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2004 DIGILAW 628 (CAL)

HINDUSTAN MOTORS LIMITED v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

2004-09-17

ALTAMAS KABIR, GORACHAND DE

body2004
ALTAMAS KABIR, J. ( 1 ) THESE three appeals arising out of Matter No. 330 of 1981, have been taken up for hearing and disposal together, inasmuch as, the facts involved in these appeals are common. ( 2 ) THE appellant in A. P. 0. No. 607 of 1991 has been carrying on business of manufacture and sale of automobiles, earth moving equipment, dumper and other items. In the process, the appellant had established a colony known as the Hind Motor Colony which comprised, inter alia, its factory workshop, residential quarters for staff, hospital, school, overhead tank for the supply of water, underground water pipes and sewerage system and electric lines. ( 3 ) ON 8th August, 1966, the question of including the local area comprising the Hind Motor Colony within the Uttarpara-Kotrung Municipality came up for consideration before the then Sub-Divisional Officer, Serampore. Although, the said proposal was strongly opposed, by Notification No. 4360/mim-45/65 issued in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 6 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, the State of West Bengal made a declaration of its intention to include within the said municipality, the said local area defined in the said notification as being contiguous to the said municipality. The appellant, Hind Motors Ltd. , filed an objection to the said notification on 12th December, 1969, before the State Government challenging the inclusion of the said area, including its said colony, in the aforesaid municipality and requested that such notification be withdrawn. Since the said objection was allegedly ignored by the State Government, the said appellant filed a writ application, being C. R. No. 1739 (W) of 1970, challenging the said notification. The said writ application was summarily rejected on 24th March, 1970, as being premature since an objection was pending before the State government. Aggrieved by the said order dated 24th March, 1970, the appellant company preferred an appeal, being F. M. A. T. No. 195 of 1970. ( 4 ) THEREAFTER, in exercise of powers conferred by clause (c) of section 8 of the aforesaid Act, the State of West Bengal issued a final notification dated 24th december, 1971, including within the Uttarpara-Kotrung Municipality the area defined in the said notification and allegedly to be contiguous to the said municipality. ( 4 ) THEREAFTER, in exercise of powers conferred by clause (c) of section 8 of the aforesaid Act, the State of West Bengal issued a final notification dated 24th december, 1971, including within the Uttarpara-Kotrung Municipality the area defined in the said notification and allegedly to be contiguous to the said municipality. ( 5 ) HOWEVER, by a letter dated 28th December, 1971, the Block Development officer, Serampore-Uttarpara Block, informed the Deputy Director of panchayats that the area proposed to be included was purely agricultural, backward and under-developed and the population was comprised mainly of poor labourers and agriculturists. According to the said officer, proviso (iv) to sub-section (1) could not, therefore, be complied with. ( 6 ) THE appellant company moved a fresh writ application, being C. R. No. 7374 (W) of 1972, challenging the aforesaid notification dated 24th December, 1971. The rule which was issued thereupon was ultimately dismissed on 20th june, 1977. The appeal preferred therefrom was also dismissed by directing the appellant company to make a representation to the Minister-in-Charge of local Self-Government upon an assurance being given that no steps, in the meantime, would be taken under the impugned notification dated 24th December, 1971. ( 7 ) PURSUANT to the order passed in the appeal, the appellant company made a representation to the Minister-in-Charge of the Local Self-Government and urban Development Department requesting him to consider the justification of issuing a fresh notification under section 6 (a) of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, to create a distinctly separate municipality for the town of Hind Motor. The representation was disposed of by the Minister on 3rd July, 1978, and aggrieved by such decision the appellant company filed a Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the order of the Appeal Court dated 18th March, 1978, together with the decision of the Minister-in-Charge, Local self-Government and Urban Development Department, Government of West bengal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court disposed of the Special Leave Petition by granting leave to the appellant company to withdraw the same with liberty to the appellant company to move this Court for determining the validity of the notification on the question as to whether the requirements for the issue of such notification for