ORDER: In October 1995, by the proceedings of the Revenue Divisional Office, Salem, the proposal of the Tahsildar, Attur was approved for acquisition of house sites to the Adi Dravidas in Yethappur village and the Special Tahsildar, Attur was directed to proceed further. The proposal sent by the Land Acquisition Officer and Special Tahsildar, Attur as against the heading ‘Reason why the land at the disposal of the Government cannot be utilised’, it was stated that no suitable poromboke lands were available for that purpose. On 17.10.1995, notice under Sec.4(2) of the Act was given to one Renulingam and both sons of Prabhulingam to lodge their objections on or before 11 a.m. on 8.11.1995. It is seen from the records that the Village Administrative Officer has made an endorsement that Ramalingam has refused to receive the notice because the properly now belongs to the two petitioners in W.P.Nos.12558 and 12669 of 1996. Thereupon, the notice was affixed on the stone. On 7.12.1995, the Land Acquisition Officer and Special Tahsildar forwarded his recommendation, according to which the Officer indicates that he was personally satisfied ‘that the notice was served and published in the manner prescribed’. Again, there is the endorsement of the Village Administrative Officer that Renulingam has refused to receive the notice. 2. The draft notice under Sec.4(1) of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 in Form II, as per Rule 3(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Rules, 1979 is signed by the Land Acquisition Officer and the Special Tahsildar and was issued on 8.12.1995. 3. Thereafter, on 15.12.1995, the District Collector by ROC.123795/95, recorded his acceptance of the report of the Special Tahsildar for acquisition of the land on the ground that there were no objections to the said acquisition. This is a cyclostyled form which has been filled up. On 29.1.1996, the Special Tahsildar, while submitting the cost statement, records that there are no trees or structures in the land sought to be acquired and that there are no wells. On 19.8.1996, the petitioner in W.P.No.12669 of 1996 has addressed the Director of Adi Dravida Welfare Department that there are trees as well as a motor connection in her lands. This is accompanied by a photograph. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the notice under Rule 3(ii) is not in conformity with Sec.4(1). On 19.8.1996, the petitioner in W.P.No.12669 of 1996 has addressed the Director of Adi Dravida Welfare Department that there are trees as well as a motor connection in her lands. This is accompanied by a photograph. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the notice under Rule 3(ii) is not in conformity with Sec.4(1). What Sec.4(1) demands or requires is the satisfaction of the Collector. Whereas, there is nothing in the notice issued under Sec.4(1) which indicates the satisfaction of the Collector and therefore, if it is apparent from the notice that there is no satisfaction of the Collector, then the proceedings need to be quashed. When the sovereign power of eminent domain is exercised the excise of power shall be only by authority of law and not otherwise. It was submitted that even the form is not in accordance with Sec.4(1). The blind adherence to the form would show the non-application of mind and absence of ‘satisfaction’ of the Collector. 5. The learned Additional Advocate General appeared on behalf of the respondents only to make his submissions with regard to the validity of Sec.4(1) notice issued in Form III. The learned Additional Advocate General referred to State of Tamil Nadu v. Ananthi Ammal, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 2114. He submitted that Sec.4(2), together with Rule 3(i), would correspond to Sec.4 of the Central Act and Sec.4(1) and Rule 3(ii), which corresponds to Sec.6 of the Central Act. Therefore, the words used in the form, “Whereas it appears that.....” have perhaps been taken from the from used in the Central Act for issuance of notice under Sec.4 and these words can really be ignored and redundant. According to the learned Additional Advocate General, this notice can be split up into three parts and if the first part which deals with the requirement of acquisition of land is ignored, then the latter parts would indicate that the notice is issued under Sec.4(1) which means that the Collector has been satisfied with the recommendations of the Special Tahsildar as per Sec.4(3)(ii). Learned Additional Advocate General would further submit that the fact that the requirement of the Government regarding the acquisition of land is mentioned in the Collector’s notice cannot equate it to a notice issued by the Government indicating its satisfaction. 6. Learned Additional Advocate General would further submit that the fact that the requirement of the Government regarding the acquisition of land is mentioned in the Collector’s notice cannot equate it to a notice issued by the Government indicating its satisfaction. 