A. V. SRINIVASA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision by the tenant is directed against the order dated 7th october, 2003 passed by the II Additional Small Causes Judge, bangalore in H. R. C. No. 75 of 2001. The Court below allowed the petition filed by the landlord under Section 27 (2) (r) of the Karnataka rent Act, 1999 ('the Rent Act' for short) and ordered eviction of the tenant from the petition premises. The petition under Section 27 (2) (a) of the Rent Act has been dismissed. No revision is preferred by the landlord against the said dismissal. ( 2 ) FOR the sake of convenience advertance to the parties is made, in the course of this order, with reference to their rank in the Court below. ( 3 ) THE petition premises belonged to one Dr. C. V. P. Verma from whom the petitioner purchased the property. After purchase the petitioner filed the petition in the Court below contending that he is a residing in a tenanted premises and he requires the petition premises for his own self-occupation. He further averred in the petition that his landlord filed O. S. No. 261 of 1998 for evicting him and has succeeded in obtaining an order of eviction. The appeal in R. F. A. No. 618 of 1999 preferred by him against the order of eviction also having been dismissed, he is facing marching orders from the Court in Execution case No. 1054 of 2000. The respondent defended the petition on several grounds. He disputed the relationship of landlord and tenant, denied that the petition premises are required by the petitioner for his own use and occupation and claimed that the acquisition by the petitioner did not bestow any title on him because the sale transaction is sham and nominal and was one made for the purpose of ejecting him from the petition premises. The Court below rejected all these contentions of the respondent and passed the impugned order of eviction. Being aggrieved, the tenant is before me in this revision. ( 4 ) I have heard learned Counsels on both sides. The Court below rejected all these contentions of the respondent and passed the impugned order of eviction. Being aggrieved, the tenant is before me in this revision. ( 4 ) I have heard learned Counsels on both sides. ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent-tenant submitted that the sale transaction was sham as it was created only for the purpose of evicting him from the petition premises and the petitioner legally speaking does not derive any valid title over the petition premises under a sham transfer. As the title of the petitioner-landlord is defective, there is no relationship of landlord and tenant and in the absence of the jural relationship the petition could not have been allowed by the Court below. He further submitted that the petition in the present case having been filed before the expiry of period of one year after the alleged purchase by the petitioner, under the provisions of the Rent Act the petition is not maintainable. He also submitted that the registration oi the sale transaction is invalid. ( 6 ) IN reply the learned Counsel for the petitioner-landlord submitted that the sale was for valid consideration and the respondent is estopped from denying the statutory relationship of landlord and tenant when he concedes that he was a tenant under the previous landlord. As letters of attornment were issued both by the previous landlord and the petitioner, it was not open at all for the respondent to call in question the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant. It is submitted by learned Counsel for the petitioner that given the fact that the petitioner himself is facing eviction orders from Court, no fault could be found with the order passed by the Court below in passing the order of eviction. ( 7 ) IN support of his contention that the sale transaction in favour of the petitioner-landlord is sham, the learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision in Devi Das v Mohan Lal. The Apex court in an appeal by the tenant from an order of eviction passed against him, struck down the order of eviction on the ground that the court did not consider the claim of the tenant that the sale transaction was a sham one. The Apex court in an appeal by the tenant from an order of eviction passed against him, struck down the order of eviction on the ground that the court did not consider the claim of the tenant that the sale transaction was a sham one. The observations made by the Apex Court while setting aside the order of eviction read:"where the order of eviction of the tenant in the eviction petition filed by the purchaser of the building was passed bypassing the plea of the tenant that in fact there was no sale of the said building and the sale deed was a paper transaction, the order of eviction would be invalid. The view that the tenant could not challenge the validity of the sale deed executed in favour of the purchaser because the tenant was not a party to it, would not be proper. Since, the lower Courts failed to record the finding on this point the case was remitted to the Trial Court to record finding on the question whether the sale of building to the purchaser was a bona fide transaction". The above decision is of no assistance to the respondent because unlike in the case before the Apex Court, the Court below has considered the question as to whether the transaction was sham or a real one. Having considered the said issue in detail the H. R. C. Court has recorded a finding to the effect that the transaction was real and one made for valid consideration. The decision in Devi Das, supra, therefore, is of no assistance at all to the respondent. The reasoning adopted by the Court below in arriving at the said conclusion, in my opinion, does not call for any interference. It may be that the Court below had not formulated a point on this issue but, nevertheless, it had considered the ground urged and determined it in the order. As a finding has been recorded on the issue, in the course of the order, the ratio of the decision relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondent would not enure to his benefit. It would be too much to assume that because the previous landlord failed in his attempt to evict the respondent, he had resorted to a sham