( 1 ) SEVERAL retired per so/is are before me in these petitions seeking for pension on the following facts; ( 2 ) IN all these petitions petitioners are questioning the non availability of pension to each one of them. Petitioners are employees of various nationalised banks under the control of Department of Banking, Ministry of Finance, Government of India. Most of the petitioners have either retired voluntarily or retired on attaining the age of superannuation. Petitioners state that in banking industry employees are broadly divided in to two categotries i. e. , award staff who are workmen governed by Industrial awards and settlements and Officers staff who are not workmen. In banks two retiral benefits are available (1) PF and (2) Gratuity, /the employees in the banking industry were demanding introduction of pension as third retiral benefit. The fourth pay commission regularised pension scheme. In these circumstances. Unions representing the employees of the Bank pressed for pension. Reserve Bank of India (for short The RBI) introduced pension regulation w. e. f. 1-11-1990, In the light of the pension to the employees of the RBI, negotiations were held between Indian Banks Association (for short IBA) and the Unions at the industry level and an industrial settlement was arrived at on 29-10-1993. Pension was introduced as a retiral benefit in lieu of contributory provident fund as in RBI. A joint note of agreed conclusions reached between the IBA and the Federation representing officers in the banking industry was signed in tune with the provisions of the settlement in so far as officers are concerned. Joint Note dtd. 29-10-1993 is produced as annexure-B, Similar joint notes were also signed between the IBA and the remaining trade unions of officers in the banking industry. Para 12 of the settlement states that provisions will be made by a scheme to be negotiated and settled between the parties to this agreement by 31-12-993 for applicability,, qualifying service, amounts of pension, payment of pension, computation of pension, family pension, updating and other general conditions etc. , on the lines as are in force in RBI. Draft Regulations were drawn and were adopted by the bank and the same vas sent for sanction of the Central Government. Regulation 10 of the Draft Regulations deals with forfeiture of service. , on the lines as are in force in RBI. Draft Regulations were drawn and were adopted by the bank and the same vas sent for sanction of the Central Government. Regulation 10 of the Draft Regulations deals with forfeiture of service. It stated as under; designation or dismissal or termination of an employee from the service shall entitle forfeiture of his entire service and consequently shall not qualify for pension. ( 3 ) THIS was identical with Regulation 18 of the Reserve Bank of India Pension Regulations 1990. Bank issued a circular dtd. 13-6-1994 it was stated therein that Sec. 19 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act 1970, was to be followed for compliance of the procedure and no changes could be made from the draft since it is based on and is in compliance with the settlement. Bank also clarified that the regulations are provisional in nature, that they are subject to approval by RBI and sanction of the Central government as required under Sec. 19 of the Act, Some employees opted for pension on the basis of the circular dtd 2-6-1994. Final regulations are made and were notified on 29-9-1995. Final Regulations provide for forfeiture in the event of participation in a strike. According to petitioners several employees participated in the strike. Hence most employees did not opt pension before 27-1-1996 which was the last date stipulated under the Regulations for option to the existing employees in the matter or pension,. Petitioners further say that aggrieved by this forfeiture clause, they threatened to go on strike in the matter. In the light or stride notice negotiations were hold and ultimately a settlement was reached on 11-11-1997. IBA agreed for deletion of forfeiture clause in pension regulations for participation in strike. Matter was thereafter referred to Government of India. Petitioners refer to correspondence between the Banks and the Government, ultimately Government approved the amended Regulations 22 (4) (b) of the pension regulations and notified the same in terms of annexure-H dtd 22-6-1999. ( 4 ) AFTER final regulations petitioners sought for option in the matter. Negotiations were held in the matter. IBA expressed its inability to give one more opportunity to those employees who had not opted for pension earlier. A settlement was signed on 27-3-2000. ( 4 ) AFTER final regulations petitioners sought for option in the matter. Negotiations were held in the matter. IBA expressed its inability to give one more opportunity to those employees who had not opted for pension earlier. A settlement was signed on 27-3-2000. In the settlement it was stated that the demand of the union to give another opportunity could be forwarded to the Government of India. Government did not act in the matter. Representations were made in this regard to the Central government in terms of annexure-L. Petitioners refer to similar option in Railways and RBI to contend that second options were permitted in those organisations in the light of subsequent development. Petitioners in these circumstances as I mentioned earlier are seeking for a declaration declaring that 120 days time stipulated under Regulation 3 (3) is directory and further with every beneficial change in the Pension Regulations 1995 the petitioners would be entitled to one more option of such beneficial amendment; and consequently declare that the petitioners have become entitled to a fresh opportunity to opt for pension regulations pursuant to the amendment made to the tension Regulations by Circular dtd 22-6-1999 Annexure-H and circular dated 15-12-2000; and direct the respondents to grant all consequential benefits including payment of pension and pensionary benefits together with Interest at 18% p. a. ( 5 ) NOTICE was issued and respondents have entered appearance. Canara Bank has filed a detailed statement of objections. They refer to the Regulations and the option in the matter. They say that petitioners did not opt in initial stage and after expiry of 120 days, they are seeking a second option. They refer to 1995 regulations and they say that the case of petitioners stand determined in so far as their terminal benefits are concerned based on the option exercised by them at the time of introduction of pension scheme. Service conditions of employees are subject to constant review and periodical changes. They say that petitioners have no specific right in the matter. They refer to the proceedings before the Bombay High Court in identical circumstances also before the Delhi High court. In so far as Bombay proceedings are concerned, the matter reached the Apex court and the Apex Court turned down the request of the petitioners in those cases. They say that petitioners have no specific right in the matter. They refer to the proceedings before the Bombay High Court in identical circumstances also before the Delhi High court. In so far as Bombay proceedings are concerned, the matter reached the Apex court and the Apex Court turned down the request of the petitioners in those cases. ( 6 ) BANK says that the petitioners on their own had opted for being paid the terminal benefits under the PF scheme which option is irrevocable. In the guise of the change in service conditions they are seeking enlargement of time to submit a fresh option which is not contemplated under the regulations. There is no right accruing in favour of the petitioners by amendment of pension regulations. No scheme much less the pension scheme or regulations governing payment on terminal benefits can be open ended forever and subject to change in their applicability even at the option of the ex-employees contrary to the option exercised by them earlier. The petitioners have derived financial benefits under the Special voluntary Retirement Scheme and after ceasing to be / employees, are seeking an opportunity to opt for pension which was not even claimed while they were in service. The amendment cannot ensure to the benefit of the petitioners who are not covered by the very regulations. They refer to the forfeiture clause and also the Special VRS introduced by them. They say that there is no right vested in the petitioners to claim one more option for pension. The fact that option has been given in RB1 cannot be a ground and does not confer any right to demand one more option for pension. They have filed para wise objections to the petition. ( 7 ) IN the connected WP No. 22294-305/2001 petitioners are employees of Vijaya Bank. ( 8 ) THEY say that there was no pensionary benefits available either to the Officers or to the Award Staff. Demand was made for payment of pension in the light of introduction of pension scheme in the RBI. They refer to the settlements and joint notes as in the connected writ petitions. They refer to 1993 and 1995 Regulations in the matter of forfeiture of past service for participation in strike in the matter of pension payment. They also refer to their respective representations to the Central Government. They refer to the settlements and joint notes as in the connected writ petitions. They refer to 1993 and 1995 Regulations in the matter of forfeiture of past service for participation in strike in the matter of pension payment. They also refer to their respective representations to the Central Government. With the amendment of 95 Regulations, participation in a strike whether in the past or in the future will not be a disqualification to get pension as participation in strike would not be treated as forfeiture of service as it was done earlier. Therefore once the clause was amended, the only conclusion is that the employees who did not exercise their option earlier are entitled to exercise their option as participation in a strike would no more be a disqualification to get/earn pension. Therefore the officers were under the impression that the management would give