B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THESE two writ appeals require to be disposed of together since they are directed against the common order dated 18-7-2003 made in Writ Petition No. s 19149 and 20009 of 2002 by a learned single Judge of this court. For the sake of convenience, we shall refer to the parties as arrayed in the writ petitions. ( 2 ) IN order to consider whether the judgment under appeal suffers from any infirmities requiring our interference, it is just and necessary to notice the relevant facts. FACTUAL MATRIX: ( 3 ) THAT an extent of 30,000 square feet of land in possession of the fourth petitioner in writ Petition No. 19149 of 2002 (who is impleaded as third respondent in Writ appeal No. 1311 of 2003) situated outside the four Mada street at Tirumala was acquired under the provisions of the Land acquisition Act, 1894 for the benefit of tirumala-Tirupati Devasthanams (for short "ttd" ). A notification dated 25-5-1987 was issued under Section 4 (1) of the Land acquisition Act. Award dated 11-8-1991 was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer awarding compensation by duly fixing the market value of the land at Rs. 11. 00 per square foot. He sought for reverence of the award to the Civil Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. ( 4 ) NOT only the land in possession of the fourth petitioner but also vast extents of properties situated at Tirumala were acquired for the benefit of TTD. Questioning the acquisition, a batch of writ petitions was filed in this Court by the persons in occupation of the lands at Tirumala. This court by its judgment dated 23-3-1989 dismissed all the writ petitions with the observation:"in so far as the religious denominations are concerned, the temple authorities have stated that they would surely provide alternate accommodation thereby enabling them to systematically develop and not to a distant place from the temple. In case of traders, wherever buildings are constructed for the purpose of providing shops the same will be allotted to them on lease basis as far as possible. In so far as the individual residents are concerned, it will be examined in respect of each individual case and alternate accommodation will be provided to them as per feasibility, availability and genuineness. In so far as the individual residents are concerned, it will be examined in respect of each individual case and alternate accommodation will be provided to them as per feasibility, availability and genuineness. The township of Tirumala needs to be systematically developed mainly around the temple and the entire temple must be a shining example to the sacred places because this temple is unique in many respects and it is said to be the richest temple in the world. "the writ appeals filed by the writ petitioners therein were also dismissed by the common judgment dated 16-3-1990. ( 5 ) AFTER the dismissal of the writ appeals, the Board of Trustees of TTD appointed a sub-Committee to make an in-depth study of problem of acquisition and displacement of several individuals and submit is report to the Board for taking appropriate action. The Sub-Committee submitted its recommendations, the details where of are not required to be noticed. The Board of trustees vide resolution No. 159 dated 28-5-1992 allotted an extent of 9000 square feet (Plot No. 30, Ananthapalligunta) to the fourth petitioner on lease basis for twenty years on a monthly ground rent of rs. 1000/- subject to withdrawal of the reference sought by him under Section 18 of the Land acquisition Act seeking enhancement of compensation. ( 6 ) FOURTH petitioner made an application addressed to the TTD stating that he has entered into a sale agreement with the father of the petitioners 1 to 3, M. Rami Reddy, and accordingly requested for dividing the site of 9000 square feet allotted to him on lease basis between him and the father of the petitioners 1 to 3. The TTD readily obliged and passed Resolution No. 662 dated 18/19-11-1992 permitting the fourth petitioner and the father of the petitioner 1 to 3 to share the land of 9,000 square feet of the site leased out to him. Thereafter, the proceedings dated 4-12-1992 have been issued by the Executive Officer of the TTD stating that the father of the petitioner 1 to 3 is entitled to 4,500 square feet subject to the same terms and conditions of lease. ( 7 ) IT appears, the fourth petitioner and his sons filed a Memo in the Court of the learned principal Subordinate Judge, Tirupati in o. P. NO. ( 7 ) IT appears, the fourth petitioner and his sons filed a Memo in the Court of the learned principal Subordinate Judge, Tirupati in o. P. NO. 94 of 1991 duly stating that they are not pressing their claim for enhancement of compensation and requested the Court to close the reference insofar as their claim for enhancement of compensation is concerned. The O. P. , was accordingly dismissed as withdrawn. ( 8 ) IN the meanwhile, the Government issued G. O. Ms. No. 452 Revenue (Endts. lll) department, dated 14-5-1993 according permission for construction of choultries/ canteens in two acres of land in ananthapalligunta in Tirumala subject to certain terms and conditions. The plans for construction of choultries and canteens were accordingly approved. A lease deed was executed by the Board of Trustees in favour of the father of petitioners 1 to 3 on 5-2-1994 in terms of the resolution of the TTD and the government Order in G. O. Ms. No. 452 dated 14-5-1993. ( 9 ) THE writ petitioners claim that they have spent huge amount of about Rs. 1. 25 crores of which 45 lakhs is the share capital and the rest of the amount was mobilized by taking loans from the financial institutions, including the banks. The father of petitioners 1 to 3 was running a choultry without contravening the terms of the lease deed and the conditions imposed by the government in G. O. Ms. No. 452 dated 14-5-1993. The father of petitioners 1 to 3 died in February 1999 and thereafter the petitioners 1 to 3 have been running choultry and canteen. ( 10 ) SO far as writ Petition No. 20009 of 2002 is concerned, there is only one petitioner. TTD allotted plot No. 32 at ananthapalligunta admeasuring 2,300 square feet in terms of Resolution No. 159 dated 28-5-1992, He was in possession and enjoyment of rang Mandiram , situated at west Mada Street, Tirumala which was acquired by TTD for the purpose of road widening. He received compensation as determined by the Land Acquisition Officer, yet he was allotted alternative site at ananthapalligunta. A lease deed was executed and registered on 17-9-1993. The term of lease granted in favour of the petitioner is for a period of twenty years and the rent payable is Rs. 1000. 00 per month. He received compensation as determined by the Land Acquisition Officer, yet he was allotted alternative site at ananthapalligunta. A lease deed was executed and registered on 17-9-1993. The term of lease granted in favour of the petitioner is for a period of twenty years and the rent payable is Rs. 1000. 00 per month. The petitioner claims to have spent huge amount for constructing choultry and he has been running the same in the name and style of srinivasa Choultry and paying the rent regularly to TTD in accordance with the terms and conditions of lease. ( 11 ) THE Government of Andhra Pradesh having examined the information furnished by the Executive Officer of the TTD with regard to resolution No. 159 dated 28-5-1992 and 662 dated 19-11 -1992 passed by the board of Trustees sanctioning allotment of alternative land on lease and having prima facie arrived at the conclusion that providing alternative accommodation would adversely affect the sanctity and serenity of the sacred hill, granted stay of operation of the resolution and as well as the orders issued in g. O. Ms. No. 452 dated 14-5-1993 pending final decision of the Government under subsection (1) of Section 121 of the Andhra padesh Charitable and Hindu Religious institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (for short" the Act") vide G. O. Ms. No 511, dated 28-6-1996. The Government accordingly further action for issuing notices to all the affected persons as is required under section 121 of the Act. ( 12 ) THE petitioner in Writ Petition no. 20009 of 2002 and several others who were also provided with alternative accommodation filed Writ Petition No. 22238 of 1997 and batch challenging G. O. Ms. No. 511 dated 28-6-1996. The said batch of writ petitions was disposed of vide order dated 7-4-2000 directing the Government to issue fresh show cause notices and the writ petitioners were given two weeks time to file their representations, if any, from the date of notice and the Government to pass orders thereafter within eight weeks in accordance with law. This Court while disposing of the writ petitions directed the Government to consider "whether a person, who received adequate compensation pursuant to the proceedings initiated under the Land acquisition Act, can claim alternative land and whether the Trust Board in its competence to squander away public property in this manner, which is expected to safeguard. This Court while disposing of the writ petitions directed the Government to consider "whether a person, who received adequate compensation pursuant to the proceedings initiated under the Land acquisition Act, can claim alternative land and whether the Trust Board in its competence to squander away public property in this manner, which is expected to safeguard. " The said order passed by the learned single Judge of this Court has become final since the writ appeals preferred against the same were dismissed by the division Bench by its order dated 16-6-2000 at the admission stage itself. ( 13 ) BE that as it may, the Government of andhra Pradesh once again issued show cause notice dated 25-7-2000 requiring the writ petitioners to show cause as to why the resolutions passed by the Board of Trustees of the TTD should not be cancelled. They were directed to show cause as to why the claim for alternative rehabilitation benefits after getting adequate compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 should not be rejected and also to state whether the TTD trust Board is competent to squander away the public property instead of safeguarding the same. The petitioners have accordingly submitted detailed explanation requesting the Government to drop further proceedings. The Government having considered the explanations and having heard the parties passed orders in G. O. Ms. No. 529 dated 31-8-2002 cancelling the resolutions dated 28-5-1992 and 19-11 -2002 of the TTD Trust board to allot 70% of the land alternatively for the displaced lodge/choultry owners and as well as allotment of land of ananthapalligunta in favour of the petitioners. The orders issued G. O. Ms. No. 452 dated 14-5-1993 were also set aside. The Government accordingly rejected the request of the writ petitioners to allot alternative lands at Tirumala Hills. ( 14 ) IT is that order, which is challenged in the writ petitions on various grounds. The case of the petitioners is that the first respondent/government without considering any of the contentions raised in the explanations mechanically and without application of any mind passed the impugned G. O. Ms. No. 529 dated 31-8-2002 cancelling the resolution of the Trust Board regarding the allotment of alternative land at ananthapalligunta. ( 15 ) THE respondents herein filed separate detailed counter affidavits opposing the writ petitions. No. 529 dated 31-8-2002 cancelling the resolution of the Trust Board regarding the allotment of alternative land at ananthapalligunta. ( 15 ) THE respondents herein filed separate detailed counter affidavits opposing the writ petitions. The sum and substance of the pleas taken by the first respondent in the counter affidavit is that there is no power vested either in the Executive Officer or in the Board of Trustees of the TTD or in the government to grant lease of property owned by TTD for a period of twenty years in favour of private individuals. The Board of trustees with the prior approval of the State government is competent to grant lease of land for a period not exceeding 99 years only in favour of public institutions or for public purpose. The resolution passed by devesthanams Board were not is the interest of Tirumala, which is visited by crores of pilgrims. It is stated that the buildings of the petitioners situated at tirumala were acquired under the Land acquisition Act and all of them were paid adequate compensation and therefore they are not entitled to claim any alternative sites in law. It is further averred that having received the information the State government in exercise of suo motu powers under Section 121 (1) of the Act has rightly cancelled the resolutions in question with a view to maintain the sanctity and serenity of the sacred hills had for catering to the needs of the pilgrims. ( 16 ) IN the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the second respondent in Writ Petition no. 19149 of 2002, it is stated as under. ( 17 ) THE fourth petitioner was paid a total compensation of Rs. 7,68,1977. 00 under award No. 43/90-91. The father of writ petitioners 1 and 2, late M. Rami Reddy approached the Government through Vice chirman, TUDA, Tirumala for relaxing the zoning regulation for construction of 3 to 5 floors of the canteen and choultry. But the same were rejected by the Government. The executive Authority, Gram Panchayat, tirumala issued a show cause notice with regard to the unauthorized structures and questioning the same late M. Rami Reddy filed O. S. No. 59 of 1995 in the Court of principal Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati, which was dismissed on 17-11-1998. Thereafter, the explanation offered by him was examined and the order dated 27-9-2002 was passed against which Writ Petition no. Thereafter, the explanation offered by him was examined and the order dated 27-9-2002 was passed against which Writ Petition no. 21377 of 2002 was filed. The sum and substance of the case set up by the TTD is that the said late M. Rami Reddy violated the terms and conditions of the lease and made construction of lodge in utter violation of the rules in his own way and constructed more number of rooms contrary to sanction and that he has been collecting exorbitant rents from the pilgrims. ( 18 ) IN the counter affidavit filed Writ petition No. 20009 of 2002, it is alleged that the petitioner therein did not comply with the conditions stipulated in G. O. Ms. No. 452 dated 14-5-1993 that he is also running a lodge by charging abnormally high rents, that the building of the petitioner was acquired and that he was paid adequate compensation and he is not entitled for any alternative site under the provisions of the land Acquisition Act or under the endowments Act. ( 19 ) THE learned single Judge upon elaborate consideration of the matter found no merit in the writ petitions filed by the appellants. The writ petitions were accordingly dismissed. Hence, these writ appeals. ( 20 ) SRI C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant in Writ Appeal no. 1339 of 2003 , contended that the State government entertained the revision on an application from the Executive Officer of TTD after a long delay from the date of resolution dated 28-5-1992 and the revision petition so filed in barred by limitation. It is not a case of suo motu exercise of revisions power. Alternatively, it is contended that even if it is to be taken that the State Government exercised suo motu revisional power, there is inordinate delay in exercising the those powers and exercising revisional powers after such unreasonable delay is arbitrary. ( 21 ) IT is further contended that the finding of the first respondent that the resolution passed by the TTD making alternative land available to the appellant are illegal is not supported by any reason and hence the same is not sustainable. The finding that rehabilitating ledge/choultry owners at tirumala Hills would affect the sanctity and serenity of Tirumala Hills and cause grave hardship to the devotes is also not supported by any material nor any reasons therefor. The finding that rehabilitating ledge/choultry owners at tirumala Hills would affect the sanctity and serenity of Tirumala Hills and cause grave hardship to the devotes is also not supported by any material nor any reasons therefor. As a matter of fact the land allotted to the appellant is located near outer ring road, which is far away from the temple. The action of the first respondent ins cancelling the resolutions is hit by the doctrine of promissory estoppel. ( 22 ) IT is also submitted that do hors the understanding to provide for an alternative site, grant of lease under the lease deed dated 17-9-1993 is well within the powers of the second respondent/devasthanams, which are traceable to Rule 150 of the Rules framed under G. O. Ms. No. 311 dated 9-4-1990 and therefore interference with the lease in exercise of the revisional power by the Government is not sustainable. ( 23 ) SRI C. V. Mohan Reddy, learned counsel for the appellants in W. A. No. 1311 of 2003 while adopting the submissions made referred to hereinabove, contended that the third respondent in Writ Appeal no. 1311 of 2003 (Fourth petitioner in Writ petition No. 19149 of 2002) had withdrawn the reference on the assurance given by the executive Officer of the TTD and thus given up a very valuable right on the promise made by the Devasthanams and in the circumstances Devesthanams cannot be allowed to turn around and dispute the correctness of the allotment of the land in favour of the appellants. The Government while issuing G. O. Ms. No. 