D. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) I have the privilege of going through the judgment and order of brother SINHA, J. I fully agree with the same. However, I would like to add a few words of mine. The order of dismissal of the petitioner/appellant from service was set aside by an order dated April 28, 1995 passed in C. O. No. 1888 (W) of 1993 with direction upon the disciplinary authority to consider the representation of the appellant/petitioner against the enquiry report and to pass an appropriate order. The representation having been rejected by the disciplinary authority after such consideration, another writ petition challenging the merit of the decision of the disciplinary authority and that of the appellate authority. This appeal is directed against the order dated April 11, 2002 passed by the learned single Judge in C. O. No. 18735 (W) of 1996 dismissing the said writ petition. Appellant's submission: ( 2 ) MR. Moitra, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the learned single Judge had failed to note the infirmities in the enquiry report and ought to have quashed the enquiry report itself. He had made his submission on various grounds. The charge-sheet was issued against the petitioner requiring him to show-cause on the following charges viz. unauthorised absence for more than seven consecutive days from April 20, 1991 without furnishing medical certificate from a panel doctor along with the petitioner's leave application and wilful absence and insubordination by absenting from duty since april 20, 2001 despite repeated advice from time to time which amounts to maligning or feigning illness as per clause 20. 03. 34 of the hmt Disciplinary and Appeal Rules. According to Mr. Moitra, the Rules permit treatment in case of necessity or emergency by doctors outside the panel. There is no bar in getting oneself treated by doctors other than the panel doctors. 03. 34 of the hmt Disciplinary and Appeal Rules. According to Mr. Moitra, the Rules permit treatment in case of necessity or emergency by doctors outside the panel. There is no bar in getting oneself treated by doctors other than the panel doctors. ( 3 ) THE first ground of challenge was that the entire action and exercise of power by the respondents commencing from dealing with the petitioner's leave application supported by the medical certificate issued by a non-panel doctor; initiation of the disciplinary proceedings; conduct of the enquiry proceeding and the enquiry report made thereon as well as the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority and the order of dismissal of the appeal were passed on the superseded Leave Rules vide Office Order No. 1/85 dated April 2, 1985, which requires the employees to avail of medical treatment from any panel doctor or specialist. The amended leave Rule vide Office Order No. 45/88 dated january 28. 1989, which superseded the aforesaid Leave Rules was not taken into consideration by the respondent authorities under which it is not mandatory to apply for sick leave supported by medical certificate issued by the panel doctor. ( 4 ) THE second ground was that the principle of proportionality has been completely ignored by the authorities concerned for imposing the major penalty of dismissal from service on the plea of unauthorized absence for more than seven days. It is contended by Mr. Moitra that the learned single Judge did not deal with the said aspect though the same was agitated in the writ petition and urged at the time of hearing. ( 5 ) MR. Moitra had argued the matter elaborately and relied upon various decisions cited by him at the Bar. He relied on Bachhittar singh v. State of Punjab and another AIR 1963 sc 395 to contend that the departmental enquiry has two stages and both these stages are justiciable, therefore, the learned single judge ought to have examined the contention raised before him and should have come to a definite conclusion with regard to the findings in the report. He relied on Bachhittar singh v. State of Punjab and another AIR 1963 sc 395 to contend that the departmental enquiry has two stages and both these stages are justiciable, therefore, the learned single judge ought to have examined the contention raised before him and should have come to a definite conclusion with regard to the findings in the report. Relying on Om Kumar and others v. Union of India AIR 2000 SC 3689 he had contended that the Court has power to judicial review an administrative action including quantum of punishment related only to wednesbury's principle, i. e. , the order passed on irrelevant factors or decision was one, which no reasonable person could have taken. He attempted to point out on facts that this particular case comes within the scope of the said principle; inasmuch as the authority had proceeded on the basis of a superseded leave rule. In order to support the contention that administrative action is subject to control by judicial review on the ground of illegality, irrationality (Wednesbury's Unreasonableness)and procedural impropriety, he relied upon tata Cellular v. Union of India AIR 1996 SC 11 : 1994 (6) SCC 651 . ( 6 ) IN order to support his contention that the punishment was disproportionate and disproportionate penalty is violative of Article 14, he relied on Bhagat Ram v. State of himachal Pradesh and others AIR 1983 SC 454 : 1983 (2) SCC 442 : 1983- II-LLJ-1. Citing Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, bombay and others v. Sharat Narayan Parab 1998 (1) SCC 484 : 1998-11- LLJ-653 he contended that the punishment shocking to conscience warrants intervention by Court. Relying on B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others AIR 1996 SC 484 : 1995 (6) SCC 749 : 1996-I-LLJ-1231 