extension of the municipal limits had been duly complied with. ( 8 ) PURSUANT to the said order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 9th August, 1978, the appellant company filed a third writ petition, being Matter No. 635 of 1978, challenging the order passed by the Minister on 3rd July, 1978. The said writ petition was disposed of on 24th April, 1980, by quashing the order of the minister dated 3rd July, 1978. The order disposing of the writ petition also provided that the respondents therein or any other appropriate authority would be entitled to pass fresh orders in accordance with law and after giving the writ petitioners a personal hearing. In compliance with the said order dated 24th april, 1980, the concerned Minister called the writ petitioners for a personal hearing on 8th August, 1980. Thereafter, the Minister passed a fresh order on 9th December, 1980, holding that the notification dated 24th December, 1971, was in order and that the inclusion of the area in question with the Uttarpara-Kotrung municipality could be legally made under section 6 (l) (d) of the Bengal municipal Act, 1932. ( 9 ) THIS resulted in the filing of the fourth writ application by the appellant company, being Matter No. 330 of 1981, challenging the validity of the notification dated 16th September, 1969, which was already in issue in FMAT no. 1957 of 1970, the notification dated 24th December, 1971, and the Minister's fresh order dated 9th December, 1980. The said writ application was taken up for disposal by the learned Single Judge on 15th March, 1991, and relying on the earlier decision in C. R. No. 7374 (W) of 1972, the writ petition was dismissed without any interference with the impugned notification dated 24th December, 1971. The learned Single Judge observed that undisputed materials had been placed before the Court to show that the conditions of section 6 (l) (d) of the bengal Municipal Act, 1932, had been fully complied with. ( 10 ) HOWEVER, while dismissing the writ application and discharging the rule issued thereupon, the learned Single Judge, keeping in mind the lapse of time and the expansion of the industry of the writ petitioner company directed the state Government to consider whether it would be desirable to constitute a distinctly separate municipality for the town of Hind Motor in the light of the representation already made by the writ petitioners. The Minister concerned was directed to consider and dispose of the said representation after giving an opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioners within one month from the date of communication of the order. ( 11 ) APPEAL No. 607 of 1991, was preferred by Hindustan Motors Limited against the said judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 15th march, 1991, dismissing the fourth writ application filed by the writ petitioner company. ( 12 ) AFTER Matter No. 330 of 1981 was dismissed it was once again mentioned before the learned Single Judge for modification of the directions given in the order of 15th March, 1991, directing the Government to consider whether it would be desirable to constitute a distinctly separate municipality for the town of the Hind Motor. It was submitted that it would not be possible to fulfil all the conditions required for the creation of a separate municipality but that a new gram Panchayat could be constituted on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the case. Pursuant to such submissions the learned Single Judge by his order dated 9th August, 1991, altered the earlier directions contained in the order of 15th March, 1991, and directed the Minister concerned to consider whether it would be desirable to constitute a distinctly separate Gram Panchayat for the town of the Hind Motor. A. P. O. No. 523 of 1991 and A. P. O. No. 524 of 1991 have been filed by the State of West Bengal and the Municipal Commissioners of Uttarpara-Kotrung Municipality against the said order passed by the learned single Judge on 9th August, 1991. ( 13 ) APPEARING on behalf of the Municipal Commissioners of Uttarpara-kotrung Municipality, Mr. B. R. Ghosal, learned Senior Advocate, submitted that the appeal preferred by Hindustan Motors Limited against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 15th March, 1991, dismissing Matter no. 330 of 1981 was completely misconceived having regard to the facts involved in the case. Referring to the provisions of section 6 (1) (d) of the Bengal Municipal act, 1932, Mr. 330 of 1981 was completely misconceived having regard to the facts involved in the case. Referring to the provisions of section 6 (1) (d) of the Bengal Municipal act, 1932, Mr. Ghosal submitted that it was within the competence of the State government by notification to declare its intention to include within a municipality any local area contiguous to the same and defined in the notification, subject, of course, to the condition that the State Government was satisfied that three-fourths