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2004 DIGILAW 728 (MAD)

M. S. Kumanan v. S. S. Mari Chettiar Trust

2004-04-30

N.V.BALASUBRAMANIAN, V.KANAGARAJ

body2004
Judgment :- N.V. Balasubramanian, J. 1. This appeal is preferred against the order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Namakkal in I.A.No.333 of 2003 in O.S.No.125 of 2003 dated 30.6.2003. 2. Learned Subordinate Judge, by the order which is under challenge, has granted the interim injunction till the disposal of the suit restraining the appellants in the appeal, who are the defendants in the suit, their men and agents from interfering with the management and administration of the first plaintiff-trust and its institutions by virtue of the purported deed of amendment registered under Document No.532/2002 on the file of Sub Registrar, Komarapalayam dated 4.9.2002. The appellants herein are the defendants in the suit and the respondents herein are the plaintiffs in the suit and the parties are hereinafter referred to as shown in the plaint. 3. The first plaintiff is a charitable trust and the second plaintiff is its lifetime trustee and Managing Trustee-cum-Chairman. It is convenient to refer to the averments of the plaint, and according to the plaintiffs, the first plaintiff-trust was founded in the year 1968 under document No.42/68 on the file of Sub Registrar, Sankari by (i) S.S.M.Purushothaman, father of the second plaintiff, (ii) S.S.M.Subramaniam, father of the defendants, (iii) S.S.M.Soundichetti @ S.S.M.Soundappan, (iv) S.S.M.Balakrishnan, (v) S.S.M.Lingappan, all sons of Mari Chettiar and (vi) S.S.M.Lakshmiammal wife of S.S.Mari Chettiar. According to the plaintiffs, under the terms of the trust deed, the settlors are the first trustees and they shall hold their office till their lifetime or until they resign. The first Managing Trustee was S.S.M.Purushothaman, the father of the second plaintiff. It is the case of the plaintiffs that under the deed of trust in the place of first trustees when they fall vacant, it shall be filled by their lineal descendants and the lineal descendants so appointed shall hold the office for their respective lives or till they resign. It is stated that after the death of S.S.M.Purushothaman, the second plaintiff was inducted as a trustee. It is also stated that after the demise of S.S.M.Subramaniam in the year 1989, the first defendant was inducted as a trustee. The other trustees S.S.M.Lingappan and S.S.M.Balakrishnan resigned from the trust and they separated from the family by virtue of an unregistered arbitration award and the trust was managed by the remaining trustees, S.S.M.Soundappan, P.Elango, second plaintiff and M.S.Kumanan, first defendant. The other trustees S.S.M.Lingappan and S.S.M.Balakrishnan resigned from the trust and they separated from the family by virtue of an unregistered arbitration award and the trust was managed by the remaining trustees, S.S.M.Soundappan, P.Elango, second plaintiff and M.S.Kumanan, first defendant. It is stated that there was a memorandum of understanding dated 24.8.1993 between S.S.M.Soundappan group and Elango group (comprising of Elango, Kumanan, Mathivanan and others) as per which they divided the management of the institutions along with institutions managed by the trust. It is stated that in the said memorandum of understanding arrived at on 24.8.1993, S.S.M.Institute of Textile Technology and S.S.M.Lakshmiammal Community Hall were allotted to Elango group, and S.S.M.Lakshmiammal Matriculation School was allotted to S.S.M.Soundappan group and after the memorandum of understanding, Soundappan left the first plaintiff-trust. It is stated that subsequently the second defendant and the wife of Elango, namely, E.Nirmala and Dr.G.Rangasamy, a public person were inducted in the Board of trustees for a period of three years. 4. It is stated that in the year 1996 the second plaintiff P.Elango, his wife E.Nirmala and the defendants and their mother S.Pankajam and their wives K.Sudha and M.Vijayalakshmi founded a trust called, S.S.M. Foundation Trust for educational and social development and the trust is managing a school namely, Sunshine Matriculation School and S.S.M.Engineering College. It is stated that dispute arose between the parties and the matter was referred to arbitration under the agreement dated 28.4.2000 before the Arbitrators, namely, K.N.V.Ramani, Advocate, Coimbatore, P.R.Vittal, Chartered Accountant, Coimbatore and B.Udhayakumar, Advocate by all the trustees of both the trusts. The subject matter of Reference to arbitration was S.S.Mari Chettiar Trust and S.S.M.Foundation Trust and the issue to be considered was the management of trusts, trust institutions and properties. It is stated that the abovesaid arbitrators passed an award on 3.5.2001 and the subject matter of the award is S.S.Mari Chettiar Trust and S.S.M.Foundation Trust and in the said award the first plaintiff trust, namely, S.S.Mari Chettiar Trust vested with the second plaintiff and the second plaintiff will have the exclusive management of the polytechnic, known as S.S.M. Institute of Textile Technology as trustee-cum-chairman and the management of trust institutions vested with him. There are other clauses regarding the management of the trust institutions. The building at Lakshmiammal Kalyana Mandapam was placed in-charge of the second plaintiff. There are other clauses regarding the management of the trust institutions. The building at Lakshmiammal Kalyana Mandapam was placed in-charge of the second plaintiff. The S.S.M.Foundation Trust, management of institutions and its properties vested with the defendants jointly. It is also stated that under clause 3 of the award, the defendants should relinquish their position and cease to be trustees in S.S..Mari Chettiar Trust, the first plaintiff and it would be open to the 2nd plaintiff Elango to fill up the vacancies with the persons of his choice. It is stated that the award also provides that the second plaintiff Elango and his wife Nirmala should relinquish their position as trustees in S.S.M.Foundation Trust and it would be open to the defendants to fill up the vacancies with the persons of their choice. It is stated that final award is enforceable in accordance with section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It is stated that no appeal was preferred against the award and all the parties admitted and consented to award unequivocally. 