452 dt. 14-5-1993 according permission for construction of choultries/canteens in two acres of land at ananthapalligunta retified the action of the trust Board of Devasthanams in allotting alternative land and thus made the appellants to believe that there were no legal impediments for proceeding with the construction of the lodge of having so acted cannot be permitted to resile from it promise. It was contended that the impugned G. O. , is the result of colorable exercise of power by the Government for collateral purposes. It was contended that the impugned G. O. , is the result of colorable exercise of power by the Government for collateral purposes. Late m. Rami Reddy was a Member of the legislative Assembly belonging to congress-I party and due to political rivalry the law set in motion in order to deprive the legitimate rights derived by late M. Rami reddy under the resolution of the Trust board of Devasthanams whereunder the lands were allotted for construction of lodge. ( 24 ) SRI D. Prakash Reddy, learned additional Advocate General contended that the writ petitioners having received compensation under the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer are not entitled for allotment of any alternative land. The resolutions passed by the TTD providing alternative land were themselves illegal. The land was not alienated for any public purpose and therefore the decision of the board of Trustees of TTD was ultra vires. The permission accorded by the government enabling the petitioners to make constructions vice G. O. Ms. No. 452 dated 14-5-1993 does not amount to ratification of lease of land granted by devasthanams. Learned Additional advocate General further contended that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the Government rightly invoked its suo motu revisional jurisdiction under section 121 of the Act and accordingly passed impugned orders, which do not suffer from any legal in infirmities warranting interference from this Court. The power has been exercised within a reasonable time. Learned Additional Advocate General contended that the information as to the illegalities committed by the Board of TTD can come to the notice from nay source and from which source the information reached the Government in order to set the law in motion is totally immaterial so long as the appellants were put on clear notice as to the proposed action to be taken for cancelling the resolutions passed by the Board. It was further contended that the alternative land was allotted to fourth petitioner, whose building was taken over for a public purpose and for the benefit of TTD and no land was made available to late M. Rami Reddy, the father of appellants 1 to 2. The order passed by the learned single Judge so far the original allottee, viz. , respondent No. 3 in the writ appeal, has become final. The order passed by the learned single Judge so far the original allottee, viz. , respondent No. 3 in the writ appeal, has become final. The appellants in Writ Appeal No. 1311 of 2003 cannot have any better right and title in respect of the land than that of the third respondent being the original allottee. Learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the writ appeals deserve summary dismissal. SCOPE OF REVISIONAL JURISDICTION: ( 25 ) SECTION 121 of the Act confers revisional jurisdiction upon the Government and the same reads:" (1) The Government, either suo motu or on an application call for and examine the records from the Board or committee or the Commissioner in respect of any administrative or quasijudicial decision taken or order passed under this chapter to satisfy themselves as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such decision or order taken or passed and if in nay case it appears to the Government that such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for consideration they may pass orders accordingly; provided that every application to the government for the exercise of the powers under this section shall be preferred within ninety days from the date on which the decision or order to which an application relates was communicated to the applicant: provided further that the Government shall not pass by order adversely affecting any person unless such person has been given an opportunity of making his representation. (2) The Government may stay the execution of any such decision or order pending the exercise of their power under sub-section (1) in respect thereof. " ( 26 ) A Plain reading of the provision makes it clear that the Government, either suo motu or on an application, can call for and examine records from the Board or the committee or the Commissioner in respected of any administrative or quasijudicial decision taken or order passed to satisfy themselves as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such decision or order taken or passed. It is true that every application to the Government for exercise of the power shall be preferred within ninety days from the date on which the decision of order to which an application relates to was communicated to the applicant. It is true that every application to the Government for exercise of the power shall be preferred within ninety days from the date on which the decision of order to which an application relates to was communicated to the applicant. ( 27 ) THE short question that falls for our consideration is, whether the Government exercised its revisional power under Sec. 121 of the Act" on an application"? ( 28 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellants, relying upon the observations made in g. O. Ms. No. 511 dt. 28-6-1996 whereunder the Government granted stay of the execution of the resolutions, contended that the Executive Officer of TTD has filed an application to revise the decision of the TTD allotting the land to the appellants. It is true that there is a reference to letters addressed by the Executive Officer of the TTD to the government requesting the Government to suspend the resolutions of the Board of trustees of TTD. But there is nothing on record to show that a revision petition as such was made by the Executive Officer invoking the revisiona! jurisdiction of the state Government under Section 121 (1) of the Act, The letters addressed by the executive Officer to the Government cannot be termed as applications seeking revision. Rules 32 and 33 of the Enquiries and appeals Rules, 1987 issued in G. O. Ms. No. 657, Revenue (Endowments. I) department dated 30-6-1989 prescribe a specific form and procedure for presentation and hearing of revision under Section 121 of the Act. Admittedly, the letters addressed by the Executive Officer of TTD to the government bringing certain facts to its notice are not in the form of revision petition. The letters addressed by the Executive officer, obviously, were taken into consideration by the State Government as piece of relevant information based upon which suo motu revisional jurisdiction was set in motion by the Government. In our considered opinion, the letters addressed by the Executive Officer of TTD cannot be treated as revision petitions. Therefore, the contention that the revision filed beyond 90 days from the date of resolution dated 28-5-1992 is barred by limitation is untenable and unsustainable. We do not find any merit in the submission. ( 29 ) THEN the question that falls for consideration is whether the suo motu revisional power has been exercised "within a reasonable time"? Therefore, the contention that the revision filed beyond 90 days from the date of resolution dated 28-5-1992 is barred by limitation is untenable and unsustainable. We do not find any merit in the submission. ( 29 ) THEN the question that falls for consideration is whether the suo motu revisional power has been exercised "within a reasonable time"? ( 30 ) THE Board of Trustees of TTD passed resolution No. 159 dated 28-5-1992 proposing to make alternative land available to such of those owners of lodges/choultries whose lands were acquired for the benefit of ttd. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that since the resolutions in questions were passed in the year 1992 and approval for construction of buildings was accorded in G. O. Ms. No. 452 dated 14-5-1993 wherein the appellants were allowed to make constructions, it is not open to the Government to initiate suo motu revisional powers after a period of more than four years and that by no stretch of imagination the suo motu revisional power sought to be exercised by the Government after a long lapse of more than four years cannot be considered to be reasonable exercise of power. Suo motu revisional jurisdiction, if at all, could have been exercised within a reasonable time. Learned counsel placed strong reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State of gujarat V. P. Raghav in support of his submission. The Apex Court in the said decision, while interpreting Sections 65 and 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, observed that the Commissioner can revise an order made under Section 65 in exercise of the revisional power under section 211 within a reasonable time "and the length of reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order, which is being revised". The Apex Court took the view:"section 65 of the code of itself indicate the length of reasonable time which the commissioner must act under sec. 211. Under Section 65 of the Code of the Collector does not inform the applicant of his decision on the application within a period of three months, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted. 211. Under Section 65 of the Code of the Collector does not inform the applicant of his decision on the application within a period of three months, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted. This section shows that a period of three months is considered ample for the Collector to make up his mind and beyond that the Legislature thinks that the matter is so urgent that the permission shall be deemed to have been granted. Reading Sections 211 and 65 together it seems to us that the commissioner must exercise his revisional powers within a few months of the order of the Collector. This a reasonable time because after the grant of permission for the building purposes the occupant is likely to spend money on starting building operations at least within a few months from the date of permission. " ( 31 ) THE Supreme Court having noticed that the Commissioner set aside the order of the Collector on 12-10-1961, that is to say more than a year after the order of the collector , came to the conclusion that the said order was passed too late. We find it difficult to discern as to how the judgment of the Supreme Court supports the case in hand. The decision of the Supreme Court is an authority for the proposition that even if the suo motu revisional power must be exercise within a reasonable time, the length of reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order, which is being revised. What is reasonable time depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. ( 32 ) IT is fairly well settled and needs no re-statement in our hands that even though no period of limitation is prescribed for exercising the power of revision suo motu, it has to be exercised within a reasonable time. What is reasonable time is the question of fact to be answered in the given facts and circumstances of each case. It s difficult to lay down any hard and fast rules in this behalf. ( 33 ) THE word reasonable in law prima facie means, reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called upon to act reasonable, knows or ought to know. It s difficult to lay down any hard and fast rules in this behalf. ( 33 ) THE word reasonable in law prima facie means, reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called upon to act reasonable, knows or ought to know. Reasonableness are test of validity is not the court s own standard of reasonableness as it might conceive it in a given situation. A thing is not unreasonable in the legal sense merely because the Court thinks it is unwise. Different contexts in which the operation of the reasonableness has tests of validity operation must be kept distinguished. Some phrases, which pass from one branch of law to another, carry over with them meanings that may be inapposite in the changed context. Reasonableness in administrative law must distinguish between proper use and improper abuse of power (See for the proposition. Gujarat Water supply and Sewerage Board v. Unique erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. , Municipal corporation of Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok kumar and G,b. Mahajan v. Jalgaon municipal Council. ( 34 ) IN Collector v. P. Mangamma, the supreme Court after elaborate consideration and after referring to the decision in State of gujarat v, P. Raghav (1 supra) and other subsequent decisions observed:"it is impossible a priori to state what is reasonable as such in all cases. You must have the particular facts of each case established before you can ascertain what is reasonable under the circumstances. . . . Reasonable, being a relative term, is essentially what is rational according to the dictates of reason and not excessive or immoderate on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. " ( 35 ) THE Court further observed that a reasonable period would depend upon the factual circumstances of the case concerned and there cannot be any empirical formula to determine that question. The Court considering the question whether the period is reasonable or not has to take into account the surrounding circumstances and relevant factors to decide the question. ( 36 ) IN the instant case, the resolutions allotting lands in favour of the appellants are of the year 1992. The actual lease deeds pursuant to the said resolutions were executed in September 1993 and February 1994. The lease itself is for a period of twenty years. There is no renewal clause incorporated in the lease deed. ( 36 ) IN the instant case, the resolutions allotting lands in favour of the appellants are of the year 1992. The actual lease deeds pursuant to the said resolutions were executed in September 1993 and February 1994. The lease itself is for a period of twenty years. There is no renewal clause incorporated in the lease deed. The decision to grant the lands on lease in favour of the appellants itself does not appear to be in accordance with law about which we shall deal separately. Suffice it to observe, at this stage, that there is no right as such inhered in appellants to obtain any such lease from devesthanams. Admittedly, the sou motu revisional proceedings were initiated in June 1996 vide G. O. Ms. No. 511 dated 28-6-1996 wherein the operation of resolution and further proceedings were stayed and the law was set in motion requiring the appellants to explain as to why further appropriate steps should not be taken in the matter. Thus, the law, was set in motion in exercise of suo motu revisional jurisdiction within a period of less than three years. Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances and the nature of right of the appellants, we hold that the exercise of suo motu revisional power by the Government is not vitiated for any reason whatsoever. The power has been exercised within a reasonable time. Whether the revisional order is a non- speaking one? ( 37 ) THE next question that falls for consideration is whether the decision of the first respondent holding that the resolution passed by the TTD are illegal is not supported by any reasons? ( 38 ) THE first respondent/government having considered the representations of the appellants found that the TTD Board has no authority or jurisdiction to part with the lands at Tirumala Hills for providing rehabilitation to lodge/choultry owners, who were displaced on account of acquisition of properties, and that since the resolutions passed by the Devasthanams are illegal, they cannot create right whatsoever in favour of the lodge/choultry owners. It is also held that very displaced person has started demanding rehabilitation only at Tirumala and if such demand is accepted the same is likely to result in increase of local populations thereby creating scarcity of infrastructure facilities, like water, sanitation, drainage, etc. , besides increasing the commercial activities at Tirumala. It is also held that very displaced person has started demanding rehabilitation only at Tirumala and if such demand is accepted the same is likely to result in increase of local populations thereby creating scarcity of infrastructure facilities, like water, sanitation, drainage, etc. , besides increasing the commercial activities at Tirumala. Increase in population at Tirumala is likely to lead to security problem, besides adversely affecting the sanctity and serenity of Tirumala. It is in this background the Government had decided that no alternative land need be allotted to the lodge/choultry owners whose lands were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act at tirumala and to whom compensation has already been paid. ( 39 ) THE reasons assigned by the government in its revisional order in support of the conclusion to set aside and cancel the resolutions are very clear. The Government assigned the reason that if any private structures of constructions are allowed to remain at four Mada street of temple of around, they will affect the sanctity and serenity of the temple. It is not as if the government without assigning any reasons cancelled Resolution No. 159 dt. 28-5-1992 allotting land to the displaced lodge/choultry owners and as well as allotment of 9,000 square feet of land at