S. P. KHARE, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated June 27, 2003 (Annexure P/4) in Case No. 30/99/mpir of the Labour Court and order dated November 1, 2003 (Annexure p/6) in Appeal No. 100/mpir/2003 of the industrial Court, Jabalpur by which the petitioner has been directed to classify the respondent as "permanent employee". ( 2 ) IT is not in dispute that the respondent was appointed as sub-engineer on daily wages in Jabalpur Development Authority (JDA) on october 1, 1991 and he is by now completing almost thirteen years in that capacity. It is also not controverted that his work has been satisfactory. He submitted an application under section 31 (3) of the M. P. Industrial Relations act, 1960 (hereinafter to be referred to as the act of 1960) stating therein that he was appointed in a "clear vacancy". He claimed that he became a permanent employee as per clause 2 (i) and (vi) of the Standard Standing orders (SSOs) annexed to the M. P. Industrial employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1963 framed under the M. P. Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1961 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act of 1961 ). The petitioner submitted its reply denying that the appointment of the respondent was in "clear vacancy". It was stated that he was appointed as a "daily rated casual employee" and not against any permanent vacancy. It was also contended that the application under Section 31 (3) of the Act of 1960 was not maintainable as Jabalpur Development Authority is not an "industry" because it has been created under a statute and further it does not fall within the description of the industries given in the schedule appended to the notification under section 31 (3) of the Act of 1960. It was also stated that the services of the employees of this authority are governed by the M. P development Authority Services (Officers and servants) Recruitment Rules, 1987 (hereinafter called Rules of 1987) framed under the M. P. Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 (for short the Act of 1973) and, therefore, the application of the SSOs is excluded. It was also stated that the services of the employees of this authority are governed by the M. P development Authority Services (Officers and servants) Recruitment Rules, 1987 (hereinafter called Rules of 1987) framed under the M. P. Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 (for short the Act of 1973) and, therefore, the application of the SSOs is excluded. ( 3 ) THE Labour Court held that the respondent is continuously working as sub-engineer with the petitioner from October 1, 1991 and he has put in about 12 years of service on daily wages, he was appointed in a clear vacancy and his work is satisfactory. Therefore, he became entitled to be classified as permanent employee as per SSOs which are applicable to the employees of the petitioner. It was held that the Rules of 1987 framed under the Act of 1973 are not applicable to the respondent as these have not been notified under Section 2 (2) of the Act of 1961. It has been further held that the JDA is covered by the definition of "industry" and being an "engineering" industry comes within entry 16 of the Schedule and therefore the application under Section 31 (3) of the Act of 1960 is legally maintainable. In appeal filed by the petitioner the Industrial Court has upheld the finding of the Labour Court that the respondent was appointed against the vacant post of sub-engineer. It has also been held that the view taken by the Labour Court on question of law is also correct. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel for both the sides have been heard by this Court. The points for determination are (a) whether the petitioner jda is industry within the meaning of Section 2 (19) of the Act of 1960, (b) whether the petitioner is covered by entry No. 16 in the schedule to the notification under Section 1 (3) of this Act, (c) whether the services of the petitioner are governed by the SSOs and (d) whether he was appointed in clear vacancy and became a permanent employee. ( 5 ) POINT (a) the petitioner has not adduced any evidence regarding the precise nature of its activities. The plea of the petitioner JDA is that it has been constituted under the Act of 1973 and therefore, it is not an industry. ( 5 ) POINT (a) the petitioner has not adduced any evidence regarding the precise nature of its activities. The plea of the petitioner JDA is that it has been constituted under the Act of 1973 and therefore, it is not an industry. The preamble to this Act provides that it is an Act to make provision for planning and development and use of land; to make better provision for the preparation of development plans and zoning plans with a view to ensuring town planning schemes are made in a proper manner and their execution is made effective, to constitute Town and Country Planning authority for proper implementation of town and country development plan, to provide for the development and administration of special areas through Special Area Development authority, to make provision for the compulsory acquisition of land required for the purpose of the development plans and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid. ( 6 ) THE main functions of the Development authorities are systematic development of rural and Urban areas and implementation of master plans. These authorities are engaged primarily