ORDER: The writ petitioner challenges the acquisition proceedings on several grounds. According to him, the lands in question were purchased by him and his sister, Aminal Bibi in 1963 and he has been in exclusive possession ever since. According to him, there are enough Government lands in and around Kadayanallur, which could be allotted to the Adi Dravidas. No enquiry was conducted and no attempt was made to serve notice on the owner nor were the rules relevant to service of notice complied with. 2. In this case, the proceedings of the Tahsildar indicate that notice was served only to one Mohd.Yusuf, S/o.Shahul Hameed and therefore, the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act also refers only to Mohd.Yusuff, S/o.Shahul Hameed as the owner of the land sought to be acquired. The recommendations of the Special Tahsildar on 16.9.1995 also indicate that the Village Administrative Officer had informed that the patta was in Mohd.Yusuff’s name and that he alone is in enjoyment of the lands. For the first time, in the Form III notice issued under Rule 5(i), the petitioner’s name is found. It is apparent even from the counter that the petitioner has not been shown as the person interested at the earlier stage when he has the right to be heard before the Collector is satisfied that the lands, in respect of which the notice under Sec.4(2) of the Act was issued, must be acquired. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the notice under Rule 3(ii) is not in conformity with Sec.4(1). What Sec.4(1) demands or requires is the satisfaction of the Collector. Whereas, there is nothing in the notice issued under Sec.4(1) which indicates the satisfaction of the Collector and therefore, if it is apparent from the notice that there is no satisfaction of the Collector, then the proceedings need to be quashed. When the sovereign power of eminent domain is exercised and property expropriated, the exercise of power shall be only by authority of law and not otherwise. It was submitted that even the form is not in accordance with Sec.4(1). The blind adherence to the form would show the non-application of mind and absence of ‘satisfaction’ of the Collector. 4. The learned Additional Advocate General appeared on behalf of the respondents only to make his submissions with regard to the validity of Sec.4(1) notice issued in Form III. The blind adherence to the form would show the non-application of mind and absence of ‘satisfaction’ of the Collector. 4. The learned Additional Advocate General appeared on behalf of the respondents only to make his submissions with regard to the validity of Sec.4(1) notice issued in Form III. The learned Additional Advocate General referred to State of Tamil Nadu v. Ananthi Ammal, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 2114. He submitted that Sec.4(2), together with Rule 3(i), would correspond to Sec.4 of the Central Act and Sec.4(1) and Rule 3(ii), which corresponds to Sec.6 of the Central Act. Therefore, the words used in the form, “Whereas it appears that.....” have perhaps been taken from the form used in the Central Act for issuance of notice under Sec.4 and these words can really be ignored and are redundant. According to the learned Additional Advocate General, this notice can be split up into three parts and if the first part which deals with the requirement of acquisition of land is ignore, then the latter parts would indicate that the notice is issued under Sec.4(1) which means that the Collector has been satisfied with the recommendations of the Special Tahsildar as per Sec.4(3)(ii). Learned Additional Advocate General would further submit that the fact that the requirement of the Government regarding the acquisition of land is mentioned in the Collector’s notice under equate it to a notice issued by the Government indicating its satisfaction. 5. Sec.4(1) clearly speaks of satisfaction. Without that, further proceedings cannot go on. In fact, in The Land Acquisition Officer and Special Tahsildar (LA) v. R.Manickammal, (2002)2 C.T.C. 1 , the Division Bench of this Court quashed the action of the Government in proceeding with the acquisition though the Collector had indicated that further action should be dropped. So, the Collector’s satisfaction is the indispensable factor to justify the acquisition. The record of satisfaction must be there in clear terms. The question is whether the notice ex facie should disclose satisfaction, or it is enough if the records disclose it. 6. In Ramachandra v. Govind, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 915, the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act and its provisions fell for consideration. A combined reading of Sec.5(3)(b) with Rule 2-A which prescribes the manner in which verification of a surrender by the tenant must be made: (1) It must be in writing. (2) It must be verified before the Mamlatdar. 