P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THE unsuccessful defendant Dr. Punuru Venkata Reddy, who is none other than the husband of the plaintiff-respondent Punuru Vijayalakshmi, preferred this appeal, aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 2. 1. 2003 made in O. S. No. 56 of 1997, on the file of learned Senior Civil Judge, Kavali, Nellore district. ( 2 ) FOR the purpose of convenience, the parties will be referred to as plaintiff and defendant as arrayed before the Senior civil Judge, Kavali. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of title, relating to the plaint schedule property and for delivery of possession and also for future mesne profits. On the strength of the respective pleadings of the parties and after settlement of issues, the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kavali, on appreciation of the evidence of P. Ws. l to 3 and D. Ws. 1 to 7 and also Exs. A-1 to A-21 and Exs. B-1 to B-6 and Exs. X-1 to X-7 and Exs. C-1 and C-2, ultimately arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs prayed for, but however, directed the parties to bear their own costs in view of the close relationship between the parties. ( 4 ) SRI Laxmana Sarma, the learned counsel, representing appellant, while making elaborate submissions, had taken this Court through the respective pleadings of the parties, plaint, written statement, additional written statement, rejoinder, issues settled and also the oral and documentary evidence let in by the parties and would contend that the Trial Court had totally erred in coming to the conclusion that the respondent-plaintiff is entitled to the decree as prayed for. The learned Counsel also had pointed out that there is any amount of doubt or suspicion in relation to passing of consideration from the hands of the plaintiff and on the contrary the evidence of d. Ws. l and 2 is clear and categorical on this aspect and especially in view of the close relationship between the parties, the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kavali should have believed the defence taken by the appellant-defendant and should have dismissed the suit. The learned Counsel in a meticulous way had taken this Court through both oral and documentary evidence available on record. The learned Counsel in a meticulous way had taken this Court through both oral and documentary evidence available on record. The Counsel would contend that despite the fact that the parties are close relatives, who are none other than husband and wife and even otherwise also related, the fact remains that the terms are not cordial and specific plea of adverse possession had been taken in the written statement, but no specific issue was settled in this regard and clear findings had not been recorded and even in this view of the matter, the learned Senior civil Judge, Kavali had not arrived at the correct conclusion while deciding the matter. The learned Counsel also had taken this court not only through the evidence of d. Ws. 1 and 2 but also the evidence of d. Ws. 3 to 6 and also D. W. 7. No doubt, the learned Counsel made an attempt to show that the marriage of this appellant-defendant with Sujatha, is first in point of time especially in the light of the evidence of d. W. 7. Several other contentions had also been advanced in relation to the evidence of P. W. I, P. W. 3 and much comment had been made, relating to the evidence of p. W. 2 on the ground that he is only an interested witness who had supported P. W. I in relation to the passing of consideration. The Counsel also in all fairness submitted that the general principles relating to the benami prior to the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1998 alone have to be taken into consideration and even otherwise in view of the fiduciary relationship, the parties being husband and wife, the bar under the Provisions of the said Act may not be operative. ( 5 ) PER contra, Sri Ravindranath reddy, the learned Counsel representing respondent-plaintiff would submit that this is a pitiable case of a wife towards whom never affection was shown by the husband. The learned Counsel also submitted that the facts clearly reveal that after marrying the present plaintiff, under circumstances explained, the appellant-defendant came into contact with said Sujatha. ( 5 ) PER contra, Sri Ravindranath reddy, the learned Counsel representing respondent-plaintiff would submit that this is a pitiable case of a wife towards whom never affection was shown by the husband. The learned Counsel also submitted that the facts clearly reveal that after marrying the present plaintiff, under circumstances explained, the appellant-defendant came into contact with said Sujatha. The learned counsel also in all fairness submitted that the suit being for declaration of title and recovery of possession on the strength of sale deed standing in the name of the respondent-plaintiff, this question was no doubt incidentally decided since the factum of validity of marriage is not the principal question of controversy between the parties. The learned Counsel also had explained that by evidence of