in the acquisition of land, development of colonies, demarcation and sale of plots, construction of buildings for residential and non-residential purposes and other activities of allied nature. These are non-sovereign functions. These come within the ambit of the welfare activities of the State. Some of its functions are purely economic and commercial in nature. They partake the character of private colonisers or builders. They are engaged in business and trade and provide service. They carry on systematic activity with the co-operation of their employees. The dominant object of these authorities is to give a boost to the housing and provide shelter to the members of the public. The predominant and integrated nature of their activity determines whether it is an "industry". These authorities do not exercise primary and inalienable functions of the State. If a business or service rendered by an individual or a private person would be an industry, it would equally be an industry in the hands of a statutory authority or Corporation. Non-sovereign welfare activities of the State or its instrumentality would come within the' definition of industry. ( 7 ) SECTION 2 (19) of the Act of 1960 defines the expression " industry". It is couched almost in the same language as in Section 2 (j) of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Non-sovereign welfare activities of the State or its instrumentality would come within the' definition of industry. ( 7 ) SECTION 2 (19) of the Act of 1960 defines the expression " industry". It is couched almost in the same language as in Section 2 (j) of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The forensic search in the interpretation of the word "industry" in this Section has been unparallel. It has been construed very widely from the very beginning. Its wider canvass has been further expanding with the passage of time. More and more enterprises are being brought within its fold in an anxiety to extend the protective umbrella of the labour laws to a larger number of workmen or employees. It has been described as "the fertile field of yielding fresh crops". The Government Departments and statutory Corporations attempt to wriggle out of the ambit of "industry" by resorting to the plea that they are exercising sovereign function but their attempts have more or less failed. ( 8 ) LONG back in Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Employees, AIR 1960 SC 675 : 1960-I-LLJ-523 various departments of the corporation were held to be an "industry". The case of Bangalore Water Supply and sewerage Boad v. A. Rajappa, AIR 1978 SC 548 : 1978 (2) SCC 213 : 1978-I-LLJ-349 can be described as "magna CARTA" of the industrial employees as Dhingra's case was said to be of civil servants. It has served as a spring board. The test for determining whether an enterprise is an "industry" evolved in this authoritative precedent is still holding the field as the suggestion to reconsider it has been rejected. Relying upon the test laid down in this case the Supreme Court has clarified in agriculture Produce Market Committee v. Ashok Harikuni AIR 2000 SC 3116 : 2000 (8) scc 61 : 2000-11- LLJ-1382 that the mere fact that one is an employee of statutory bodies would not take it outside the Industrial Disputes act, 1947. Even if a statute confers on any statutory body, any function which could be construed to be "sovereign" in nature that would not mean every other functions under the same statute to be also sovereign. The Court should examine the statute to sever one from other by comprehensively examining various provisions of that statute. Even if a statute confers on any statutory body, any function which could be construed to be "sovereign" in nature that would not mean every other functions under the same statute to be also sovereign. The Court should examine the statute to sever one from other by comprehensively examining various provisions of that statute. In interpreting any statute to find if it is " industry" or not the Court has to find its pith and subs ( 9 ) THE recent trend shows that more and more Government Departments and statutory bodies which are performing welfare activity ire coming within the ambit of "industry". To illustrate: Public Works Department, Irrigation department, Public Health Engineering department, Forest Department, Corporation undertaking construction work, Telecom department, All India Radio, Doordarshan, khadi and Village Industries, Tube-well projects have been held "industries" by the supreme Court in various decisions. All these cases have been exhaustively dealt with by my learned brother ARUN MISHRA J. in CITU v. State of M. P. , 2002 (1) MPHT 179 to hold that pwd is an "industry". This view has also been taken by the Supreme Court in State of gujarat v. PWD Employees Union, 2002 (10) scc 147 and CPWD v. Madhukar, 2002 (9) scc 622 . ( 10 ) THE argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner JDA that it is not an industry as it has been created under a statute is too late in the day and is so feeble that it was not even raised when the case of Bhopal Development authority came before this Court. That is bhopal Development Authority v. Farzana, 2002-IV-LLJ (Suppl)-1476 (NOC) (MP ). The learned counsel for the respondent has produced a copy of unreported judgment dated august 13, 1997 in JDA v. State of MP M. P. No. 2615 of 1986 in which it has been held by dharmadhikari, J. (as