and U. P. State Road transport Corporation and others v. Mahesh kumar Mishra and others AIR 2000 SC 1151 : 2000 (3) SCC 450 : 2000- I-LLJ-1113 he submitted that the High Court can impose appropriate punishment without directing the authority to reconsider the punishment. He then relied upon Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and others AIR 1987 SC 2386 : 1987 (4) SCC 611 : 1988-I-LLJ-256, to contend that the punishment disproportionate to the offence and shocking to conscience amounts to conclusive evidence of bias. To establish that the punishment is disproportionate, he relied upon hind Construction and Engineering Co. He then relied upon Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and others AIR 1987 SC 2386 : 1987 (4) SCC 611 : 1988-I-LLJ-256, to contend that the punishment disproportionate to the offence and shocking to conscience amounts to conclusive evidence of bias. To establish that the punishment is disproportionate, he relied upon hind Construction and Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen AIR 1965 SC 917 : 1965-I-LLJ-462 wherein an order of dismissal on the ground of absenteeism was held to be an extreme punishment. Relying upon the decision in Union of India and another v. Ganayutham air 1997 SC 3387 : 1997 (7) SCC 463 : 2000-II-LLJ-648 he contended that fundamental freedom is affected in the case of disproportionate punishment. ( 7 ) HE then contended that certificate issued by a non-panel doctor cannot be refused in the absence of any material that the plea of illness is false relying upon Gouranga Achargee v. Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal and others 2002-IV-LLJ (Suppl)-260 (Cal ). The dismissal of the appeal was without any application of mind, which is abhorred by the apex Court in R. P. Bhat v. Union of India AIR 1986 SC 1040 : 1986 (2) SCC 651 wherein it was held that the appellate authority must apply its mind to all the requirements of the rule. Relying on Mantu Biswas v. Union of India and others ATR 1988 (2) CAT 17 (Calcutta Bench)he contended that a cryptic order of the appellate authority without application of mind is liable to be quashed. Submission on behalf of the respondent: ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent had relied on the decisions in Union of India v. Upendra Singh 1994 (3) SCC 357 : 1994-I-LLJ-808, State of Tamil Nadu v. K. V. Perumal and others AIR 1996 SC 2474 : 1996 (5) SCC 474 : 1996-II-LLJ-799 and R. S. Saini v. State of Punjab and others AIR 1999 SC 3579 : 1999 (8) SCC 90 : 1999-II-LLJ-1415 in order to support his contention that the judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of the correctness of the charges or reasonableness of the decision. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made (Union of India v. Upendra Singh (supra)) To support his contention that the question as to whether the charges were established by material available was held to be beyond the scope of judicial review as the Administrative tribunal is not an appellate authority over the departmental authorities (State of Tamil Nadu v. K. V. Perumal and others (supra) ). To support his contention that the High Court while exercising writ jurisdiction does not reverse a finding of an enquiry authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it is insufficient; if there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusions of the enquiring authority. It is not the function of the court to review evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding; the enquiring authority is the sole judge of the fact so long as there is some legal evidence to substantiate its findings adequacy or reliability of evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the Court in writ proceedings, he relied on the decision in R. S. Saini v. State of punjab and others (supra ). Relying on these decisions, he contended further that the scope of judicial review in matters of disciplinary proceedings being restricted, the High Court can consider the challenge to the impugned order within a limited degree of scrutiny. The supreme Court in R. S. Saini (supra)considered the matter within the limited scope in order to find out the correctness of the appellant's allegation that the impugned order of disciplinary authority suffered from vice of perversity and non-application of mind and was tainted by malice. Report of the enquiring authority cannot be faulted except on grounds other than those. The scope of the present case: ( 9 ) WE have heard the respective counsel for the parties and gone through the materials placed before us and had considered the erudite arguments made by Mr. Moitra and have also perused the judgment of the learned single judge. A great stress was given by Mr. Moitra on the suppression of the Leave Rules and the ingenuinity of the charges levelled and on the mala fide and non-application of mind and the haste in which the order of dismissal was issued on the facts which are stinking. Moitra and have also perused the judgment of the learned single judge. A great stress was given by Mr. Moitra on the suppression of the Leave Rules and the ingenuinity of the charges levelled and on the mala fide and non-application of mind and the haste in which the order of dismissal was issued on the facts which are stinking. We agree with the principle of law as propounded by Mr. Moitra relying on the various decisions cited by him and as discussed hereinabove while noting the submission of Mr. Moitra. These are correct propositions of law. At the same time, we also agree that the principles of law propounded by the learned counsel for the respondent are equally settled principles of law. The question before us is as to what extent these principles of law