ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J. ( 1 ) THE subject of dispute in the present appeal is an immovable property, being premises No. 43, Taltolla Lane. The appellants claim to be the intending purchaser of the same by virtue of an agreement for sale entered into between Shaukat Ali, the predecessor of the appellants and respondent Nos. 1 to 7, being the original owners of the premises, on 25th december, 1993. The respondent Nos. 8 and 9, claim to have acquired ownership of the said property by virtue of a deed of sale executed on 15th May, 1995 in their favour by the respondent Nos. 1 to 7. In both these transactions, one Noel david, as the constituted attorney of the original owners of the property (being respondent Nos. 1 to 7) had executed the documents on their behalf. The respondent Nos. 1 to 7 either by themselves or through Noel David did not enter into appearance before the Trial Court expectedly, and we did not direct service of notice upon them at the present stage of the proceeding. ( 2 ) THE present appeal, arises out of an order passed on 3rd March, 2004 by the learned Judge in charge of the 9th Bench of the City Civil Court of Calcutta on an application under Order 39 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure in Suit no. 1182 of 1999. The appellants, being the plaintiffs in that suit had obtained an order of temporary injunction on 21st February, 2003 against the respondent nos. 1 to 7 herein directing them to maintain status quo in respect of the suit property asserting equitable right over the said property. The suit was filed when, as per the case of the appellants, the defendants declined to complete the sale in pursuance of the agreement referred to above in spite of being requested to do so. In the plaint, a copy which has been produced before us, it has been pleaded that as per the agreement the value of the property was rupees five lacs and a sum of rupees two lacs and fifty thousand had already been advanced to the vendor as earnest money and part payment. The suit was filed on 12th July, 1999 and the suit was for specific performance of the agreement for sale. In this suit, the respondent Nos. 8 and 9 were not impleaded as defendants. The suit was filed on 12th July, 1999 and the suit was for specific performance of the agreement for sale. In this suit, the respondent Nos. 8 and 9 were not impleaded as defendants. ( 3 ) THE appellants' case is that subsequent to the institution of the suit, they discovered "feverish building activity" and that on enquiry they came to learn that the premises had apparently been transferred and move was afoot to demolish the said premises, which prompted them to apply for an order of temporary injunction restraining the defendants from further dealing with the said property and from effecting any work of construction in any form at the subject premises. This petition for temporary injunction was filed, it has been submitted before us, on 14th February, 2003. The learned Trial Judge was pleased to pass an order of status quo in respect of the said property on 21st february, 2003 initially till 21st March, 2003, which had been extended subsequently. Thereafter, the respondent Nos. 8 and 9 got themselves impleaded as added defendants/respondents in the said suit in the Trial Court. They have filed written objection to the petition for temporary injunction also filed an application under Rule 4 of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure for vacating the order of status quo. The case of the respondent Nos. 8 and 9, whom we shall refer to as the contesting respondents in later part of this order, is that they had made purchase of the suit property under a registered deed of conveyance executed on 15th May, 1995. It has been submitted on their behalf that before making such purchase they were assured by Noel David, the constituted attorney of the respondent Nos. 1 to 7 that the subject property was free from all encumbrances and charges. Thereafter, upon making search from the registration Authority, they made the purchase. Subsequent to purchasing the subject property, they had got their names recorded with the Calcutta municipal Corporation in their assessment role and were in the process construction of a building through two individuals, Kafil Ahmed and Raju. who are described by the contesting respondents as "honest and reliable contractors" in the pleadings filed in the Trial Court. Subsequent to purchasing the subject property, they had got their names recorded with the Calcutta municipal Corporation in their assessment role and were in the process construction of a building through two individuals, Kafil Ahmed and Raju. who are described by the contesting respondents as "honest and reliable contractors" in the pleadings filed in the Trial Court. ( 4 ) THE learned Trial Judge allowed their applicarion under Rule 4 of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure and vacated the interim order upon being prima facie satisfied that they were purchasers for value without notice of the prior agreement. The appellants have preferred the appeal against this order of the learned Trial Judge. In connection with the appeal an application for stay of operation of the impugned order has been filed, with which we are concerned at this stage of the proceeding. The appellants have assailed the impugned order and applied for stay of operation of the said order primarily on the ground of balance of convenience and inconvenience, contesting the claim of the respondent Nos. 8 and 9 that they are bona fide purchasers for value of the subject premises without notice of the prior transaction. It has been submitted by Mr. Aniruddha Chatterjee, learned Advocate for the appellants that an agreement is subsisting between his clients and the original owners of the said property on the strength of which they have acquired equitable right in respect of the subject property. It has also been submitted that at all material times the appellants had been ready and willing to