of the adult male population of the local area to which it referred were chiefly employed in pursuits other than agriculture. ( 14 ) MR. Ghosal urged that the areas proposed to be included within the limits of the Uttarpara-Kotrung Municipality were, in fact, contiguous except that a railway line was situated between the limits of the municipality and the area intended to be included within the municipality. Mr. Ghosal submitted that the question as to whether the lands comprised in the municipality and those proposed to be included therein were contiguous to each other or not on account of the intervention of the railway line had been considered at length, both by the State Government and also by the Court, and it had been held in no uncertain terms that the two tracts of land were contiguous to each other, particularly because there were two link roads connecting the two areas. It was also held that the intervention of the railway line did not affect that contiguity of the two tracts of land and the same were adjacent to each other. In fact, the examples of other municipalities, such as, the municipal towns of Kamarhati, panihati, Khardah, Titagarh, Barrackpore, Naihati, Bally, Baidyabati, Serampore and Rishra were also cited in support of the contention that the railway line also runs through different parts of the said municipal towns. ( 15 ) APART from the above, Mr. Ghosal urged that the area proposed to be included in the municipality is predominantly inhabited by people who are engaged in pursuits other than agriculture. ( 15 ) APART from the above, Mr. Ghosal urged that the area proposed to be included in the municipality is predominantly inhabited by people who are engaged in pursuits other than agriculture. It was submitted that there are several brick fields and tile fields together with a large number of brick-built residential buildings, a modern refugee colony, a cinema hall, a dental hospital and the company itself is a large factory where several thousands of workmen are employed and the majority of the work force reside within the area proposed to be included in the municipality. Mr. Ghosal submitted that, in fact, from the census report it had been found that 95 per cent of the adult male population of the area proposed to be included in the municipality are chiefly engaged in pursuits other than agriculture. ( 16 ) MR. Ghosal submitted that the final notification in terms of clause (c) of section 8 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, was published by the State government on 24th September, 1971, after an objection filed by the Hindustan motors on 12th December, 1969, to the notification dated 16th September, 1969, issued in terms of section 6 (1) (d) of the said Act had been duly considered and the same was reflected in the judgment disposing of the second writ application filed on behalf of the appellant company, being C. R. No. 7374 (W) of 1972. Mr. Ghosal submitted that the representation made by the appellant company pursuant to the liberty granted in the third writ application was disposed of by the Minister-in-Charge, Local Self-Government and Municipal Affairs, on 9th december, 1980, upon the finding that Hindustan Motors Ltd. had not been prejudiced in any manner by the proposed inclusion of the concerned areas within the Uttarpara-Kotrung Municipality and that the company would be free to maintain the internal amenities within its industrial area, but would only have to conform with the requirements of civic administration of the uttarpara-Kotrung Municipality instead of being administered as an area within a Gram Panchayat. On the basis of the aforesaid observations the Minister arrived at a decision that it was not desirable to constitute a distinctly separate municipality for the town of Hind Motor. ( 17 ) MR. On the basis of the aforesaid observations the Minister arrived at a decision that it was not desirable to constitute a distinctly separate municipality for the town of Hind Motor. ( 17 ) MR. Ghosal submitted that pursuant to the said decision the District magistrate, Hooghly, on 9th August, 1991, formerly recorded the inclusion of the added area to the Uttarpara-Kotrung Municipality, the day on which the learned Single Judge modified his order dated 15th March, 1991, against which a. P. O. Nos. 523 and 524 of 1991 have been filed. ( 18 ) ACCORDING to Mr. Ghosal on 12th August, 1991, the Uttarpara-Kotrung municipality took possession and charge of the added area mentioned in the notification No. 7077/mm-145/60 dated 24th December, 1971, issued by the state Government under section 8 (c) of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932. Mr. Ghosal submitted that long after, on 29th August, 1991, M/s. Hindustan Motors affirmed an application for stay in connection with the appeal filed by them against the judgment and order dated 15th March, 1991, being Appeal No. 607 of 1991, but no stay was, in fact, granted on such application. On the other