propounded by the respective counsel can be applied in the facts and circumstances of the case. The context of the case: ( 10 ) BEFORE we proceed further, we must appreciate the context in which we would be dealing with this case. Admittedly, a charge-sheet was issued and an enquiry was held in which the appellant/petitioner having been found guilty was dismissed from service and the appeal thereout was also dismissed. The learned single Judge had declined to set aside the order of dismissal on the ground that on facts there was no infirmity in the order of dismissal. ( 11 ) THE appellant got himself treated on account of his illness at Bangalore. Admittedly, in an emergent situation it may not be possible to get oneself examined by the panel doctor of the employer. But when he applied for leave on the ground of his illness, he was intimated by the employer that he was not examined by a panel doctor. It was open to him to get himself examined by a panel doctor immediately and obtain a reference from the panel doctor for being treated outside. Nothing prevented him from submitting to a panel doctor. The learned single Judge has also found that he complained of chest pain for the last six months and was not hospitalized. At the same time, he offered to join his transferred post with certain conditions. He did not join the transferred post quite for a long time. In these circumstances, he was found to be feigning illness by the fact finding authority. At the same time, he offered to join his transferred post with certain conditions. He did not join the transferred post quite for a long time. In these circumstances, he was found to be feigning illness by the fact finding authority. It was also found by the fact finding authority that he was ignoring the orders of his superiors to join his transferred post. May be these are findings of fact which are not in dispute. ( 12 ) UNLESS the Court found these facts to be perverse or based on no material or that there was any mala fides in the whole process, the writ Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact arrived at by the disciplinary authority. The jurisdiction of the Writ Court is circumscribed within the principles enunciated in the decisions cited by Mr. Ghosh referred to in paragraph 3 hereinbefore, in order to avoid complexity, we may not repeat the same herein. We may, however, summarize the principles enunciated in the said decisions referred to in paragraph 3 hereinbefore. The judicial review, of the decision of the disciplinary authority and as affirmed by the appellate authority being a concluded finding of fact, by a Writ Court cannot be extended to the examination of the correctness of the charges or reasonableness of the decision. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Whether the charges were established by material available is beyond the scope of judicial review since it is not an appellate authority over the departmental authorities. The High Court while exercising writ jurisdiction does not reverse a finding of an enquiring authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it was insufficient. If there was some evidence to reasonably support the conclusions of the enquiring authority, it is not the function of the court to review evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding. The enquiring authority is the sole judge of the fact so long as there is some legal evidence to substantiate its findings adequacy or reliability of evidence is not a matter, which could be permitted to be canvassed before a Court in writ proceedings. The scope of judicial review in a matter of disciplinary proceedings being restricted, the high Court can consider the challenge to the impugned order within a limited degree of scrutiny. The scope of judicial review in a matter of disciplinary proceedings being restricted, the high Court can consider the challenge to the impugned order within a limited degree of scrutiny. However, the Writ Court can interfere in cases where the impugned order of the disciplinary authority suffers from vice of perversity, non-application of mind and is tainted by malice. Report of the enquiring authority cannot be faulted except on grounds other than those. In the facts whether interference is called for: ( 13 ) HAVING regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, even if we accept that the authority had proceeded on the basis of a superseded rule, even then we do not find that the finding could be held to be perverse when on facts it is apparent that the appellant did not join for long six months without getting himself examined by a panel doctor and requesting the authority to permit him to be treated by a doctor of his choice. The Rule does not compel a person to be treated by a panel doctor. The appellant had every right to get himself treated by a doctor of his choice. But the examination of the panel doctor was necessary only for the purpose of enabling him to obtain the leave. Even without being got himself treated by a panel doctor, he could have got himself examined by a panel doctor for the purpose of obtaining leave. Under the Rules, it was equally open to ask for reference to a specialist by the panel doctor. The Rule never required that a person must be treated by a panel doctor. It required only that he should get himself examined by a panel doctor in order to obtain the benefit of leave of the company under the rules. The extent of the Rules was limited only for that purpose. In these circumstances, the question of superseded rules does not become so important so as to declare the whole disciplinary proceeding as perverse. Neither it can justify to impugn the disciplinary proceedings as malicious or mala fide. The extent of the Rules was