a two Judge Bench decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Ramkubai (Smt) deceased by LRS and others vs. Hajarimal Dhokalchand Chandak and others, (1999) 6 SCC 540 . In the aforesaid case the Apex Court ruled that the son who was unemployed on the date of filing of the suit should not be expected to idle away the time by remaining unemployed till the case was finally decided. In this regard the decision rendered in the case of Siddalingamma and another vs. Mamtha Shenoy, (2001) 8 SCC 561 is worth-noting. In the said case R. C. Lahoti, J. (As his Lordship then was) speaking for the Court dealt with the concept of bona fide need which requires practical approach instructed by realities of life. The Apex Court gave a note of caution indicating that the Court must guard against an approach which is too liberal or too conservative or pedantic. Their Lordships further expressed the view that law does not command that the landlord be prevented to have the comfort in a house of his own and live in inadequate premises in order to give protection to the tenant. In this context we may reproduce para 9 with profit: 9. Rent control legislation generally leans in favour of the tenant; it is only the provision for seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord for his own occupation or use of the tenanted accommodation which treats the landlord with some sympathy. In Shiv Sarup Gupta vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222 this Court has held that, bona fide requirement must be an outcome of a sincere, honest desire in a contradistinction with a mere pretext for evicting the tenant on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family which would entitle the landlord to seek ejectment of the tenant. The question to be asked by a judge of facts, by placing himself in the place of the landlord, is, whether in the given facts proved by the material on record the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive the need is bona fide. The concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded against. If the landlord wishes to live with comfort in a house of his own, the law does not command or compel him to squeeze himself and dwell in lesser premises so as to protect the tenant's continued occupation in tenancy premises. In Deena Nath vs. Poor an Lai, (2001) 5 SCC 705 this Court has held that bona fide requirement has to be distinguished from a mere whim or fanciful desire. The bona fide requirement is in praesenti and must be manifested in actual need so as to convince the Court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. 16. Yet in another decision rendered in the case of Akhileshwar Kumar and others vs. Mustqim and others, (2003) 1 SCC 462 the Apex Court has held as under: Once it has been proved by a landlord that the suit accommodation is required bona fide by him for his own purpose and such satisfaction withstands the test of objective assessment by the Court of facts then choosing of the accommodation which would be reasonable to satisfy such requirement has to be left to the subjective choice of the needy. The Court cannot thrust its own choice upon the needy. Of course, the choice has to be exercised reasonably and not whimsically. 17. In the case of Sushila vs. Hnd Addl. The Court cannot thrust its own choice upon the needy. Of course, the choice has to be exercised reasonably and not whimsically. 17. In the case of Sushila vs. Hnd Addl. District Judge, Banda and others, (2003) 2 SCC 28 while dealing with the concept of bona fide requirement their Lordships while interpreting section 21(1)(a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 read with Rule 16 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 came to hold that the bona fide requirement of the landlord for starting an independent business for the son is more relevant and the acquisition of any kind of technical education by the son would not annihilate or destroy the bona fide need of the landlord. At this juncture we may usefully refer to the law laid down in the case of Raghunath G. Panhale (supra). After referring to the decision rendered in the case of Bega Begum vs. Abdul Ahad Khan, (1979) 1 SCC 273 that reasonable requirement postulates an element of need as opposed to a mere "desire or wish", their Lordships approved the view taken earlier that the language of the provision cannot be unduly stretched or strained to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get the possession. 18. Keeping in view the aforesaid pronouncements in the field, presently we shall proceed to appreciate the reasonings ascribed by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge has held that the pleadings are utterly vague as it is merely stated that the family was small and there are grown-up sons and there is need to support the business. The learned Single Judge has expressed the opinion that at the time of institution of the suit the stand of landlords was not very clear in regard to their own need. The learned Single Judge has expressed the opinion that at the time of institution of the suit the stand of landlords was not very clear in regard to their own need. Quite apart from the above, the learned Single Judge, as has been indicated hereinbefore, gave emphasis on the combined business of the tenant in respect of its activities carrying on in the three floors including the suit portion and when the landlord allowed the tenant to occupy the upper portion of the same building, there is no reason to carry on its business similar to those being carried on in the ground floor and on that foundation it was held a serious doubt in the genuineness of the need was caused. 