P.Sathasivam, J.: Aggrieved by the order of the Registrar General, High Court, Madras/first respondent herein dated 19.11.2002, permitting the petitioner to retire from Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service on attaining the age of superannuation at 58 years i.e., on 30.11.2002 A.N., the petitioner has filed the above writ petition to quash the same on various grounds. 2. The case of the petitioner is briefly stated hereunder: He was selected in 1981 in the Tamil Nadu Magisterial Service and posted as Judicial Second Class Magistrate from 9.2.1982. Thereafter, he was posted on 6.10.1988 as District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, a newly created post. He was promoted in March, 2001 as the Civil Judge (Senior Division) and given posting as IX Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai. He was deputed to Pondicherry Judicial Service to function as Sub Judge, Yanam as per the orders in G.O.(D) No.677, Home (Courts 1A) Department, dated 12.6.2002 and he assumed charge on 17.6.2002 as Sub Judge cum Assistant Sessions Judge at Yanam. Since he was attaining age of 58 years on 30.11.2002, physical fitness and fitness certificate was forwarded to High Court certifying that he was medically fit to continue in service for two years. On 26.11.2002, he was served with the impugned proceedings dated 19.11.2002, issued by the first respondent stating that taking into consideration of the relevant reference and overall performance, the High Court has resolved to permit him to retire from service on attaining the age of superannuation at 58 years i.e., on the afternoon of 30.11.2002. The said order is not valid in law and the same is liable to be set aside. 3. The Registrar General, High Court, Madras, first respondent herein filed a counter affidavit stating that the petitioner was posted as Judicial Second Class Magistrate on 12.2.1982. He was promoted as Sub Judge on 16.3.2001 and functioned as IX Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras till 14.6.2002 and subsequently functioned as Sub Judge, Yanam from 17.6.2002 to 30.11.2002 i.e., upto the date of retirement. He was promoted as Sub Judge on 16.3.2001 and functioned as IX Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras till 14.6.2002 and subsequently functioned as Sub Judge, Yanam from 17.6.2002 to 30.11.2002 i.e., upto the date of retirement. The case of the petitioner was taken up for consideration for continuance in service beyond the age of 58 years and upto 60 years by the Administrative Committee of the High Court in the meeting held on 7.11.2002 and on careful consideration of relevant records and overall performance of the officer, the committee resolved to permit the petitioner to retire on attaining the age of superannuation at 58 years i.e., on the afternoon of 30.11.2002; accordingly he was informed and permitted to retire on attaining the age of superannuation at 58 years by the impugned proceedings. The norms and guidelines prescribed in the Full Court Meeting held on 28.10.1993 were strictly followed by the Screening Committee while considering the case of the petitioner for continuance of service beyond the age of 55 years. Considering the relevant records, remarks recorded in the confidential report, work done statements, other relevant records, overall performance and his utility in service, the petitioner who was functioning as Sub Judge, Yanam, was allowed to retire from service on attaining the age of Superannuation to 58 years. The course adopted and conclusion arrived are perfectly valid in law. There is no merit in the claim made by the petitioner. 4. Heard Mr.N.S.Sivam, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr.B.Rajendran, learned counsel for first respondent and Mr.S.Kandasmay, learned Special Government Pleader for 2nd respondent. 5. Mr.N.S.Sivam, learned counsel for the petitioner, after taking us through the impugned order of the first respondent and all other connected materials, would contend that the impugned order is contrary to the guidelines issued by the Supreme Court regulating the continuance of judicial officers in service till the age of superannuation reached on 60 years. He further contended that as per the order of the Supreme Court in All India Judges Association v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2493, if a judicial officer is not found fit to continue upto 60 years i.e., the age of superannuation, then such judicial officer shall be compulsorily retired following the said procedure for compulsory retirement. The impugned order is contrary to the above direction. The impugned order is contrary to the above direction. He also contended that the Screening Committee has not considered his performance for the last 5 years and only one incident alone was considered which cannot be sustained. He also contended that inasmuch as the Government alone is the competent authority to pass orders, the impugned communication by the Registrar General is not valid in law. On the other hand, Mr.B.Rajendran, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent, would contend that the impugned order is perfectly valid in law and the same was passed after considering all the relevant materials by the Screening Committee and there is no ground for interference. 6. We have carefully considered the rival submissions. 