Ananthapalligunta in favour of respondent No. 3 in Writ Appeal no. 1311 of 2003 (fourth writ petition in w. P. No. 19149 of 2002) and resolution no. 662 dated 18/19-11-1992 permitting him to equally share the land of 9000 square feet leased out to him between himself and late m. Rami Reddy and others also set aside. ( 40 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant, sri C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, submitted that there is no evidence whatsoever available on record to support the conclusion that the allotment of alternative and enabling private individuals to raise structure or constructions will effect the sanctity and serenity of the temple. Learned counsel invited our attention and serenity of the temple. Learned counsel invite our attention to a passage in administrative Law, wherein it is observed:"no evidence does not mean only a total dearth of evidence. It extends to any case where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding; or where, in other words no tribunal could unreasonably reach that conclusion on that evidence. Learned counsel invite our attention to a passage in administrative Law, wherein it is observed:"no evidence does not mean only a total dearth of evidence. It extends to any case where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding; or where, in other words no tribunal could unreasonably reach that conclusion on that evidence. This no evidence principles has something in common with the principle that perverse or unreasonable action is unauthorized and ultra vires. " ( 41 ) WE are unable to appreciate the submission made by the learned counsel of the appellant. The reasons assigned by the revisional authority are self-explanatory. It is not as if the revisional authority is helpless and permit private structures or constructions to comp up in the land around and nearby the temple. Undoubtedly such indiscriminate construction would adversely affect the sanctity and serenity of the temple. If is for the authorities to decide as to what measurements are required to be taken in order to maintain the sanctity and serenity of the temple. Indiscriminate permission to construct cholutries/lodges, undoubtedly would result in chaos and causes strain on the infrastructure facilities like water, sanitation, drainage, etc. It may result in acceleration of commercial activities at tirumala, which undoubtedly would have its own impact on the sanctity and serenity in the vicinity of the temple. This Court cannot exercise any appellate jurisdiction and disturb the finding of fact recorded by the revisional authority. ( 42 ) WE have no hesitation to accept the proposition that reasons must be given for quasi-judicial or even administrative decisions. Lord Denning in Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union held that "giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration. " It is very well settled that even when the statute does not impose an obligation of recording of reasons, it is necessary for the judicial authority to record reasons, as it is the only safeguard against possible injustice and arbitrariness and affords protection to the person adversely affected. In Union of India v. M. L. Capoor, the Supreme Court observed that the reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusion are based and actual conclusion. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject matter for a decision, whether it is purely administrative or quasi judicial. In Union of India v. M. L. Capoor, the Supreme Court observed that the reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusion are based and actual conclusion. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject matter for a decision, whether it is purely administrative or quasi judicial. The reasons should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusion reached. In siemens Engineering and Mfg. Co v. Union of India, the Supreme Court observed:". . . . . . IT is essential that the administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and "give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the order made by them". . . . . . . . The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principles of audi alteram partem, basic principles of natural justice, which must inform every quasi judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law. " ( 43 ) THE general rule that reasons should be given for decisions is an essential element of administrative justice. The duty to give reasons is an element of natural justice, the failure to give reasons, like in every breach of natural justice, may render the disputed decision void. ( 44 ) IN S. N. Mukherjeee v. Union of India, the Apex Court observed:"the requirement of recording reasons would (i) guarantee consideration by the authority, (ii) introduce clarity in the decisions; and (iii) minimize chances of arbitrariness in decision-making. . . . . . . . . These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, viz. , it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision- making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions in espective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. However, it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend upon particular facts and circumstances. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions in espective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. However, it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend upon particular facts and circumstances. What it necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. " (Emphasis is of ours ). ( 45 ) THERE is no prescribed form, and the reasons recorded by the adjudicating authority need not be in detail or elaborate and the requirement of recording reasons will be satisfied if only relevant reasons are recorded. ( 46 ) IT is difficult to state precisely "standard of reasoning" the court will demand. In De Smith s Judicial Review of administrative Action, it is observed;" It is clear that the reasons given must be intelligible and must adequately meet the substance of the arguments advanced. However, it is still difficult to state precisely the standard of reasoning the court will demand. Much depends upon the particular circumstances and the statutory contest in which the duty to give reasons arises. The Court have not attempted to define a uniform standard on threshold, which the reasons must satisfy. For example, it may be unrealistic to require a tribunal faced with conflicting evidence on a matter that is essentially one of opinion, to state much more than that on the basis of what is has heard and of its own expertise it prefers one view to the other or that it finds neither wholly satistactory and therefore adopts its own. On the other hand, the reasons must generally state the tribunal s material findings of fact (and, if the facts were disputed at the hearing, their evidential support), and meet the substance of the principal arguments that the tribunal was required to consider. In short, the reasons must show that the decision__maker successfully came to grips with the main contentions advanced by the parties, and must "tell the parties in broad terms why they lost or. as the case may be won. " ( 47 ) IN the background of the stated legal position, we have critically examined the impugned order passed by the Government. as the case may be won. " ( 47 ) IN the background of the stated legal position, we have critically examined the impugned order passed by the Government. The conclusions arrived at by the revisional authority to cancel the resolution and allotment of the land are supported by clear and cogent reasons. The reasons assigned by the Government in support of the conclusion are not only proper but also adequate and intelligible. The Government in principle has decided that no private property be allowed to remain on up-hills and the entire property should vest in the temple only. The reason that if every displaced person is to be rehabilitated only at Tirumala, the same would result in increase of local population thereby resulting in scarcity of infrastructure facilities like, water, sanitation, drainage, itself explanatory. There is no further evidence, as such, required in support of the reasons so given by the revisional authority. Permission to allow more and more private lodges and choultries to be constructed in the vicinity of the area of temple would undoubtedly lead to escalation in commercial activities at Tirumala. These are the reasons assigned by the revisional authority in support of is conclusion to cancel the resolutions and not to allot and to any one of displaced person. These reasons, in our considered opinion, are proper and adequate. ABOUT VALIDITY AND LEGALITY OF the RESOLUTION: ( 48 ) THE next question that falls for consideration