JUDGMENT Per Bobde. J.-This first appeal is preferred by the plaintiff. The plaint has been rejected by the trial Court under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. The parties are referred to in this judgment as per their status before the trial Court. 3. The plaintiff initially sued the defendants for specific performance and possession of land as per agreement dated 9.11.1984. The suit was decreed in March, 1988. In the first appeal decided on 16th July, 1992, the judgment and decree was quashed and the matter was remanded to the trial Court for disposal of the suit. This was because before the appellate Court, i.e. this Court, it was claimed by the defendants that the land is notified as a forest land. An amendment of that effect was allowed by this Court. In the first appeal, this Court also allowed the plaintiff to amend her pleadings for moulding his reliefs. The parties were also allowed to lead fresh evidence. 4. A Special Leave Petition against the judgment and order of this Court was dismissed. After the matter was remanded before the trial Court, the plaintiff sought an amendment praying for the relief of damages. It is important to note that this was not objected to by the defendants. This prayer was made by the plaintiff because it was not possible for him to pursue his prayer for specific performance in view of the defendants' stand that the land in question has been notified as a reserved forest. 5. Apparently, before the trial Court, the defendants moved the instant application for rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC. Rule 11 of Order VII, reads as under ; "11. Rejection of plaint.- The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases ; (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is under-valued, and the plaintiff. Rule 11 of Order VII, reads as under ; "11. Rejection of plaint.- The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases ; (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is under-valued, and the plaintiff. on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where it is not filed in duplicate; (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9." 6. According to the defendants, since the suit land is declared to be a reserved forest, no suit for specific performance can be decreed and, therefore, the suit is barred. They, therefore, prayed that the Court be pleased to reject the plaint since it has no jurisdiction to decree the suit. The trial Court has granted the application mainly on the basis of the fact that it is pleaded in the written statement and appears to have been impliedly accepted by the plaintiff that suit land is a forest land. This, to our mind, raises an infirmity in the order of the trial Court since the application under Order VII, Rule 11, CPC is allowed on the basis of the averments in the written statement and not on the basis of the averments in the plaint which alone must be taken into account while dealing with such an application, as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Saleem Bhai and others v. State of Maharashtra and others, reported in (2003) 1 SCC 557 . The trial Court has further rejected the plaint on the basis that it has been held in the case of State of U.P. v. Dy. Director of Consolidation and others, reported in (1996) 5 SCC 194 that the Indian Forest Act, 1927 is a complete code in itself and contains an elaborate procedure to be followed by the Government before and while notifying any area as the reserved forest area. Director of Consolidation and others, reported in (1996) 5 SCC 194 that the Indian Forest Act, 1927 is a complete code in itself and contains an elaborate procedure to be followed by the Government before and while notifying any area as the reserved forest area. Once a notification under Section 20 of the said Act declaring an area as a reserved forest area is published, then all the rights in the said land claimed by any person come to an end and area no longer available to him. The learned trial Court has further relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Shri Alex Gregorio D'Silva and others v. The Chief Secretary and others, reported in 1999 (1) Goa LT 398 where this Court followed the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. (supra) and held, in the facts of the case before it, that where a property is notified as a reserved forest under Section 20 of the said Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred in respect of such area and the Forest Settlement Officer has jurisdiction as per Section 11 of the Act. While relying on this last judgment, the learned trial Court seems to have been oblivious of the fact that the suit in the case of Shri Alex Gregorio D'Silva, (supra), was for a decree of possession and mandatory injunction. 7. Undoubtedly, having regard to the provisions of the Indian Forest Act, such suits which may broadly be categorized as suits in respect of rights over the land which has been declared to be a forest area, must be treated as barred under the provisions of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. The Forest Act contains an elaborate scheme, vide Chapter II, for declaration of an area as reserved forest. Section 4 provides for a notification by the State Government. Section 5 bars accrual of forest rights. Section 6 provides for a proclamation by Forest Settlement Officer. Sections 7 and 8 provide for an inquiry by the Forest Settlement Officer and the powers of such an officer for the purposes of an inquiry respectively. The latter section provides that the Forest Settlement Officer shall have powers of a Civil Court in the trial of