them one more opportunity to exercise their option afresh with the amendment of the Regulation 22 (4) (b) of the 1995 Pension Regulations. Representations were filed. Several grounds have been raised by the petitioners in this petition also. In these petitions they seek for a mandamus directing the management to accept the option exercised by the petitioners to be governed by the 1995 Regulations and grant them pensionary benefits after collecting from the managements contribution of Provident Fund with interest thereon. ( 9 ) STATE of objections is filed by the Union of India. They say that the petitioner are those employees Mho on their own will had not opted for pension scheme. Therefore the petitioners are estopped from raising the said claim. They say that around 6299 employees of the bank exercised their option for pension and as on date there are about 2676 retired employees receiving pensionary benefits, No right is available in the matter of strike. They say that amendment of Rule 24 (4) (b) would not create any right for the employees to exercise a fresh option. They opted for VRS and the same was accepted. After acceptance of the same they cannot claim pension in the case on hand. They also refer to the proceedings before the Bombay and Delhi High Court to contend that relief is to be denied in the case on hand. They also deal with various grounds raised by the petitioners. They deny that Article 14 is available to the petitioners. After acceptance of the same they cannot claim pension in the case on hand. They also refer to the proceedings before the Bombay and Delhi High Court to contend that relief is to be denied in the case on hand. They also deal with various grounds raised by the petitioners. They deny that Article 14 is available to the petitioners. ( 10 ) BANK has also filed its objections. They say that the petitioners did not opt for pension earlier because of the forfeiture clause in Rule 22 (4) (b ). They say that 6299 exercised their option. Draft Regulations were secured in 1994. They say that the present execuse put forward is just a rouse and a mere after thought. They say in the objections statement that in a public sector bank, the pension scheme operates on the principle of creation and funding of pension fund. Such funding by the concerned bank is to be done on an ongoing basis to keep the fund at viable levels. The bank therefore is required to adequately fund the pension scheme out of the profits earned. Though the pension as a second retiral benefit was conceived as an alternative to contributory provident fund and in Hew thereof, the cost of the pension to the Bank is far more than in case of contributory provident fond. On an average, the banks are required to contribute annually at the rate of 27% of pensionable salary of each employee who has opted for pension as against 10% of pay, which was being contributed to Contributory Provident Fund. Therefore the pension schemes have become a costly proposition for the banks and the Banks being commercial organisations are to necessarily go into the coat aspect before any improvement is to be brought into the pension scheme or its scope widened. The financial implication can be said to be a crucial factor in deciding whether the remaining employees or the retired employees under VRS should be brought within the purview of pension scheme or a fresh option is to be given for them to switch over to the pension scheme from Contributory Provident Fund. They also refer to the proceedings in other courts and ultimately they say that petitioners cannot be granted any fresh opportunity in terms of the pleadings. They also refer to the proceedings in other courts and ultimately they say that petitioners cannot be granted any fresh opportunity in terms of the pleadings. ( 11 ) THE Central Government has also filed its objection on 23-9-2004 and in the additional statement of objections they refer to the various aspects of the matter and they also say that in pursuance of the settlement a small committee consisting of the representatives of the ISA and major unions was formed to go into details of the regulations. The term of reference for the committee was to formulate regulations to be adopted by individual boards of the banks for setting up pension fund. This was to be done on similar lines as RBI Pension Regulations applicable to RBI employees and CCS Pension Rules applicable to Central Government Employees. They say that option given by the employee Mas irrevocable and hence all those employees who did not give option within the stipulated period have no right to claim pension subsequently. They further say that the question relating to strike clause was examined in pursuance of several demands received from workmen and it was decided to delete the words or for participation in a strike in Regulations 22 (4) (b) and banks were advised on 2-1-1998 by 1ba to make the necessary amendment. They say that with fall in interest rates, cost of pension has increased substantially. With depleting returns the pension has now become more lucrative than CPF. As per the actual calculations got done by IBA through Actuaries if a fresh option is given to the none optees, the banks require to contribute Rs. 10160 crores as on 31-3-2003. They further say that looking to its increasing cost. Government has already decided to discontinue this scheme and all those employees who joined the Government of India on or after 1-4-2004 shall be eligible to participate in a scheme where under 10% contributions of the basic pay and dear/less allowance are to be made by both the employee and employer and the minimum 40% of the amount at the time of retirement shall be invested in the annuities so that the employee can draw the regular income after retirement. The matter with regard to providing a fresh option for pension has been examined at the Ministers level and looking to the exorbitant coat, it was decided that the same may not be accepted. They say that Regulation 22 (4) (b) is strictly in confirmity with the CCS Pension Rules and therefore it cannot be termed as retrogatory or illegal. They want the petition to be dismissed. ( 12 ) IN the course of hearing, parties have filed additional papers highlighting their respective contentions. Matter was heard fairly for a long time. Elaborate arguments have been advanced by both sides. ( 13 ) SRI K Subba Rao, learned Senior counsel, Sri Narayan Bhat Sri Rajagopal, Sri Vittal Shetty, learned counsel for appearing the petitioners, Sri Ramdas learned Senior counsel, Sri DLN Rao, learned counsel for the Bank Sri T Rajaram and Smt Sarojini Mutthanna, learned Central Government Standing counsel, were heard in the matter. ( 14 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners elaborately argued to contend that a legal right is available on facts and circumstances of this case. They traced their right to the settlement in the case on hand. History and Economics of the issue was also shown to me by the petitioners. Petitioners essentially contending that a valid legal right was frustrated and the frustration was set aside by way of amendment. They refer to pension rules of RBI and the Central Government to say that option cannot be an obstacle for enforcing their right in terms of the settlement. Several case laws are pressed into service. In so far as option is concerned it is argued that earlier options are no options at all and the only option now is after amendment to 1995 Rules by way of deletion of forfeiture clause. Even otherwise, he says that fairness is expected on the part of the respondents particularly when respondents are State under Article 12 of the Constitution. Non-consideration on the sole ground of no option is nothing but arbitrary and in violation of Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Learned counsel press into service the principal of legitimate expectation and fairness in the matter of payment of pension. Even according to them, in terms of Nakaras case, a right is available to them and that right cannot be frustrated in the light of deletion of forfeiture clause. 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Learned counsel press into service the principal of legitimate expectation and fairness in the matter of payment of pension. Even according to them, in terms of Nakaras case, a right is available to them and that right cannot be frustrated in the light of deletion of forfeiture clause. In so far as the Delhi and Bombay High court are concerned, counsel would say that those judgments are rendered in different circumstances and at any rate this court can take independent decision notwithstanding two orders. They are at the instance of the petitioners. They refer to similar rejections and the SLP to contend that it does not operate as resjudicata in the matter. They refer to several case laws in support of their submissions. ( 15 ) WHILE arguing with regard to interpretation of the statute, they say that an interpretation has to be in favour of the petitioners in the light of the facts being a social oriented one. Interpretation has to benefit the beneficial legislation and not to frustrate the same. Here again they refer to several case laws. Itemed Senior counsel ultimately argued that the deletion has to be given retrospective character and if so given the petitioners would get benefits. ( 16 ) IN reply Sri S S Ramadas learned Senior Counsel and Sri D L N Rao, learned counsel would argue that there is no such vested interest available in the case on hand. Options were given and were not made use of by the petitioners. They retired and after obtaining VRS in various cases petitioners are knocking the doors of this court but there is no right available in the case on hand. Once the option is not accepted entry is closed and they cannot have any back door entry on account of subsequent amendment in the case on hand. According to them the subsequent deletion does not in any way profit for any new right to the petitioners. The refer to several judgments in support of their case. They say that legitimate expectation principle is not available in the given circumstances. They strongly argue that the