is, whether the resolutions passed by the Trust Board of Devesthanams to provide for alternative site suffer from any legal infirmity? Whether the decision was well within the powers of the devesthanams? ( 49 ) THE Government of Andhra Pradesh in exercise of the powers conferred by section 97 read with Section 153 of the Act made the Rules known as Powers and functions of T. T. D. , Board Rules, 1990. Rule 138 mandates that all leases of lands, buildings, sites and other immovable properties and the rights belonging to TTD shall be given by public auction held at the places in which the properties are situated or the rights exist. Rule 150, however, confers upon the Board of Trustees to lease the buildings, lands and any other property belonging to TTD on nomination for any number of years not exceeding 99 years only in favour of public institutions and public purposes. Rule 150, however, confers upon the Board of Trustees to lease the buildings, lands and any other property belonging to TTD on nomination for any number of years not exceeding 99 years only in favour of public institutions and public purposes. The Rule read as follows:"notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the Board of Trustees shall have power to lease the buildings, lands and any other property belonging to the T. T. D. on nomination for any number of years not exceeding 99 years in favour public institutions or public purposes only after duly recording the reasons in writing and subject to ratification by the government. " ( 50 ) THE case of appellants is that the decision of the Board of Trustees, in the instant case, in traceable to Rule 150 of the rules referred to hereinabove. We are unable to accede to the submission. A plain reading of Rule 150 suggests that the Board of Trustees shall have the power to lease the buildings, lands belonging to TTD on nomination for any number of years not exceeding 99 years in favour of public institutions or public purposes but only after duly recording reasons in writing and subject to ratification by the Government. The resolution passed by the Board of Trustees is to the following effect:" (I) Resolved that "as the land available is limited and keeping in view the requirement of choultries and other, it is felt that it is very much necessary to make allotment of 70% of the areas, they possess (owners of lodges and choultries) on lease in Ananthapalligunta land. In regard to shops which are located in park Road, DMB Road could be allotted shops in the shopping complex and shops to be constructed near telephone Exchange by lost and by transfer to Asthana Mandapam. As regards the shops to be constructed near Ram Bagicha Guest House, these shops will be allocated among the shops owners of Mada Streets. " ( 51 ) A plain reading of the resolution discloses that there are no reasons, whatsoever, recorded by the Board of trustees for allotment of the lands in question in favour of appellants and others. Recording of reasons is mandatory since the statutory rule requires recording of reasons in support of its decision. The rule imposes obligation on the authority and the reasons must be recorded by the authority. Recording of reasons is mandatory since the statutory rule requires recording of reasons in support of its decision. The rule imposes obligation on the authority and the reasons must be recorded by the authority. True, that it is not expected that the Trust Board should give anything approaching the judgment of a court, but it must at least state, as briefly as it may, why it came to the conclusion to allot alternative lands to the displaced persons. In the absence of any such reasons, we are unable to agree with the submission that reasons are implicit in the resolution. However, reliance was placed upon the report submitted by the Sub-Cornmittee leading to passing of the resolutions by the board. We have perused the Sub- committee's report. Even the Sub- committee does not assign any reasons whatsoever in this regard. ( 52 ) ADMITTEDLY, the appellants are not public institutions. Under Rule 150 the Board of Trusiees in conferred with the power to lease buildings, lands and any other property belonging to TTD on nomination for any number of years in favour of public institutions. The question that remains is, whether the lease of the land by the Board of trustees if for any public purpose? ( 53 ) IT is nobody's case that the main idea in passing the resolution was not to think of the private comfort or advantage of the members of the public but the general pubic good. The report of the Sub-Committee as well as the resolutions suggest that the paramount consideration was to provide land equivalent to 70% of the land which the displaced persons lost on account of the acquisition. What is 'public purpose'? ( 54 ) 'public purpose' involves in it an element of general interest of the community and whatever furthers the general interest must be regarded as 'public purpose'. In state of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy, there is an interesting and useful discussion about the term 'public purpose':"does the purpose subserve some public use or interest or produce some public good or utility? If it does the purpose becomes public. 'public' qualifies the object. Black's Legal dictionary elucidates the expression: the term is synonymous with governmental purpose. (State v. Dizon ). If it does the purpose becomes public. 'public' qualifies the object. Black's Legal dictionary elucidates the expression: the term is synonymous with governmental purpose. (State v. Dizon ). As employed to denote the objects'for which taxes may be levied, it has no relation to the urgency of the public need or to the extent of the public benefit which is to follow; the essential requisite being that a public service or use shall affect the inhabitants as a community, and not merely as individuals. (Stevenson v. Port of Portland ). A public purpose or public business has for its objects the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, general welfare, security, prosperity, and contentment of all inhabitants or residents within a given political division, as for example, state, the sovereign powers of which are exercised to promote such public purpose of public business. (Green v. Frazier) (emphasis ours) there may be many processes of satisfying a pubic purpose. A wide range of choices may exist. The State may walk into the open market and buy the items, movable and immovable, it fulfill the public purpose; or its may compulsorily acauire from some private person's possession and ownership the articles needed to meet the public purpose; it may requisition, instead of resorting to acquisition; it may take on loan or on hire or itself manufacture or produce. All these steps are various alternative means to meet the public purpose. The State may need chalk or cheese, pins, pens or planes, boats, buses or buildings, carts, cars, or eating houses or any other of the innumerable items to run a welfare- oriented administration or a public corporation or answer a community requirement. If the purpose is for servicing the public, as governmental purposes ordinarily are, then everything desiderated for subserving such public purpose fall under the broad and expanding rubric. The nexus between the taking of property and the public purpose springs necessarily into existence if the former is capable of answering the latter. On the other hand, if the purpose is a private or non- public one, the mere fact that the hand that acquires or requires is government or a public corporation does not make the purpose automatically a public purpose. Let us illustrate. If a fleet of cars is desired for conveyance of public officers, the purpose is a public one. On the other hand, if the purpose is a private or non- public one, the mere fact that the hand that acquires or requires is government or a public corporation does not make the purpose automatically a public purpose. Let us illustrate. If a fleet of cars is desired for conveyance of public officers, the purpose is a public one. If the same fleet of cars in sought for fulfilling the tourist appetite of friends and relations of the same public officers, it is a private purpose. If bread is 'seized' for feeding starving section of the community, it is a public purpose that is met but, if the same bread is desired for the private dinner of a political maharajah who may pro tern fill a public office, it a private purpose. Of course, the thing taken must be capable of serving the object of the taking. If you want to run bus transport you cannot take buffaloes. " ( 55 ) IN Corpus Juris the meaning of the term 'public purpose' stated to be flexible and varying with the time and circumstances. All that can be said is that is embraces-public utility, public advantage, public interest or