suits. Section 11 confers a power on the Forest Settlement Officer to acquire land over which rights are claimed. The latter section provides that the Forest Settlement Officer shall have powers of a Civil Court in the trial of suits. Section 11 confers a power on the Forest Settlement Officer to acquire land over which rights are claimed. None of the provisions of the Indian Forest Act contain any provision whereby a person may make claim for damages against the Government or any other person in respect of a reserved forest. In any case, there is no power conferred on any of the authorities under the Indian Forest Act, including the Forest Settlement Officer to adjudicate such a claim, if made. Nonetheless, the learned trial Court has rejected the plaintiff's claim on the basis that Section 11 of the Forest Act bars the claim for damages also. A perusal of Section 11 of the Act shows that it has nothing to do with a claim for damages, but confers a power on the Forest Settlement Officer to acquire land. It is important to note that the trial Court has not rejected the plaint on the ground that the specific performance of the agreement with the plaintiff cannot be granted in respect of a forest land, but has in fact proceeded on the assumption that the plaintiff has confined the relief in the suit in respect to damages. The trial Court has come to the conclusion that even this claim for damages can be made "before the Forest Settlement Officer who is empowered like a Collector and deemed to be a Collector proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act". 8. We consider the view taken by the trial Court to be untenable since the Forest Act, 1927 does not provide for any forum for adjudicating a claim for damages, such as the one made by the plaintiff. 9. The learned counsel for the defendants, however, relied on certain observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh, reported in AIR 1992 SC 1604 where the Supreme Court construed the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, wherein their Lordships were pleased to make the following observations "So far as the proviso to sub-section (5) is concerned, two positions must be kept clearly distinguished. If the amendment relates to the relief of compensation in lieu of or in addition to specific performance where the plaintiff has not abandoned his relief of specific performance the Court will allow the amendment at any stage of the proceeding. This is a claim for compensation failing under Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the amendment is one under the proviso to sub- section (5). But different and less liberal standards apply if what is sought by the amendment is the conversion of a suit for specific performance into one for damages for breach of contract in which case Section 73 of the Contract Act is invoked. This amendment is under the discipline of Rule 17, Order VI, CPC. The fact that sub-section (4), in turn, invokes Section 73 of the Contract Act for the principles of quantification and assessment of compensation does not obliterate this distinction. " We find that these observations are no an authority for the proposition that if the claim for specific performance is abandoned by the plaintiff, he cannot pursue his suit for damages. In fact, the observations above clearly show that the conversion of a suit for specific performance of contract is sought into one for damages for breach of a contract, is permissible, though such an amendment is under the discipline of Rule 17, Order VI, CPC. Indeed, in a case such as the present where one of the reliefs, such as that of specific performance becomes impossible, the plaintiff is always entitled under Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure to abandon any part of his claim. 10. The observations of the Privy Council in Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Sassoon, reported in AIR 1928 Privy Council 208, clearly show that a suit for specific performance or damages can be converted into the one for damages only. The Privy Council observed as follows : "A suit for specific performance or damages in the alternative can be amended so as to convert it into one for damages only. That the Court should have the power of granting such an amendment in a proper case is salutary and indeed necessary. But it is one to be most carefully and jealously exercised in all the circumstances of each individual case and with due regard to its effect upon the position of both the plaintiff and the defendant." 11. That the Court should have the power of granting such an amendment in a proper case is salutary and indeed necessary. But it is one to be most carefully and jealously exercised in all the circumstances of each individual case and with due regard to its effect upon the position of both the plaintiff and the defendant." 11. In any case, the trial Court has not rejected the plaint on the ground that the plaintiff has now only asserted his claim for damages, but has rejected the plaint on the ground that it is barred by the provisions of the Indian Forest Act. In the view that we have taken, it is clear that the trial Court could not have taken into account the pleadings in the written statement and that in any case, the plaint is not barred by the provisions of the Indian Forest Act, expressly or by necessary implication. 12. In the result, we find that the appeal deserves to be allowed and is, hereby allowed. The order in appeal is set aside. The trial Court is directed to proceed with the suit in accordance with law. The parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 7th July, 2004 at 10.30 am. Appeal allowed.