6. Learned Additional Advocate General referred to the judgment in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 981, wherein it was held as follows: “If there is obvious anomaly in the application of law the Court could shape the law to remove the anamoly. If the strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to absurdity or inconsistency, the Court could discard such interpretation and adopt an interpretation which will give effect to the purpose of the legislature. That could be done, if necessary even by modification of the language used. The legislators do not always deal with specific controversies which the Courts decide. They incorporate general purpose behind the statutory words and it is for the Courts to decide specific cases. If a given case is well within the general purpose of the legislature but not within the literal meaning of the statute, then the Court must strike the balance.” This cannot strictly apply to the present case and the present objection that is raised. It is not as if the interpretation of the notice that gives rise to absurdity or inconsistency. The objection of the land owners is that the notice does not indicate satisfaction and it is apparent that it does not. 7. Sec.4(1) clearly speaks of satisfaction. Without that, further proceedings cannot go in. In fact, in a case which will be dealt with later, this Court quashed the action of the Government in proceeding with the acquisition though the Collector had indicated that further action should be dropped. So, the Collector’s satisfaction is the indispensable factor to justify the acquisition. The record of satisfaction must be there in clear terms. The question is whether the notice ex facie should disclose satisfaction, or it is enough if the records disclose it. 8. In Ramachnadra v. Govind, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 915, the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act and its provisions fell for consideration. A combined reading of Sec.5(3)(b) with Rule 2-A which prescribes the manner in which verification of a surrender by the tenant must be made: (1) It must be in writing. (2) It must be verified before the Mamlatdar. 8. In Ramachnadra v. Govind, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 915, the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act and its provisions fell for consideration. A combined reading of Sec.5(3)(b) with Rule 2-A which prescribes the manner in which verification of a surrender by the tenant must be made: (1) It must be in writing. (2) It must be verified before the Mamlatdar. (3) While making such verification the Mamlatdar must satisfy himself in regard to two things, namely, (a) that the tenant understands the nature and consequences of the surrender, and (b) that it is voluntary. (4) The Mamlatdar must endorse his finding as to such satisfaction upon the document of surrender. The Supreme Court held that the imperative language, the beneficent purpose and the importance of Sec.5(3)(b) and Rule 2-A would lead to the conclusion that the provisions are intended to be mandatory and not directory. In the Tamil Nadu Act 31 of 1978 also, the language used is imperative and the Act being exproporiatory, before acquiring the lands against the will of the owner, the provisions must necessarily be adhered to fully. The Supreme Court held that the requirement as to the recording of its satisfaction by the authority in the manner prescribed by the rule is the substance of the matter and not an empty formality, and that if the endorsement was not there, the surrender is rendered non-est. 9. In Income Tax Officer v. Biju Patnaik, (1991)1 S.C.C. (Supp.) 161, the Supreme Court held, in a case relating to assessment under Sec.147-A of the Income Tax Act, that the satisfaction of the authority making the order cannot be challenged on the ground of non-application of mind even though the order does not ex facie disclose the satisfaction if the records disclose the same. It was observed as follows: “It is settled law that in an administrative action, though the order does not ex facie disclose the satisfaction by the officer of the necessary facts, but if the record discloses the same, the notice of the order does not per se become illegal.” 10. In State of Haryana v. Hari Ram Yadav, (1994)2 S.C.C. 617 , the Supreme Court dealt with Rule 3(1) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969. In State of Haryana v. Hari Ram Yadav, (1994)2 S.C.C. 617 , the Supreme Court dealt with Rule 3(1) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969. This Rule required the Government of a State or the Central Government to be ‘satisfied’ that it was necessary or desirable to place a member of the service under suspension. A question arose whether the absence of any recital recording satisfaction would render the order of suspension invalid. Their Lordships held as follows: “In cases where exercise of a statutory power is subject to fulfillment of a condition then recital in the order about the condition having been fulfilled, raises a presumption about fulfillment of such condition. The burden is on person who challenges validity of order to show that the said condition was not fulfilled. In a case where the order does not contain such recital, the burden to prove that the condition was fulfilled would be on the authority passing the order.” 