object. Parting away and making available of the precious land belonging to a public institution to private individuals for their benefit does not make the purpose a 'public purpose'. It is a private purpose. The Trust Board of the devasthanam is not the owner of the properties. The ownership vests in the institution. The Trust Board is merely entrusted with power coupled with duty to manage the properties of the institution in a manner beneficial to the institution. They are mere trustees required to act and discharge their functions to subserve common good. The act of the Trust Board in allotting lands in question in no manner subserves public purpose. ( 56 ) THE resolution does not say that the lease was granted for any public purpose, nor there is any material on record to infer that it was granted for a public purpose. The land was allotted in order to enable the appellants to construct lodges, of course, with certain terms and conditions under which the TTD is entitled for a part of the revenue to be realized by the appellant out of the commercial activity of running the lodge after its construction on the allotted land. The land was allotted in order to enable the appellants to construct lodges, of course, with certain terms and conditions under which the TTD is entitled for a part of the revenue to be realized by the appellant out of the commercial activity of running the lodge after its construction on the allotted land. It is clearly averred in the counter affidavit that the appellants did not make available any particulars in this regard, nor they have paid any amounts. That apart the construction itself is stated to have been made contrary to the sanctioned plan. ( 57 ) WAS there any ratification by the government as is required under Rules 150 of the Rules? ( 58 ) THE record does not disclose of any ratification of the action of the Board in passing the resolutions proposing to allot the land in question to the appellants. The government never adverted itself as to the legality and propriety of the resolution of the board of Trustees dated 28-5-1992. On the hand, the Government noticed the highhanded action of late Mabbu Rami Reddy when he made an attempt to get the lease agreement registered with the Sub-Registrar without even the signature of the Executive officer of the TTD on the lease deed. In fact, it was irregularly registered; subsequently sent the lease deed to the Executive Officer for his signature and the Executive Officer did not sign the lease agreement and advised the Sub-Registrar to cancel the lease agreement, which had been done irregularly. The Executive Officer did not sign the lease agreement because by that the government had asked for special report in respect of the lands proposed to be leased out for construction of hotels at Tirumala. Notwithstanding the fact that the lease agreement has not been registered Mabbu rami Reddy submitted a plan to the tirumala Gram Panchayat for according approval for construction of Janata Hotel. The plans were not approved and were returned unapproved for the reasons mentioned therein. ( 59 ) THE record discloses that the government for whatever reasons, without considering the question as to the validity of the resolution since it was never raised at that stage, accorded permission for construction of choultries at ananthapaligunta subject to the conditions mentioned therein. Therefore, the contention that the Government has ratified the action of the Board in passing the resolution is absolutely untenable and unsustainable. Therefore, the contention that the Government has ratified the action of the Board in passing the resolution is absolutely untenable and unsustainable. There is no substance in the submission. The record, on the other hand, reveals no holds bar attitude adopted by beneficiaries of the resolution passed by the TTD. ( 60 ) THE expression 'ratification' employed in Rule 150 is of some significance. 'ratifications' are those made in direct terms of assent. 'ratification' means; "to accept the resolutions of the act with an intent to ratify, with full knowledge of all the material circumstances. " (See: P. Ramanatha Aiyer's lax Lexicon ). It means approval or confirmation and to give validity to the act of another. A close scrutiny of the records made available for the perusal of the Court does not reveal that any exercise, as such, was undertaken by the Government to ratify the action already taken by the Board of trustees of TTD resolving to make available alternative land. ( 61 ) ON the facts and in the circumstances, we have no doubt whatsoever, in our mind that the decision of the TTD in passing resolution is ultra vires. The action does not satisfy any of the ingredients incorporated in Rule 150 of the rules referred to hereinabove. ( 62 ) WE are not impressed by the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant, Sri C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, that the Court at this stage cannot undertake to examine whether the decision of the board of Trustees was a valid one. Be it noted that this Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India acts as a Court of equity. It is entitled to go into every conceivable aspect of the matter brought before it in order to decide for itself whether the case on hand is a fit case requiring its interference. ( 63 ) IT is well settled that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not interfere with the decision of an authority merely because a case in made out for such interference on any grounds of judicial review of such interference results in resurrection or resuscitation of an illegal order. ( 63 ) IT is well settled that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not interfere with the decision of an authority merely because a case in made out for such interference on any grounds of judicial review of such interference results in resurrection or resuscitation of an illegal order. In the instant case, any interference with the revisional order passed by the government would result in revival of the resolutions passed by the Board of TTD, which are, themselves, ultra vires. ( 64 ) WHETHER the action of the first respondent in cancelling the resolutions is hit by the "doctrine of promissory estoppel"? promissiory ESTOPPEL: ( 65 ) THIS question does not survive requiring any further adjudication in view of our finding that the very decision of the Trust board of Devasthanams to allot the land in question to the appellants is not in accordance with law. Ultra vires decisions do not give rise to any cause attracting the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel. The Trust Board of Devasthanams acted not within the scope of its authority in passing resolution proposing to allot the land to the appellants. The act was ultra vires and therefore the "doctrine of estoppel" could not be invoked. It is very well settled that there cannot be any estoppel against statute. The equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be allowed to operate so as to validate an ultra vires act or to override the clear words of statute. Prof. Wade states:"in public law the most obvious limitation on the doctrine of estoppel is that it cannot be invoked so as to give an authority powers, which it does not in law, possesses. In other words, no estoppel can legitimate action, which is ultra vires. " (Emphasis is of ours) ( 66 ) THE "no estoppel principle" is applicable to cases where the acts performed in reliance are contrary to statute. In such cases the fact that the Government or governmental authorities are involved is really not a determining factor, for no person can be stepped into a position contrary to law. The doctrine of estoppel could not be used to give de facto validity to ultra vires decisions. That a statutory body can only perform the acts that it is empowered to perform. The doctrine of estoppel could not be used to give de facto validity to ultra vires decisions. That a statutory body can only perform the acts that it is empowered to perform. "when the Government is unable to enforce the law because the conduct of its agents has given rise to an estoppel the interest of the citizenry as a whole in obedience to rule of law is undermined. " (See: Heckler v. Community Health service" ). ( 67 ) TO sum up, the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be used against or in favour of administration so as to give de facto validity to ultra vires acts. ( 68 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellants, however, relied upon the decision of the supreme Court in Sharma Transport v. Govt. of A. P. , in support of the contention that the respondents are estopped from giving a go-by to their earlier promise of making alternative land available to the appellants. The judgment, in our considered opinion, in no manner supports