P. Ws. l to 3 coupled with exs. A-1 to A-21 and also Exs. X-1 to X-7, the purchase of the property and the passing of consideration had been well established by the respondent-plaintiff, though the burden squarely lies on the part of the appellant-defendant. The learned Counsel also would submit that the stand taken by d. W. I that there was payment of higher consideration and the document was taken for a lesser consideration for evasion of stamp duty, cannot be sustained especially in the light of the bar imposed by Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act and also in the light of the clear recitals in Ex. A-3. The learned Counsel also would submit that this is a case of husband and wife. No doubt, the relationship might have been strained, but the fact remains that even prior to the marriage, they are very close relatives. The relationship can be traced back even prior to their marriage and in the light of the same, the plea of adverse possession if any taken by the appellant defendant may have to be appreciated. The counsel further submitted that though specific issue was not framed, both the parties are conscious of this aspect and evidence had been let in, and hence, by the mere fact of non-framing of the said issue, no prejudice is caused to the appellant defendant and hence that cannot be a ground to disturb the well considered findings recorded by the learned Senior Civil Judge, kavali in this regard. ( 6 ) HEARD both the Counsel and perused the oral and documentary evidence available on record and also the findings recorded by the learned Trial Judge in this regard. ( 7 ) BEFORE proceeding with the further discussion for proper appreciation of the factual matrix, the respective pleadings of the parties may be relevant. The plaintiff had pleaded as hereunder: the plaint schedule property originally belonged to Dr. M. Venkata Lakshmi narasimha Rao, who purchased it under a sale deed dated 25. 9. 1971. The plaintiff purchased the plaint schedule property from said M. Venkata Lakshmi narasimha Rao under a registered sale deed dated 26-8-1974 for Rs. 16,000/ -. The earlier title deed was also handed over to the plaintiff. The possession of plaint schedule property was delivered to the plaintiff. Ever since then, plaintiff has been paying house tax to the suit schedule property. In view of her close relationship with the defendant, the plaintiff permitted the defendant to run his hospital in the plaint schedule property. Thus, the defendant is in possession of plaint schedule property. The plaintiff being in need of premises and as defendant neglected her, has been demanding the defendant to deliver possession of plaint schedule property by vacating the same, but the defendant has been evading to do on some ground or other. Being left with no other option, plaintiff got issued a notice to the defendant on 27. 10. 1997 to vacate the premises, but the defendant having received the notice, neither replied nor vacated the premises. Hence, the plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of title and for delivery of possession. Accordingly, the plaintiff is entitled for the reliefs sought for. ( 8 ) IN the written statement, the appellant as defendant pleaded as hereunder: it is true that plaint schedule property originally belonged to M. Venkata lakshmi Narasimha Rao, who purchased it. But it is not true to say that plaintiff purchased the plaint schedule property from him under a sale deed dated 26-8-1974 for Rs. 16,000/- and possession of property was delivered to the plaintiff. It is also false to state that plaintiff permitted the defendant to run hospital in plaint schedule property. It is false to state that plaintiff is in need of suit house, and the defendant neglected her, and plaintiff demanded the defendant to vacate it. 16,000/- and possession of property was delivered to the plaintiff. It is also false to state that plaintiff permitted the defendant to run hospital in plaint schedule property. It is false to state that plaintiff is in need of suit house, and the defendant neglected her, and plaintiff demanded the defendant to vacate it. It is true that defendant received notice issued by plaintiff, but due to the intervention of husband of sister of plaintiff, who assured to settle the matter, the defendant could not send the reply. The plaintiff is the sister s daughter of defendant. This defendant studied his M. B. B. S. , Degree in a Medical College at Kakinada whereas dr. Sujatha was studying M. B. B. S. , course at Thirupati in 1970. They fell in love and decided to marry. But it was not intimated to the parents since it is inter caste marriage, which may not be acceptable to them. The marriage took place in a cottage in Tirupati in the presence of friends, well-wishers like mr. Murthy, A. Sreenivasa, an employee of T. T. D. and his wife, who was MBBS student, and others as per Hindu rites, caste, custom and usage. The marriage was also consummated. This defendant s family and his sister s husband Thirupathi reddy were doing business jointly. In the division, the defendant s share and the share of Thirupathi Reddy were