19. To appreciate the aforesaid facet we have carefully gone through the pleadings of the parties. In the plaint there is assertion in paragraphs 4 and 5 to the extent that when the premises were let out the sons of the plaintiffs were small and by efflux of time they have grown up and are unemployed and hence, there was necessity for the premises in question for starting a new business. It has also been set forth in the plaint that the plaintiff No. 1, namely, Madanlal Gandhi wanted to start a business along with his sons for carrying on the business of hardware and sanitary items and has gathered experience and necessary funds for commencing the said business. The question that arises for consideration is whether the said pleading would be treated to be vague. Submission of Mrs. Chowdhary is that there is no specific pleading and there is no reason to accept the oral evidence that the ground floor was only suitable for the business in question. Upon perusal of the pleadings we are of the considered view there is a precise asseveration that the plaintiff No. 1 wanted the premises in question for commencing a business. The type of business also does find mention. It would include all his sons and from the aforesaid it can be construed that the parties went to trial with regard to aforesaid bona fide need/requirement and it cannot be said that there was total absence of pleading and, therefore, the evidence would not be admissible on that score. 20. We have also perused the evidence of Madanlal Gandhi, PW-1. 20. We have also perused the evidence of Madanlal Gandhi, PW-1. The said witness has categorically stated with regard to the need of his sons. He has also expressed that the business which was to commence cannot start on the first floor or the second floor. In his cross-examination it has been elicited that Ashok Kumar Gandhi, the son of the appellant No. 1 is a government coatractor and pays income-tax. 21. In the evidence of DW-1, S. K. Rai, he has admitted that the landlord had never asked them for enhancement of rent. He has admitted that he was not in a position to say whether Madanlal Gandhi, the plaintiff was carrying on the contract business as a contractor. He has admitted that Ashok Kumar was engaged on stop gap arrangement and was involved in the contractor's business. 22. At this stage we would like to mention that the learned Single Judge has expressed the view that no assertion was made that upper floors of the buildings are not suitable as available alternative accommodation for the wholesale business of hardware. It has come on record that the first and second floors were given on rent during the pendency of the suit which is perceptible from the evidence on record. There is material on record that the first floor is not equivalent to ground floor. 23. In this context we may usefully refer to the decision rendered in the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222 wherein it has been held that alternative accommodation is not a ground to deny the claim of the landlord as the premises must be reasonable, suitable obviously in comparison with the suit accommodation of which the landlord is seeking eviction. In the case of Dhannalal vs. Kalawatibai and others, 2001(2) MPLJ (SC) 349 : (2002) 6 SCC 16 their Lordships have held that the bona fide need of the landlord for the premises or additional premises have to be determined by the Court by applying objective standards and once the Court is satisfied of such bona fides then the matter of choosing out or more than one accommodation available to the landlord, his subjective choice, shall be respected by the Court. In the aforesaid case their Lordships held that an accommodation situated on the first floor cannot be said to be alternative suitable accommodation in comparison with shops situated on the ground floor. We may clarify, we have referred to the aforesaid two judgments only to show how the factual scenario ought to be appreciated by the Court of law. In the case at hand, the plaintiffs have adduced categorical and unequivocal evidence to the effect, that the ground floor is more suitable because of the type and nature of business they are contemplating to start. The learned Single Judge has observed that the pleadings are vague. We may proceed to state with great respect, we are unable to concur with the same. We are of the considered opinion that there is pleading on record in that regard and the parties have entered into trial knowing fully well about the lis in question and the bona fide need has been appropriately proved by the landlord and it cannot be said that it was mere a desire or wish. The reasonings given by the learned Single Judge while concurring with the finding with the learned trial Judge that when the landlords have allowed the tenant to occupy the first floor and second floor, there is no justification to seek eviction in respect of the ground floor, do not commend acceptance and in a way, defeat the actual bona fide need of the landlords. 24. In view of the preceding premises, the LPA is allowed. The judgment and decree passed in the First Appeal by the learned Single Judge and the judgment and decree passed by the learned VIIIth Additional District Judge, Bhopal, dismissing the suit are set aside and the suit for eviction of the appellants is hereby decreed with costs throughout. The tenant is directed to handover vacant possession of the premises in question within two months.