5. It is also stated that subsequently, the second plaintiff Elango and his wife Nirmala, the defendants and their wives, K.Sudha and M.Vijayalakshmi entered into another agreement of Reference to arbitration on 6.10.2001. It is stated that in the said Reference under clause-F the agreement of Reference to arbitration dated 28.4.2000 is superseded and replaced by the agreement without affecting the award passed on 3.5.2001 subject to the provisions of the agreement. It is also stated in the Reference under clause-H that so far as S.S.Mari Chettiar Trust and S.S.M.Foundation Trust are concerned, supplementary or consequential or other directions are to arise out of the earlier award of arbitration dated 3.5.2001. It is stated that the arbitrators passed an award on 28.2.2002 and the arbitrators, in the award, have not changed the management of the trust and the institutions and certain portions of properties which were allotted to the second plaintiff and some directions were issued to S.S.M.Foundation Trust to execute a deed of sale. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the award has become final as no appeal has been filed and is enforceable under section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. It is stated that the first plaintiff trust is managed by the second plaintiff, Elango. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the award has become final as no appeal has been filed and is enforceable under section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. It is stated that the first plaintiff trust is managed by the second plaintiff, Elango. It is stated in paragraph-10 of the plaint that on the basis of the award and the order of the Directorate of Technical Education dated 29.11.2002, the plaintiffs obtained an order of interim injunction against the defendants from interfering with the management of the plaintiff trust. It is also stated that the second plaintiff apprehends that the valuable property and the substantial income of the first plaintiff trust would be mishandled and misappropriated by the defendants and the first plaintiff trust has already lodged a complaint before the Judicial Magistrate, Tiruchencode and a first information report has also been registered against the second defendant. The case of the plaintiffs is that the first defendant is making attempt to do some illegal acts as Managing Trustee of the first plaintiff trust with the purported deed dated 4.9.2002 which was an amendment to the deed of trust. Hence, the plaintiffs filed the suit to declare the trust amendment deed dated 4.9.2002 as null and void and not binding on the second plaintiff and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the affairs of the first plaintiff trust and the educational and other institutions owned and operated by the first plaintiff trust. The plaintiffs also referred to the suit filed by the defendants in O.S.No.179 of 2002 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Sankari for declaring that they are the trustees of the first plaintiff S.S.Mari Chettiar Trust and for injunction restraining the second plaintiff, P.Elango from interfering with their peaceful possession and the said suit was dismissed. It is also stated that no appeal has been filed against the awards by the Arbitrators dated 3.5.2001 and 28.2.2002. The plaintiffs also referred to the meeting convened on 21.6.2002 wherein the defendants relinquished their position as trustees. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the defendants are not entitled to represent the first plaintiff trust and any such act done by them would not bind the first plaintiff. The plaintiffs also referred to the meeting convened on 21.6.2002 wherein the defendants relinquished their position as trustees. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the defendants are not entitled to represent the first plaintiff trust and any such act done by them would not bind the first plaintiff. It is stated that the defendants are attempting to dispossess the second plaintiff from the management of the trust by illegal way and against the award and the second plaintiff has also given a complaint before the Inspector of Police, Komarapalayam against the unlawful activities of the defendants. It is stated that in the third week of November, 2002 the defendants were attempting to obstruct the road leading to the trust institution and create troubles in the minds of the students studying in the institutions. Hence, the suit has been filed with the prayers set out in the plaint. 6. Along with the plaint, the plaintiffs have also filed a petition for interim injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the management and administration of the first plaintiff trust and its institutions by virtue of the purported deed of amendment registered under document No.532/2002 on the file of Komarapalayam Sub Registry dated 4.9.2002. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed and it is the case of the defendants that the second plaintiff was expelled from both the trusts from the month of August, 2002 and the defendants are in physical possession and administrative control of the trust and its properties. 