taken by the latter, and his brothers Kota reddy and Ramana Reddy took their half share. The plaintiffs father was managing the share of the defendant. The plaintiffs father having come to know about the marriage of defendant with Dr. Sujatha, which took place on 15-2-1970, came to kakinada and brought this defendant to kavali and all the family members forced defendant to marry the plaintiff and the marriage was performed against the will and wish of this defendant on 15-8-1970. The relationship between plaintiff and the defendant is not cordial from the beginning of their marriage. The defendant and dr. Sujatha came down to Kavali and started to reside and practice together. The defendant asked his father Ankireddy and his elder brother Kota Reddy to arrange for purchase of suit house. Mischievously, they took the sale deed in the name of plaintiff, though sale consideration was paid by the defendant, who did not verify the document in whose name it was taken. The defendant asked his father Ankireddy and his elder brother Kota Reddy to arrange for purchase of suit house. Mischievously, they took the sale deed in the name of plaintiff, though sale consideration was paid by the defendant, who did not verify the document in whose name it was taken. Subsequently, defendant started his Nursing Home in the plaint schedule house in the name and style of Pragathi Nursing Home. The defendant made lot of improvements spending huge amounts to the said building. The defendant got three children through dr. Sujatha. For all practicable purpose the marriage between plaintiff and defendant is dissolved as the plaintiff never attempted to join the defendant. Now, she filed this suit at the instance of a person, who wanted to grab the property. By being in uninterrupted possession of property openly for more than a statutory period, the defendant perfected his title by adverse possession. The parents of defendant who are interested to unite the plaintiff and defendant, paid house tax in the name of plaintiff and handed over the documents to her. Accordingly, the plaintiff is not entitled for the suit relief and the suit is liable to be dismissed. ( 9 ) THE respondent-plaintiff filed a rejoinder, denying the marriage between the defendant and Dr. Sujatha and had taken a stand that the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant took place on 6-9-1970 and the plaintiff realized funds from her father s Rice Mill to purchase the suit house. The other allegations in the written statement also had been specifically denied in the rejoinder. The appellant-defendant also filed another additional written statement denying the allegations made in the rejoinder. ( 10 ) ON the strength of the respective pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled:1. Whether the plaintiff has got right and title over plaint schedule property ?2. Whether the defendant is liable to deliver suit schedule property in favour of plaintiff ?3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for further profits as prayed ?4. To what relief ? ( 11 ) AS already referred to supra, on behalf of the respondent-plaintiff, the plaintiff got herself examined as P. W. I and also got examined two other persons as p. Ws. 2 and 3. P. W. 2 is the Accountant of lakshmi Prasanna Rice Mill and P. W. 3 is the scribe of Ex. To what relief ? ( 11 ) AS already referred to supra, on behalf of the respondent-plaintiff, the plaintiff got herself examined as P. W. I and also got examined two other persons as p. Ws. 2 and 3. P. W. 2 is the Accountant of lakshmi Prasanna Rice Mill and P. W. 3 is the scribe of Ex. A-3 sale deed, under which the property was purchased by the plaintiff. Apart from Exs. A-1 to A-21 Exs. X-1 to X-7 were also marked. The defendant got himself examined as D. W. I, and 6 more persons were examined as D. Ws. 2 to 7. Exs. B-1 to B-6 and Exs. C-1 and C-2 were marked. Findings had been recorded and ultimately the suit was decreed and aggrieved by the same, the present appeal had been preferred by the unsuccessful defendant. ( 12 ) THE points which emerge for consideration in the present appeal are as hereunder: (A) Whether the respondent-plaintiff has got title to the plaint schedule property and whether she is entitled to recover possession of the plaint schedule property from the appellant defendant ? (B) If so, what relief the parties are entitled to ? ( 13 ) POINT a : this point being a comprehensive point, all the aspects of the case may be dealt with. No doubt, non-framing of an issue relating to the plea of adverse possession had been elaborately canvassed, but in the light of the close relationship between the parties and also in the absence of clear and categorical evidence when there was a specific denial of the right or title of the plaintiff by the defendant and when the hostile possession in an un-interrupted fashion had commenced, this question falls into insignificance. Be that as it may, the case of the plaintiff is that she purchased the plaint schedule property under a registered sale deed dated 26. 8. 1974 for Rs. Be that as it may, the case of the plaintiff is that she purchased the plaint schedule property under a registered sale deed dated 26. 