sale in favour of the petitioner in order to evict the respondent from the petition premises. It would be too much to assume that because the previous landlord failed in his attempt to evict the respondent, he had resorted to a sham sale in favour of the petitioner in order to evict the respondent from the petition premises. The eviction proceedings are summary in nature and a landlord who fails in one attempt to evict the tenant need not resort to any such drastic measure as it is always open to him to make a similar application again urging the same or different grounds. The previous landlord being an educated man would have known better than to resort to such extreme measures which could even result in his losing a valuable property, if the trust reposed in other person turns out to be misplaced. The petitioner has produced Ex. P. 1-the certified copy of the sale deed. Under Ex. P. 1 a stamp fee of Rs. 6,00,000/- has been paid by the petitioner to purchase the premises in question. It is too unrealistic to believe that the original landlord would part with such a huge sum and transfer his title over a valuable property to another person under a duly registered document only in order to set up the other person as landlord for purpose of evicting the respondent. The said defence is too improbable and unrealistic and does not inspire confidence in the Court to accept the same. It has been rightly rejected by the Court below and I find no reason to interfere with the said finding. ( 8 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent cited the decision in subhash Chandra v Mohammad Sharif, in order to show that he is entitled to contest the petition on the ground that the alleged transfer is ineffective. In the present case the defence so taken by the respondent has not been shut out by the Court below. This plea of the respondent has been considered in detail by the Court below while discussing issues 1 and 2. In the present case the defence so taken by the respondent has not been shut out by the Court below. This plea of the respondent has been considered in detail by the Court below while discussing issues 1 and 2. The pertinent observations made by the Apex Court in this regard and relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondent are at para 7 and they read:"the tenant is entitled to show that the plaintiff has not as a matter of fact secured a transfer from the original landlord or that the alleged transfer is ineffective for some other valid reason, which renders the transfer to be non-existent in the eye of law". The Apex Court has held that in cases where the landlord himself had not inducted the tenant into the petition premises and his rights are founded on a derivative title, the tenant who is already in possession can challenge the plaintiffs claim of derivative title by showing that the real owner is somebody else. It is not the case of the respondent herein that dr. Verma who executed the sale deed in favour of the petitioner is not the real owner of the petition premises. The principle laid down in subhash Chandra, supra, proceeds on the basis that the right to question the derivative title of the landlord accrues to the tenant only in cases where the original landlord who executed the document of transfer himself had no valid title to property. I quote, verbatim, the observations made by the Apex Court in this regard:"the doctrine of estoppel ordinarily applies where the tenant has been let into possession by the plaintiff. Where the landlord has not himself inducted the tenant in the disputed property and his rights are founded on a derivate title, for example, as an assignee, donee, vendee, heir, etc. , the position is a little different. A tenant already in possession can challenge the plaintiff claim of derivative title showing that the real owner is somebody else, but this is subject to Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act which does not permit the tenant, during the continuance of the tenancy, to deny that his landlord had at the beginning of the tenancy a title to the property. The rule is not confined in its application to cases where the original landlord brings an action for eviction. The rule is not confined in its application to cases where the original landlord brings an action for eviction. A transferee from such a landlord also can claim the benefit, but that will be limited to the question of title of the original landlord at the time when the tenant was let in. So far claim of having derived a good title from the original landlord is concerned, the same does not come under the protection of the doctrine of estoppel and is vulnerable to challenge". What the Apex Court in sum and Substance distinctly laid down in the above decision is that the principle of estoppel does not operate in cases where the title derived by the landlord filing the petition is defective because the original landlord who executed the deed of transfer himself had no valid title to the property. The exception to Section 116 of the indian Evidence Act carved out in the said decision is applicable to and is operative only in cases where the derivative title of the landlord who moved the eviction petition against the tenant who had come into possession of the tenanted premises under the original landlord is defective for one reason or the other. That is not the case herein. Nowhere, the respondent has contended that Dr. Verma's title to the property was defective. Therefore, this contention advanced by the learned Counsel for respondent by placing reliance on the above decision is without substance and only merits to be rejected. ( 9 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent has also cited the decision in Fatehsinh Gaikwar of Baroda v A. D. Gupta and Others, wherein the bombay High Court has held that registration of the document by the registering Officer in breach of mandatory provision of Section 230-A would render the registration void and ineffective and, therefore, no title passed to the petitioner under Ex. P. 1. This submission fails to take note of the fact that the total consideration received under the deed of transfer is only Rs. 24,00,000/ -. Section 230-A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is not attracted to any transfer in respect of an immovable property in Bangalore, the sale consideration of which does not exceed Rs. 25,00,000/-, as exemption is provided for all transactions not exceeding rs. 25,00,000/ -. 