11. In The Land Acquisition Officer and Special Tahsildar (LA) v. R.Manickaammal, (2002)2 C.T.C. 1 , it was observed as follows: “State Act is completely different as Government intervention is not at all contemplated - Collector is appropriate authority to decide acquisition of land - Provisions of State Act is absolute- Decision to acquire land was to be exercised only by Collector by application of mind independently - Legislature did not reserve any power to State Government to have supervisory role as is provided under Central Act - When legislature names particular authority to exercise power, only that authority has to exercise authority and nobody else.” In that case, the Government interfered with the decision of the Collector that it was not desirable to acquire the land and it was held that the Government could not do so since the Governmental intervention was unwarranted. 12. In the present case, it is obvious that the notice does not say that the Collector is satisfied. From the mere fact that the words refer to the notice being one under Sec.4(1), the Court cannot presume that the Collector was satisfied. When the Section mandates that the Collector should be satisfied, then there should be a record of the satisfaction of the Collector. From the mere fact that the words refer to the notice being one under Sec.4(1), the Court cannot presume that the Collector was satisfied. When the Section mandates that the Collector should be satisfied, then there should be a record of the satisfaction of the Collector. If the notice does not indicate such satisfaction then at least the records should show that the Collector is indeed satisfied with the recommendations of the Special Tahsildar that the acquisition was necessary. 13. In view of the decision referred to above, it will not be possible to hold that the notice itself as invalid if the records indicate satisfaction. But, in the absence of materials to show satisfaction, Sec.4(1) cannot be said to have been complied with. As observed by the Supreme Court in the decisions cited supra, if the notice itself expresses the satisfaction, then it is for the land owner to prove that there was no real satisfaction. If the notice does not indicate satisfaction, then it is for the Government to prove that there was satisfaction. In this case, there is no evidence to show that the Collector was satisfied since as we have seen from the records, cyclostyled forms have been filled up. 14. The other ground raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Act requires that the Collector shall authorise the Special Tahsildar to issue the notice under Sec.4(2). In this case, page 1 of the records show that the Revenue Divisional Officer has directed the Special Tahsildar to take action. This renders all actions pursuant to such a direction invalid. If the Special Tahsildar has not been authorised by the Collector in a manner known to law, then he cannot take any action. 15. The records indicate that the service of notice having been refused by Renulingam, it was effected by affixture on the boundary stone. This is contrary to the rules which require the notice to be served on the land owner, if he resides in the lands in question or if the resides elsewhere, by registered post in the last found address. This alone would be service according to law and not other mode of service. 16. This is contrary to the rules which require the notice to be served on the land owner, if he resides in the lands in question or if the resides elsewhere, by registered post in the last found address. This alone would be service according to law and not other mode of service. 16. To this effect, the learned counsel for the petitioners cited the judgment in T.M. Lakshmiah v. Collector of Dharmapuri District and another, (2002)3 L.W. 517, where it was held that there was no provision for service by affixture and that it can be resorted only as the last mode. In A.Dhurvasala v. The Collector and another, 2002 W.L.R. 852, it was held that the procedure requiring notice to be sent by registered post is mandatory and when the records did not indicate service of notice in this manner, there is no service in the eye of law. In P.Rajendran v. The District Collector, Salem and another, (2000)2 M.L.J. 790 , the proceedings were quashed because the notice was affixed on the survey stone and it was held to be not in accordance with law. That, of course, was a case that arose out of the Central Act. In this case, the records also indicate, as stated above, the Village Administrative Officer was informed by Renulingam, who refused to receive the notice, that the petitioners were the owners of the property and not him. In spite of his being informed and put on notice that the petitioners were the owners of the property, no notice under Sec.4(2) was issued to them and therefore, only in the notice under Sec.4(1), their name find is a place. The Collector could not have ‘considered’ the matter without hearing the petitioners. So, the proceedings are vitiated. In P.C.Thanikavelu v. The Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition, Madras, 1989 W.L.R. 89 (F.B.), a Full Bench of this Court held that individual notice is mandatory only to those persons whose names are found in the records or who are found by the Collector as persons interested on information received through reliable source. That was a matter that arose out of the Central Act, but however, the principle is the same. The Full Bench observed that, It cannot be gainsaid that when the lands of an individual are acquired, albeit he may be paid compensation, his civil rights may be affected. That was a matter that arose out of the Central Act, but however, the principle is the same. The Full Bench observed that, It cannot be gainsaid that when the lands of an individual are acquired, albeit he may be paid compensation, his civil rights may be affected. It is thereof elementary that, to be consistent with the principles of natural justice, such a person should be put on notice before his lands are acquired and his objection heard and considered. But, at the same time, it is made clear that individual notice is mandatory only to those persons whose names are found in the revenue records or who are found by the Collector as persons interested on information received through reliable source.” 