Judgment 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners, who are defendants in Title Suit No. 144/1993, which was filed by the plaintiffsopposite parties for partition of the suit land after avoiding compromise decree dated 12.7.1993 passed in an earlier suit for partition bearing Title Suit No. 149/ 1992. 2. The petitioners challenge the impugned order dated 11.10.2002 passed in Title Suit No. 144/1993, by which the learned Subordinate Judge-Ill, Bhabhua (Kaimur) rejected his petition under Order-XXIII Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code for the sake of brevity) for dismissing the suit on the ground of maintainability. 3. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that Order XXIII Rule 3A completely bars the filing of a suit for setting aside the decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. He relies upon a decision in the case of Banwari Lal V/s. Smt. Chando Devi and another reported in AIR 1993 Supreme Court 1139 in which it was held that if any one wants to challenge a compromise decree he can only file a petition in the same suit or he may file an appeal against the said compromise decree but no suit shall lie against a compromise decree. Learned counsel for the petitioners also contended that the opposite parties claim in the subsequent suit was that they did not join and sign the compromise petition in the earlier suit, although they were parties to it and their signatures were forged and also that no leave was taken under Order XXXII Rule 7 of the Code from the court on behalf of the minors, hence according to the learned counsel for the petitioners the subsequent suit challenging the said compromise decree was not at all maintainable and it should have been dismissed. 4. From the aforesaid averments as well as from the materials on record including the impugned order it is apparent that the subsequent suit, namely, Title Suit No. 144 of 1993 was mainly for partition of the share of the opposite parties after avoiding the decree passed in the earlier Title Suit No. 149 of 1992, which was obtained by forgery and fraud, not only upon the defendants of that suit but also upon the court. Section 44 of the Indian Evidence Act clearly provides that any party to a suit or other proceeding may show that any judgment, order or decree which is relevant under Sections 40, 41 or 42 of the Evidence Act and which has been proved by the adverse party, was delivered by a court not competent to deliver it, or was obtained by fraud or collusion can show the same in a subsequent suit. Section 4 of the Code further provides that in absence of any specified provision to the contrary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law. Hence in the facts and circumstances of the case Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, which is the special law, will be applicable which provides that any person who apprehends that any such instrument, which is obtained by forgery or fraud, may cause injury, may sue. 5. The above mentioned decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners, in my view, is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case because here the suit is not for challenging a compromise decree only, rather it is mainly for partition of the admitted joint properties after avoiding the earlier partition decree which was claimed to be obtained by forgery and fraud any was coming in the way of partition. 6. Reliance can be placed on a decision in the case of Ibne Hasan V/s. Smt Hasina Bibi and others reported in AIR 1984 Allahabad 216 which specifically held that the decree can be allowed to be avoided due to forgery, fraud etc. 7. Hence in the aforesaid circumstances, I do not find any illegality or jurisdictional error in the impugned order and accordingly this civil revision is dismissed.