principle of constructive resjudicate/resjudicate is available to them in the light of the Bombay and Delhi High Court rulings in somewhat identical circumstances. The refer to several judgments in support of their case. They say that legitimate expectation principle is not available in the given circumstances. They strongly argue that the principle of constructive resjudicate/resjudicate is available to them in the light of the Bombay and Delhi High Court rulings in somewhat identical circumstances. While arguing on the merits of the matter they say that if any relief is given it would erode the finances of the scheme. Referring the settlement they say that the scheme is a latter one and they are two independent acts of the management. In so far as interpretation is concerned, they say that in a matter like this, the court cannot add something to the scheme, which is not otherwise available to petitioners. While concluding, they say that petitioners are not so deprived of anything warranting any interference by this court. Petitioners were provided retiral benefits in accordance with law. Non-payment of pension is only on account of the petitioners non-option in the matter. They justify their action. ( 17 ) SRI. Rajaram learned counsel for Central Government would say that Regulations are saved in terms of the Sec. 19 of the Act and he refers to the pleadings and the documents to contend that in the light of the notifications and discussions, the forfeiture clause has deleted and it does not give to the petitioners any right seeking pension. According to him, Central Government can direct in terms of the powers available to them in law with regard to pension. ( 18 ) AFTER hearing the following debatable points arise for my consideration,a. History of the case b. Economics c. Legal right in terms of the settlement/scheme d. Option e. Interpretation of Pension Rules f. Article 14 g. Legitimate Expectation h. Resjudicata i. Power of Central government j. Relief. A. History of the Case ( 19 ) PETITIONERS admittedly are employees of nationalised banks. From the material available on record and in terms of the pleadings, RBI introduced RBI Pension Regulations. RBI Regulations provide for forfeiture of service on resignation/dismissal/termination in terms of clause 16. It is on record that in the light of RBI introducing pension, demands were raised by the employees in the banking industry and discussions were held between the representatives of IBA and AIBOC/ncbe on 21-10-1993 and that it would reveal of improvement in the existing pension scheme. It is on record that in the light of RBI introducing pension, demands were raised by the employees in the banking industry and discussions were held between the representatives of IBA and AIBOC/ncbe on 21-10-1993 and that it would reveal of improvement in the existing pension scheme. The history would further reveal of settlement between the management of 58 banks represented by IBA and the workmen represented by IBEA/ncbe/befi/wbef under Sec. 2 (p) and Sec. 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 r/w rule 55 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957. The result of the discussion was to introduce pension as a retiral benefit in lieu of contributory provident fund as in RBI to the following category of employees as well as retired employees;a) Employees who joined the service of the bank on or after 1st Nov, 1993? b) Employees in service of the bank as on 31st October, 1993 and who on or before 30th June 1994 exercise an option in writing in response to banks notice to this effect to be given not later than 31st December, 1993 to become members of the pension scheme and to cease to be members of the contributory provident fund w. e. f. 1st November 1993. c) Retired employees who were in service of the bank/merged bank on or after 31-12-1985 and retired on or after lat January, 1986 but before 1st November, 1993 provided that such retired employees apply for it on their own on the format prescribed by each bank and refund within a period of six reckoned from 1st November, 1993 including interest. (d) Permanent part time employees drawing scale wages. ( 20 ) THE settlement further says that the general conditions are to be in line as are in force in RBI. On the same day, a joint note was signed on agreed conclusions. IBA issues general letter in the matter of introduction of pension scheme stating that banks are to take steps for implementation of the pension scheme as envisaged in the settlement between IBA and the workmen unions and as per the joint minutes signed by IBA with the officers organisations. IBA issues general letter in the matter of introduction of pension scheme stating that banks are to take steps for implementation of the pension scheme as envisaged in the settlement between IBA and the workmen unions and as per the joint minutes signed by IBA with the officers organisations. Minutes of the meeting of the small committee on pension was held on 26-3-1994 and Regulation 10 of Chapter II on forfeiture or services was substituted to read as resignation or dismissal or termination of an employee from the service shall entail forfeiture of his entire service and consequently shall not qualify for pension. A circular was issued on 7-6-1994 in the matter of introduction of pension scheme in bank. It provided for option from retired employees for the purpose of pension. It stated that employees / in service have to exercise option within six months. Last date for such option would be 30-9-1994, Employees who retired from service between 1-1-1966 and 31-10-1993 should exercise their option within four months reckoned from 1-4-1994 and the Ia3t date for such option would be 31-7-19941 Option once exercised is final and irrevocable. Bank Employees Draft Pension Regulations provide for forfeiture of service for dismissal and termination of the employee from service. It farther provided that in the matter of application of the scheme regard may be had to the corresponding provisions of the Civil Service Regulations or the Liberalised Pension Rules or the Civil Pensions (commutation) Rules or the Family Pension Scheme for Central Government Employees. The history also would reveal of discussions with regard to the strike clause in the matter, The forfeiture clause in addition to dismissal/termination/ provided for forfeiture in the matter of participation of in a strike by an employee, Employees discussed the matter and in terms of the minutes of the meeting it is seen that the Union asserted that pension settlement in banks was arrived at explicitly on the premises that it will be exactly on the lines of the RBI Pension Scheme. RBI Pension Scheme did not provide for strike clause, IBA agreed with view and recommended the Government for its deletion. The Unions agreed not to go ahead with their agitation/strike programme in response to an appeal made by the IBA. Thereafter the Government had a second look in the matter of forfeiture of service for participation in an illegal strike. RBI Pension Scheme did not provide for strike clause, IBA agreed with view and recommended the Government for its deletion. The Unions agreed not to go ahead with their agitation/strike programme in response to an appeal made by the IBA. Thereafter the Government had a second look in the matter of forfeiture of service for participation in an illegal strike. Regulation 22 (4) (b) of Pension Regulations provided as follows: nothing in clause (a) shall apply to interruption caused by resignation, dismissal or removal from service or for participated in a strike. Provided that before making an entry in the service record of the Bank employee regarding forfeiture of past service because of his participation in strike, an opportunity of representation may be given to such bank employees. ( 21 ) IBA issued a circular dtd 2-1-1998 stating that the Government of India vide their letter dtd 26-8-1996 had advised the Banks with regard to their decision that necessary amendments be made to the Bank (employees} Pension Regulations, 1995 to substitute the word strike by the words illegal strike in Regulation 22 (4) (b) and now the IBA is informed by the Government of India that after re-examination of the matter, it has now been decided that the provision for forfeiture of past service for participation in illegal strikes may be deleted, and that the banks way now take steps to amend the said Regulation following the provisions of Sec. 19 (1) of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970/1980. In the light of the deletion petitioner made request for fresh option in terms of the request through their representative body. Banks say that since the employees failed to provide option at the relevant point of time, no fresh option was available. With this history,, petitioners are before me seeding for pension in the light of subsequent deletion of words participation in strike in Regulation 22 (4) (b) of the Regulations, ( 22 ) BOTH the learned counsel argue before me with regard to the economics in the event of granting the relief and in the event of refusal of relief with reference to the scheme itself. Sri DLN Rao, learned counsel and Sri Ramdas, learned Senior counsel took me through the scheme to say that any consideration at the cost of the scheme. Sri DLN Rao, learned counsel and Sri Ramdas, learned Senior counsel took me through the scheme to say that any consideration at the cost of the scheme. They say that it Is a self-contained scheme and it cannot be disturbed at this stage resulting in drain on the finance of the scheme. Per contra, learned counsel for the petitioners would say that the exhorbitant figure shown by the respondents need not disturb this court in giving relief. In the event of their establishing a right in their favour, and in the event of this court granting pension in their favour, they would be refunding PF with interest and that aspect of the matter has not been taken into consideration while providing exhaustive figure in terms of the objection statement. ( 23 ) SRI Rajaram learned standing counsel for the Central Government would say that there is definitely increase