24,00,000/ -. Section 230-A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is not attracted to any transfer in respect of an immovable property in Bangalore, the sale consideration of which does not exceed Rs. 25,00,000/-, as exemption is provided for all transactions not exceeding rs. 25,00,000/ -. Therefore, this submission of learned Counsel for the respondent is totally ill-founded and does not merit consideration in this revision. ( 10 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent nextly urged that the eviction petition filed by the petitioner within a period one year from the date of purchase is incompetent. Reliance is placed by him on the proviso to Section 27 (2) (r) of the Rent Act. The said proviso reads:"provided that where the landlord has acquired the premises by transfer, no application for recovery of possession of such premises shall lie under this clause unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of acquisition". (emphasis supplied) the application made for eviction of the tenant was made under the provisions of the Karnataka Eent Control Act, 1961 ('the previous Act' for short) and not under the present Rent Act. The proviso speaks of an application made under Section 27 of the Rent Act and not an application made under the previous Act. Matters of procedure are governed by the rules that exist at the particular point of time when a certain thing is done. The provision prohibiting the filing of an application for eviction by a landlord, who acquires the premises by transfer, having coming into force on 31st December, 2001 all actions brought for eviction prior to this date under the provisions of the previous Act would not attract the prohibition contained in the proviso. The provisions of the Rent Act being only prospective, all matters in which the applications were made even prior to the coming into force of the Rent Act would be governed only by the rules of procedure as were prescribed under the previous Act and not by the procedure prescribed under the present Rent Act. An application which was validly made in accordance with the provisions of then existing law would not be rendered invalid on the coming to force of a new law merely because the new law invalidates a procedure that existed previously and prescribes a different procedure. An application which was validly made in accordance with the provisions of then existing law would not be rendered invalid on the coming to force of a new law merely because the new law invalidates a procedure that existed previously and prescribes a different procedure. Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 70 of the rent Act which mandates that all cases and proceedings other than those referred to in clause (a) and pending at the commencement of the rent Act shall be continued and disposed off by the Court in accordance with the provisions of the Rent Act would not apply to applications which were filed even before coming into force of the Rent Act. The reference made in Section 70 (2) (b) of the Rent Act only refers to 'cases and proceedings' pending and therefore it is not applicable to a process began and completed even before the coming into force of the Rent Act. The proviso to Section 27 (2) (r) clearly speaks of 'application for the recovery of possession. . . under this clause'. No enactment can be understood to take away the right of a landlord to make an application for recovery of possession of the premises owned by him even before it comes into existence and especially so if it is given prospective effect and it does not specifically nullify actions started prior to its coming into force. If such right was available and the same was exercisable by the landlord under the provisions of the then existing law and an application came to be filed by the landlord in exercise of that right, the provisions of the Rent Act which came into force later on cannot be understood to render incompetent the filing of the application by the landlord under the provisions of the previous Act when there was no impediment to make such an application. In Rajahmundry Electric supply Corporation Limited v A. Nageshwara Rao and Others, the Apex court had occasion to lay down what factor should weigh with the Court for determining the validity of an application. In Rajahmundry Electric supply Corporation Limited v A. Nageshwara Rao and Others, the Apex court had occasion to lay down what factor should weigh with the Court for determining the validity of an application. The dictum laid down by the Apex Court, reads:"the validity of a petition must be judged on the facts as they were at the time of its presentation, and a petition which was valid when present cannot, in the absence of a provision to that effect in the statute, cease to be maintainable by reason of events subsequent to its presentation". Given the fact that there is no specific provision in the Rent Act invalidating the applications made under the previous Act, it would be a travesty of justice to dislodge a petition validly presented on a technical plea that such a petition is incompetent under the provisions of the Rent act. Thus, I find no merit in this submission of learned Counsel for the respondent too. ( 11 ) WHAT remains is the question whether the petitioner's requirement of the premises is real and genuine. The petitioner himself is a tenant under his landlord and he has suffered a decree for eviction. The threat of dispossession from the premises in his occupation is looming large and considering this factual aspect of the matter, there could be no doubt at all that the requirement of the petitioner is real and genuine. Thus, I find that there is no merit in any of the grounds urged in this revision requiring interference with the impugned order by this court in revision. ( 12 ) IN the result, the revision is dismissed. The respondent-tenant is directed to quit and deliver vacant possession of the premises to the petitioner-landlord within two months' from today. --- *** --- .