Judgment 1. By the Court These three cases have been heard together as all of them arise out of G.R. Case No. 175/98 (Kadamkuan (Kankarbag) P.S. Case No. 25/98) pending in the Court of Shri D.K. Pandey, Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Patna and his judgment will govern all of them. There are six petitioners in Cr. Misc. No. 30780 of 2002 while in Cr. Misc. No. 15357 of 2002 there are five petitioners. There is a sole petitioner, Kameshwar Prasad alias Kamleshwar Prasad in Misc. No. 10899 of 2002. In all of them the prayer has been made for quashing the order dated 26.3.1999 by which cognizance of the offence under Secs. 420, 406, 506 and 120-B/34 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Sec. 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act has been taken. Prayer in all of them has been made to quash the entire criminal proceeding noted above as also the order dated 26.3.1999. 2. Since the facts of these three cases as also the prayers made therein are similar I will refer to the petition filed in Cr. Misc. No. 30780 of 2002 mainly. It appears that opposite party No. 2, Rajendra Prasad the informant had filed a written petition addressed to Sr. Superintendent of Police, Patna on 2.1.1998 alleging therein that all the petitioners mentioned above as also 5-6 unknown persons fraudulently tried to get his daughter Ragini Kumari married to Rajesh Kumar (petitioner No. 3). The marriage was settled and on 8.6.1997 the ceremony of Cheka was also performed in which gifts and presents as also cash worth Rs. 2,50,000.00 were paid to the bridegroom party. The date of marriage was fixed on 27.6.1997 which was subsequently shifted to Dec. 1997. On 16.10.1997 the informant Rajendra Prasad (O.P. No. 2) was called by the present petitioners at their residence for fixing the date of marriage on 3.12.1997. However, subsequently demand for more dowry was made by the bridegroom (petitioner No. 3) on which the informant agreed only to give a Hero Honda Motor Cycle. In the meantime the informant came to learn that the petitioner No. 3 was kidnapped by one Tito Mandal (petitioner No. 6) and he was not being allowed to return back to get his marriage performed. In the meantime the informant came to learn that the petitioner No. 3 was kidnapped by one Tito Mandal (petitioner No. 6) and he was not being allowed to return back to get his marriage performed. Subsequently it was also learnt by opposite party No. 2 that as a matter of fact petitioner No. 3 had already performed court marriage on 21.7.1997 with Indu Patel (petitioner No. 2) the daughter of petitioner No. 6. The informant tried to find out the where-abouts of petitioner No. 3, Rajesh Kumar to press him for the return of the articles and cash given to him at the time of Chheka. 3. Opposite party No. 2 filed written fardbeyan to the Sr. Superintendent of Police, Patna giving out these details. This was sent to the Kadamkuan (Kan-kerbag) police station where a criminal case was registered on 11.1.1998 as Kadamkuan (Kankerbag) P.S. Case No. 25/98 under various sections of the Indian Penal Code and Dowry Prohibition Act (Annexure-1). The police after completing the investigation submitted charge-sheet. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in a mechanical way by his impugned order dated 26.3.1999 took cognizance of the offence and transferred the case to the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Patna for disposal. 4. The petitioners have contended that the petitioner No. 1 is the widow-mother of bridegroom (petitioner No. 3). Petitioner No. 4 is his elder brother and petitioner No. 5 is his Bhabhi. Petitioner No. 2 is the wife of petitioner No. 3. The petitioners have contended that the case against them has been instituted maliciously on a false and fabricated story by opposite party No. 2 who happens to be the accountant in the office of Sr. Superintendent of Police, Patna. Taking advantage of his position and proximity to the Sr. Superintendent of Police he filed a petition before him though he must be knowing that any information with respect to a cognizable offence has to be given to the Officer In-charge of the police station and not to the Superin-tendent of Police. It is only when the Officer-in-charge refused to record the information, that the informant as per Sec. 154(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 may send the substance of such information to the Superinten-dent of Police. 5. So far as petitioner Nos. It is only when the Officer-in-charge refused to record the information, that the informant as per Sec. 154(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 may send the substance of such information to the Superinten-dent of Police. 5. So far as petitioner Nos. 2 and 6 are concerned even according to the allegations made by opposite party No. 2 they had no role to play as it can not be imagined that they being the wife and father-in-law of petitioner No. 3 could be a party to the demand of higher dowry for petitioner No. 3 for his second marriage which was going to be performed. The same would be the case with petitioner Nos. 4 and 5. 6. It has been further alleged that opposite party No. 2 being an influential police personnel actually got petitioner No, 3 and his mother (petitioner No. 1) kidnapped for the marriage of his dau-ghter. Since, however, petitioner No. 3 did not agree for this marriage, his whole scheme failed. Being annoyed, the present case being a counter blast to the criminal case of kidnapping brought against opposite party No. 2 was filed in course of which he wrongfully realised a sum of Rs. 1,00,000.00 from the petitioners. On these grounds it has been con-tended that the entire criminal pro-ceeding against them is mala fide false, fabricated and in the interest of justice the same should not be allowed to continue. 7. I have heard the parties in detail with respect to various submi-ssions made on their behalf. At the out set on behalf of the opposite party No. 2 it has been contended that at the stage when the criminal case is proceeding against the petitioners the cognizance taken against them as also the entire criminal proceedings should not be quashed. It has been pointed out that it is the settled law that a criminal case once instituted should be allowed to continue and to be decided by the com-petent Court and at the stage of framing of charge or even subsequent thereto the same should not be quashed. In this connection the learned counsel on behalf of the opposite party No. 2 has placed reliance on the case of State of Haryana and others V/s. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others . He has also relied on a number of other decisions to which I will refer to at the appropriate stage. In this connection the learned counsel on behalf of the opposite party No. 2 has placed reliance on the case of State of Haryana and others V/s. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others . He has also relied on a number of other decisions to which I will refer to at the appropriate stage. As against it learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on a number of cases to show that in a suitable case even FIR against a person as also the taking of cognizance against him may be quashed. Since these contentions raised on behalf of the parties are important questions of law I will firstly like to decide the same. 8. In this connection I will firstly refer to the case of State of Karnataka V/s. L. Muniswamy and others. In this decision the Honble Supreme Court has observed as follows : The High Court in exercise of the wholesome power under Sec. 482 is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice requires that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The Honble Supreme Court in this decision has further observed as follows: The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. 9. From the facts of this decision it would appear that the Sessions Judge by order discharged some accused and adjourned the case for framing specific charges against the rest. The High Court for the reasons recorded quashed the proceedings against the rest of the accused. The Honble Supreme Court observed as follows: It is clear from Sec. 227 of the New Code that the Sessions Judge has power to discharge an accused if after perusing the record and hearing the parties he comes to the conclusion, for reasons to be recorded, that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. Thus this appears to be the law on the subject. 10 In this connection a reference may also be made to the case of Punjab National Bank and others V/s. Surendra Prasad Sinha. In this decision the Honble Supreme Court has observed as follows : Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or nee-dless harassment. Thus this appears to be the law on the subject. 10 In this connection a reference may also be made to the case of Punjab National Bank and others V/s. Surendra Prasad Sinha. In this decision the Honble Supreme Court has observed as follows : Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or nee-dless harassment. The complaint was laid impleading the Chairman, the Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process lest it would be an instrument in the hands of private complainant as vendetta to harass the persons needlessly. From this decision it would appear that the Court must guard against the judicial process being misused by a litigant so as not to allow him to make it an instrument of vendetta or needless harassment of anybody else. 11. In this connection a reference may also be made to the case S.N. Palanitkar and others V/s. State of Bihar and another. In this decision it has been observed as follows : Exercise of inherent power is available to the High Court to give effect to any order under the Cr PC or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. ..... In appropriate cases to prevent judicial process from being an instrument of oppression or harassment in the hands of frustrated or vindictive litigants, exercise of inherent power is not only desirable but necessary also, so that the judicial forum of Court may not be allowed to be utilised for any oblique motive. When a person approaches the High Court under Sec. 482, Cr PC to quash the very issue of process, the High Court on the facts and circum-stances of a case has to exercise the powers with circumspection to really serve the purpose and object for which they are conferred. 12. From the above mentioned autheratative pronouncements of the Honble Supreme Court it would clear that the law enjoins on the High Court to exercise the inherent power vested in it under Section 482 of the Code to prevent the judicial process from being made an instrument of oppression or harassment in the hands of frustrated or vindictive litigants. In the present case it has been contended that this is what is happening so far as the present petitioners are concerned. In the present case it has been contended that this is what is happening so far as the present petitioners are concerned. In support of this they have given details of certain facts which I will presently examine and determine as to how far this contention is correct. Before doing so I will refer to the first point urged on behalf of the opposite party No. 2, namely, that at the stage of taking cogni-zance or during trial of a case the High Court should not ordinarily interfere with the judicial proceeding in exercise of its power under Sec. 482 of the Code. In this connection as noticed above reliance has been placed on the case of Bhajan Lal, (supra). In the said case a land mark decision has been given by the Honble Supreme Court to specify when and under which circumstances the power can be exercised under Sec. 482 of the Code as also under Article 226 of the Constitution. A perusal of paragraph 108 will, however, show that in the cases wherein such power should be exercised. Seven such cases have been given in this paragraph. Its category 7 runs as follows: 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking ven-geance on the accused with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, such power under Sec. 482 of the Code has to be exercised. 13. On behalf of the petitioner it has been submitted that the present case is covered by this category of paragraph 108 of this judgment and, therefore, this decision is no bar so far as this prayer is concerned, and, therefore, FIR in the present case may be quashed. On this ground it has been contended that there is no merit in this contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party. 