17. The proceedings under Sec.7 have been conducted by the Special Tahsildar, which is again, in violation of the provisions of the Act. Sec.7 refers to the prescribed authority and the prescribed authority has been defined in the Act and therefore, no other officer or authority can discharge those functions. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioners would point out that in the award enquiry conducted by the second respondent, it is specifically stated that there are no trees or well as in the lands under acquisition, whereas the photographs sent by the petitioners would clearly indicate that there were wells, which could not have come up overnight. He would submit that it is not correct to state that there were no suitable Government poromboke lands available at the disposal of the Government. It is also submitted that it is difficult to accept the averment made in paragraph 11 of the counter affidavit that Survey Nos.270, 271, 284 and 285 were classified as thope poromboke and that they had vested with the panchayat office. Such a statement is said to be baseless. The learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the averment made in the counter that these lands are located far away from the existing village sites and that the beneficiaries are not willing to settle in these areas cannot be a ground for choosing the petitioners’ lands when admittedly Government poromboke is available. Therefore, the statement made, in the recommendations of the Special Tahsildar that there were no Government poromboke, which alone was the material that was available to the Collector before he arrived at his satisfaction, clearly had no factual basis. Therefore, the statement made, in the recommendations of the Special Tahsildar that there were no Government poromboke, which alone was the material that was available to the Collector before he arrived at his satisfaction, clearly had no factual basis. In the counter, it comes to light that there are Government poromboke, but that they are not suitable only because the beneficiaries are not inclined to settle there. This would also show that correct materials were not placed before the Collector. Hence, on this ground also, the decision to acquire the lands is vitiated. 19. In Arunachala Reddiar and others v. The Government of Tamil Nadu, (2000)2 T.N.L.J. 84, it was held that the District Collector has no power to further delegate or authorise. In Gopanna Reddiar v. The Special Tahsildar, Adi Dravida Welfare Department, Cuddalore (DD), (2000)1 M.L.J. 436 , it was held that when the acquiring authority is aware of interested persons other than the names found in the revenue records, the authorities shall issue notice to them before acquiring the land. In Immaculate Heart of Mary Society, Pudupalayam v. The Special Tahsildar, Adi Dravidar Welfare, Sivaganga and another, 2003 W.L.R. 362, this Court has held that it is the bounden duty of the State to ascertain the ownership of the land and to see that it acts fairly, prudently and in compliance of the provisions of the Act. In Thirugnana-sambandam v. The Government of Tamil Nadu, (2001)1 M.L.J. 328 and in G.Ramakrishna Naidu v. District Collector, (2001)3 C.T.C. 649 , this Court has disapproved of the notice issued under Sec.4(1) by the Collector which clearly indicate that there is non-applications of mind since they are cyclostyled forms which have been filled up. 20. Sec.7, which deals with the determination of amount and the enquiry to be conducted for such determination, employs the word ‘prescribed authority. ‘Prescribed Authority’ is defined in Sec.3(f) as an authority or officer authorised by the Government. By G.O.Ms. No.1628, Social Welfare, the District Collector has been prescribed as the authority authorised by the Government in this matter. Therefore, when power has been delegated by the Government to the District Collector for conducting the enquiry, he has no power to delegate it to the Special Tahsildar, which has been done in this case. This is another factor which vitiates the acquisition proceedings. 21. The petitioners have also alleged mala fides against the Revenue Inspector. Therefore, when power has been delegated by the Government to the District Collector for conducting the enquiry, he has no power to delegate it to the Special Tahsildar, which has been done in this case. This is another factor which vitiates the acquisition proceedings. 