hand, on 2nd September, 1991, the order passed by the leaned Single Judge on 9th August, 1991, in modification of the order passed on 15th March, 1991 was stayed by the Division Bench and the interim order was extended from time to time. According to Mr. Ghosal after, amalgamation of the area in question within the Uttarpara-Kotrung Municipality, the first civic election of the municipality was held on 28th May, 1995 and Ward Nos. 1 to 5 covered the added area. In fact, it was submitted by Mr. Ghosal that Ward No. 1 covers the Hindustan motor Industrial Complex. Mr. Ghosal submitted that a second civic election was held on 13th August, 2000, and Ward Nos. 1 to 5 was renumbered as Ward nos. 20 to 24, of which Ward No. 24 covers the Hindustan Motor Industrial complex. Mr. Ghosal submitted that the present Vice-Chairman of the municipality represents Ward No. 20. ( 19 ) MR. Ghosal then urged that meanwhile the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 was replaced by the West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993, and that while in the 1932 Act the word 'inhabitant' had been defined in sub-section (25) of section 3, such definition had been excluded from the 1993 Act. Mr. ( 19 ) MR. Ghosal then urged that meanwhile the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 was replaced by the West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993, and that while in the 1932 Act the word 'inhabitant' had been defined in sub-section (25) of section 3, such definition had been excluded from the 1993 Act. Mr. Ghosal submitted that the Legislature had consciously omitted the definition of the word 'inhabitant' keeping in mind the provisions of section 7 of the 1932 Act whereunder an inhabitant of the town or local area or any ratepayer of the municipality or municipalities in respect of which a notification has been published under section 6 could object to anything contained in the notification. Mr. Ghosal contended that the word 'inhabitant' had been omitted with the intention of withdrawing the right to prefer any objection in the matter of constitution or reconstitution of the municipal towns from ratepayers, property-holders and businessmen as such. According to Mr. Ghosal, the use of the word 'inhabitant' in section 5 of the 1993 Act without the same being defined, excluded an artificial person like Hindustan Motors Ltd. from raising any objection against the reconstitution of the municipal town in question. ( 20 ) VARIOUS decisions have been cited by Mr. Ghosal in support of his said submissions to which reference may be made, if required. ( 21 ) AS far as the appeal preferred by Hindustan Motors Ltd. against the judgment and order dated 15th March, 1991, is concerned, Mr. Ghosal urged that the same was without any substance and was liable to be dismissed. ( 22 ) AS far as the appeal preferred by the Municipality against the order dated 9th August, 1991, is concerned, Mr. Ghosal submitted that having disposed of the writ petition of M/s. Hindustan Motors Ltd. finally the learned Judge had become functus officio and it was no longer open to him to alter the directions contained in his final order and that too on mere mentioning and without any notice to the parties before him. ( 23 ) MR. Ghosal submitted that the questions being raised by M/s. Hindustan motors Ltd. had been considered and rejected in earlier proceedings between the parties, and, in any event, after the amalgamation two civic elections have been held and the Uttarpara-Kotrung Municipality is in effective administration of the added area on and from 12th August, 1991. Mr. ( 23 ) MR. Ghosal submitted that the questions being raised by M/s. Hindustan motors Ltd. had been considered and rejected in earlier proceedings between the parties, and, in any event, after the amalgamation two civic elections have been held and the Uttarpara-Kotrung Municipality is in effective administration of the added area on and from 12th August, 1991. Mr. Ghosal submitted that the added area which constituted the erstwhile Makhla Gram Panchayat became part and parcel of Uttarpara-Kotrung Municipality on and from 15th March, 1991, and there was no further scope for the Hon'ble Minister to consider the directions contained in the modified order of 9th August, 1991, directing that fresh consideration be made as to whether it would be desirable to constitute a distinctly separate Gram Panchayat for the town of Hind Motor. ( 24 ) MR. Ghosal submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge on 9th August, 1991, modifying the directions contained in his final order dated 15th March, 1991, was without jurisdiction and was liable to be set aside. ( 25 ) THE stand taken by Mr. Ghosal on behalf of the Uttarpara-Kotrung municipality was reiterated by the learned Advocate General, appearing for the State of West Bengal and its authorities in Appeal No. 523 of 1991. ( 26 ) THE learned Advocate General submitted that the matter relating