perform the said agreement and in the plaint it has been pleaded that on several occasions they had written to Noel David, for this purpose. It has also been submitted that the existence of the said agreement was acknowledged as late as on 4th October, 1996. In this respect a copy of a Facsimile Message purporting to originate from Noel david has been produced before us. The addressee of this message is the predecessor of the appellant. ( 5 ) IN support of the petition for stay of operation of the impugned order, the main argument advanced on behalf of the appellant has been in the event construction work is allowed to continue, the subject property shall change its character irreversibly and for all practical purposes the appellants' claim would be defeated. ( 5 ) IN support of the petition for stay of operation of the impugned order, the main argument advanced on behalf of the appellant has been in the event construction work is allowed to continue, the subject property shall change its character irreversibly and for all practical purposes the appellants' claim would be defeated. It is further contention of the appellants that the contesting respondents are not bona fide purchaser for value without notice and the appellants' equitable right over the said property must prevail. In particular it has been submitted on behalf of the appellants that at this stage the Court ought not to hold a mini trial and in the event the status quo order as originally granted is not sustained, the appellants would suffer irreparable loss and injury. ( 6 ) THE case of the respondents, on the other hand is that the title of the property has already passed on to them, and they are in peaceful possession of the property. Further contention of the respondents is that construction work has already started for construction of a multi-storied complex on the said property and third party right has been created in respect of certain portions of the building in the process of construction, as the constituted attorney of the respondents has already executed five booking agreements in the proposed building for induction of tenants. It has also been argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that the delay in taking action disentitles the appellants from obtaining equitable relief of injunction founded on the claim for specific performance of the agreement. Md Farhauddin, learned counsel for the respondents has further submitted that the suit, out of which the present proceeding arises, is barred under the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963, and has drawn our attention to Article 54 thereof. In addition, he has submitted that his clients' rights are protected as per the provisions of section 19 (b) of the specific Relief Act, 1963, his clients having paid the entire consideration amount specified in the deed of conveyance. In addition, he has submitted that his clients' rights are protected as per the provisions of section 19 (b) of the specific Relief Act, 1963, his clients having paid the entire consideration amount specified in the deed of conveyance. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsels for the appellants and respondents have relied on various authorities in support of their contentions, but we need not refer to all of these cited decisions for the purpose of disposal of the present application, as we are primarily required to scrutinise as to whether the learned Trial Judge had exercised his discretion judicially to ascertain which of the parties have better claim in law, applying the tests of prima facie case, balance of convenience and/or inconvenience and the possibility of suffering irreparable loss and injury, while passing the impugned order. ( 8 ) MR. Chatterjee has submitted that if the impugned order is not stayed, situation would become irreversible. In support of his argument on this count, he has relied on the decisions reported in AIR 1983 SC 742 , Gangubhai vs. Sitaram and Israil vs. Samser Rahman reported in XIX CLJ 47. Mr. Chatterjee's further submission is that at this stage, Court is not to hold a mini trial, and as there are two documents, raising contrary claims over the subject premises, there is a prima facie case for investigation, and the order of status quo ought to have been retained. In support of such submission, he has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anand prasad Agarwalla vs. Tarakeshwar Prasad and Ors. , 2001 (5) SCC 568 . He has also referred to another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, Dalpat Kumar vs. Prahlad Singh, AIR 1993 SC 276 , for the proposition that "prime facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial". In this case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has further observed, inter alia, as follows :"only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. In this case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has further observed, inter alia, as follows :"only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in "irreparable injury" to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that "the balance of convenience" must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that it is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject-matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit. " ( 9 ) THE two other decisions which the appellant relied upon are two un-reported judgments of this Court being CAN No. 2522 of 2002 and FMAT No. 782 of 2002, Prasanta Kr. Das and Anr. vs. Messers Admired Builders and developers and G. A. No. 251 of 1996 in CAN No. 7281 of 2002, Ganga Prasad roy vs. Thashavi Tower Private Ltd. These two authorities were relied upon by mr. Chatterjee in support of his submission that as an interim measure further construction on the subject property and creation of third party right ought to be prevented in the given facts of the present case. On the issue of limitation, mr. Chatterjee in support of his submission that as an interim measure further construction on the subject