7. In the light of the narration of the case of both parties in the earlier part of our order, there is no need to refer the same once again. It is the claim of the petitioner that the age of superannuation is at 60 years and not at 58 years, as referred to and mentioned in the impugned proceedings by the first respondent. It is also relevant to find out whether if the petitioner’s service is not extended after 58 years, whether the procedure as contemplated for compulsory retirement has to be followed or mere intimation that the petitioner retires on 30.11.2002 on accounting the age of 58 years is sufficient. Mr.N.S.Sivam, learned counsel for the petitioner, mainly relied on two decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The first one is in the case of All India Judge’s Association v. Union of India, (1992)1 S.C.C. 119 . It is a case of writ petition filed under Art.32 of the Constitution of India by All India Judge’s Association and its working President for reliefs through directions for setting up of an All India Judicial Service and for bringing about uniform conditions of service for members of the subordinate judiciary throughout the country. After analysing the constitutional provisions, the Supreme Court has issued eight directions to the Union Government and State Governments. Among the directions, learned counsel for the petitioner very much relied on clause 3 in para 63 of the said judgment which reads as under: "63. After analysing the constitutional provisions, the Supreme Court has issued eight directions to the Union Government and State Governments. Among the directions, learned counsel for the petitioner very much relied on clause 3 in para 63 of the said judgment which reads as under: "63. We would now briefly indicate the directions we have given in the judgment: (i) xx xx (ii) xx xx (iii) Retirement age of Judicial Officers be raised to 60 years and appropriate steps are to be taken by December 31, 1992." It is also relevant to note that pursuant to the various directions in para 63 of the above decision, second proviso was inserted to Fundamental Rule 56(1). There is no dispute that as per Sub-rule (1) of Rule 56, every Government servant in the superior service is to retire from service on attaining the age of 58 years. The second proviso, which was inserted with effect from 1.1.1993 is relevant: "56(1) Retirement on superannuation: (a) Every Government servant in this superior service shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of fifty eight years. He shall not be retained in service after that age except with the sanction of the Government on public grounds, which must be recorded in writing but he shall not be retained after the age of sixty years except in very special circumstances: Provided xx xx Provided further that on and from the First January, 1993, a District Judge, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Subordinate Judge or District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, who, in the opinion of the High Court, Madras, has potential for continued useful service beyond the age of fifty eight years, shall retire from service on attaining the age of sixty years." It is clear from the above 2nd proviso that in the opinion of the High Court the Judicial Officer concerned has potential for continued useful service beyond the age of 58 years, then the officer concerned shall retire from service on attaining the age of 60 years. 8. Before elaborating the above proviso, the learned counsel for the petitioner has also pressed into service the order passed by the Supreme Court on a Review Petition in All India Judges’ Association and others case, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2493. 8. Before elaborating the above proviso, the learned counsel for the petitioner has also pressed into service the order passed by the Supreme Court on a Review Petition in All India Judges’ Association and others case, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2493. The following conclusion of their Lordships with regard to increase of retirement age to 60 years are relevant: (para 7 at page 2509) "There is, however, one aspect we should emphasise here. To what extent the direction contained in the main judgment under review shall stand modified. The benefit of the increase of the retirement age to 60 years shall not be available automatically to all judicial officers irrespective of their past record of service and evidence of their continued utility to the judicial system. The benefit will be available to those who, in the opinion of the respective High Courts, have a potential for continued useful service. It is not intended as a windfall for the indolent, the infirm and those of doubtful integrity, reputation and utility. The potential for continued utility shall be assessed and evaluated by appropriate Committees of Judges of the respective High Courts constituted and headed by the Chief Justice of the High Courts and the evaluation shall be made on the basis of the Judicial Officers’ past record of service, character rolls, quality of judgments and other relevant matters. The High Court should undertake and complete the exercise in case of officers about to attain the age of 58 years well within time by following the procedure for compulsory retirement as laid down in the respective Service Rules applicable to the judicial officers. Those who will not be found fit and eligible by this standard should not be given the benefit of the higher retirement age and should be compulsorily retired at the age of 58 by following the said procedure for compulsory retirement. The exercise should be undertaken before the attainment of the age of 58 years even in cases where earlier the age of superannuation was less than 58 years. It is necessary to make it clear that this assessment