in cost if pension is granted when compared to grant of CFF. He refers to the objections statement. To appreciate the argument let me see the scheme itself, ( 24 ) PENSION Regulations provide for a chapter named as Constitution of the Fund to be called the Employees Pension Fund under an irrevocable trust. It provides for transfer of provident fund to the pension fund in terms of provident fund to the pension fund in terms of Regulation 6 of the Regulations, Composition of Fund is provided at clause 7 and Regulation 11 deals with acturial investigation of the fund. It further provides for investigation and payment out of fund. It is fairly admitted before me that Provident Fund is to be refunded in the event of grant of pension. Petitioners say that they are agreeable for refund of Provident Fund with interest in the event of grant of pension. Respondents while providing financial details have chosen to say in their objection statement that in the event of grant of pension, it would result in a huge drain on the part of the scheme. In para 14 of the objection statement filed by the Bank in WP WP. 4623-4624/2003 it is mentioned that if pension option is again given and all the staff members opt for pension, it is estimated that the required pension corpus would be around Rs. 285 Crores as against the present corpus of Rs. In para 14 of the objection statement filed by the Bank in WP WP. 4623-4624/2003 it is mentioned that if pension option is again given and all the staff members opt for pension, it is estimated that the required pension corpus would be around Rs. 285 Crores as against the present corpus of Rs. 181 Crores and if the VRS optees who had not opted for pension earlier are given a fresh option an additional corpus of Rs. 25 crores would be required. In the additional statement of objections filed by the Bank they refer to Annexure-5 in which they have given the details with regard to the pension. In so far as Vijaya Bank is concerned they have mentioned that if pension option is to be given to the remaining employees then, actuarial liability for pension as on 31-3-2001 is Rs. 613. 38 crores taking into account the total benefits up to the date of retirement. The short fall in corpus would be Rs. 225. 69 Crores. They have also filed the income and expenditure statement alongwith the objection statement. The Central Government in its additional statement has stated in para 11 that as per the acturial calculations got done by ISA through actuaries if a fresh option is given to the non-optees the banks requires to contribute Rs. 10160 crores as on 31-3-2003, Petitioners refuted the same. At any rate, taking into consideration, the continuous payment of pension to petitioners and taking into consideration, increase in longevity it cannot be said that there would not be any additional financial burden in the case on hand as argued by the petitioners. Even the learned counsel for the petitioners would say that there can not be any burden at all. Their argument is that burden should not come in the way of enforcing their right. It is no doubt true that the petitioners have to refund provident fund with interest in the event of the court accepting their case. If that aspect of the matter is taken into consideration, the liability may come down. At any rate it cannot be said that there is no burden at all. Banks have to share some burden in the event of this court granting relief. If that aspect of the matter is taken into consideration, the liability may come down. At any rate it cannot be said that there is no burden at all. Banks have to share some burden in the event of this court granting relief. Therefore this court as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel, has to bear in mind the after effects of grant of pension even assuming a right is shown to the court by the petitioners. ( 25 ) THE Supreme Court in 2004 (6) SCC 218 noticed that the Central Government as well as the State Government accepted the recommendations of the Fourth Central Pay Commission and in that view of the matter the Supreme Court ruled that the financial burden has no relevance when the claim for pay is fully justified. ( 26 ) IN the case on hand the court has to notice as to whether the claim is justified or not and whether the claim is based on any acceptable legal principle. Therefore the financial burden would depend upon a right and financial burden would also be a relevant factor for consideration in the given set of facts. ( 27 ) ELABORATE arguments have been advanced on this issue. Learned counsel for the petitioners were at great pains to point out to me that the whole pension scheme hag taken its birth from a settlement. They are enforcing their right in terms or the settlement which otherwise would amount to a legal right available to them on the facts of this case. Respondents deny that right by contending that it is not unconditional and that right would depend upon the option and if there is no option then there is no question of any right being available in the given circumstances. Let me see as to whether the material facts would provide a legal right to the petitioners. ( 28 ) ADMITTED facts would reveal of a settlement between the parties in terms of the settlement dtd. 29-10-1993. It definitely provides for grant of pension and there can be no doubt about a pension right in terms of the settlement. I must also notice various Judgments cited at the bar with regard to a right. It is also seen that the material facts would provide for pension subject to certain terms and conditions. 29-10-1993. It definitely provides for grant of pension and there can be no doubt about a pension right in terms of the settlement. I must also notice various Judgments cited at the bar with regard to a right. It is also seen that the material facts would provide for pension subject to certain terms and conditions. Admittedly respondent Banks are covered by Banking Companies (Acquisitions and Transfer of Undertakings) Act. Section 19 of the said Act provides for a power in the matter. In terms of the power granted under the said Act, a statutory regulation has come into force in the light of settlement between the parties. Elaborate arguments have been advanced. Several judgments have been relied upon by the parties with regard to the binding character of a settlement. It is unnecessary for this court to refer to all those judgment except a few judgments on the facts of this case. ( 29 ) IN AIR 1984 SC 516 the Supreme Court has held that the agreement relied upon by the union is a valid subsisting agreement. It is in force. It is neither repudiated not terminated. It is binding upon both the parties. Once the agreement is held to be binding, the employer is estopped from contending that the workmen involved in the dispute who were salesmen were not workmen within the meaning of the expression under the Act, ( 30 ) IN AIR 1990 SC 1801 , the Supreme Court has ruled that a settlement arrived at in the of conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workman of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent it departs from the ordinary law of contract. The object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement. To that extent it departs from the ordinary law of contract. The object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement. ( 31 ) IN AIR 2000 SC 469 the Supreme Court has ruled that a settlement which is sought to be impugned has to be scanned and scrutinized Sub-sec 1 and 3 of Sec. 18 divides settlements into two categories, namely (1) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings and (2) those arrived at in the coarse of conciliation proceedings, A settlement which belongs to the first category has limited application in that it merely binds the parties to the agreement but the settlement belonging to the second category / has extended application since it is binding on all the parties to the industrial disputes, to all others who were summoned to appear in the conciliation proceedings and to all persons employed in the establishment or part of the establishment. The Supreme Court further ruled that when a settlement is arrived at during the conciliation proceedings it is binding on the members of the Workers Union as laid down by Sec. 18 (3) 9d) of the Act. It would ipso facto bind all the existing workmen who are all parties to the industrial dispute and who may not be members of the union that are signatories to such settlement under sec. 12 (3) of the Act. Act i3 based on the principle of collective bargaining for resolving industrial disputes and for maintaining industrial peace. This principle of industrial democracy is the bedrock of the Act, as pointed out in the case of P. Virudhachalam Vs. Management of Lotus Mills (1998)1 SCC 650 . ( 32 ) IN AIR 1999 SC 1059 the Supreme Court again noticed a similar settlement. ( 33 ) IN AIR 2002 SC 937 after noticing the earlier judgments ruled that settlement in conciliation proceedings cannot be littled by an award of the tribunal. The Supreme Court noticed in para 4 that settlement arrived at in the instant case was in the course of conciliation proceedings and therefore it carries a presumption that it is just and fair. The Supreme Court noticed in para 4 that settlement arrived at in the instant case was in the course of conciliation proceedings and therefore it carries a presumption that it is just and fair. It becomes binding on all the parties to the dispute as well as the other workmen in the establishment to which the dispute relates and all other persons who may be subsequently employed in that establishment. An individual employer cannot seek to wriggle cat of the settlement merely because it does not suit hint. From this judgment what is clear to this court is that a settlement has been given a prime place in industrial adjudication. ( 34 ) ADMITTED facts would reveal of a binding settlement between the employees of the bank and the same is not seriously disputed by the bank. Therefore as rightly pointed out by the petitioners pension right takes birth from the settlement. However, matter does not end here. After the settlement between