property and creation of third party right ought to be prevented in the given facts of the present case. On the issue of limitation, mr. Chatterjee has referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of india in the case of Govind Prasad vs. Hari Dutt, AIR 1977 SC 1005 , for the proposition that when a contract relates to sale of immovable property it will normally be presumed that the time is not the essence of the contract. It has been argued on behalf of the contesting respondents that the suit in any event ought to be barred under the Limitation Act, the agreement being relied upon by the appellants having been executed in the year 1993, with a provision that the final transaction shall be concluded within a year. The suit has been filed admittedly in the year 1999. For this purpose the learned counsel for the respondent has drawn our attention to Article 54 of the Limitation Act. He has relied on the cases of Munna Lal vs. Krishna Kumari, AIR 19s3 All 5, Bhanwar lal and Ors. vs. Mahadev Vikash Samiti, Bikaner, AIR 2003 Raj 178 and Subbanna gounder vs. Subbayammal, AIR 2003 Mad. 437 , to contest the priority claim of the appellants on equitable ground. The other authorities relied on by the learned counsels for the respondents for this purpose are K. S. Vidyananadam and Ors. vs. Vairavan, 1997 (3) SCC 1 . In support of the order vacating the original status quo order, he has relied upon the cases of Lourdu Mari david vs. Louis Chinnaya Arogiaswamy and Ors. , 1996 (5) SCC 589 , Mahadeo savlaram vs. Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. , 1995 (3) SCC 33 . To establish his clients' right as bona fide purchaser for value without notice, the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the contesting respondents has relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the cases of Ram Niwas vs. Bano, 2000 (6) SCC 685 and Jagannath vs. Jagadish Rai, AIR 1998 SC 2028 . To establish his clients' right as bona fide purchaser for value without notice, the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the contesting respondents has relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the cases of Ram Niwas vs. Bano, 2000 (6) SCC 685 and Jagannath vs. Jagadish Rai, AIR 1998 SC 2028 . Strong emphasis has been laid by the learned counsel for the respondents on delay in bringing the action of the part of the appellants, firstly in instituting the suit in the year 1999 (the agreement being executed in the year 1993) and then in filing the petition for interim injunction in February, 2003. He has argued that the application for injunction founded on the claim of specific performance, being an equitable relief, ought to be refused on the ground of delay, and for this proposition he has relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble supreme Court in the case of K S. Vidyanadam and Ors. vs. Vairavan, reported in 1997 (3) SCC 1 , and that of Karnataka High Court in the case of Kirloskar proprietary Ltd. and Ors. vs. Kirloskar Mimensions Pvt. Ltd. , AIR 1997 Karnataka 1. Relying on these two authorities, he has submitted that prayer for injunction can be refused on the ground of delay even if the action is brought within the period of limitation, In addition, it has also been submitted before us that the agreement of the appellants are understamped and no notice of the same ought to be taken by us. The case relied on in this respect is that of Swapnadip Lahiri vs. Tridip Kumar Ray, reported in 1999 (2) CLJ 259 . ( 10 ) AS it is well-established, we are not to hold a mini trial at this stage and we are only to test as to who has made out a prima facie case in this matter and in whose favour the balance of convenience and inconvenience lies. Added to that, we are also required to come to a prima facie finding as to whether if the impugned order is sustained, whether the appellant or the respondent shall be the victim of irreparable loss and injury. ( 11 ) THE fact that there was an agreement for sale is not under serious dispute at this stage. Added to that, we are also required to come to a prima facie finding as to whether if the impugned order is sustained, whether the appellant or the respondent shall be the victim of irreparable loss and injury. ( 11 ) THE fact that there was an agreement for sale is not under serious dispute at this stage. From the copy of the agreement which has been produced before us in a separate compilation of documents, we find that a cheque for rupees one lac, bearing number 4048461 dated 22th June, 1994 drawn on Punjab national Bank (Mirza Galib St. Branch) was received by the vendors. A learned advocate is a witness to this agreement. The fact of execution of the deed of conveyance in favour of the respondents is also not a contentious issue. ( 12 ) SO far as the question of limitation is concerned, Clause 4 of the agreement stipulates that the transaction shall be completed within one year of the execution of the agreement, on the parties of the second part (being the appellants) paying the purchasers tine balance of consideration money agreed therein, time being the essence of contract. There is however, a further qualification incorporated in this clause, to be satisfied by the original owners. The stipulation regarding time for completion of the transaction is dependant upon parties of the first part making out a good and marketable title to the satisfaction of learned advocate of the party of the second part. Two other features of this case have come to our notice. The original agreed amount as per the agreement for sale was rupees five lacs in the year 1993 and in 1995, the deed of conveyance shows the value of the property to be of rupees four lacs. This goes contrary to the normal trend concerning movement of property-value, which ordinarily rises with the passage of time. It is also a principle well-established in law that the onus is on the person claiming protection under section 19 (b) of the Specific Relief Act, that he had no notice of the prior agreement. To quote from