to inclusion of the added area within the limits of the Uttarpara-Kotrung municipality had been considered at length from various angles by the Minister-in-Charge, local Self-Government and Munucipal Affairs, pursuant to the directions given by the Court from time to time on the writ applications filed by m/s. Hindustan Motors Ltd. On being satisfied that the conditions contained in section 6 (1) (d) and proviso (iv) thereto had been duly satisfied, the said Minister had held that the final notification published on 24th September, 1971 under section 8 (c) of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 was valid and did not call for any change and/or interference. ( 27 ) THE learned Advocate General submitted that despite the repeated writ applications filed on behalf of M/s. Hindustan Motors Ltd. , the Courts had chosen not to interfere and on 9th August, 1991, a formal order was recorded by the district Magistrate, Hooghly, regarding inclusion of the added area within the uttarpara-Kotrung Municipality. The learned Advocate General echoed Mr. The learned Advocate General echoed Mr. Ghosal's submission that this had been followed by two civic elections of the said municipality in 1995 and 2000 and the Municipal Commissioners of the uttarpara-Kotrung Municipality are in effective administration of the added area on and from 12th August, 1991. ( 28 ) APPEARING for Hindustan Motors Limited, Mr. Samaraditya Pal, learned senior Counsel, submitted that the questions which arise for consideration in the appeal preferred by the company are whether the power exercised by the state Government under section 6 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 was valid and even if the exercise of such power was valid, whether the order passed by the Minister, Local Self-Government and Municipal Affairs, on 9th December, 1980, is capable of being sustained. ( 29 ) MR. Pal submitted that the conditions precedent of valid exercise of power under section 6 (l) (d) of the above Act are (i) that the local area must be contiguous to the limits of the existing Municipality referred to in the notification and (ii) the State Government must be satisfied that three-fourths of the adult male population of the local area to be included are not chiefly employed in agricultural pursuits. Mr. Pal urged that neither of these two conditions were fulfilled in the instant case. ( 30 ) MR. Pal reiterated the submissions made in the earlier writ petitions that the local area defined in the notification is not contiguous to the municipality and the State Government, therefore, had no power and/or authority to declare its intention to include the said local area within the uttarpara-Kotrung Municipality. ( 31 ) MR. Pal submitted that the local area defined in the notification dated 24th December, 1971, lies to the west of the Municipality and is completely separated from the Municipality by a strip of land belonging to the Eastern railway administration of the Central Government and lying completely outside the local limits of the Uttarpara-Kotrung Municipality. Mr. Pal submitted that in that view of the matter, the local area cannot be considered as contiguous which according to Black's Law Dictionary means touching on a point or along a boundary. ( 32 ) IN furtherance of his said submission Mr. Mr. Pal submitted that in that view of the matter, the local area cannot be considered as contiguous which according to Black's Law Dictionary means touching on a point or along a boundary. ( 32 ) IN furtherance of his said submission Mr. Pal referred to a letter dated 10th July, 1951, written by the District Magistrate, Hooghly, to the Chairman, uttarpara-Kotrung Municipality, wherein it was opined that the proposal for extension of the western boundary of the Municipality did not appear to be legal as the local area intervening is not within the municipal limits of the municipality within which Hind Motor town was being proposed to be included. Mr. Pal submitted that the railway lines are on property belonging to the Union of India and not to the Uttarpara-Kotrung Municipality. ( 33 ) MR. Pal then submitted that the minimum height of the railway lines is 120 feet and at places it touches even 250 feet. At some places there are railway stations, platforms and other railway equipment. According to Mr. Pal, the railway lines demarcate and completely separate the local area and the municipal area and such total separation negates the very concept of common boundary. ( 34 ) MR. Pal urged that since the local area defined in the aforesaid notification is not contiguous to the municipality within the meaning of section 6 (1) of the bengal Municipal Act, 1932, one of the conditions precedent for issuing the notification under section 6 (1) (d) of the said Act was absent and both the initial notification dated 16th September, 1969 and the final notification dated 24th december, 1971, were without jurisdiction and ultra vires the aforesaid