14. Now coming to the facts to the present case it would appear that opposite party No. 2 is working as accountant in the office of Sr. Superintendent of Police and under this circumstance it can safely be presumed that he has some knowledge about the institution of the cases and the proceedings before the police. In spite of this, for the reasons best known to him, he preferred to file a petition before the Sr. Superintendent of Police and under this circumstance it can safely be presumed that he has some knowledge about the institution of the cases and the proceedings before the police. In spite of this, for the reasons best known to him, he preferred to file a petition before the Sr. Superintendent of Police and not to lodge the FIR before the concerned police station. It is not clear under what circum-stances he did so. Be that as it may, his petition was sent to the concerned police station, the case was instituted the investigation was held and the charge-sheet was submitted. In this connection it is important to remember that this petition is dated 2.1.1998. On behalf of the petitioners it has been submitted that as a matter of fact opposite party No. 2 had actually kidnapped the petitioner Nos. 1 and 3 for the purpose of forcibly getting his daughter married to opposite party No. 3 and as a counter blast of their case, this false case has been instituted by filing a petition before Sr. Superintendent of Police. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioners has drawn any attention to Annexure 2/A dated 14.12.1997. This is a letter from petitioner No. 2 to the Director General of Police, Government of Bihar. In this letter petitioner No. 2 had alleged that Rajendra Prasad (opposite party No. 2) had wrongfully confined her husband Rajesh Kumar (petitioner No. 3) and her mother-in-law Mst. Sarswati Devi (petitioner No. 1) since 2.12.1997. She has further alleged that opposite party No. 2 was demanding a sum of Rs. 3,00,000.00 for their release. Annexure 2/B is another letter from petitioner No. 2 to the Officer Incharge of Hirapur police station, District Bardhwan. It is dated 11.12.1997 in which she alleged that opposite party No. 2 had admitted kidnapping her husband and her mother-in-law. Annexure 2/C is another letter from opposite party No. 3 addressed to the Addl. Superintendent of Police, Asansol alleging that opposite party No. 2 had extorted a sum of Rs. 1,00,000.00 from him for securing their release and the money was paid through two bank drafts dated 3.12.1997 (Annexures 2/D and 2/E). It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that only on the payment of Rs. 1,00,000.00 through these two bank drafts that the petitioners could be able to secure the release of petitioner Nos. 1,00,000.00 from him for securing their release and the money was paid through two bank drafts dated 3.12.1997 (Annexures 2/D and 2/E). It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that only on the payment of Rs. 1,00,000.00 through these two bank drafts that the petitioners could be able to secure the release of petitioner Nos. 1 and 3 from the clutches of opposite party No. 2. In this connection it is important to remember that all these things had happened in the year 1997 and the money was also paid in December, 1997. It was thereafter that opposite party No. 2 filed a petition before the Sr. Superintendent of Police on 2.1.1998 on the basis of which the present criminal proceeding against the present petitioners was started as will appear from Annexure 1. It has been submitted that it was in this back ground that this false case has been instituted against them by opposite party No. 2 in the manner indicated above. From the aforesaid it would become clear that all these informations with various police authorities was lodged on behalf of the petitioners against opposite party No. 2 much before the filing of his petition on 2.1.1998 before the Sr. Superintendent of Police. Under this circumstance it has been contended that the present prosecution of the petitioners is malaciously false and a counter-blast to the prosecution launched by them against opposite party No. 2. The facts and circumstances of this case clearly to support this conten-tion of the petitioners. As mentioned above the Honble Supreme Court has time and again pointed out that the powers under Sec. 482 of the Code should be exercised to prevent the judicial process from being made an instrument of oppression or harassment at the hands frustrated or vindictive litigants. The Honble Supreme Court has pointed out that in such a situation the exercise of inherent power is not only desirable but also necessary so that the judicial forum of the Court may not be allowed to be utilised for any oblique motive as held in the case of S.N. Palanitkar, (supra). The facts of the present case clearly attract the aforesaid observation made by the Honble Supreme Court. The facts of the present case clearly attract the aforesaid observation made by the Honble Supreme Court. It is well known that the Court exists to secure justice between two persons and nobody howsoever high or mighty he may be, can be allowed to misuse the process of the court to satisfy his personal grudge or whims. 15. From the detailed discussions made about it becomes perfectly clear to me that the criminal proceeding against the petitioners in all these three cases can not be allowed to continue and the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. In the result the entire criminal procee-dings against the petitioners in all the three cases arising out of G.R. No. 175/1998 (Kadamkuan (Kankerbag) P.S. Case No. 25/98) pending in the Court of Shri D.K. Pandey, Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Patna are hereby quashed. Also the order dated 26.3.1999 passed by the learned Magistrate taking cognizance of the offences under various sections of the Indian Penal Code and Dowry Prohibition Act against the present petitioners in all these three cases are also quashed. These three applications are allowed in the manner indicated above.