his lordship then was) that keeping in view the Preamble and provisions of the Act of 1973 Jabalpur development Authority is "industry". ( 11 ) THEREFORE, in view of the foregoing discussion it can be safely held that petitioner jda is an "industry" within the meaning of section 2 (19) of the Act of 1960 or Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. ( 11 ) THEREFORE, in view of the foregoing discussion it can be safely held that petitioner jda is an "industry" within the meaning of section 2 (19) of the Act of 1960 or Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. ( 12 ) POINT (b) the next question is whether the petitioner comes within any of the entries specified in the schedule to the notification issued under section 1 (3) of the Act of 1960. As discussed above the petitioner is engaged in civil engineering work of developing the land, demarcation of plots and building of houses and flats and in the activities incidental thereto. Therefore, it is covered by entry No. 16 of this schedule-"engineering". In SHORTER OXFORD english DICTIONARY "engineering" has been stated to mean "the work done by, or the profession of, an engineer". Again the meaning of 'engineer' is "one who designs and constructs works of public utility". According to CHAMBER's ENCYCLOPEDIA: "engineering", in its broader sense, is that "branch of human endeavour by which the forces of nature are brought under human control and the properties of nature made useful in structures and machines". Again as per RANDAM HOUSE dictionary of English language the meaning of word "engineering" is the art or science of making practical application of the knowledge of pure science as physics, chemistry etc. as in the construction of engines, bridges, buildings, mines, chemical plants and the like. Therefore, the activity of the petitioner is covered by civil "engineering". ( 13 ) IN Bharatchand v. State of M. P. , 1993 mplj 159 it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court that the Public Health Engineering department of Madhya Pradesh Government whose essential function is to build reservoir, dams, canals and to dig well for maintaining supply and distribution of water to the public is covered by Entry 16 of this notification. Therefore, Jabalpur Development Authority which being engaged in the work of civil engineering, as mentioned above, would also be covered by this entry. In such a situation the petitioner could directly knock at the doors of the Labour Court under Section 31 (3) of the act of 1960 instead of adopting a circuitous route of approaching it through the reference procedure given in the Central Act. ( 14 ) POINT (c) the tug-of-war is between the SSOs and the Regulations of 1987. In such a situation the petitioner could directly knock at the doors of the Labour Court under Section 31 (3) of the act of 1960 instead of adopting a circuitous route of approaching it through the reference procedure given in the Central Act. ( 14 ) POINT (c) the tug-of-war is between the SSOs and the Regulations of 1987. The question is which should prevail over the other. Standard standing Orders for all the undertakings in the state are given in "annexure" to the Rules of 1963. There is a procedure for bringing amendment or modification in these SSOs by any particular undertaking. In case there is no amendment the Standard Standing Orders which are of model character would be applicable to all the undertakings in the State. The Standing Orders Act has been enacted to define with sufficient precision the conditions of employment for workers employed in industrial establishments and to make the same known to them. The Standing Orders are binding upon both the employer and the employees and constitute the conditions of service of the employees. These are "statutorily imposed conditions of service". ( 15 ) IN U. P. State Electricity Board v. Hari shanker, AIR 1979 SC 65 : 1978 (4) SCC 16 : 1978-II-LLJ-399 the Supreme Court considered the nature and scope of the industrial Employment (Standings Orderso act, 1946. It has been observed that before the passing of the Act, conditions of service of industrial employees were invariably ill defined and were hardly ever known with even a slight degree of precision to the employees. There was no uniformity of Conditions of Service for employees discharging identical duties in the same establishment. Conditions of service were generally ad hoc and the result of oral arrangements which left the employees at the mercy of the employer. With the growth of the trade union movement and the right of collective bargaining, employees started putting forth their demands to end this sad and confusing state of affairs. Recognising the rough deal that was being given to workers by employers who would not define their conditions of service and the inevitability of industrial strife in such a situation, the legislature intervened and enacted the industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. Recognising the rough deal that was being given to workers by employers who would not define their conditions of service and the inevitability of industrial strife in such a situation, the legislature intervened and enacted the industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. This Act is thus seen to be an Act specially designed to define the terms of employment of workmen in industrial establishments to give the workmen a collective voice in