MAHARAJA SINHA, J. ( 1 ) THE writ petitioner has challenged an order of suspension against him dated 13 May, 1999 of the Chairman, Adhoc Committee, Midnapore District primary School Council. It appears from the said order, Annexure P/7 to the writ application, that the writ petitioner was "placed under suspension with immediate effect i. e. from the date of issue of this order of suspension till the disposal of the aforementioned criminal proceedings or until further orders from this Council to that effect". The actual order of suspension is quoted from the order of suspension itself. The writ petitioner is the Headmaster of Majuria primary School in Keshpur Circle, in the District of Midnapur West. ( 2 ) IT appears that the writ petitioner was impleaded as an accused in the criminal case the particulars of which are mentioned in the said order of suspension dated 13 May, 1999. It further appears that the writ petitioner was arrested and detained in jail custody from 17 August, 1998 to 2nd september, 1998. The order of suspension was issued because the petitioner was in the jail custody as an accused in a criminal case as aforesaid. The petitioner, it appears, was released on bail by the learned sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Midnapur. The learned Magistrate found that in the F. I. R. in question filed against the accused, the writ petitioner, there was no whisper or any case diary about the involvement of the writ petitioner in the case in question. The learned Magistrate found no reason to refuse the prayer for bail of the writ petitioner, namely, Ayub Ali. The order was made by the learned Magistrate granting bail to the writ petitioner on 1st September, 1998. ( 3 ) MR. Deb Barman, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner submits that the said order of suspension was made against the writ petitioner much after the writ petitioner was released on bail by the learned magistrate after having been found that there was not even a prima facie case against the writ petitioner as his name was not found in the F. I. R. in question. Essentially, the jurisdiction of the Chairman of the Adhoc Committee, Midnapur district Primary School Council is challenged by Mr. Essentially, the jurisdiction of the Chairman of the Adhoc Committee, Midnapur district Primary School Council is challenged by Mr. Deb Barman and in this connection he relies on a judgment of His Lordship Justice Bhaskar bhattacharjee in Basudeb Mallick v. State of West Bengal and Others, reported in 2004 (1), Calcutta High Notes, Page 32. Before I consider and deal with the said judgment as cited by Mr. Deb Barman, the relevant provisions of the West bengal Primary Education (Conduct of Service of Teachers of Primary Schools) rules, 2001 under which the Chairman of the Midnapore District Primary Council sought to exercise his jurisdiction in passing the said order of suspension are ' set out below :-"where a teacher is detained in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours on a criminal charge or otherwise, he shall be deemed to be suspended by an order of the appointing authority with effect from the date of his detention and shall remain under suspension until further orders. A teacher who is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment shall be dealt with in the same manner pending a decision as to the disciplinary action to be taken against the teacher". ( 4 ) IN dealing with practically and identical provisions, as above, His lordship Justice Bhattacharya in the above case held that the Managing committee had a right to suspend the teacher or an employee where such suspension was in the interest of the Institution pending trial of proceedings against the person concerned within ninety days from the date of suspension. ( 5 ) IN that case, the petitioner was arrested for an alleged offence committed beyond the scope of his duty as an assistant teacher. Such offence was neither directed against the institution nor the property of the institution. His Lordship further observed that if in the long run, the petitioner was found guilty and was consequently convicted, the school authority was at liberty to take appropriate disciplinary action against the petitioner. But, so long the criminal proceeding was not concluded and the petitioner was not found guilty there was no scope for initiating proceeding at the instance of the school. Thus, the school authority had no right to even suspend the petitioner merely because a criminal proceeding had been initiated against the petitioner. But, so long the criminal proceeding was not concluded and the petitioner was not found guilty there was no scope for initiating proceeding at the instance of the school. Thus, the school authority had no right to even suspend the petitioner merely because a criminal proceeding had been initiated against the petitioner. ( 6 ) THE above, as aforesaid, is the view of His Lordship Justice bhattacharya expressed in the said judgment while dealing with the sub- rule (8b) of Rule 28 of the Management Rules, which Rule, as I have said, is practically identical to the Rule with which I am concerned herein. ( 7 ) THE above decision proceeds on the basis that the moment an approved teacher or an employee of a school is arrested in connection with a criminal case and consequently detained to jail custody beyond 48 hours he should be deemed to have been suspended during the period of detention and according to the said newly incorporated sub-rule (8b), in such a case the school authority is not even required to pass any formal order of suspension as the teacher or the employee concerned should be deemed to be under suspension and the school authority has no further role to play in the matter. ( 8 ) BUT His Lordship held further that the moment the teacher or the employee concerned was released from the detention by the