Act. Referring to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Barium chemicals Limited vs. Company Law Board, reported in AIR 1967 SC page 295, Mr. Pal submitted that as had been explained in the said decision the discretion given to a statutory authority has to be exercised properly and such discretion could be exercised only after a bona fide opinion had been arrived at for exercise of such discretion. ( 35 ) MR. Pal submitted that as had been explained in the said decision the discretion given to a statutory authority has to be exercised properly and such discretion could be exercised only after a bona fide opinion had been arrived at for exercise of such discretion. ( 35 ) MR. Pal urged that no declaration could have been made by the State government under section 6 (1) (d) of the aforesaid Act, unless it was satisfied that three-fourths of the adult male population of the local area to which it referred are chiefly employed in pursuits other than agriculture. In this regard, mr. Pal referred to the letter dated 28th December, 1971, written by the Block development Officer, Serampore-Uttarpara Block, to the Deputy Director of panchayats, West Bengal, with regard to the proposed inclusion of part of Mouza uttarpara (JL 12), entire Mouza of Makhla (JL 11) and part of Mouza Bhadrakali (JL 9) to Uttarpara-Kotrung Municipality. It was mentioned in the letter that the area is purely agricultural, backward and under-developed as the population is comprised of daily labourers and agriculturists. It was also mentioned that if the areas of Makhla and Bhadrakali were included in Uttarpara-Kotrung municipality the same would create an unbearable strain on the civic amenities. Mr. Pal pointed out that the Block Development Officer recommended inclusion only a portion of Kotrung Mouza to the Uttarpara-Kotrung Municipality and to leave the area of Mouza Makhla Uttarpara and Bhadrakali. ( 36 ) REGARDING the population and the occupation of persons residing in the said area, Mr. Pal urged that from the figures available it is clear that the adult male population in the entire area is chiefly employed in the pursuits of agriculture and the second condition of the proviso (iv) to section 6 (1) of the Act was not, therefore, satisfied. ( 37 ) MR. Pal also contended that the learned Judge had, in fact, proceeded on a fact which was extraneous to the statute by including the expression 'working' in respect of the adult male population. Mr. Pal submitted that such fact was not contemplated by the statute and the learned Judge had erred in incorporating the same in the course of his findings. According to Mr. Pal, this constitutes an error of law apparent on the fact of the judgment and render the same wholly erroneous. Mr. Pal submitted that such fact was not contemplated by the statute and the learned Judge had erred in incorporating the same in the course of his findings. According to Mr. Pal, this constitutes an error of law apparent on the fact of the judgment and render the same wholly erroneous. ( 38 ) AS to the decision of the Minister dated 9th December, 1980, pursuant to the order passed in Matter No. 635 of 1978, Mr. Pal submitted that reliance was placed by the Minister upon the judgment delivered on 28th June, 1977, in c. R. No. 7374 (W) of 1972, upholding the notification dated 24th December, 1971. According to the Minister, the said findings had not been questioned in any subsequent judicial decision and thus there was no alternative but to rely on the said findings. Mr. Pal submitted that the Minister proceeded on a completely erroneous assumption, inasmuch as, in the appeal preferred against the judgment dated 28th June, 1977, being FMA No. 809 of 1977, the Appeal court had dismissed the appeal upon the assurance given to the Court that the respondents would not take any steps in terms of the impugned notification dated 24th December, 1971 and would reconsider the matter upon giving a personal hearing to the applicant. Mr. Pal contended that even the Hon'ble supreme Court while disposing of the Special Leave Petition preferred against the Appeal Court's order dated 2nd March, 1978 and the order dated 3rd July, 1978, passed by the Minister-in-Charge of Municipal Affairs, had allowed the petitions to be withdrawn with liberty to the petitioner company to move the high Court for determining the validity of the notifications on the question as to whether the requirements for the issue of such notification for extension of municipal limits had been complied with. ( 39 ) MR. Pal submitted that the Minister was, therefore, wrong in relying on the judgment dated 28th June, 1977, without noticing the order of the Appeal court passed in the appeal from the said judgment. ( 40 ) MR. Pal submitted that for the reasons aforesaid the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge on 15th March, 1991, passed pursuant to the said order was liable to be quashed. ( 40 ) MR. Pal submitted that for the reasons