6. In Ramachandra v. Govind, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 915, the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act and its provisions fell for consideration. A combined reading of Sec.5(3)(b) with Rule 2-A which prescribes the manner in which verification of a surrender by the tenant must be made: (1) It must be in writing. (2) It must be verified before the Mamlatdar. (3) While making such verification the Mamlatdar must satisfy himself in regard to two things, namely, (a) that the tenant understands the nature and consequences of the surrender, and (b) that it is voluntary. (4) The Mamlatdar must endorse his finding as to such satisfaction upon the document of surrender. The Supreme Court held that the imperative language, the beneficent purpose and the importance of Sec.5(3)(b) and Rule 2-A would lead to the conclusion that the provisions are intended to be mandatory and not directory. In the Tamil Nadu Act 31 of 1978 also, the language used is imperative and the Act being expropriatory, before acquiring the lands against the will of the owner, the provisions must necessarily be adhered to fully. The Supreme Court held that the requirement as to the recording of its satisfaction by the authority in the manner prescribed by the rule is the substance of the matter and not an empty formality, and that if the endorsement was not there, the surrender is rendered non-est. 7. In Income Tax Officer v. Biju Patnaik, (1991)1 S.C.C. (Supp.) 161, the Supreme Court held, in a case relating to assessment under Sec.147-A of the Income Tax Act that the satisfaction of the authority making the order cannot be challenged on the ground of non-application of mind even though the order does not ex facie disclose the satisfaction if the records disclose the same. It was observed as follows: "It is settled law that in an administrative action, though the order does not ex facie disclose the satisfaction by the officer of the necessary facts, but if the record discloses the same, the notice or the order does not per se become illegal." 8. In State of Haryana v. Hari Ram Yadav, (1994)2 S.C.C. 617 , the Supreme Court dealt with Rule 3(1) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969. In State of Haryana v. Hari Ram Yadav, (1994)2 S.C.C. 617 , the Supreme Court dealt with Rule 3(1) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969. This Rule required the Government of a State or the Central Government to be ‘satisfied’ that it was necessary or desirable to place a member of the service under suspension. A question arose whether the absence of any recital recording satisfaction would render the order of suspension invalid. Their Lordships held as follows: "In cases where exercise of statutory power is subject to fulfillment of a condition then recital in the order about the condition having been fulfilled, raised a presumption about fulfilment of such condition. The burden is on person who challenges validity of order to show that the said condition was not fulfilled. In a case where the order does not contain such recital, the burden to prove that the condition was fullfilled would be on the authority passing the order." 9. In The Land Acquisition Officer and Special Tahsildar (LA) v. R.Manickammal, (2002)2 C.T.C. 1 , it was observed as follows: "State Act is completely different as Government intervention is not at all contemplated - Collector is appropriate authority to decide acquisition of land - Provisions of State Act is absolute - Decision to acquire land was to be exercised only by Collector by application of mind independently - Legislature did not reserve any power to State Government to have supervisory role as is provided under Central Act - When legislature names particular authority to exercise power, only that authority has to exercise authority and nobody else." In that case, the Government interfered with the decision of the Collector that it was not desirable to acquire the land and it was held that the Government could not do so since the Governmental intervention was unwarranted. 10. In the present case, it is obvious that the notice does not say that the Collector is satisfied. From the mere fact that the words refer to the notice being one under Sec.4(1), the Court cannot presume that the Collector was satisfied. When the Section mandates that the Collector should be satisfied, then there should be a record of the satisfaction of the Collector. From the mere fact that the words refer to the notice being one under Sec.4(1), the Court cannot presume that the Collector was satisfied. When the Section mandates that the Collector should be satisfied, then there should be a record of the satisfaction of the Collector. If the notice does not indicate such satisfaction, then at least the records should show that the Collector is indeed satisfied with the recommendations of the Special Tahsildar that the acquisition was necessary. 