is for the purpose of finding out the suitability of the concerned officers for the entitlement of the benefit of the increased age of superannuation from 58 years to 60 years. While summing up at the end of their order, their Lordships have held: (para 10) 10. It is necessary to make it clear that this assessment is for the purpose of finding out the suitability of the concerned officers for the entitlement of the benefit of the increased age of superannuation from 58 years to 60 years. While summing up at the end of their order, their Lordships have held: (para 10) 10. (b) The direction with regard to the enhancement of the superannuation age is modified as follows: While the superannuation age of every subordinate judicial officer shall stand extended up to 60 years, the respective High Courts should, as stated above, assess and evaluate the record of the judicial officer for his continued utility well within time before he attains the age of 58 years by following the procedure for the compulsory retirement under the Service Rules applicable to him and give him the benefit of the extended superannuation age from 58 to 60 years only if he is found fit and eligible to continue in service. In case he is not found fit and eligible, he should be compulsorily retired on his attaining the age of 58 years." Heavily relying on the above conclusion, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the superannuation of the petitioner who being a judicial officer, is extended up to 60 years and even if he is not found fit and eligible to continue beyond 58 years, he should be compulsorily retired on his attaining the age of 58 years by following the procedure for compulsory retirement. In other words, according to him, having found that the petitioner is not found fit beyond 58 years, the petitioner should be compulsorily retired by following the procedure under F.R.56 (2). After going through the All India Judges’ Association case, (1992)1 S.C.C. 119 (in short "1992 case") and the All India Judges’ Association case, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2493 (in short "1993 case"), we are unable to accept the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. As rightly pointed out by Mr.B.Rajendran, learned counsel for the first respondent, the very same contentions/questions were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a subsequent decision reported in Bishwanath Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2001)2 S.C.C. 305 . The said decision in (2001)2 S.C.C. 305 . As rightly pointed out by Mr.B.Rajendran, learned counsel for the first respondent, the very same contentions/questions were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a subsequent decision reported in Bishwanath Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2001)2 S.C.C. 305 . The said decision in (2001)2 S.C.C. 305 . The said decision arose in a writ petition filed under Art.32 of the Constitution of India, who is a member of Bihar Superior Judicial Service prayed for direction to the State of Bihar to frame rules for enhancement of age of superannuation of the Judicial Officers of the State as per the direction of the Supreme Court issued in the All India Judges’ Association case (1992 case) and also further direction quashing the communication contained in the letter of the Registrar General of Patna High Court dated 17.5.2000 informing him that having assessed and evaluated his service in the light of All India Judges’ Association case (2nd case) and not to allow him the benefit of enhancement of the retirement age from 58 years to 60 years. In the said decision, their Lordships, after considering "1992 case" as well as "1993 case," have held: (paras.10, 11, 13, 14 and 16) "10. In Ramesh Chandra Acharya v. Registrar, High Court of Orissa, (2000)6 S.C.C. 332 , the Orissa Service governing the age of retirement of the petitioner was not amended. The petitioner, retired at the age of 58 years, filed a petition under Art.32 contending that the age of superannuation had stood extended to 60 years by 1993 case, (1993)4 S.C.C. 288 ; 1994 S.C.C. (L&S) 148 L (1993)225 ATC 818. A two Judge Bench of this Court held: (S.C.C. pp.333 and 337, paras 1 and 12) "There can be no right of an employee to continue in service de hors statutory or administrative rule prescribing superannuation age and continuation in service could be only subject to the condition provided. ...in the absence of a specific rule made by the State no judicial officer has a right as such to continue beyond the ages of 58. It is only when the High Court, after reviewing all aspects of service including the past record of the officer concerned, specifically orders that in the interest of the judicial service of the Stte it is necessary to retain the particular officer beyond that age-limit and allow him to superannuate at the age of 60. It is only when the High Court, after reviewing all aspects of service including the past record of the officer concerned, specifically orders that in the interest of the judicial service of the Stte it is necessary to retain the particular officer beyond that age-limit and allow him to superannuate at the age of 60. In other words, continuation beyond 58 years is permissible only when the High Court makes a positive recommendation in favour of that officer for such continuation. Otherwise the judicial officer has to retire at the age of 58. This can be departed from only when the state makes a specific rule otherwise." 