the case of the appellants and on the other hand it is against the proposition sought to be canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellants. In Sharma Transport it is observed:"it is equally settled law that the promissory estoppel cannot be used to compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is prohibited by law or which was devoid of the authority or power of the officer of the Government or the public authority to make. Doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield place to the equity, if larger public interest so requires, and if it can be shown by the Government or public authority for having regard to the facts are they have transpired that it would be inequitable to hold the Government public authority to the promise or representation made by it. The Court on satisfaction would not, in those circumstances raise the equity in favour of the persons to whom a promise or representation is made and enforce the promise of representation against the government or the public authority. These aspects were highlighted by this court in Vasantkumar Radhakisan vora v. Board of Trustees of Port of bombay, STO v. Shree Durga Oil mills and Ashok Kumar Maheshwari (Dr) v. State ow. These aspects were highlighted by this court in Vasantkumar Radhakisan vora v. Board of Trustees of Port of bombay, STO v. Shree Durga Oil mills and Ashok Kumar Maheshwari (Dr) v. State ow. P. Above being the position, the plea relating to promissory estoppel has no substance. " ( 69 ) WE are in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned single Judge that the resolutions in question making available the alternative land to the appellants and granting lease in their favour are contrary to the said Rules and therefore it is not open to the appellants to invoke the principle of promissory estoppel. ( 70 ) NEITHER the provisions of the Act nor the rules framed thereunder do confer any power or authority on the Board to pass resolution allotting sites to those persons whose lands were acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and adequate compensation was already paid. ( 71 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellants, however, relied upon the decision of the apex Court in H. C. Venkat Swamy v. Bangalore Development Authority to contend that it was perfectly open to TTD to make available alternative land to the displaced persons even after providing adequate compensation to them under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. In venkat Swamy, the land owned by the appellants therein was acquired by the bangalore Development Authority for development scheme called Rajamahal vilas II Stage. The authority passed resolution dated 26-6-1984 wherein it was decided that each of the appellant would be given a site admeasuring 40' x 60' free of cost. The Bangalore Development Authority did not implement the decision on the ground that the resolution was not approved by the State Government. The Bangalore development Authority's action was challenged by the appellants by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Karnataka High Court. The High court came to the conclusion that the contract between the Bangalore development Authority and the appellants was void and as such could not be implemented. The Bangalore development Authority's action was challenged by the appellants by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Karnataka High Court. The High court came to the conclusion that the contract between the Bangalore development Authority and the appellants was void and as such could not be implemented. The Bangalore Development authority's contentions that it is not within its power to convey any site to any person by reason only of the fact that his land was acquired; there is no provision in the bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 and the rules to give any site free of cost; and the allotment of sites could be made only in terms of the allotment rules and not in contravention thereof, were upheld by the high Court, however, without giving any reasons in support of the conclusion. The supreme Court reversing the decision came to the conclusion that the provisions of section 9 of the Bangalore Development authority Act are fully applicable to the allotments made to the appellants during the period 1984-85. The conditions for allotment having been satisfied the allotments are deemed to have been validly made and shall have the effect for all purposes as if the said allotments were made under Section 38 (c) of the principal Act. In the result, the Apex court held that even though the allotments may not have been made under Sec. 38 (c), they would be saved by Section 9 of the amendment Act by virtue of the deeming fiction. Even otherwise, it was held that the allotment of plots to them was to further compensate the appellants in lieu of acquisition of lands for the development scheme. ( 72 ) THERE is no provision of law brought to our notice under which the resolutions could have been at all passed by the Trust board of the Devasthanams proposing to allot the lands even after paying adequate compensation under the provisions of the land Acquisition Act. Neither the resolutions nor the recommendations of the Sub- committee suggest that the allotment of land was to further compensate them in lieu of acquisition of their land. In the circumstances, we hold that the decision has no application to the fact situation. Neither the resolutions nor the recommendations of the Sub- committee suggest that the allotment of land was to further compensate them in lieu of acquisition of their land. In the circumstances, we hold that the decision has no application to the fact situation. ( 73 ) WE find to merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the third respondent in Writ Appeal No. 1311 of 2003 (Petitioner No. 4 in Writ Petition no. 19149 of 2002) has withdrawn his claim under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and had lost valuable right and therefore the respondents cannot be allowed to go back on their promise. We have already noticed the conduct of the appellants and the manner in which their predecessor tried to overreach and went ahead with the construction even in the absence of any valid permission. It is a situation created by the appellants and their predecessor for themselves. It is a case of spider getting caught in its own web. At any rate the learned single Judge permitted the appellants to make an application under section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act and no such application being made the compensation payable to third respondent in writ Appeal No. 1311 of 2003 and the sole appellant in Writ Appeal No. 1339 of 2003 shall be re-determined by the appropriate authority within six weeks from the date of filing of such application. ( 74 ) BE it noted that the fourth petitioner in writ Petition No. 19149 of 2002 (respondent no. 3 in Writ Appeal No. 1311 of 2003) did not prefer any appeal. So far as he is concerned the judgment of the learned single Judge has become final and the appellants cannot be permitted to plead and raise any objections on his behalf in the writ appeal. ( 75 ) WE do not find any merit in the contention that the case on hand is a colourable exercise of power by the government for the reasons, which we have indicated supra. ( 76 ) LEARNED Additional Advocate general, however, made statement which we wish to make it part of the record that the ttd is willing to pay compensation for the improvements made and structures raised by the appellants subject to adjustment of amounts due from them towards 30% of rents agreed to be paid. ( 76 ) LEARNED Additional Advocate general, however, made statement which we wish to make it part of the record that the ttd is willing to pay compensation for the improvements made and structures raised by the appellants subject to adjustment of amounts due from them towards 30% of rents agreed to be paid. The said statement is made part of the record. If any such application is filed, the same shall be determined in terms of the statement made by the learned Additional Advocate General as expeditiously as possible. ( 77 ) WITH the observations above, the writ appeals shall stand dismissed with costs. ( 78 ) AFTER pronouncement of the judgment, the learned counsel for the appellants made a request to keep the impugned G. O. Ms. No. 529, dated 31-8-2002 under suspension for a period of four weeks. ( 79 ) WE have examined the matter in detail and arrived at our own conclusions rejecting each of the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the appellants. ( 80 ) IN the circumstances, we are not inclined to keep the operation of the impugned G. O. , under suspension. 81. Registry is directed to furnish copy of the judgment by 27-1 -2004. --- *** --- .