8. 1974 for Rs. 16,000/- from M. Venkata Lakshmi Narasimha Rao, who delivered possession of the said property along with the prior title deed and she had been paying house tax and inasmuch as the defendant is her husband, she permitted the defendant to run hospital in the plaint schedule property and subsequent thereto defendant neglected her and inasmuch as the plaintiff is in need of the plaint schedule property, she demanded the defendant to vacate and despite the notice since he did not comply with the demand, the present suit was filed. ( 14 ) THE stand taken by the appellant defendant is that plaintiff never purchased the plaint schedule property and she had not paid any consideration; that he married one Sujatha; that since his parents forced him to marry the plaintiff, against his will, he married the plaintiff. But the defendant and Sujatha alone have been practicing together and the defendant asked his father and elder brother to arrange the suit house for purchase, but unfortunately they had taken the sale deed in the name of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is taking advantage of the same. The defendant also had taken a specific plea that inasmuch as he had been in continuous possession, he perfected his title by adverse possession. No-doubt, the evidence of D. W. I had been discussed in detail in relation to the proof of marriage of the defendant with Sujatha. It is pertinent to note that the validity of marriage or otherwise is not the question in controversy between the parties. At any rate, in the absence of Sujatha, who will be also an effected party, that question need not be gone into in the present suit. Hence, the findings recorded relating to this aspect may not be much relevant as far as this litigation is concerned. There is no controversy relating to the factum of marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant. The stand taken by the defendant also is that due to force by his parents, he also married the defendant. The crucial question to be decided in the present appeal is whether by virtue of Ex. There is no controversy relating to the factum of marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant. The stand taken by the defendant also is that due to force by his parents, he also married the defendant. The crucial question to be decided in the present appeal is whether by virtue of Ex. A-3, the respondent-plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs as prayed for or whether she is liable to be non-suited for the reasons explained by the appellant-defendant. ( 15 ) P. W. I as plaintiff deposed categorically all the facts and also had explained Ex. A-1 wedding card, Ex. A-2 and Ex. A-3, the originals of title deeds in her favour and ex. A-4 earlier title deed. Apart from these, exs. A-5 to A-10, house tax receipts are standing in her name. Ex. A-11 is the office copy of lawyer s notice, Ex. A-12 is postal acknowledgement, Ex. A-13 is envelope. The contents of the letter Ex. A-14 also had been argued at length. Ex. A-15 is the original registered relinquishment deed, dated 17-1-1974, executed by the defendant in favour of Tirupati Reddy, Ex. A-16 is the signature of the defendant on demand notice dated 31-3-1976, Ex. A-17 is the served copy of the plaint in O. S. No. 57 of 1971, ex. A-18 is the copy of summons, Ex. A-19 is the private notice, Ex. A-20 is the certificate issued by A. A. O. , Ex. A-21 is the note book. Apart from explaining these documents, P. W. I had deposed in detail taking of the sale deed-Ex. A-3 in her name and the other title deed Ex. A-4 and also payment of consideration by her was amply supported by the evidence of P. W. 2, the accountant in the Rice Mill of the father of the plaintiff Tirupati Reddy and the same is well established by marking Exs. X-1 to X-7. Apart from the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2, there is evidence of P. W. 3 also. P. W. 3 is the scribe of Ex. A-3. This evidence of p. Ws. 1 to 3 had been elaborately discussed by the learned Senior Civil Judge and clear findings had been recorded that the respondent-plaintiff was able to establish the passing of title in her favour by virtue of ex. A-3 and ultimately granted a decree in her favour. P. W. 3 is the scribe of Ex. A-3. This evidence of p. Ws. 1 to 3 had been elaborately discussed by the learned Senior Civil Judge and clear findings had been recorded that the respondent-plaintiff was able to establish the passing of title in her favour by virtue of ex. A-3 and ultimately granted a decree in her favour. As against this evidence, the evidence of D. W. 1 defendant and also the evidence of D. W. 2 the attestor of Ex. A-3 is no-doubt available on record apart from other documentary evidence for the purpose of judging the nature of Ex. A-3 transaction. As already specified supra, the evidence of D. W. 7 is in relation to the proof of marriage in between the appellant defendant and Sujatha, which may not be of much significance to the present litigation. ( 16 ) D. WS. 3 to 6 are the tenants, no doubt, who