competent criminal Court the "deemed suspension" would come to an end and he should be permitted to join his duty subject to the final decision in the criminal case against the teacher or the employee. ( 9 ) I, on my part, do not see any reason to take any different view from the view that was taken by His Lordship Justice Bhattacharya in that case. From a plain reading of the provisions of Rule-7 of the said 2001 rule, it appears the moment an approved teacher of the school is arrested in connection with a criminal charge or otherwise detained in custody beyond 48 hours, he should be deemed to have been suspended by an order of the appointing authority with effect from the date of his detention and shall remain under suspension until further orders. So, even if, no order of suspension had been made against the petitioner in the present case, the petitioner should be deemed to have been under suspension on those days when he was under the custody of the police authority or the other authority concerned being on accused in a criminal case. ( 10 ) HOWEVER, it is difficult to understand in the present case as to why and how the authority concerned namely, Chairman, Adhoc Committee or the District Primary School Council, Midnapore, found it necessary to put the headmaster under the order of suspension when the said headmaster, the writ petitioner herein, was released by the learned magistrate on 1st September, 1998. After the said order of the learned magistrate on 1st September, 1998, no disciplinary proceedings, it appears, was even in or under contemplation against the petitioner when the said order of suspension was issued or made against the petitioner. When there was no disciplinary proceeding pending or even in contemplation against the writ petitioner, it is difficult to appreciate how the authority concerned namely, the Chairman, of the Adhoc Committee of the Midnapore District primary Council could exercise his power under the provisions of the said rule or in terms thereof and the said order of suspension could or can be termed as a legal order against the writ petitioner herein. ( 11 ) AS a simple law of precedent, the judgment cited by Mr. Deb barman in support of his case is to be followed particularly when I see no reason to differ from the views expressed in the said judgment by the Hon'ble judge. I am, as aforesaid, concerned with the identical or almost similar provisions in the present as were involved in the above case. ( 12 ) SINCE, in my opinion, the concerned respondent exercised the power under the said provisions of the said Rule wrongly the said order of suspension against the petitioner cannot be allowed to remain or continue against him indefinitely. The school authority or the authority concerned has the power of taking disciplinary proceeding against any teacher or employee under the relevant provisions of the Rules in question. The school authority or the authority concerned has the power of taking disciplinary proceeding against any teacher or employee under the relevant provisions of the Rules in question. But if an order is passed which on examination is found has not been passed in accordance with the provisions of a Rule in question, or when it is found that the authority in exercise its power under a provision of law has exceeded its authority or jurisdiction conferred upon the authority by such provision then that order cannot be sustained in the eye of law. ( 13 ) HAVING, found that the Chairman of the said Council exercised his power under the said Rule wrongly, the said order cannot be allowed to continue against the writ petitioner. Before I part with the subject, I must say, perhaps at the cost of re-petition that it is very difficult to appreciate for a reasonable man with a reasonable approach as to why the petitioner was put under suspension much after his release by the learned Sub- divisional Magistrate when the learned Judicial Magistrate did not even find the name of the accused in the concerned F. I. R. ( 14 ) NO disciplinary proceedings have so far been initiated against the petitioner nor the same had or has so far been incontemplation of the authority concerned. I have, however, my doubts whether the authority concerned could at all initiate any disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner on the day it passed order of suspension or even thereafter, nothing has however, been done as yet. My doubts perhaps will remain with me even after I have disposed of this writ petition. ( 15 ) THUS, the order of suspension dated 13th May, 1999 passed by the Chairman, Adhoc Committee, Midnapore District Primary Council, is set aside and the school authority and all other concerned authorities are directed to allow the petitioner to join the school in question as the headmasterthereof and as a natural consequence of this order, it is needless to mention, the petitioner will be entitled to receive his salary as before but the petitioner shall not be entitled to his salary on those days while he was under the custody of the police or in the jail custody being an accused of the said criminal proceedings against him. It is made clear that the petitioner should also be entitled to the salary in arrears in his favour which should be paid by the authority concerned within a reasonable time and in any event within a period of 6 weeks from the date of communication of this order. ( 16 ) THIS writ application is disposed of in terms of the above order. ( 17 ) THERE will be no order as to costs. ( 18 ) LET the notice filed in Court to-day be kept on record. ( 19 ) AFTER the order is dictated and the matter is disposed of, the learned advocate Mr. K. J. Usuf appears and submits that he was instructed to appear on behalf of the concerned State-respondents herein. If urgent xerox certified copy of this order is applied for, the same should be supplied expeditiously.