21. The petitioners have also alleged mala fides against the Revenue Inspector. The Revenue Inspector has also been named as the third respondent in the writ petitions. The counter is filed only by the second respondent. The third respondent has not chosen to file a counter denying the allegations made by the petitioners. It is seen from the affidavit that in May 1995, it is alleged that the third respondent demanded donation for the Government sponsored Yercaud Summer Festival and since the petitioners paid a sum of Rs.150 as against the demand of Rs.3,000, he had threatened them that he would not allow them to continue with their cultivation. If this is not true, the third respondent ought to have filed a counter. But, in the absence thereof, we have to take it that there was such a threat. Therefore, the attack on the ground of mala fides also has not been rebutted. 22. Before parting with the case, it is necessary to bring to the notice of the respondents the manner in which such acquisition proceedings are initiated and proceeded with: 23. The Tamil Nadu Act 21 of 1978 is a very brief Act. The crucial section is Sec.4. But, we often find that the provisions of even this single section are not complied with. It is better that the respondents educate their Special Tahsildar and the District Collectors on the legal provisions before they initiate acquisition proceedings. Sec.2 of the Act states that the Act is meant to give effect to the State’s policy of securing the Directive Principles, in particular Art.46 of the Constitution. So, it requires greater vigilance on the part of the State to see that the provisions are not violated or ignored, thereby defeating the noble object. The Act being an exproporiatory one, there cannot be any haphazard approach on proceeding with the acquisition. 24. Very often, the manner in which the proceedings are initiated leaves one in great doubt as to whether the alleged public purpose genuinely exists. Signature are obtained from persons on cyclostyled papers to establish the requirement. The Act being an exproporiatory one, there cannot be any haphazard approach on proceeding with the acquisition. 24. Very often, the manner in which the proceedings are initiated leaves one in great doubt as to whether the alleged public purpose genuinely exists. Signature are obtained from persons on cyclostyled papers to establish the requirement. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, (1995)1 S.C.C. (Supp.) 596, it was observed, “It is inherent in every sovereign State, by exercising its power of eminent domain, to expropriate private property without owner’s consent. Prima facie, the State would be the judge to decide whether a purpose is a public purpose. But, it is not the sole judge. This decision will be subject to judicial review and it is the duty of the Court to determine whether a particular purpose is a public purpose or not.” There should be a real public need and a real public purpose for which individual interests are adjusted with public interest by social engineering. “So long as the exercise of power is for public purpose” are the words used in Chemli Singh v. State of U.P., (1996)2 S.C.C. 549 . It is this which validates the power of eminent domain. I also take judicial notice of the fact that in land acquisition proceedings initiated for Housing Board purpose, the State has recorded that, the assessment of the extent of land required has not been done on a scientific basis. This must be avoided. Individual rights cannot be sacrificed so carelessly and at what cost? To whose advantage is it, if huge constructions are put up by expropriatary measures and there are no takers? 25. Though Arts.19(1)(f) and 31 were deleted and the right to property is no longer a Fundamental Right, it was re-introduced as Art.300-A as a Constitutional right, according to which deprivation of property can only be by the authority of law. It also means that the power to acquire one’s property has to be exercised in accordance with law. 26. An attempt was made by the respondents in this case to refer to the explanation in Sec.16 which states that for the purpose of Sec.16, the District Collector would include the District Revenue Officer. It also means that the power to acquire one’s property has to be exercised in accordance with law. 26. An attempt was made by the respondents in this case to refer to the explanation in Sec.16 which states that for the purpose of Sec.16, the District Collector would include the District Revenue Officer. This issue has been dealt with in Annavu Chettiar v. The District Revenue Officer, Villupuram, (2004)1 C.T.C. 501 , Sec.16 refers to delegation of the power conferred on or the duty imposed on the Government. According to the Section, the Government may, by a notification, delegate this power to the District Collector who shall, on such delegation by notification in the Government Gazette, exercise such power or discharge such duty. It is in this context that the Explanation says that the District Collector will include District Revenue Officer. This is not to be construed to mean that wherever the word District Collector is used in the Act, it would include District Revenue Officer. If so, the words used in the Explanation, ‘for the purpose of this Section’, will be meaningless. 