support the case of D. W. I to a particular extent. The evidence of D. Ws. 3 to 6 may have to be appreciated, taking into consideration the close relationship between p. W. I and D. W. I. It is also pertinent to note that D. W. 2 also is a close relative of d. W. I and equally he may be related to p. W. 1 also. The evidence of D. W. 1 is not trustworthy; especially for the reason that d. W. I had deposed that he was not aware of the property standing in the name of his wife at all and he came to know about the same just prior to the litigation. Much comment had been made by the learned Trial Judge in this regard while appreciating the evidence of D. W. I. D. W. I also had taken a stand that the consideration recited in Ex. A-1 is not the real consideration but something more was paid but for the purpose of evading the stamp duty the sale deed was taken for lesser amount. When the recitals of the document Ex. A-3 are clear and categorical, this oral evidence cannot be given much weight, especially in the light of the bar imposed by Sections 91 and 92 of the indian Evidence Act, 1872. When the recitals of the document Ex. A-3 are clear and categorical, this oral evidence cannot be given much weight, especially in the light of the bar imposed by Sections 91 and 92 of the indian Evidence Act, 1872. I have given my anxious consideration to all the findings recorded by the learned Senior Civil Judge, kavali, who in fact had dealt with the evidence of D. Ws. l and 2 and also the evidence of P. Ws. l, 2 and P. W. 3 at length and had recorded a clear finding that the consideration in relation to Ex. A-3 had passed from the hands of the plaintiff only and hence the plea taken by the appellant defendant that the sale deed was taken by his family members in view of the close relationship, in the name of his wife, but the said purchase was made by the family members only for his benefit, cannot be sustained. Ex. B-1 is a certified copy of the birth certificate, dated 20. 7. 1974, Ex. B-2 is a certified copy of the birth extract dated 15-9-1975 and Ex. B-3 is a certified copy of the birth extract, dated 25-4-1978, Ex. B-4 is a bunch of 10 receipts relating to service connection No. 460, Ex. B-5 is the demand notice relating to additional deposit, Ex. B-6 is the demand notice dated 1-9-2002. Exs. C-1 and C-2 are the Commissioner s report and the Commissioner s plan respectively. Exs. B-1 to B-3 documents had been relied upon to show mere birth of the children. Those questions may not be very relevant or germane to the present litigation. As far as passing of consideration is concerned, the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kavali had appreciated the evidence of D. Ws. l and 2 also and he had preferred the evidence of p. W. I well supported by the evidence of p. W. 2 and the entries in Exs. X-1 to X-7. Apart from this evidence, the evidence of the scribe of the document Ex. A-3, P. W. 3 also is available on record. These are findings recorded on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence at length in detail by the Trial Court. Now the question is whether such findings be disturbed by this Court or the said findings are to be confirmed in the facts and circumstances of the case. A-3, P. W. 3 also is available on record. These are findings recorded on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence at length in detail by the Trial Court. Now the question is whether such findings be disturbed by this Court or the said findings are to be confirmed in the facts and circumstances of the case. In Lakshmiah v. Kothandarama, air 1925 PC 181, their Lordships of the privy Council held: a purchase in India by a native of India of property in India in the name of his wife unexplained by other proved or admitted facts is to be regarded as a benami transaction by which the beneficial interest in the property is in the husband although the ostensible title is in the wife. The rule of law of England that such a purchase by a husband in England is to be assumed to be a purchase for the advancement of the wife does not apply in India. In Sitamma v. Sitapatirao, AIR 1938 madras 8, the Division Bench of the Madras high Court held: the onus lies upon the person who pleads that certain transaction executed and registered in the name of a person is benami. The Division Bench also had observed that: where a wife has a separate income of her own, though the amount thereof is not known, and certain properties are purchased in her name, the mere fact that it is found impossible to connect any of the sale deeds relating to the properties with a particular item of asset belonging to the wife does not necessarily lead to the inference that the purchases have been made with the family funds by the husband. The mere suspicion that the purchases might not have wholly been made with the lady s money will certainly not suffice to establish that the purchases were benami, nor even the suspicion that moneys belonging to the husband, whether in a smaller measure or a larger measure, must have also contributed to these purchases. Even in cases where there is positive evidence that