Snell's Equity, a recognised and acclaimed text on this subject, (page 47, 29th edition), "the onus of proving the purchase of a legal estate without notice tests on the purchaser. To quote from Snell's Equity, a recognised and acclaimed text on this subject, (page 47, 29th edition), "the onus of proving the purchase of a legal estate without notice tests on the purchaser. " It does not appear that the respondents had made any requisition of title from the original vendors, which is a normal practice in transactions involving immovable property in the city of calcutta of which we can take judicial notice. In order to ascertain whether any equitable right has been created in respect of an immovable property, a search only at the registry is not sufficient since an agreement for sale is not required to be registered under law. The only way existence of such agreement can be found out is by sending a requisition of title which has not been done in the present case. ( 13 ) THOUGH, in the deed of conveyance a clause has been incbrporated to the effect that the property is free from encumbrance, for the reason indicated above we are not prima facie satisfied that the respondents have discharged their onus which is necessary for claiming protection under section 19 (b) of the act. As regards the authorities relied on by the respondents, Munna Lal's case (supra) was decided after passing of decree and not at the interim stage. So was the case of Jagannath (supra), and the Hon'ble Supreme Court decided the case of Lorudu Mari David (supra) upon considering that there was concurrent finding of facts by the Trial Court and the High Court. On the issue of grant of temporary injunction, the cases relied on by the respondents, being mahadeo Savlaram Shelka vs. Pune Municipal Corporation (supra ). Subbanna gounder vs. Subbayammal (supra) and Bhanwar Lal vs. Mahadev Vikash samity, Bikaner (supra), we cannot but agree with the legal principles enunciated by these authorities, but these judgments were delivered in the light of particular set of facts involved in each case, which are not identical to the factual matrix of the present proceedings. Subbanna gounder vs. Subbayammal (supra) and Bhanwar Lal vs. Mahadev Vikash samity, Bikaner (supra), we cannot but agree with the legal principles enunciated by these authorities, but these judgments were delivered in the light of particular set of facts involved in each case, which are not identical to the factual matrix of the present proceedings. ( 14 ) ON the question of limitation, we cannot come to a finding in favour of the respondents at this stage since it has been pleaded in the plaint that the vendors had on several occasions acknowledged the said agreement and the agreement specifically stipulated that the one year term postulated for completion of the transaction was subject to the vendors establishing satisfactory marketable title. So we cannot automatically presume that computation period for limitation began to run in the present case immediately on completion of one year from the date of execution of the agreement. The contention of the respondents that delay, even if the action is instituted within the limitation period would disentitle the appellants from obtaining equitable relief of injunction is also an issue on which we cannot come to a prirna facie finding at this stage, as the appellants have explained in their pleadings as to why they brought the action in 1993 and applied for temporary injunction in February, 2003. Veracity of such statements can be finally established only at the trial. In our opinion, both these issues can be adjudicated upon only on consideration of evidence, on trial. The submissions of the respondents that the agreement cannot be taken notice of because of payment of inadequate stamp-duty also cannot be sustained, as from the decision of Swapnadip Lahiri (supra), it is apparent that a requirement to pay stamp-duty in terms of Schedule 1a. Item 5 (d) was introduced with effect from 31st January, 1994, and the subject agreement was admittedly executed in the year 1993. ( 15 ) IN the light of the given state of facts, and the law as discussed by us in the earlier part of this order, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants that change in the character of the subject property would cause irreversible change in the situation has persuaded us to set aside the impugned order. In our opinion, the learned Trial Judge had wrongly exercised his discretion in vacating the order of status quo. In our opinion, the learned Trial Judge had wrongly exercised his discretion in vacating the order of status quo. If a multi-stored complex is permitted to be constructed on the subject property, in the event the appellants are ultimately successful in the suit, it would cause substantial loss to the appellants. This aspect has been completely overlooked by the learned Trial judge. We are also satisfied that the appellants have made out a prima facie case, that calls for further investigation before coming to a final decision on his claims. Moreover, in respect of transactions involving immovable property, the possibility of monetary compensation to the party seeking specific performance of the agreement cannot be held to be adequate relief. The mere fact that the appellants have made monetary claim in the suit does not disentitle them from obtaining equitable relief of injunction. There is no evidence that the appellants were not ready and willing to perform their part of obligation. The appellants' pleading is contrary to this allegation, and we have no reason to completely ignore such pleading. ( 16 ) ACCORDINGLY, we set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal. The trial Court is now to dispose of the application for injunction in accordance with law and the observation made hereinabove expeditiously. ( 17 ) LET an urgent xerox certified copy be supplied, if applied for, to the parties duly countersigned by the Assistant Registrar, Court on usual undertaking. Appeal allowed.