27. From the legal provisions and the decisions cited supra, the following steps can be identified: The acquisition proceedings commence with Sec.4(2), whereby the District Collector, or any officer authorised by the District Collector in this behalf, calling upon the owner or any person interested in the land sought to be acquired, to show cause why his land should not be acquired. This secures the principles of natured justice. Rule 3(1) corresponds to this section and deals with the manner in which this notice should be issued. It requires communication by registered post with acknowledgment due, if the owner or any other person interested resides elsewhere than where the land is situated. If the District Collector is not issuing this notice, he and he alone can authorise another officer to do it in this behalf. The notice should go to the owner as defined in the Act or the person interested as defined in the Act. If it comes to the notice of the District Collector or the officer authorised by the District Collector that the person whose name is found in the revenue record is no longer the owner or the person interested in the land, it requires that notice should go to such other person who is the owner or the person interested. If it comes to the notice of the District Collector or the officer authorised by the District Collector that the person whose name is found in the revenue record is no longer the owner or the person interested in the land, it requires that notice should go to such other person who is the owner or the person interested. It is not enough if the notice is affixed on boundary stones or other places, taking down the signatures of the so called villagers or public, to prove such affixture. Where the notice must be sent by registered post with acknowledgment due, no other mode of service would suffice. Once this notice is served, then follows the enquiry contemplated under Sec.4(3). Sec.4(3)(a) will apply when the District Collector himself issued the notice under Sec.4(2). Sec.4(3)(b) will apply when the person authorised by the District Collector has issued the notice. The objections should be heard and the recommendations should be forwarded to the District Collector. If the land owners refer to wells or standing trees or other physical features in the lands, then the officer authorized will have to verify whether the information is correct. Casually writing ‘Nil’ against ‘standing trees’, whereas there are 10 year old trees cannot be justified. After considering this report, the District Collector shall pass orders as he deems fit. The very fact that the Section uses the word ‘consider’ would show that the District Collector has to apply his mind. Filling up cyclostyled forms prepared by the Special Tahsildar while forwarding his recommendations clearly indicate non-application of mind. The District Collector must remember that lands are being acquired against the will of the owners and therefore, he must be satisfied that the acquisition is necessary, and that the objections deserve to be overruled. Next comes the notification under Sec.4(1) which indicate the “satisfaction” of the District Collector, who by this notification under Sec.4(1), declares his intention to acquire the lands. This is issued in Rule 3(2), Form II. This form clearly does not speak of satisfaction. It is for the Government to decide whether they will continue with this form or they will make necessary changes. But, though the proceedings are not invalidated merely because the notice does not indicate satisfaction, the record of satisfaction is mandatory. This is issued in Rule 3(2), Form II. This form clearly does not speak of satisfaction. It is for the Government to decide whether they will continue with this form or they will make necessary changes. But, though the proceedings are not invalidated merely because the notice does not indicate satisfaction, the record of satisfaction is mandatory. According to the decisions referred to above, if the notice does not indicate satisfaction, the records should indicate satisfaction because that is the substance of the notice. It is not an empty formality. Where the proceedings have to be initiated by one District Collector, it cannot be issued or initiated by any other person. Rule 5 deals with the procedure for determining the amount, which requires the prescribed authority to service notice in Form II to the owner and person interested. Clear 15 days’ time is required to be given by this notice after the publication of the notice under Sec.4(1). Rule 5 refers only to the prescribed authority and therefore, it is that authority alone who shall discharge the functions laid down in the said rule. 28. In Ananthi Ammal’s case, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 2114, the Supreme Court has clearly observed that the main difference between the two Acts, the Central Act and Tamil Nadu Act 31 of 1978, is that in the Central Act, the Government notifies the acquisition, conducts the enquiry and declares its satisfaction, whereas in the Tamil Nadu Act, it is the Collector. The Tamil Nadu Act merely encapsulates in one Section, viz., Sec.4, the three Sections from the Central Act, Secs.4 to 6. It cannot be difficult for the respondents to ensure adherence to these provisions while they initiate and conduct the acquisition proceedings. If they fail to act in accordance with the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, then the acquisition proceedings will necessarily have to be quashed. The laudable purpose for which the Act has been enacted and the constitutional promise extended by Art.46 are defeated. 29. For all these reasons, the acquisition proceedings must be quashed. The writ petitions are, therefore, allowed as prayed for. No costs. Consequently, the connected W.M.Ps. are closed.