money had been contributed by the husband and not by the wife, that circumstance is not conclusive in favour of the benami character of the transaction, though it is an important criterion. Even in cases where there is positive evidence that money had been contributed by the husband and not by the wife, that circumstance is not conclusive in favour of the benami character of the transaction, though it is an important criterion. It is true that the Indian law, the English rule as to presumption of advancement has not been adopted, but section 82, Trusts Act, recognizes that money may have been contributed by another towards a purchase with the intention of giving a beneficial interest to the person in whose name the purchase is made. The relationship of husband and wife between the person who contributes the money and the person in whose name the sale is taken will be a very important factor in determining whether the transaction was really meant for the benefit of the wife or not. Where the motive alleged for a benami transaction itself suggests that the purpose in view could be served only by a genuine transfer and not by a mere benami transaction, the more reasonable inference is that the transfer was intended to be operative as a transfer of beneficial interest and not as a mere benami transaction. While dealing with the aspect of English rule of advancement and applicability thereof to India in Sahdeo Karan Singh v. Usman Ali Khan, AIR 1939 Patna 462, the division Bench of the Patna High Court held: there is no rule in India corresponding with the presumption of advancement which is in existence in England. If A purchases property and takes a conveyance or transfer in the name of B, B is not a beneficial owner of the property but holds it in trust for A. There is a resulting trust in favour of the person who provided the consideration. In england, however, if the conveyance or transfer is made not to a stranger but to the wife or child of the person who provided the consideration, then no resulting trust arises. If the transaction is wholly unexplained, the law in England presumes an intention to benefit wife or child. In india no such rule exists. Hence where property is purchased by father in the name of the son and the latter claims the property as his own by alleging that the father intended to make a gift of the property to him, onus rests upon him to establish such a gift. In india no such rule exists. Hence where property is purchased by father in the name of the son and the latter claims the property as his own by alleging that the father intended to make a gift of the property to him, onus rests upon him to establish such a gift. In Ratanchand v. Deochand, AIR (33) 1946 Bom. 157, the Division Bench of bombay High Court held: where the sale deed is in favour of the wife and there is nothing in it to indicate that she was only a benamidar for her husband, the onus lies on the other side to make out that the transaction was benami. No doubt the rule of English law that the purchase of property by a husband in the name of his wife is assumed to be for her advancement, has no application in India; but there is no presumption that property standing in the name of wife belongs to the husband. In Ramarao v. Srikrishnamurthi, AIR 1962 ap 226 , the Division Bench of this Court while laying down the tests of benami held: in order to decide whether a sale deed is benami for another it is necessary to consider the following relevant factors: (1) Motive for taking the sale deed in the name of another, (2) custody of the sale deed and the connected vouchers, (3) passing of consideration and (4) possession of the property. In Jaydayal Poddar v. Bibi Hazra, AIR 1974 SC 171 , the Apex Court while dealing with benami sale and onus of proof thereof and matters to be considered in determining benami nature of transaction held: it is well settled that the burden of proving that a particular sale is benami and the apparent purchaser is not the real owner, always rests on the person asserting it to be so. This burden has to be strictly discharged by adducing legal evidence of a definite character which would either directly prove the fact of benami or establish circumstances unerringly and reasonably raising an inference of that fact. The essence of a benami is the intention of the party or parties concerned; and not unoften such intention is shrouded in a thick veil which cannot be easily pierced through. The essence of a benami is the intention of the party or parties concerned; and not unoften such intention is shrouded in a thick veil which cannot be easily pierced through. But such difficulties do not relieve the person asserting the transaction to be benami of any part of the serious onus that rests on him; nor justify the acceptance of mere conjectures or surmises, as a substitute for proof. The reason is that a deed is a solemn document prepared and executed after considerable deliberation, and the person expressly shown as the purchaser or transferee in the deed, starts with the initial presumption in his favour that the apparent state of affairs is the real state