ORDER P. S. NARAYANA, J. Heard Sri S. Krishna Murthy, the learned counsel representing the writ petitioner and the learned Government Pleader for Commercial Taxes. M/s. National Mineral Development Corporation Limited, Hyderabad, filed the present writ petition praying for a writ of certiorari after calling for the records and quash the assessment order passed by the first respondent, Commercial Tax Officer, Agapura Circle, Hyderabad, in G.I.R. No. 10396/92-93 (ST) dated October 18, 2002 and order refund of the amount of Rs. 88,166 paid by the writ petitioner for the above assessment order and for such other suitable orders. The writ petitioner is a public limited company engaged in the business of excavation and export of minerals and is an assessee on the rolls of the first respondent. The first respondent by his proceedings dated October 20, 1999 in Rc. No. 1396/99-2000 had made an assessment under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for the purpose of convenience for the assessment year 1992-93 on a gross turnover of Rs. 12,06,07,766 and Rs. 11,98,49,711 respectively and raised a demand of Rs. 1,18,53,634 and the same was questioned by way of W.P. No. 22434 of 1999 and the said writ petition was allowed on December 27, 1999 ([2000] 118 STC 571 (AP) (National Mineral Development Corporation Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer)). The first respondent by his proceedings dated October 18, 2002 in G.I.R. No. 10396/92-93 (CST) made a fresh assessment on gross and net turnovers of Rs. 29,78,766 and Rs. 22,20,711 to a tax of Rs. 90,734. The stand taken by the writ petitioner is that this being the subject-matter of W.P. No. 22434 of 1999 ([2000] 118 STC 571 (AP) (National Mineral Development Corporation Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer)), the impugned order cannot be sustained and the same is liable to be quashed. The first respondent filed a counter-affidavit in detail and the stand taken by the first respondent is that the writ petitioner claimed the relief only on the part of the turnover of Rs. 11,76,29,000 which was added on reassessment and not on turnover made in the original assessment. Further, specific stand was taken that this Court in W.P. No. 22434 of 1999 ([2000] 118 STC 571 (AP) (National Mineral Development Corporation Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer)) did not set aside the turnover on assessment dated September 6, 1995. 11,76,29,000 which was added on reassessment and not on turnover made in the original assessment. Further, specific stand was taken that this Court in W.P. No. 22434 of 1999 ([2000] 118 STC 571 (AP) (National Mineral Development Corporation Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer)) did not set aside the turnover on assessment dated September 6, 1995. A reply affidavit was filed again reiterating the same stand taken in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. Sri S. Krishna Murthy, the learned counsel representing the writ petitioner, would contend that there was neither a show cause notice nor a valid demand made by the first respondent and the first respondent being a quasi-judicial authority while making an assessment order is bound to follow the procedure and the impugned order is in violation of the principles of natural justice. The counsel also would submit that the assessment of 1995 got itself merged with the subsequent assessment which was the subject-matter of W.P. No. 22434 of 1999 ([2000] 118 STC 571 (AP) (National Mineral Development Corporation Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer)) and in view of the same, the remedy available to the first respondent would be to get the prior order reviewed and definitely not by making the present impugned order which may even amount to contempt of court. The counsel also would submit that in view of the facts and circumstances the prior assessment also would be non est in the eye of law and even on the ground of non-application of mind the said order also cannot be sustained and hence the present impugned order is liable to be quashed. Per contra the learned Government Pleader for Commercial Taxes had taken this Court through several averments made in detail in the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent and also the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the prior writ petition. Per contra the learned Government Pleader for Commercial Taxes had taken this Court through several averments made in detail in the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent and also the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the prior writ petition. The learned counsel would contend that it is no doubt true that W.P. No. 22434 of 1999 ([2000] 118 STC 571 (AP) (National Mineral Development Corporation Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer)) was allowed, but on that simple ground alone it cannot be said that the present impugned order is contrary to the prior order made by this Court in W.P. No. 22434 of 1999 ([2000] 118 STC 571 (AP) (National