C. Y. SOMAYAJULU, J. ( 1 ) PRIVATE complaint filed by the second respondent for offences under sections 498-A, 406, 420 IPC read with 109 ipc and Sections 4 and 6 of Dowry prohibition Act against the petitioners, referred to the II Town Police Station, Nizamabad, for investigation under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. by the learned Magistrate was registered as crime No. 75 of 2001. This petition is filed to quash the said F. I. R. ( 2 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that since the complaint in this case was given after there was a divorce between the first petitioner and the second respondent, question of the petitioners committing the offences alleged cannot arise and so, the fir is liable to be quashed. According to him, after she is divorced by the first petitioner, the remedy of second respondent, if any, is to claim maintenance during the DDDAT period, as per the provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, and that she lost her right to initiate proceedings under section 498-A I. P. C. The contention of the learned Counsel for the second respondent is that the first petitioner gave divorce to the second respondent only to get over the criminal liability and in the facts and circumstances of the case, there are no grounds to quash the F. I. R. ( 3 ) PRINCIPLES governing the quashing of FIRs are laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 605 and State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, 2002 (1) ALD (Crl.) 412 (SC) = 2002 (3) SCC 89 , as per which an fir can be quashed only when the allegations therein do not prima facie disclose commission of any offence, or if the allegations therein are so absurd that no ordinary prudent man would believe them to be true or if the complaint is in abuse of process of Court and the like. ( 4 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that after the husband divorces his wife, his criminal liability for all the acts and offences, if any, committed by him during the subsistence of the marriage would get wiped out cannot be accepted.
( 4 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that after the husband divorces his wife, his criminal liability for all the acts and offences, if any, committed by him during the subsistence of the marriage would get wiped out cannot be accepted. With divorce the marital tie between the husband and wife only would be broken but the liability for the crimes committed by any spouse during the subsistence of the marriage would not be wiped out. Therefore, merely because first petitioner divorced the second respondent, the marital crimes, if any, committed by him during the subsistence of the marriage do not get vanished. If divorce is the panacea for marital crimes, or crimes committed by the spouses, many marriages may not subsist. ( 5 ) THE allegations in the FIR, if taken to be true, do disclose commission of at least the offence under Section 498-A IPC against the Petitioners 1 to 3. So, the FIR against them cannot be quashed. ( 6 ) THE allegation against Petitioners 4 to 9 is that they instigated the first petitioner (A-1) in making a demand for dowry. It is well known that in recent past it has become a practice to make all the members of the family of the husband accused in cases relating to dowry harassment. ( 7 ) IN this case except baldly stating that Petitioners 4 to 9 had instigated the first petitioner to demand more dowry from second respondent, no specific allegations are made against them. So, it is easy to see that Petitioners 4 to 9 are roped in only with a view to harass them and so the proceedings against Petitioners 4 to 9 can be quashed. ( 8 ) HENCE, petition of Petitioners 1 to 3 is dismissed. Petition of Petitioner 4 to 9 is allowed and the FIR in Crime No. 75 of 2001 of II Town Police Station, Nizamabad, against the Petitioners 4 to 9 only is quashed.