defining the terms of employment and to subject the terms of employment to the scrutiny of quasi-judicial authorities by the application of the test of fairness and reasonableness. It is an Act giving recognition and form to hard-won and precious rights of workmen. ( 16 ) IT has been further laid down by the supreme Court in the above mentioned decision that the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act is a special law in regard to the matters enumerated in the schedule and the Regulations made by the Electricity Board under the Electricity (Supply) Act with respect to any of those matters are of no effect unless such Regulations are either notified by the government under Section 13-B or certified by the Certifying Officer under Section 5 of the industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. In regard to matters in respect of which regulations made by the Board have not been notified by the Governor or in respect of which no Regulations have been made by the Board, the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) act continues to apply. ( 17 ) IN Uptron India Limited v. Shammi bhan, AIR 1998 SC 1681 : 1998 (6) SCC 538 : 1998-I-LLJ-1165 the Supreme Court again highlighted the importance of Standing Orders. It has been eloquently observed: "the general principles of the Contract Act applicable to an agreement between two persons having capacity to contract, are also applicable to a contract of industrial employment, but the relationship so created is partly contractual, in the sense that the agreement of service may give rise to mutual obligations, for example, the obligation of the employer to pay wages and the corresponding obligation of the workman to render services, and partly non-contractual, as the States have already, by legislation, prescribed positive obligations for the employer towards his workmen. Prior to the enactment of these laws, the situation, as it prevailed in many industrial establishments, was that even terms and conditions of service were often not reduced into writing nor were they uniform in nature, though applicable to a set of similar employees. This position was wholly incompatible to the notions of social justice, inasmuch as there being no statutory protection available to the workmen, the contract of service was often so unilateral in character that it would be described as mere manifestation of subdued wish of the workmen to sustain their living at any cost. An agreement of this nature was an agreement between two unequals, namely those who invested their labour and toil, flesh and blood, as against those who brought in capital. The necessary corollary of such an agreement was the generation of conflicts at various levels disturbing industrial peace and resulting necessarily in loss of production and sometimes even closure or lock out of the industrial establishment. In order to overcome this difficulty and achieve industrial harmony and peace, the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946 was enacted requiring the management to define, with sufficient precision and clarity, the conditions of employment under which the workmen were working in their establishments. The underlying object of the Act was to introduce uniformity in conditions of employment of workmen discharging similar functions in the same industrial establishment under the same management and to make those terms and conditions widely known to all the workmen before they could be asked to express their willingness to accept the employment. " ( 18 ) IN the Full Bench decision consisting of five learned Judges of this Court in MPSRT corporation v. Heeralal, 1980 MPLJ 8 the tie was between the SSOs and the M. P. S. R. T. C employees Service Regulations. The dicta of the Full Bench is: "the Standing Orders Acts are special laws dealing with conditions of employment of industrial workers and so on principle of construction, their provisions prevail over general provision contained in section 45 (2) (c), Road Transport Corporation act. The Regulations made therefore cannot have effect on matters contained in the schedule to the Standing Orders Acts on which standing Orders can be made under those Acts for industrial workers. The Regulations made therefore cannot have effect on matters contained in the schedule to the Standing Orders Acts on which standing Orders can be made under those Acts for industrial workers. The Regulations can however be operative even in respect of industrial workers on matters not included in the Schedule to the Standing Orders Acts. The only method by which the Regulations can be applied to matters contained in the Schedule to standing Orders Acts is either to notify them under Section 13-B of the Central Standing orders Act or Section 2 (2) of the Madhya pradesh Act as the case may be or to have them certified as Standing Orders in accordance with the procedure laid down in those Acts". ( 19 ) THE same view has been taken by the full Bench of three learned judges in superintending Engineer, PWD v. Dev prakash, 1999-II-LLJ-663. ( 20 ) RECENTLY in M. P. Vidyut Karamchari sangh v. M. P. Electricity Board, 2004 (9) SCC 755 : 2004-II-LLJ-470 the question was whether the Regulations made under Section 79 (c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 would prevail over the Standing Orders framed under the Act of 1961. The Supreme Court held: "for excluding the operation of the 1961 act, it is