11. In view of the decisions referred to above, it will not be possible to hold the notice itself as invalid if the records indicate satisfaction. But, in the absence of materials to show satisfaction, Sec.4(1) cannot be said to have been complied with. As observed by the Supreme Court in the decisions cited supra, if the notice itself expresses the satisfaction, then it is for the land owner to prove that there was no real satisfaction. If the notice does not indicate satisfaction, then it is for the Government to prove that there was satisfaction. In this case, there is no evidence to show that the Collector was satisfied since as we have seen from the records, cyclostyled forms have been filled up. 12. The objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner would also show that he has not been served with the notice under Sec.4(1), since the notice under Sec.4(1) only refers to one Mohd.Yusuf, son of Shahul Hameed. For the first time, in the notice issued under Rule 5(2), the petitioner’s name was found. The records and the counter, as been stated earlier, reveal that the respondents knew that the petitioner alone is in enjoyment of the lands and is the person interested. The opportunity to the land owner is mandatory and it should be complied with strictly. In S.P.Vedanayagam v. Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu, Madras and two others, (1996)1 M.L.J. 432 : (1996)1 C.T.C. 379 , it has been held also as also in K.Gopanna Reddiar v. The Special Tahsildar, Adi Dravida Welfare Department, Cuddalore, (2000)1 M.L.J. 436 (DB). In Immaculate Heart of Mary Society, Pudupalayam v. The Special Tahsildar, Adi Dravidar Welfare, Sivaganga and another, 2003 W.L.R. 362, it has been held that the respondents owe a duty to find out who is the owner and to see that it acts fairly. In Immaculate Heart of Mary Society, Pudupalayam v. The Special Tahsildar, Adi Dravidar Welfare, Sivaganga and another, 2003 W.L.R. 362, it has been held that the respondents owe a duty to find out who is the owner and to see that it acts fairly. The manner in which notice should be served is also clearly improper. It has also been held so in P.Rajendran v. The District Collect, Salem and another, (2002)2 M.L.J. 790 and A.Dhurvasala v. The Collector and another, 2002 W.L.R. 852, that unless Form I notice is served by registered post, if the person interested or the owner is not residing in the land in question, and affixture of notice on boundary stone or survey stone is not proper service in accordance with law. The acquisition proceedings initiated and concluded without hearing the owner of the land in question is clearly vitiated and would, therefore, stand quashed. 13. Very often, the manner in which the proceedings are initiated leaves one in great doubt as to whether the alleged public purpose genuinely exists. Signatures are obtained from persons on cyclostyled papers to establish the requirement. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, (1995)1 S.C.C. (Supp.) 596, it was observed, “It is inherent in every sovereign State, by exercising its power of eminent domain, to expropriate private property without owner’s consent. Prima facie, the State would be the judge to decide whether a purpose is a public purpose. But, it is not the sole judge. This decision will be subject to judicial review and it is the duty of the Court to determine whether a particular purpose is a public purpose or not.” There should be a real public need and a real public purpose for which individual interests are adjusted with public interest by social engineering. “So long as the exercise of power is for public purpose” are the words used in Chemeli Singh v. State of U.P., (1996)2 S.C.C. 549 . It is this which validates the power of eminent domain. I also take judicial notice of the fact that in land acquisition proceedings initiated for Housing Board purpose, the State has recorded that, the assessment of the extent of land required has not been done on a scientific basis. This must be avoided. Individual rights cannot be sacrificed so carelessly and at what cost? I also take judicial notice of the fact that in land acquisition proceedings initiated for Housing Board purpose, the State has recorded that, the assessment of the extent of land required has not been done on a scientific basis. This must be avoided. Individual rights cannot be sacrificed so carelessly and at what cost? To whose advantage is it, if huge constructions are put up by expropriatory measures and there re no takers? 14. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Ananthi Ammal, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 2114, the Supreme Court has clearly observed that the main difference between the two Acts, the Central Act an Tamil Nadu Act 31 of 1978, is that in the Central Act, the Government notifies the acquisition, conducts the enquiry and declares its satisfaction, whereas in the Tamil Nadu Act, it is the Collector. The Tamil Nadu act merely encapsulates in one Section, viz., Sec.4, the three Sections from the Central Act, Secs.4 to 6. It cannot be difficult for the respondents to ensure adherence to these provisions while they initiate and conduct the acquisition proceedings. If they fail to act in accordance with the Act and the Rules framed therein, then the acquisition proceedings will necessarily have to be quashed. 15. For all these reasons, the writ petition is allowed as prayed for. No costs. Consequently, the connected W.M.Ps. are closed.