the parties, a communication was sent on 7-6-1994 calling for exercising option with a specific date. Pension Regulation 1993, was also available during the relevant point of time. Subsequently 1995 pension Regulation has come in to force on 29-9-1995. It is admitted before me that option is provided in terms of the pension regulations and a second option was sought for and the same was not provided by the employees. How far this could come in the way of a legal right in terms of the settlement has to be noticed by this court in terms of the pleadings and the material available on record. ( 35 ) IT is no doubt true that the pension has taken its birth from the settlement. Mother settlement has resulted In delivering a pension scheme in terms of the 95 Regulations. After delivery regulation has its own existence particularly in the light of the regulation being framed in terms of the statutory provision. Therefore though a right of pension is provided in terms of the settlement, that right is subject to pension regulation in terms of the regulations. Regulations as I mentioned earlier provide for an option and no option was submitted by the employees. In fact the very application of the regulation would show of an option in writing within 120 days from the notified date to become member of the fund. Regulations as I mentioned earlier provide for an option and no option was submitted by the employees. In fact the very application of the regulation would show of an option in writing within 120 days from the notified date to become member of the fund. Admittedly no option was given by the petitioners- Why and for what reason is totally a different matter. Once the option is not given as rightly argued by Sri DLN Rao, an entry to the scheme is barred. Legal right in terms of the settlement is subject to an entry in terms of pension regulations. When that entry is closed, petitioners cannot complain of any violation of any legal right in terms of the scheme. Arguments of the petitioners are that the said option is illusory and it cannot be accepted. There are several circulars issued and thousands of employees opted for the same. Petitioners also have obtained VR5 benefits and they are relieved of the duties. At this stage, it is not possible for this court to shut its eyes and rule a legal right, notwithstanding no entry in terms of the statutory scheme. Once the gates are closed, a conditional right in terms of the option gets closed and any subsequent development thereafter would not provide any legal right by way of second option in the light of closure of gate to the scheme. ( 36 ) IN fact the learned counsel for the respondent strongly relies on a latest judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 2004 SC 2135 , The Supreme Court was considering this very regulation in the said judgment. ( 37 ) TO sum up , the pension scheme embodied in the regulation is a self supporting scheme. It is a code by Itself. The bank is a contributor to the pension fund. The bank ensures availability of funds with the trustees to make due payments to the beneficiaries under the regulations. The beneficiaries are employees covered by the regulation. It is in this light that one has to construe Regulation 22 quoted above. Regulation 22 deals with forfeiture of service. Regulations 22 (1) states that resignation,. dismissal, removal or termination of an employee from the service of the bank shall entail forfeiture of his entire past service and consequently shall not qualify for pensionary benefits. It is in this light that one has to construe Regulation 22 quoted above. Regulation 22 deals with forfeiture of service. Regulations 22 (1) states that resignation,. dismissal, removal or termination of an employee from the service of the bank shall entail forfeiture of his entire past service and consequently shall not qualify for pensionary benefits. In otherwords, the pension scheme, disqualifies such dismissed employees and employees who have resigned from membership of the fund. The reason is not far to seek. In a self-financing scheme, a separate fund Is earmarked as the scheme is not based on budgetory support. It is essentially based on adequate contributions from the members of the fund. It Is for this reason that under Regulation 11, every bank is required to cause an Investigation to be made by a actuary into the financial condition of the fund from time to time and depending on the deficits, the bank is required to make annual contribution to the fund. Regulation 12 deals with investment of the fund whereas Regulation 13 deals with payment out of the fund. In the case of retirement, voluntary or on sperannuation, there is a nexus between retirement and retiral benefits under the provident fund rules. Retirement is allowed only on completion of qualifying service which is not there in the case of resignation. When sack a retiree opts for self-financing pension scheme, he brings in accumulated contribution earned by him after completing qualifying number of years of service under provident fund rules whereas a person whop resigns may not have adequate credit balance to his provident fund account (i. e. , banks contribution) and, therefore, the regulation 3 does not cover employees who have resigned. Similarly, in the case of 8 dismissed employee, there may be forfeiture of his retiral benefits and consequently the framers of the scheme have kept oat the retirees as well as dismissed employees vide regulation 22, Further, the pension payable to the beneficiaries under the scheme would depend on income accruing on investments and unless there is adequate corpus, the scheme may not be workable and, therefore, clause 22 prescribes a disqualification to dismissed employees and employees who have resigned. Lastly/ as stated above, the scheme contemplated pension as the second retiral benefit in lieu of employees contribution to contributory provident fund. Lastly/ as stated above, the scheme contemplated pension as the second retiral benefit in lieu of employees contribution to contributory provident fund. Therefore, the said scheme was not a continuation of the earlier scheme of provident fund. As a new scheme, it was entitled to keep out dismissed employees and employees who have resigned. ( 38 ) IN the light of this judgment of the Supreme Court I am of the view that it cannot be contended that a legal right would suffer in the event of no option in terms of the scheme. As I mentioned earlier, a legal right takes its birth in terms of the settlement and when that legal right results in a scheme and if that scheme does not provide an entry in the absence of option, petitioners cannot still say that notwithstanding no entry petitioners are to be provided benefits as per the scheme. That would result in rendering a statutory scheme ineffective in the given circumstances. It cannot be forgotten that the scheme is a self-supporting scheme. Therefore the argument of legal right does not appeal to me. ( 39 ) ELABORATE arguments have been advanced with regard to no option, illegal option, second option etc. Material facts would reveal that an agreement was entered into on 21-10-1993. Settlement and pension schemes were drawn thereafter. Draft Regulations were signed on 7-3-1994 and on 26-4-1994. Draft Pension Regulations are settled between parties. Thereafter, pursuant to the settlement dtd 21-10-1997, 29-10-1995 and 23-6-1999, options were provided by the Banks 1995 Regulations provides for an option in the matter. Petitioners argument is that the said option is no option at all since the same is contrary to settlement. At this stage, I must notice that 1995 Regulations were not challenged and the said Regulations have withstood the test of time. If the banks have committed any wrong in the matter of option, nothing prevented the petitioners to approach this court at the earliest possible time, Even otherwise this court has already ruled that the scheme stands on a different footing and the scheme only take a birth from the settlement. After its birth it gets separated and it has its own existence in the eye of law. Therefore it cannot be said that the option which has been given in terms of 1995 Regulations is no option at all as argued by the petitioners. After its birth it gets separated and it has its own existence in the eye of law. Therefore it cannot be said that the option which has been given in terms of 1995 Regulations is no option at all as argued by the petitioners. Petitioners have not chosen to opt when provided to them and that therefore they cannot complain of no option in the matter subsequently. ( 40 ) SIMILARLY the argument of fresh option also does not appeal to me. Pension scheme no doubt provided a forfeiture of past service in terms of Rule 26. That was subsequently redone in the light of stride as I see from the material on record, That by itself cannot be said to create a new right of a fresh option as argued by the learned counsel. At the most the deletion of forfeiture clause would be a welcome measure but that welcome measure may not be available to those who did not see century at the time when entry was offered to them. Therefore the argument of new option in the light of deletion of forfeiture clause is not available to the petitioner. ( 41 ) IN this regard, I must again notice the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 2004 SC 2135 , In the said case, the Supreme Court noticed that Regulation 22 only disentitles an employee who has resigned from service from becoming a member of the fund. ( 42 ) IN 1999 SC 821 the Supreme Court has again noticed the pension scheme. The Supreme Court after referring to various aspects of the matter has ruled that the subsequent amendment would amount to a new pension scheme and it cannot apply to those employees who retired prior to the advent of such a new pension scheme. Supreme Court ultimately in para 21 has provided two categories of employees as I find from the judgment and ruled that if a person retiring is eligible for pension at the time of his retirement and if he survives till the time by subsequent amendment of the relevant pension scheme, he would become eligible