of affairs. Though the question, whether a particular sale is benami or not, is largely one of fact, and for determining this question, no absolute formulae or acid test, uniformally applicable in all situations, can be laid down; yet in weighing the probabilities and for gathering the relevant indicia, the Courts are usually guided by these circumstances: (1) the source from which the purchase money came; (2) the nature and possession of the property, after the purchase; (3) motive, if any, for giving the transaction a benami colour; (4) the position of the parties and the relationship, if any, between the claimant and the alleged benamidar; (5) the custody of the title-deeds after the sale and (6) the conduct of the parties concerned in dealing with the property after the sale. In Bhim Singh v. Kan Singh, AIR 1980 sc 727 , while dealing with the principles governing determination whether a transaction is benami or not, the Apex Court held: the principle governing the determination of the question whether a transfer is a benami transaction or not may be summed up thus: (1) The burden of showing that a transfer is a benami transaction lies on the person who asserts that it is such a transaction; (2) if it is proved that the purchase money came from a person other than the person in whose favour the property is transferred, the purchase is prima facie assumed to be for the benefit of the person who supplied the purchase money, unless there is evidence to the contrary; (3) the true character of the transaction is governed by the intention of the person who has contributed the purchase money and (4) the question as to what his intention was has to be decided on the basis of the surrounding circumstances, the relationship of the parties, the motive governing their action in bringing about the transaction and their subsequent conduct, etc. , ( 17 ) IN the light of the catena of decisions referred to supra, there cannot be any controversy for the proposition that when a plea of this nature is raised by the husband, the burden is on the husband to discharge. The learned Senior Civil Judge, kavali on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence clearly held that this burden was not discharged and hence the plaintiff, in whose name the sale deed stands, is entitled to the reliefs prayed for in the suit. It is needless to say that none of the ingredients to satisfy the test of benami had been established by the appellant- defendant. The only strong ground which had been canvassed at length is the so called grave suspicion of passing of consideration from the hands of the plaintiff. It is no-doubt true that the attestor D. W. 2 had supported the version of D. W. I in this regard. But this evidence, in my considered opinion, may not be sufficient to hold that the appellant-defendant was able to discharge burden cast upon him in establishing that ex. A-3 is only a benami transaction, unless he is able to satisfy the other conditions also. But this evidence, in my considered opinion, may not be sufficient to hold that the appellant-defendant was able to discharge burden cast upon him in establishing that ex. A-3 is only a benami transaction, unless he is able to satisfy the other conditions also. In the present case, the parties are close relatives not only by virtue of the marital tie, but even prior thereto. It is not as though the respondent-plaintiff is not at all having any other independent income at all. It is in evidence that even prior thereto the father of the plaintiff was doing business and joint business also and the evidence of p. W. 2 is clear and categorical relating to the accounts maintained in regular course of business in the Rice Mill and the entries made therein, such entries made in regular course of business when proved by examining p. W. 3 normally may have to be presumed to be true unless contrary is established. In the light of Exs. X-1 to X-7 and the evidence of P. W. 2, who had supported the version of P. W. I in toto, this Court is satisfied that the passing of consideration in relation to ex. A-3 had been well established by the respondent-plaintiff. At any rate, the burden cast on the appellant-defendant had not been discharged and the, positive proof of passing of consideration from the hands of the family members of the defendant definitely had not been established. Apart from this aspect of the matter, yet another important aspect is that the original title deed Ex. A-3 is emanating from the custody of P. W. I only. Apart from it, the prior title deed Ex. A-4 also had been in the custody of P. W. I. The custody of the original title deeds also is an important factor to be considered while deciding the nature of the transaction. Yet another important aspect is that the tax is being paid regularly only by the respondent-plaintiff. The specific stand taken by her is that in view of the close relationship between the parties, she had permitted the husband to continue in the said property and when she is in need of the property, though a demand was made, since he was not inclined to deliver the possession of the property, the present