limited only for that purpose. In these circumstances, the question of superseded rules does not become so important so as to declare the whole disciplinary proceeding as perverse. Neither it can justify to impugn the disciplinary proceedings as malicious or mala fide. ( 14 ) HAVING regard to the facts discussed and the materials available on record to come to a definite finding even on the principle laid down in Bachhittar Singh (supra), empowering the Court to examine the contention raised before it and to come to a definite conclusion with regard to the findings in the report, we do not find any material to enable us to take a view different from that concluded by the disciplinary and the appellate authority. ( 15 ) WE have also considered the question of proportionality of the punishmnent. Right it is, that in view of the decision in Om Kumar (supra), Court could go into such question for examining on the ground of illegality, irrationality on the principle of Wednesbury's unreasonableness and procedural impropriety as held by Tata Cellular (supra ). But in this case, the appellant was holding a very high and responsible post. He complained of chest pain for over six months without being got himself admitted in any nursing home or any hospital and imposed condition to join the transferred post and did not join the transferred post over a long period of time ignoring the direction of his superiors. These are sufficiently grave. At the same time, this situation continued over a long period of time. Over and above he did not get himself examined by the panel doctor. Therefore, we do not think that the principle of wednesbury's Unreasonableness could be applied in this case and that the punishment inflicted could be held to be disproportionate having regard to the gravity of the situation and the conduct of the appellant in the given circumstances as are evident from the facts and the materials disclosed before us. Therefore, we do not think that the principle of wednesbury's Unreasonableness could be applied in this case and that the punishment inflicted could be held to be disproportionate having regard to the gravity of the situation and the conduct of the appellant in the given circumstances as are evident from the facts and the materials disclosed before us. ( 16 ) AS held in Bhagat Ram (supra) the disproportionate penalty is violative of Article 14 and that the punishment shocking to conscience warrants intervention as was held in sharat Narayan Parab (supra) and that the high Court can impose appropriate punishment without directing the authority to reconsider the punishment as laid down in Mahesh Kumar mishra (supra) and a punishment disproportionate to the offence and shocking to conscience amounts to conclusive evidence of bias as held in Ranjit Thakur (supra) and that a punishment of dismissal on the ground of absenteeism is an extreme punishment propounded in Hind Construction and Engineering co. Ltd. (supra) and such punishment affects the fundamental freedom by reason of disproportionate punishment enunciated in gouranga Acharjee (supra) are settled propositions of law, which are supposed to be attracted in a situation. These principles cannot be applied in a straight-jacket formula, application of these principles is dependent on the given facts. In case the facts revealed are such, that the punishment inflicted, though severe, yet until it is shocking to conscience on account of being so disproportionate that no reasonable man can take such a decision on the basis of the materials available, the principles cannot be applied. In the present case, as we have already found, even though the punishment may be on the verge of little stringent but having regard to the situation as discussed above, we do not think that the punishment is so disproportionate to shock the conscience in order to attract the above principles. ( 17 ) WHETHER the illness was false or not is a finding of fact. After having gone through the materials placed before us, it does not appear that the examination by a non-panel doctor was the only ground on which the conclusion was arrived at. ( 17 ) WHETHER the illness was false or not is a finding of fact. After having gone through the materials placed before us, it does not appear that the examination by a non-panel doctor was the only ground on which the conclusion was arrived at. The disciplinary authority had also taken into account the fact mat the appellant had been complaining of chest pain over a period of long six months without having got himself admitted in any nursing home or in any hospital and that he had been avoiding joining his transferred post ignoring instruction given to him by his superior authority, though he was holding a very high responsible post and had imposed conditions for joining the transferred post, were additional facts apart from examination by non-panel doctor and as such the finding cannot be said to be without any application of mind as held in R. P Bhat (supra)or that it could not be so held in the absence of any material as was held in Gouranga Acharjee (supra) in view of the above finding. Nor we could hold that the order of the appellate authority was cryptic and without application of mind as was held in Mintu Biswas (supra), since it is apparent that the appellate authority though have not given detailed reasons but from the text of the order, it appears that it had applied its mind. Order: ( 18 ) IN these circumstances, I am in agreement with the decision taken by my learned brother SINHA, J. The appeal, therefore, stands dismissed. ( 19 ) THERE will, however, be no order as to costs. ( 20 ) XEROX certified copy of this Judgment be made available to the parties, if applied for, on usual undertakings.