to get enhanced pension or would become eligible to get more pension as per the new formula of computation of pension subsequently brought into force. The Supreme Court ruled that entry is necessary and if entry is denied, the subsequent development would not be available to such an employee. ( 43 ) MR. Subba Rao, learned Senior Counsel says that these beneficiaries stood outside the clause in the light of the amendment and in the light of forfeiture clause. He says that in terms of the very judgment they would be entitled for the benefits. I am afraid that this argument is not available to the petitioner in the light of the Supreme Court ruling that the scheme is a self sustaining scheme and in the light of no entry on account of no option in terms of the material available on record, the argument of a new option in the light of this amendment does not appeal to me. ( 44 ) MR Rajagopal learned counsel argues that it would result in injustice to his clients When a beneficial scheme is amended from time to time, it cannot be expected of a public institution to provide a fresh option at every point of time. It is not a though these employees are totally deprived of their retiral benefits. Pension is only an improvement of retiral benefits. If that improvement is denied on account or no option it cannot be said that the petitioners are totally deprived of their entire retiral benefits. No doubt some employees may suffer. But that suffering is not on account or the bank in these cases. Therefore I am not able to accept the argument of the petitioners with regard to new option in the light of the amended regulations. However, I must notice the various case laws cited by the petitioners. ( 45 ) AIR 2003 SCC 721 , was pressed into service. A reading of the said Judgment would show that the said judgment is clearly distinguishable on facts. In the said case, as I see in para 9, the very basic concept of the scheme underwent a change which also goes to show that the banks had sought to invoke their power of amending the scheme. ( 46 ) 1990 (2) SCC 47 is again a case decided by the Apex Court with regard to Article 14 of the Constitution. A reading of the said judgment would show that was a case in which the respondents hare accepted the tender of the fourth respondent. ( 46 ) 1990 (2) SCC 47 is again a case decided by the Apex Court with regard to Article 14 of the Constitution. A reading of the said judgment would show that was a case in which the respondents hare accepted the tender of the fourth respondent. It is only after acceptance, certain developments took place. In those circumstances, this court ruled that the Government should have acted fairly even in contract matters. This judgment is also not available to the petitioners. In these circumstances and in the light of the Apex Court ruling I am of the view that amendment does not in any way provide for a new option as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners. ( 47 ) SRI Ramdas learned Senior Counsel relief on ILR 2002 KAR 1028 a judgment of this court and in the said judgment this court ruled as under; it is the admitted case, the petitioner exercised option on 27-11-1995 and opted out of the pension scheme. The provision providing for exercising option afresh, as aforesaid, also made it clear that the option once exercised shall be final and irrevocable. The bank thus, left nothing to chance when it made it very clear to the officers that the option exercised by them in pursuance of the circular dated 4-11-1995 would be final and irrevocable. Having opted out of the pension scheme even in the face of the aforesaid condition that it would be final and irrevocable, the petitioner by his act has accepted the offer so made by the bank which results in a concluded contract between the bank and the officer. This court further ruled as under; the petitioner does not even challenge the validity of the pansi on regulations 1995 under which the service benefits were determined between the Bank and the petitioner. Without challenging the Pension Regulations 1995, it is not open for the petitioner to seek the reliefs to which he is not entitled to under the Regulations. The petitioner having lost his right to the benefits to which he would have otherwise been entitled to had he not revoked his option earlier given in favour of receiving pension, he cannot now be permitted to get them now as the Bank would suffer a financial loss if he is so permitted. The petitioner having lost his right to the benefits to which he would have otherwise been entitled to had he not revoked his option earlier given in favour of receiving pension, he cannot now be permitted to get them now as the Bank would suffer a financial loss if he is so permitted. This court cannot exercise its option under Art. 226 in favour of a person who has no legal right to the relief sought by him, more so if the grant of such relief would affect the interests of employer -bank. ( 48 ) HE also relies on (2001) 6 SCC 61 . In the said case Supreme Court ruled that the retired employees had in fact more than one month time to exercise their option. It cannot be said that sufficient time was not given to the employees to exercise their option. The High Court has rightly taken a view that those who had not exercised their option were not entitled to get the pension. ( 49 ) BOTH the learned counsel argue that liberal interpretation has to be given to the rules thereby providing a fresh option in the light of deletion of forfeiture clause. 1983 Nakaras case is a leading case in the matter of retiral benefits. In the said case Supreme Court has ruled that pension is neither a bounty not a matter of grace depending upon the sweet will of the employer nor an ex gratia payment, It is a payment for the past service rendered. It is a social welfare measure rendering socio economic justice to those who in the hey-day of their life ceaselessly toiled for the employer on an assurance that in their old age they would not be left in the lurch. Pension as a retirement benefit is in consonance with and furtherance of the goals of the constitution. While interpreting or examining the constitutional validity of legislative / administrative action, the touchstone of Directive Principles of the State Policy in the light of the Preamble will provide a yardstick to hold one way or the other. The discernible purpose thus underlying pension scheme or a statute introducing the pension scheme mast inform interpretative process and accordingly it should receive a liberal construction and the courts may not so interpret such statute as to render them insane. The discernible purpose thus underlying pension scheme or a statute introducing the pension scheme mast inform interpretative process and accordingly it should receive a liberal construction and the courts may not so interpret such statute as to render them insane. ( 50 ) IN (1999) 6 SCO 459 the Supreme Court ruled that it is a duty of the Court to interpret a provision, especially a beneficial provision, liberally so as to give it a wider meaning, instead of giving a restrictive meaning which would negate the very object of the provision. ( 51 ) SRI DLN Rao learned counsel appearing for the Bank invites my attention to a Judgment or the Supreme Court reported in 2000 (2) SCO 69 to contend that when language of the provision is clear, it has to be given effect to instead of resorting to a construction which requires for its support any addition or rejection of words. ( 52 ) HE also relies on JT 1999 (7) SC 256 wherein the Supreme Court has ruled that where a statute provides a thing to be done in particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and not in any other manner, ( 53 ) IN the light of these judgment what is clear to me is that a beneficial interpretation has to be given in terms of beneficial legislation but at the same time courts cannot add something that is not available while interpreting a scheme thereby redoing the scheme itself, ( 54 ) THE argument or afresh option if accepted would result in adding something that is not available in the scheme to the petitioners. Hence the principle of interpretation cannot be accepted in the given circumstances. ( 55 ) SERIOUS arguments have been advanced stating therein that in the light of deletion of forfeiture clause, this has to be given retrospective effect 30 that petitioners have a option in the light of retrospective effect being given to this amendment. It is seen that this amendment is pursuant to a power vested in terms of the Banking Companies Act. Any amendment unless otherwise stated had to be viewed only prospectively. Just because it is helpful to the petitioner this court cannot under Article 226 provide retrospective effect in the absence or any such intention on the part ox those who introduced such amendments. Any amendment unless otherwise stated had to be viewed only prospectively. Just because it is helpful to the petitioner this court cannot under Article 226 provide retrospective effect in the absence or any such intention on the part ox those who introduced such amendments. ( 56 ) SRI K Subba Rao, learned senior counsel relies on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1989 SC 124 wherein the Supreme Court has ruled in para 21 as under A retrospective operation is not be given to a statute so as to impair existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. Before applying a statute retrospectively the court has to be satisfied that the statute is in fact retrospective. The presumption against retrospective operation is strong in cases in which the statute if operated retrospectively/ would prejudicially affect vested rights or the illegality of the past transaction, or impair contracts, or impose new duty or attach new disability in respect of past transactions or considerations already passed. However, a statute is not drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. The general scope and purview of the statute and the remedy sought to be applied must be looked into and what was the former state of law and what the legislation contemplated has to be considered. Every law that impairs