Suit was initiated. The specific stand taken by her is that in view of the close relationship between the parties, she had permitted the husband to continue in the said property and when she is in need of the property, though a demand was made, since he was not inclined to deliver the possession of the property, the present Suit was initiated. The fact that he had been in possession of the property is being taken advantage of by the appellant-defendant putting forth the plea of adverse possession. Much comment had been made by the learned Counsel representing the appellant in this regard. The law is well settled as far as the plea of adverse possession is concerned and the same need not be elaborated again by this Court. Apart from the plea being specific, especially when the parties are close relatives, that too, husband and wife, be that the relationship may be strained. Unless there is a specific denial and a clear declaration to the knowledge of the wife that her title to the property by virtue of Ex. A-3 had been denied, there is no question of commencement of any adverse possession and in this view of the matter the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kavali had arrived at the correct conclusion that in the facts and circumstances of the case the possession to be taken only as permissive possession and definitely not adverse possession. Much comment had been made on the non-framing of specific issue in this regard. It is no-doubt true that it could have been better if a specific issue had been framed in this regard and findings had been recorded. But from the findings recorded by the learned Trial Judge, this Court is thoroughly satisfied that both the parties were conscious of this fact also and contentions had been advanced by both the Counsel. Hence, in any view of the matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that by non-framing of that issue, absolutely no prejudice had been caused and hence this contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant also cannot be sustained. Hence, in any view of the matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that by non-framing of that issue, absolutely no prejudice had been caused and hence this contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant also cannot be sustained. Several factual details narrated in the oral evidence had not been elaborated by this Court for the reason that it is not going to alter the situation in any way since several facts are not in controversy and the controversial factual aspects had been dealt with by this court while referring to the evidence of p. Ws. l to 3 and also D. Ws. l to 7. No-doubt, some comment was also made that the true consideration is not Rs. 16,000/-, but something more. This Court is of the opinion that this aspect also may not enure to the benefit of the appellant-defendant in the light of the clear recitals in Ex. A-3. ( 18 ) HENCE, viewed from any angle, this court is of the considered opinion that the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kavali had appreciated the oral and documentary evidence at length in detail and this Court does not see any reason to disturb those findings. However, it is made clear that sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence relating to the validity of the marriage, either with sujatha or with the plaintiff, and the findings in relation thereto are not relevant for the purpose of deciding the question in controversy and hence the said findings cannot be sustained, that too in the absence of Sujatha being made a party to the litigation. Except making this observation in all other aspects the findings recorded by the learned Senior civil Judge, Kavali are hereby confirmed. ( 19 ) POINT b : in the light of the foregoing discussion, it is needless to say that the appellant is bound to fail and accordingly the appeal shall stand dismissed. Despite the strained relationship between the parties, taking into consideration their close relationship, this Court directs both the parties to bear their own costs. At this stage, Sri Lakshman Sarma, the learned counsel representing the appellant-defendant submitted that appellant as defendant in fact is running a Hospital in the plaint schedule property and to make alternative arrangement, appellant-defendant needs some time. At this stage, Sri Lakshman Sarma, the learned counsel representing the appellant-defendant submitted that appellant as defendant in fact is running a Hospital in the plaint schedule property and to make alternative arrangement, appellant-defendant needs some time. Sri Ravindranth Reddy, the learned counsel for respondent-plaintiff opposed the said request on the ground that the report of the Commissioner also shows that in fact the appellant-defendnat is not running any hospital there at all and just for the purpose of postponing the execution of the decree such request is being made. Be that as it may, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant-defendant is granted two (2) months time to vacate the premises on undertaking to be filed in this regard within a period of two (2) weeks.