aforesaid the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge on 15th March, 1991, passed pursuant to the said order was liable to be quashed. ( 41 ) AS far as the appeals relating to the order dated 9th August, 1991, passed by the learned Single Judge after disposal of Matter No. 330 of 1981 are concerned, Mr. Pal urged that in the event the appeal preferred by the company is allowed, the two appeals preferred by the State and the Municipality must be held to have become infructuous. However, in the event, the appeal preferred by the company is dismissed, even then the submissions advanced in support of the said appeals are no longer res Integra in view of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Damodar Valley Corporation vs. Damodar Valley corporation Displaced Employees' Union, reported in Cal LT 1992 (2) HC page 244, wherein the Division Bench rejected the contention that the learned Single judge had no jurisdiction to pass the concerned order after disposal of the main writ petition. Mr. Pal submitted that the Damodar Valley Corporation had gone on appeal to the Supreme Court against the order of the Division Bench but the Supreme Court dismissed the said appeal. ( 42 ) MR. Pal submitted that while dismissing the appeal preferred by the damodar Valley Corporation the Division Bench relied on certain observation made in 'halsbury's Laws of England' to the effect that the circumstances or the nature of a judgment or order often render necessary subsequent appeals to the Court for assistance in working out the rights declared. All orders of the court carry with them inherent liberty to appeal to the Court and there is no need to reserve expressly such liberty in the case of orders which are not final. ( 43 ) MR. Pal also submitted that the law had been settled by the Hon'ble supreme Court that Articles 226 of the Constitution is meant for speedy remedy and is couched in widest possible terms and encompasses the power of the high Court to even treat a review petition as a fresh writ petition and pass appropriate orders. According to Mr. Pal also submitted that the law had been settled by the Hon'ble supreme Court that Articles 226 of the Constitution is meant for speedy remedy and is couched in widest possible terms and encompasses the power of the high Court to even treat a review petition as a fresh writ petition and pass appropriate orders. According to Mr. Pal, the upshot of the combined reading of the order dated 15th March, 1991 and 9th August, 1991 is that the direction for reconsideration contained in the order dated 15th March, 1991 was superseded by the direction for consideration in the order dated 9th August, 1991. ( 44 ) MR. Pal submitted that for the reasons aforesaid the two appeals preferred by the State and the Municipality against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 9th August, 1991, were liable to be dismissed along with the order passed by the Minister on 17th July, 1991, on the basis of the order dated 15th March, 1991. Mr. Pal urged that the Minister-in-Charge of Municipal Affairs is required to be directed to consider the feasibility of formation of a Gram Panchayat comprising the town of Hind Motor after hearing the parties and by passing a reasoned order. ( 45 ) FROM the materials on record and the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties it is clear that the appeal preferred by M/s Hindustan Motors limited will depend mainly on the question as to whether the provisions of section 6 (l) (d) and proviso (iv) thereto of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, have been satisfied or not when the two notifications dated 12th December, 1969 and 24th December, 1971 were published by the State Government. ( 46 ) AS has been indicated hereinbefore, under section 6 (1) (d) and proviso (iv) thereto, the State Government is required to consider whether the area to be included within the local limits of a Municipality is contiguous or not and as to whether three-fourths of the adult male population of the area to be included are chiefly employed in pursuits other than agriculture. Both the questions had been considered in the several writ applications filed on behalf of the appellant company and lastly in the judgment dated 15th March, 1991, disposing of the fourth writ application, being Matter No, 330 of 1991, the learned Single judge took note of the fact that the two sides of the railway line are capable of being negotiated by means of a link road. The learned Judge also took note of the submissions made on behalf of the Municipality that there were several other Municipalities where the same situation existed. ( 47 ) IN our view, the decision of the learned Single Judge on the question of contiguity of the two tracts of land is sound and does not require any interference having regard to the similar circumstances existing with regard to other municipalities where not only railway lines but even a river divides the two portions