or takes away rights vested agreeably to existing laws is retrospective, and is generally unjust and may be oppressive. But laws made justly and for the benefit of individuals and the community as a whole may relate to a time antecedent to their commencement. The presumption against retrospectivity may in such cases be rebutted by necessary implications from the language employed in the statute. It cannot be said to be an Invariable rule that a statute could not the retrospective unless so expressed in the very terms of the section which had to be construed. The question is whether on a proper construction the legislature may be said to have so expressed its intention. ( 57 ) AN argument is also advanced that a Regulation has to be understood as Directory and not mandatory. I am afraid that this argument is not available. The question is whether on a proper construction the legislature may be said to have so expressed its intention. ( 57 ) AN argument is also advanced that a Regulation has to be understood as Directory and not mandatory. I am afraid that this argument is not available. A reading of the entire regulation as a whole would show that the option is nothing but an entry to the scheme and if it is held to be not mandatory, then the very object of providing time limit is frustrated. Therefore this argument is not available to the petitioner in the given set of facts. ( 58 ) PER contra, learned counsel for the respondent would rely on AIR 1974 SC 1 wherein the Supreme Court was considering the service rules classifying the employees for promotion. In para 22, the Supreme Court ruled as under; an argument which found favour with Mufti Bahauddin J. , one or the learned Judges of the letters Patent Bench of the High Court, and which was repeated before us is that the retrospective application of the impugned rules is violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is difficult to appreciate this argument and impossible to accept it. It is wrong to characterise the operation of a service rule as retrospects we for the reason that it applies to existing employees, A rule which classifies such employees for promotional purposes. Undoubtedly operates on those who entered service before the framing of the rule but it operates in future, in the sense that it governs the future right of promotion of those who are already in service. The impugned rules do not recall a promotion already made or reduce a pay-seals already granted. They provide a classification by prescribing a qualitative standard, the measure of that standard being educational attainment, Whether a classification founded on such a consideration suffers from a discriminatory vice is another matter which we will presently consider but surely, the rule cannot first be assumed to be retrospective and then be struck down for the reason that it violates the guarantee of equal opportunity by extending its arms over the past. If rules governing conditions of service cannot ever operate to the prejudice of those who are already in service, the age of superannuation should have remained immutable and schemes of compulsory retirement in public interest ought to have foundered on the rock of retrospectivity. But such is not the implication of service rules nor is it their true description to say that because they affect existing employees they are retrospective. It is well settled that though employment under the Government like that under any other master may have a contractual origin, the Government servant acquires a status on appointment to his office. As a result, his rights and obligations are liable to be determined under statutory or constitutional authority, which for its exercise requires no reciprocal consent. The government can alter the terms and conditions of its employees unilaterally and though in modern times consensus in matters relating to public services is often attempted to be achieved consent is not a pre-condition of the validity of rules of service, the contractual origin of the service notwithstanding. ( 59 ) AT any rate the present facts of the case do not warrant any interpretation by way of retrospective character as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners, ( 60 ) IT is no doubt true that our Constitution provides for equal treatment and equality in law. There cannot be any quarrel over the proposition that the State/ Public authorities are expected to act in a fair and reasonable manner, Any arbitrary, irrational or any unreasonable action is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the case on hand, what has been done is that in the absence of option at the earliest point of time, respondents in the light of subsequent deletion have chosen to say no to the subsequent option. Let me see as to whether this would amount to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. ( 61 ) IT is argued before me that the petitioners have not opted earlier and that would indicate a no option in the case on hand. It is also argued before me that the second option has no place in terms of the scheme. At the outset I must notice that there is no challenge to the regulation by the petitioners. Regulations are available even on on date. It is also argued before me that the second option has no place in terms of the scheme. At the outset I must notice that there is no challenge to the regulation by the petitioners. Regulations are available even on on date. Reliance was placed (1991)1 SCC 212 , wherein the Supreme Court ruled that in the event of arbitrariness, judicial review is permissible. ( 62 ) IN AIR 1990 SC 1782 the Supreme Court has considered the question of option given to the employees of Railways covered by Provident Fund to switch over to the pension scheme with effect from a specified cut off date. Article 14 was pressed into service by the petitioners in the said case. Supreme Court ruled in para 30 and 31 that the option given to the employees to switch over to pension scheme w. e. f. specified cut off date would not be in violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India, ( 63 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of 1997 (1) SCO 208 also ruled that new and revised rules which came into force were not given retrospective effect. The respondents cannot be made retrospectively eligible for pension by virtue of the Rules in such 3 case. This is not a case where discrimination is made among pensioners who were similarly situated. Accepting the respondents contention would have very curious consequences and even a person who had retired long earlier would equally become eligible for pension on the basis of the 1986 rules. This cannot be. ( 64 ) THE Supreme Court again in 1999 (3) SCC 414 has ruled in para 16 that the appellant has not acted illegally or contrary to law in introducing the pension scheme prospectively from 1-7-1966 and the employees who retired before 1-7-1986 cannot compel the appellant-board to extend benefit of pension scheme with retrospective effect. ( 65 ) THE Supreme Court again in 1997 (7) SCC 334 noticed argument of Article 14 and after referring to Nakaras case in para 4 and 5 the Supreme Court ruled that the respondent had retired prior to 1-1-1986 and hence he was not granted pension as he did not qualify under those rules. This court distinguished Nakaras case and held that he cannot be retrospectively made eligible under the new rules. This court distinguished Nakaras case and held that he cannot be retrospectively made eligible under the new rules. Pensioners under the old rules and pensioners tinder the new rules are not similarly situated. Each set of retiring employees will be governed by their own rules in force when they retire. ( 66 ) IN 2000 (3) SC 733 the Supreme Court after noticing Nakaras case ruled that two categories of persons are governed by two different sets of rules. They can not be equated. Further, granting of additional benefits has financial implications also. Specifying the date for conferment of such additional benefits cannot be considered as arbitrary. ( 67 ) THE Supreme Court has consistently noticed the cut off dates and the pension scheme and thereafter has ruled that there cannot be any discretion or arbitrariness in the matter. I have already held in my earlier paragraphs that the subsequent deletion does not confer any right and that I have further ruled that a scheme is a complete code by itself and that this court cannot over rule the scheme in this Article 1413 rejected on the facts and circumstances of this case. ( 68 ) I must notice at this stage history of the case of All India Canara Bank SC/st employees Association Vs. Canara Bank WP 157/2001 filed in identical circumstntances. The Bombay High Court in the said writ petition, ruled that petitioners were unable to show any legal right for exercising their option to the pension scheme which was introduced in 1993 and it was not offered to the employees. The Delhi High court has taken a similar view in CW 6607/2000. When this matter was taken to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court rejected the SLP. Elaborate arguments have been advanced to say that the judgment of the Bombay High Court and Delhi High court would operate as rejusdicata. Sri DLN Rao, argued at great length to say that in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in AIR 1986 SC 391 , the judgments of the Delhi High Court and Bombay High Court would act as constructive resjudicata in terms of Sec. 11 Explanation 4 of the CPC. Sri DLN Rao, argued at great length to say that in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in AIR 1986 SC 391 , the judgments of the Delhi High Court and Bombay High Court would act as constructive resjudicata in terms of Sec. 11 Explanation 4 of the CPC. Per contra, learned counsel for the petitioners have argued before me that they are not the members of the All India Canara Bank SC/st Employees Association and even otherwise the said petition is against Canara Bank only and other banks are not bound by the action taken by the Canara Bank SC and AT Employees Association. Elaborate arguments have been advanced with regard to the effect of rejection of SLP. It