imperative that an appropriate notification in terms of Section 2 (2) of the 1961 act is issued". It has been further observed that"the 1961 Act is a special law whereas the regulations framed by the Board under Section 79 (c) are general provisions. The maxim "generalia specialibus non derogant" would, thus, be applicable in this case". ( 21 ) IN light of the legal position discussed above SSOs will prevail over the Regulations of 1987 as these Rules have not been notified under Section 2 (2) of the Act of 1961. The publication of the Rules in the gazette is not enough. These are required to be notified under section 2 (2) of the Act involving a conscious decision of the Government in the Labour department that the operation of the SSOs would be excluded and the Rules would have the predominance. This has been explained by this Court in Bhopal Development Authority v. Smt. Farzana (supra) cited above. These are required to be notified under section 2 (2) of the Act involving a conscious decision of the Government in the Labour department that the operation of the SSOs would be excluded and the Rules would have the predominance. This has been explained by this Court in Bhopal Development Authority v. Smt. Farzana (supra) cited above. ( 22 ) POINT (d): the Labour Court and the Industrial Court have recorded a concurrent finding of fact that the respondent was appointed on daily wages against the vacant post of the sub-engineer and his work was satisfactory during the period of his service of more than twelve years. It is found that the oral and documentary evidence has been properly appreciated. It can reasonably be presumed that there was vacant post which the respondent was appointed when he has worked on that post for more than 12 years. There was heavy burden on the petitioner to prove by documentary evidence the non-existence of vacant post of sub-engineer at the time of his appointment. No documentary evidence was produced by the petitioner to establish the number of vacant posts which existed in the year 1991 and that no such post was created during this long period. The Executive Engineer who was examined as a witness on behalf of the petitioner deposed that there was vacancy of the sub-engineer against which the respondent was appointed. Therefore, the finding of the two courts is not liable to interference as it cannot be said to be perverse or unreasonable. It is well settled that once a state of affairs is shown to exist the presumption of its continuity both backwards and forwards can be drawn. It was for the petitioner to establish by production of relevant documents that no clear vacancy existed at the time of appointment of the respondent and no such vacancy arose during the long period of 12 years against which the respondent could be adjusted. He could not have access to the record of the petitioner. He produced the relevant documents which were with him and gave his oral evidence, in the absence of documents from the side of the petitioner the two Courts have rightly held on the basis of available evidence that the respondent was appointed in clear vacancy and continued to work in that vacancy for more than 12 years. He produced the relevant documents which were with him and gave his oral evidence, in the absence of documents from the side of the petitioner the two Courts have rightly held on the basis of available evidence that the respondent was appointed in clear vacancy and continued to work in that vacancy for more than 12 years. For classification as permanent employee three ingredients must be established: (a) appointment in clear vacancy (b) service of six months or more and (c) the satisfactory nature of that service. The ingredients (b) and (c) were not disputed. The dispute was with regard to (a) only i. e. existence of clear vacancy and that has been answered in favour of the respondent on the basis of evidence and that finding is not liable to interference by this Court in exercise of power of judicial review. The respondent became permanent employee in view of the language used in SSOs 2 (i) and (vi ). ( 23 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision in Indore development Authority v. IDA Daily Wage sub-Engineers Union 2001 (1) MPHT 367 . The ratio of that decision is not attracted in the present case as there was cogent and definite material to hold that the employees concerned were not appointed in clear vacancies. The division Bench decisions in State of M. P. v. Ram Prakash, 1990-I-LLJ-551 (MP-DB) and vandana Singh v. Steel Authority, 1993 JLJ 55 are relevant for holding that a daily wage employee is also a temporary employee and if his appointment is against clear vacancy and he has worked for more than six months and his work is satisfactory he can be classified as a permanent employee. The existence of clear vacancy is a must as held by the Full Bench also in Dev Prakash's case 1999 (1) JLJ 391 referred above. In the present case that ingredient has also been proved, as discussed above, the impugned orders are unassailable, it has been observed in Vandana Singh's case by relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in n. S. K. Nayar v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1574 : 1992 Supp (2) SCC 508 that an employee cannot be called "a temporary employee" after rendering more than 12 years of service. That would be wholly arbitrary. ( 24 ) IN the result the petition is dismissed. .