of the same Municipality. The other contention regarding the occupation of three-fourths of the adult male population in pursuits other than agriculture has also been considered on the basis of the data collected from the Directorate of census 1961 and 1971 for the district of Hooghly. The said census reports had been duly produced before the learned Single Judge who had disposed of Civil rule No. 7374 (W) of 1972 and had also been placed before the Minister concerned who had decided the representation of the appellant company. The learned Judge took into consideration the fact that the census report of 1971 clearly indicates that more than three-fourths of the working adult male population of the local area included in the municipality were chiefly engaged in pursuits other than agriculture. Of course, a question has been raised on behalf of the appellant company that the provisions of proviso (iv) to section 69 (l) (d) of the 1932 Act contemplates that three-fourths of the adult male population of the local area to be included must be chiefly engaged in pursuits other than agriculture and that the learned Single Judge had imported the concept of "working" adult male population while considering the aforesaid question. That is certainly a factor to be considered in favour of the appellant company, but subsequently, in the 1981 census report the said local area has been classified as non-municipal urban area. That is certainly a factor to be considered in favour of the appellant company, but subsequently, in the 1981 census report the said local area has been classified as non-municipal urban area. Furthermore, two civic elections have intervened in the meantime on the basis of the final notification dated 24th December, 1971 and, in our view, it would not be proper at this belated stage to upset a settled position merely on the question that instead of taking into consideration three-fourths of the adult male population, the learned Single Judge had proceeded on the basis that three-fourths of the "working" adult male population were chiefly engaged in pursuits other than agriculture. The municipality had taken possession of the added area on and from the month of August, 1991, pursuant to the formal recording of the inclusion of the same within the Uttarpara-Kotrung Municipality by the District magistrate, Hooghly on 9th August, 1991. ( 48 ) IN our view, the objection taken on behalf of the appellant is too technical to be considered at this belated stage and the appeal preferred by the appellant company must, therefore, be dismissed. ( 49 ) AS far as the two appeals filed by the Municipal Commissioners of uttarpara-Kotrung Municipality and the State of West Bengal are concerned, we are inclined to agree with submissions made by Mr. Ghosal and the learned advocate General that having delivered a final judgment the learned Single judge had become functus officio and, in any event, the modification of the direction in the judgment of 15th March, 1991 could not have been made on mere mentioning with or without notice. In the said two appeals a ground has been categorically taken that notwithstanding that it had been indicated in the impugned order of 9th August, 1991, that the matter had been mentioned on notice, no notice had, in fact, been given to the appellants before the matter was mentioned and the directions contained in the judgment of 15th March, 1991, were modified. ( 50 ) THE decisions cited by Mr. Pal are not, in our view, germane to the facts involved in these appeals. ( 50 ) THE decisions cited by Mr. Pal are not, in our view, germane to the facts involved in these appeals. The decision of the Division Bench in the case of damodar Valley Corporation (supra) were passed in circumstances which were different from those of the instant case, inasmuch as, the learned Single Judge had taken up the entire matter for disposal in terms of an earlier liberty given to His Lordship. Even the except from Halsbury's Laws of England are in respect of powers inherent in a Court in case of orders which are not final. Mr. Pal's submission that the power under Article 226 of the Constitution is meant for speedy remedy is couched in the widest possible terms, does not, in our view, include the power to modify the directions contained in a judgment finally disposing of a matter on mere mentioning and that too without notice. ( 51 ) IN our view, the said two appeals must succeed on the aforesaid ground alone and are allowed accordingly. The order dated 9th August, 1991, impugned in the said two appeals is hereby set aside. ( 52 ) THERE will be no order as to costs. ( 53 ) PRAYER for stay is considered and refused having regard to the view taken by us. ( 54 ) ALL parties to act on the xerox signed copy of the operative portion of this judgment on the usual undertakings. ( 55 ) IF an urgent certified copy of this judgment is applied for, the same is to be supplied to the applicant expeditiously. Appeals allowed.