is argued before me that mere rejection of the SLP does not by itself would come in the way of consideration of the case in terms of the various judgments cited at the bar by Sri Rajagopal. He relies on 1988 (4) SCC 146, 1994 Suppl (3) SCC, 1996 (9) SCCC 28 and 2004 (3) SCC 619 . All these judgments would show that an order passed in SLP at the threshold without detail reasons would not constitute any declaration of law or constitute a binding precedent. Even the learned counsel for the respondents would not go so far to say that the rejection of the SLP comes in the way of the petitioner. At any rate, since I have also held in my earlier paragraphs that no legal right flows to the petitioner, any finding on this issue would be purely academic in the given circumstances. Prima facie, these two judgments would show that a similar view has been taken by two different respected High Courts. No final opinion is expressed on this issue. ( 69 ) SRI Subba Rao, learned counsel would say that the facts would show that petitioned legitimately expected the respondents to provide an option in the light of deletion of forfeiture clause. He says that neither the settlement, nor the RBI/ccs pension Rules, provide for forfeiture clause in these cases. Therefore according to learned counsel, petitioners expecting a new option for pension is justified. He relies on 1994 5 SCC 509 . He says that neither the settlement, nor the RBI/ccs pension Rules, provide for forfeiture clause in these cases. Therefore according to learned counsel, petitioners expecting a new option for pension is justified. He relies on 1994 5 SCC 509 . The Supreme Court in the said case ruled that legitimate exception may arise a) if there is an express promise given by a public authority; or b) because of the existence of a regular practice which the claimant can reasonably expect to continue; c) such an expectation must be reasonable. ( 70 ) IN 1998 (7) SCC 66 Supreme Court ruled that legitimate expectation is a question of fact and it has to be pleaded in the proceedings. ( 71 ) PER contra, learned counsel for the respondent would argue that there cannot be any legitimate expectation in such matters. Banks rely on (2003) 3 SCC 485 . In the said case, the Supreme Court noticed the theory of legitimate expectation and has ruled in para 19 33 under ; it was accepted that the principle of legitimate expectation gave the applicant sufficient locus standi to seek judicial review and that the doctrine was confined mostly to a right or fair hearing before a decision which resulted in negativing a promise or withdrawing an undertaking, was taken. It did not involve any crystalized right. The protection of such legitimate expectation did not require the fulfillment of the expectation where an overriding public interest required otherwise. However, the burden lay on the decision-maker to show such an overriding public interest, A case of subsantitive legitimate expectation would arise when a body by the authority was arbitrary, unreasonable or not taken in public interest. If it is established that a legitimate expectation has been improperly denied on the application of the above principles, the question of giving opportunity can arise if failure of justice is shown. The court must follow an objective method by which the decision making authority is given the fall range of choice, which the legislature is presumed to have intended. If the decision is reached fairly and objectively, it cannot be interfered with on the ground of procedural fairness. An example was given that if a renewal was given to an existing licence-holder, a new applicant cannot claim an opportunity based on natural justice. If the decision is reached fairly and objectively, it cannot be interfered with on the ground of procedural fairness. An example was given that if a renewal was given to an existing licence-holder, a new applicant cannot claim an opportunity based on natural justice. On facts, it was held that legitimate expectation was denied on the basis of reasonable considerations. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in para 23 as under; "on the facts of the case delineated above, the principle of legitimate expectation has no application. It has not been shown as to how any act was done by the authorities which created an impression that the conditions attached in the original appointment order were waived. Mere continuance does not imply such waiver. No legitimate expectation can be founded on such unfounded impressions. It was not even indicated as to who, if any, and with what authority created such impression. No waiver which would be against requisite compliances can be countenanced. Whether an expectation exists is, self-evidently, question of fact. Clear statutory words override any expectation, however, founded. " ( 72 ) IN the given circumstances, I am of the view that the material on record would not show that the parties gave an impression that the condition of option was waived. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that an impression is given to the petitioners that the bank has waived the option. There must be sufficient material on record to show that an assurance was made out or at any rate impression of assurance is given to the court and it is only the court may consider the plea of legitimate expectation. The present set of facts would show that on the other hand, the respondents at every point of time have denied the benefits to the petitioner. Legitimate expectation argument is therefore does not appeal to me. ( 73 ) ALL Parties stated. before me that the Central Government has the necessary power to issue a direction in terms of Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1980 Regulations are no doubt brought into force in terms of the power regulatory powers conferred under the Act. Not withstand the same the Central Government has the power to issue a cases. The argument of Sri Subba Rao learned Senior Counsel has to be accepted in this regard. Not withstand the same the Central Government has the power to issue a cases. The argument of Sri Subba Rao learned Senior Counsel has to be accepted in this regard. ( 74 ) THIS court has to notice that the parties are governed by a welfare state and welfare measure is always a welcome measure and such welfare measure is not only be reasonable bat also would be a just gesture for maintaining industrial peace and harmony in banking sector. ( 75 ) I have already come to a conclusion that the petitioners have failed to establish a legal right in the light of deletion of forfeiture clause and in the absence of an option in their favour. Therefore petitioners may not be able to get a relief in terms of the scheme and in terms of the various findings of mine in this judgment. This court however cannot straightaway wipe out the history of pension regulations. Pension Regulations were framed by a settlement in the light of Central government/rbi pension pattern. Settlement provides for scheme in terms of settlement dtd 29-10-1993. The correspondence between the parties also would show that the parties are agreeable for pension in terms of the RBI/central scheme. In so far as RBI scheme is concerned, it is seen that there is no forfeiture clause. In so far as CCS Pension Rules is concerned. Rule 88 provides for powers of relaxation in the matter. In fact the deletion is also in the light of RBI Pension Regulations, In fact the Railway Employees have been provided various options at various points of time. ( 76 ) TAKING note of all these factors, I am of the view that the petitioners cannot totally be denied of any relief in these cases particularly in the light of introduction of forfeiture clause by the Government and later deleting the same by the Government in terms of the material on record. In these circumstances, I am of the view that relief can be moulded in the following manner particularly in the light of a prayer by some petitioners with regard to a direction to their respondents including the Government. In these circumstances, I am of the view that relief can be moulded in the following manner particularly in the light of a prayer by some petitioners with regard to a direction to their respondents including the Government. Though a new option is not available in terms of the scheme, a one time direction by the Central Government on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case with certain conditions covering only these petitioners would be a correct solution to meet the ends of justice. In these circumstances I deem it proper to direct the Central Government to accept the demand made on the Ministry of Finance dtd 28-11-2000 Annexure-P in WP No. 4623-24/2003 as a demand on them for the purpose o consideration of exercising its powers for a direction with regard to a one time new/fresh option or exemption from the option governing only these petitioners/employees as a one time measure in terns of the Act. The Government in its wisdom if necessary may call for any additional Information from the Union and the Bank for the purpose of issue of a direction in terms of the Act. Any acceptance of a demand in terms of this order is not be construed as creating any right in favour of the Unions in question. The acceptance of the demand is only for the purpose of this case. While considering the Government may think of various conditions for the purpose of complying the directions including the return of the PF amount within a stipulated period with stipulated interest or past pension without any interest or any other condition in its wisdom on the facts and circumstances of this case while complying with this direction. The above-referred material is only a food for thought and the Government is free to impose such terms and conditions as deemed in accordance with law. The Government in its wisdom may also have a tripartite meet if necessary for the purpose of direction. Time for consideration and passing of a final order is three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the result, these petitions are rejected with the above directions. Parties are to bear their respective costs. --- *** --- .