11. The use of the words "compulsory retirement" for the judicial officer allowed to superannuate at the age of 58 years and the expression such as "compulsory retirement on attaining the age of 58 years according to the procedure for compulsory retirement under the rules" have emboldened the petitioner to raise the plea that subsequent to the judgment of this Court in 1993 case (1993) 4 S.C.C. 288 ), the retirement of a judicial officer at the age of 58 years is not retirement in ordinary course but compulsory retirement and therefore the procedure for compulsory retirement has to be followed. In our opinion such a submission cannot be entertained on an overall reading of the judgment of this Court in 1993 case. 12. xx xx 13. We would like to state, even at the risk of repetition, that 1993 case is not intended to operate as a piece of legislation and certainly it could not have been so. It is only on account of inaction of the executive to carry out the directions of this Court made in 1992 case (1992)1 S.C.C. 119 , that persuaded this Court into issuing suitable directions, ad hoc in nature, to remain in operation for the period for which the field was not occupied by statutory rules by amendment made to bring the rules in conformity with the directions in 1993 case. The direction in 1993 case enhancing the age of retirement from 58 to 60 years is a benefit and not a right. The availability of benefit is conditional upon the exercise of evaluation undertaken by the High Court and the individual judicial officer having satisfied the test of continued utility to the judicial system in the opinion of the High Court. The availability of benefit is conditional upon the exercise of evaluation undertaken by the High Court and the individual judicial officer having satisfied the test of continued utility to the judicial system in the opinion of the High Court. Extension of service is neither automatic nor a windfall. 14. In 1993 case, this Court mandated that the exercise of evaluation for the purpose of finding out the suitability of the officer concerned for entitlement of the benefit of the increased age of superannuation has to be undertaken before the officer attains the age of 58 years. At such evaluation the High Court may arrive at one of the three conclusions with respective consequences as under: (i) The High Court may find the officer having the potential for rendering continued useful service whereupon the officer would be given an extension in the age of superannuation. (ii) The High Court may find the officer not only not entitled for being conferred the benefit of extended age of superannuation but may also find that the officer is a burden on public exchequer with no utility for judicial service, intolerable even to be retained up to the age of 58 years, the normal superannuation age, then the High Court may undertake further exercise by following the procedure prescribed by the statutory rules governing compulsory retirement and, in the event of such an opinion being formed bona fide, may compulsorily retire him forthwith. The latter exercise can be undertaken before or after crossing the age of 58. (iii) The High Court may form an opinion that the officer does not have utility for continued service so as to be retained beyond 58 years of age but at the same time he is not such a dead wood as cannot be tolerated even up to the normal age of superannuation, i.e., 59 years, as appointed by the statutory rules, then the High Court may simply observe silence and allow the officer concerned to retire at the normal age of superannuation. 15. xx xx xx 16. 15. xx xx xx 16. The word "compulsory statement" is not a very appropriate expressions to be employed in the cases covered by category (iii) because the officer has neither been given the benefit of "extended age of superannuation" nor was he being retired prematurely nor was he being "compulsorily retired" in the sense the expressions is known to service jurisprudence but was being allowed to retire simpliciter at the age of superannuation appointed by the service rules governing him. His length of service was neither being extended nor snapped midway. In this third category of cases, the employment of words "compulsory retirement" denotes only this much that the High Court having undertaken the exercise of evaluation in the terms of 1993 case and having formed the opinion that the officer was not entitled to benefit of extension, there was no other option left available except to allow the officer concerned to retire at the normal age of his superannuation. Even assuming, without conceding that the retirement at the normal age of superannuation, viz., 58 years, has been consciously called "compulsory retirement" in 1993 case, the same would at the most be a "compulsory retirement in public interest" and carefully not by way of penalty casting any stigma. But in every case other than the exercise of evaluation undertaken by the High Court, an order of so-called "compulsory retirement" would not need to be passed by the State Government inasmuch as such retirement was not under the service rules but only in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court which judgment does not require an order by the State Government to be passed for its validity or efficacy. Thus, there is no scope for raising the pleas sought to be raised by the petitioner herein." 