Mineral Development Corporation Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer)) inasmuch as the original assessment order was not set aside and in view of the same the present order questioned in the writ petition cannot be found fault in anyway since there is no illegality or any other legal infirmity in making the impugned order. Even otherwise, the learned counsel would contend that no prejudice is caused to the writ petitioner and there is some delay in approaching this Court by invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under article 226 of the Constitution of India. The simple question which had been argued at length by both the counsel is whether the present impugned order is contrary to or in conflict with the prior order made by this Court in W.P. No. 22434 of 1999 ([2000] 118 STC 571 (AP) (National Mineral Development Corporation Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer)) and whether the same is liable to be quashed on the said ground. No doubt certain incidental and ancillary questions had been canvassed by both the counsel in support of their respective contentions to substantiate their respective stands in relation to the principal question referred to supra. No doubt certain incidental and ancillary questions had been canvassed by both the counsel in support of their respective contentions to substantiate their respective stands in relation to the principal question referred to supra. It may be appropriate to have a look at the relief prayed for in W.P. No. 22434 of 1999 ([2000] 118 STC 571 (AP) (National Mineral Development Corporation Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer)) which is as hereunder : "For the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit, the petitioner herein prays that this honourable Court may be pleased to issue a writ or order or direction particularly one in the nature of writ of certiorari after calling for the records and quash the impugned order dated October 20, 1999 passed in R.C. No. 1396/99-2000 in G.I.R. No. 10396/92-93/CST by the first respondent or to pass such further or other orders as this honourable Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case." In the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent, at para 2, while narrating the details it was specifically pleaded as hereunder : "...... I respectfully submit that the petitioner-assessee for the year 1992-93 filed returns under the CST Act, disclosing a gross turnover of Rs. 29,78,766 and net turnover of Rs. 22,20,711. The returns filed by the assessee were accepted by my predecessor in office then, and he accordingly passed assessment orders on September 6, 1995. The said order was served on the petitioner-assessee on November 4, 1995. Against this order, the petitioner did not file appeal and thereby allowed the assessment to become final. Similarly, the assessment of the petitioner for the year 1992-93 under the APGST Act was also completed by my predecessor on September 6, 1995. While so, the Deputy Commissioner (CT) abids, being the revisional authority under section 20(2) of the APGST Act, 1957 had revised the assessment orders of the petitioner on February 26, 1996 for the year 1992-93 under the APGST Act, adding a turnover of Rs. 11,76,29,000 towards sales of exim scrips/REP licences which escaped assessment at the hands of assessing authority. Against the revision orders for the year 1992-93, the petitioner-dealer filed appeal before the honourable Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal in T.A. No. 413 of 1996. The honourable Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal remanded the matter on April 6, 1999 to the assessing authority holding only a part of the above turnover, i.e., Rs. Against the revision orders for the year 1992-93, the petitioner-dealer filed appeal before the honourable Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal in T.A. No. 413 of 1996. The honourable Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal remanded the matter on April 6, 1999 to the assessing authority holding only a part of the above turnover, i.e., Rs. 8,87,59,000 would be exigible to tax under the APGST Act and on the balance turnover of Rs. 2,88,70,000, the appeal was remanded as sales relating to outside the State sale was involved and for verification by the assessing authority whether it is taxable at the hands of the petitioner-assessee. It is submitted that my predecessor in office, however, passed reassessment orders for the assessment year 1992-93 under the CST Act on October 20, 1999 adding the turnover of entire sales of exim scrips of Rs. 11,76,29,000 to the turnover already reported by the petitioner-assessee through returns under the CST Act and accepted in the assessment order dated September 6, 1995. Against the assessment orders dated October 20, 1999, the petitioner filed W.P. No. 22434 of 1999 ([2000] 118 STC 571 (AP) (National Mineral Development Corporation Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer)) before this honourable Court. In the affidavit filed in support of that writ petition, the petitioner claimed relief only on that part of the turnover of Rs. 11,76,29,000 which was added on reassessment and the tax due thereon but not on the turnover made in the original assessment dated September 6, 1995 relating to the sales of ferric oxide. This honourable Court by an order dated April 27, 1999 did not appreciate the action of my predecessor in passing the assessment order on October 20, 1999 adding the turnover of Rs. 11,76,29,000 relating to sales of exim scrips under the CST Act. Accordingly, by its order dated December 27, 1999 allowed the writ petition and quashed the impugned assessment proceedings dated October 20, 1999 so far as the addition of turnover is concerned. It is submitted that as the turnover relating to the sales of ferric oxide in the original assessment order dated September 6, 1995 was also included in the impugned assessment order dated October 20, 1999, a separate order was passed on October 18, 2002 confirming the turnovers reported by the petitioner and accepted by the assessing authority in his assessment order dated September 6, 1995. By virtue of the orders of this honourable High Court dated December 27, 1999 ([2000] 118 STC 571 (AP) (National Mineral Development Corporation Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer)), the petitioner was given relief, deleting the turnover of exim scrips added in the reassessment orders on October 20, 1999, while restoring the turnover relating to the original assessment dated September 6, 1995. By virtue of the assessment orders dated October 18, 2002, no additional demand was raised against the petitioner causing prejudice to him." From a careful reading of the order in W.P. No. 22434 of 1999 ([2000] 118 STC 571 (AP) (National Mineral Development Corporation Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer)) and the very pleading of the writ petitioner it is clear that the original assessment of the year 1995 was not set aside, but however, the stand taken by the writ petitioner is that the prior order had merged with the subsequent assessment order which was the subject-matter of W.P. No. 22434 of 1999 ([2000] 118 STC 571 (AP) (National Mineral Development Corporation Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer)) and hence when once the said assessment was quashed, the first respondent has no authority or jurisdiction to make the impugned proceedings. No doubt incidentally contentions regarding the non-issuance of show cause notice of demand, etc., also had been canvassed. At this juncture it may be appropriate to have a look at the relevant portion of the order of this Court made in W.P. No. 22434 of 1999 dated December 27, 1999 ([2000] 118 STC 571 (National Mineral Development Corporation Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer)) wherein the division Bench of this Court had stated : "A survey of the facts narrated above could reveal that the first respondent has completely forsaken his duty as a quasi-judicial authority, blatantly misconstrued the order of the Tribunal in T.A. No. 413 of 1996 and clutched at the jurisdiction not vested in it to revise the assessment under the CST Act on the basis of a non-existent directive of the Tribunal. The first respondent out-stepped his jurisdiction in projecting the very same turnover that was assessed under the APGST Act into the CST assessment by reviewing the CST assessment order. The question of revision of assessment would only arise if any turnover had escaped assessment or had been subjected to lower rate of tax. The first respondent out-stepped his jurisdiction in projecting the very same turnover that was assessed under the APGST Act into the CST assessment by reviewing the CST assessment order. The question of revision of assessment would only arise if any turnover had escaped assessment or had been subjected to lower rate of tax. The Tribunal's order in an appeal arising out of the APGST assessment does not even contain a whisper or hint that any part of the turnover would attract tax under CST Act. By figment of imagination, the first respondent proceeded to revise the assessment under the CST Act and the order of the Tribunal is used as a cloak to raise a fanciful demand of Rs. 1.17 crores. It would be travesty of justice if the impugned assessment is allowed to stand. It is one of the extraordinary cases where we are called upon to exercise the jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution to prevent further harassment to the assessee. It is not at all just and appropriate to relegate the petitioner to the remedy of appeal. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order of the assessment is quashed." While dealing with the meaning of the expression "assessment" under section 14 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957, a division Bench of this Court in K. Mohd. Osman Saheb & Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1971] 27 STC 303; ILR 1972 AP 719; 1970 APHN 357 held : "No doubt the word 'assessment' may have a comprehensive meaning and may sometimes mean the whole procedure laid down for imposing the tax or penalty, but the said expression must be interpreted with reference to the context in which it is used. ....... Therefore, the expression 'assessment' occurring in the last sentence of section 14(1) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 is only referable to the final order of assessment and not the whole procedure for imposing the tax." From an analysis of the factual position it is clear that the writ petitioner is in know of all the facts and also is conscious of the fact that the original assessment had been left untouched by the subsequent judicial verdict. However, having kept quiet for a considerable length of time, the writ petitioner no doubt had invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under article 226 of the Constitution of India questioning the impugned order. The principal ground of attack of the applicability of the concept of doctrine of merger had not been specifically pleaded by the writ petitioner though in paras 5 and 6 of the affidavit the prior order of the division Bench of this Court in W.P. No. 22434 of 1999 dated December 27, 1999 ([2000] 118 STC 571 (National Mineral Development Corporation Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer)) had been referred to and a specific stand had been taken that the impugned assessment is contrary to the said order. In Kunhayyammed v. State of Kerala (2000) 6 SCC 359 the apex Court while dealing with the doctrine of merger had observed at paras 7 and 42 as hereunder : "The doctrine of merger is neither a doctrine of constitutional law nor a doctrine statutorily recognised. It is a common law doctrine founded on principles of propriety in the hierarchy of justice delivery system. On more occasions than one this Court had an opportunity of dealing with the doctrine of merger. It would be advisable to trace and set out the judicial opinion of this Court as it has progressed through the times. 'To merge' means to sink or disappear in something else; to become absorbed or extinguished; to be combined or be swallowed up. Merger in law is defined as the absorption of a thing of lesser importance by a greater, whereby the lesser ceases to exist, but the greater is not increased; an absorption or swallowing up so as to involve a loss of identity and individuality. (Corpus Juris Secundum)." Except raising a vague ground of merger at the time of arguments without any factual foundation, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner also was unable to substantiate how the several conditions or ingredients for applying the doctrine of merger are satisfied in the present case. The apex Court had well-discussed the preconditions for attracting the applicability of doctrine of merger in Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar AIR 1975 SC 1185 and Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat AIR 1970 SC 1 ; (1969) 2 SCC 74 . The apex Court had well-discussed the preconditions for attracting the applicability of doctrine of merger in Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar AIR 1975 SC 1185 and Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat AIR 1970 SC 1 ; (1969) 2 SCC 74 . This question of applicability or otherwise of the doctrine of merger had been well-discussed in a catena of decisions by the apex Court : Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Amritlal Bhogilal & Co. [1958] 34 ITR 130; AIR 1958 SC 868 , State of Madras v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd. [1967] 19 STC 144; AIR 1967 SC 681 , Gojer Brothers (P) Ltd. v. Shri Ratan Lal Singh AIR 1974 SC 1380 ; (1974) 2 SCC 453 and S. S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1990 SC 10 ; (1989) 4 SCC 582 . A division Bench of this Court also had an occasion to deal with this aspect in Special Deputy Collector v. Vasudeva Rao (2003) 12 ILD 342. In the light of the specific stand taken in the counter-affidavit by the first respondent and on a careful analysis of the impugned order and also the order made by this Court in W.P. No. 22434 of 1999 ([2000] 118 STC 571 (National Mineral Development Corporation Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer)) this Court is satisfied that the applicability of doctrine of merger cannot be stretched too far to an assessment of this nature especially in the light of the fact that the original assessment was left untouched by the prior judicial verdict and an interpretation that in the light of the above factual position the present order would be contrary to the prior order made by this Court would lead to absurdity. Apart from this aspect of the matter, this Court is thoroughly satisfied that absolutely no prejudice is caused to the writ petitioner by the present impugned order. Hence, for the reasons referred to above, this Court sees no valid reasons to interfere with the impugned order and accordingly the writ petition is dismissed as devoid of merits. No costs. Writ petition dismissed.