9. As rightly pointed out by Mr.B.Rajendran, learned counsel for the first respondent, the above decisions in Bishwanath Prasad Singh case which is a three Judge Bench is an answer to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is true that as per second proviso to Fundamental Rule 56(1), Judicial officers in this State are entitled to continue till they attain the age of 60 years. It is true that as per second proviso to Fundamental Rule 56(1), Judicial officers in this State are entitled to continue till they attain the age of 60 years. However, in terms of the proviso, only on the opinion of the High Court that the judicial officer has potential for continued useful service beyond the age of 58 years, he will be allowed in service on attaining the age of 60 years. In other words, continuation beyond 58 years is permissible only when the High Court makes a positive recommendation in favour of such officer. The contention that if the officer is not allowed to continue beyond 58 years, he shall be compulsorily retired and the procedure for compulsory retirement is to be followed is negatived in the said decisions (vide para 11). As a matter of fact, it is clear from the above decision that if in the opinion of the High Court that the officer does not have utility for continued service, so as to be retained beyond 58 years, there is no obligation on the part of the High Court to pass an order and simply allow the officer to retire at the normal age of superannuation. In fact, it is apt and relevant to refer again from the conclusions of the Supreme Court para 18(4) of Bishwanath Prasad Singh case, (2001)2 S.C.C. 305 : “18 (4). If the High Court finds a judicial officer not entitled to the benefit of extension in superannuation age he would retire at the age of superannuation appointed by the service rules. No specific order or communication in that regard is called for either by the High Court or by the Governor of the State. Such retirement is not” compulsory retirement “ in the sense of its being by way of penalty in disciplinary proceedings or even by way of” compulsory retirement in public interest“. No right of the judicial officer is taken away. Where the High Court may choose to make any communication in this regard, it would be better advised not to use therein the expression” compulsory retirement“. It creates confusion. No right of the judicial officer is taken away. Where the High Court may choose to make any communication in this regard, it would be better advised not to use therein the expression” compulsory retirement“. It creates confusion. It would suffice to communicate, if at all, that the officer concerned, having been found not fit for being given the benefit or extended age of superannuation, would stand retired at the normal age or date of superannuation.” In the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, all contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner are liable to be rejected. Further, it is also clear that if the High Court finds that the judicial officer is not entitled to the benefit of extension of the superannuation age, no specific order either by the High Court or by the state is required. It is also clear that such retirement is not “compulsory retirement being by way of penalty in disciplinary proceedings or in public interest”. Since no right of the judicial officer is taken away, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the first respondent, mere communication mentioning that having been found not fit for being given the benefit or extended the age of superannuation is sufficient; hence the impugned communication by the Registrar General cannot be faulted with and the same is in consonance with the law declared by the Supreme Court in the above referred case. 10. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that with reference to the official Memorandum dated 12.11.2002 informing about the adverse remarks made in the Annual Confidential Reports for the period from 22.3.2001 to 31.12.2001 and submitted a representation dated 28.11.2002 to expunge the remarks “not satisfactory”, the same was explained in the counter affidavit that inasmuch as he has retired on 30.11.2002 and his representation was received by the High Court on 3.12.2002, the same was ordered. There cannot be any error in the said procedure. There cannot be any error in the said procedure. On the other hand, after taking note of the norms and guidelines prescribed by the Full Court for the purpose of deciding as to whether a judicial officer should continue in service beyond the age of 58 years and up to 60 years after considering the relevant records, remarks recorded in the confidential reports, work done statements, overall performance of the petitioner, his utility in service and all other relevant records, the screening committee resolved to allow the petitioner from retiring from service on attaining the age of superannuation at 58 years. We are satisfied that the screening committee had considered all the relevant materials in terms of the guidelines prescribed. Hence, there is no error in the procedure followed as claimed by the petitioner. As rightly contended, though the petitioner is physically fit, it does not automatically entitle him to continue in service beyond the age of 58 years. Regarding the non settlement of pension benefits etc., the first respondent is informed that the petitioner has not submitted the pension papers to the High Court claiming pension benefits etc. It is also explained that it is the duty of the concerned authority namely Accountant General with pension proposals for claiming the pension marking copy to the High Court. 11. Under these circumstances, we do not find any error or infirmity in the impugned proceedings and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed; accordingly dismissed. No costs. W.P.M.P.No.17129 of 2003 is closed.