7. Before considering the points that arise for consideration, it is necessary to refer to the averments made in the affidavit filed by the second plaintiff in W.P.No.13308 of 2003 on the file of this Court and the writ petition was filed in the month of April, 2003. In the affidavit, which is found at page 393 of the Volume-I of the typedset of papers filed by the appellants herein, it is stated that the respondents in the writ petition, by name, Mathivanan and Kumanan have regularly attempted to interfere in the management and administration of the trust making it appear as if they are in management of the polytechnic in question and the respondents brought hooligans and underworld elements and took the Principal of the Polytechnic away and threatened him with dire consequences. It is stated that the said incident occurred on 22.11.2002 and again they came surreptitiously under the cover of darkness armed with dangerous weapons and beat the watchmen and trespassed into the Polytechnic when it remained closed for Diwali vacation. It is also averred in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition that the respondents 2 and 3 in the writ petition attempted to withdraw amounts from the bank for payment of salary to the staff and the respondents 2 and 3 in the writ petition withdrew and misappropriated the cash kept in the hostel office for meeting emergency expenses. It is also stated that the defendants with the collusion of the Principal illegally took away the bank cheque books and other records and tried to operate the bank accounts of the trust and the Polytechnic and misappropriate the funds and also issued cheques to unrelated persons. It is stated that the lorries, mini-vans, water supply trucks were illegally diverted to the custody of the respondents 2 and 3 in the writ petition and the Principal, staff and students of the Polytechnic were misled and threatened to obey the commands of the defendants in the suit. There are several other averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition filed for the issue of a writ of mandamus to direct the Director of Technical Education, Government of Tamil Nadu to finalise the Governing Council of the SSM Institute of Textile Technology and Polytechnic, Komarapalayam. 8. We referred to the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, W.P.No.13308 of 2003 as the submission of learned senior counsel for the appellants/defendants was that the defendants are in possession and control of the management of the Polytechnic in question and hence, injunction should not have been granted. We will consider the submission of learned senior counsel for the appellants later. 9. Learned Subordinate Judge, Namakkal considered the petition for interim injunction. On behalf of the plaintiffs, 26 documents have been produced and marked and on behalf of the defendants 16 documents have been produced and marked. Learned Subordinate Judge found that from 26.11.1997 the second plaintiff was in management and control of the first plaintiff-trust. 9. Learned Subordinate Judge, Namakkal considered the petition for interim injunction. On behalf of the plaintiffs, 26 documents have been produced and marked and on behalf of the defendants 16 documents have been produced and marked. Learned Subordinate Judge found that from 26.11.1997 the second plaintiff was in management and control of the first plaintiff-trust. He also referred to the arbitration agreement and the suit instituted by the defendants and came to the conclusion that the defendants were not trustees from August, 2002 and there is nothing to show that the defendants were in possession and management of the trust. Taking note of the fact that the second plaintiff continued to manage the trust, learned Subordinate Judge held that the second plaintiff is entitled to interim injunction as prayed for. It is against this order, the present appeal has been preferred. 10. It is relevant to refer to the writ petition filed in W.P.No.27340 of 2003 where the first plaintiff and also one G.S.Jayaprakasam were the petitioners. After the order of injunction granted by the trial Court, the defendants have preferred the present appeal. It is stated that the order of interim injunction granted by the learned Subordinate Judge, Namakkal was not stayed by this Court in appeal and hence, the writ petition was filed by the plaintiffs in the suit to provide police protection to give effect to the order of injunction forbearing the defendants from interfering with the second plaintiff’s management and administration of S.S.Mari Chettiar Trust. The writ petition came up before a learned Single Judge and the learned Judge went into the facts and found that the order passed in I.A.No.333 of 2003 in O.S.No.125 of 2003 dated 30.6.2003 which is challenged in appeal was in force and it was not stayed. Learned Judge also found that the application filed in the suit for police protection whi ch has been transferred to the file of District Court, Namakkal should be considered and directed the learned District Judge, Namakkal to dispose of the said application on merits within seven days from the date of receipt of the copy of the order. Learned Judge also found that the application filed in the suit for police protection whi ch has been transferred to the file of District Court, Namakkal should be considered and directed the learned District Judge, Namakkal to dispose of the said application on merits within seven days from the date of receipt of the copy of the order. As against the order passed in W.P.No.27340 of 2003, a writ appeal in W.A.No.3474 of 2003 was preferred and that writ appeal came up before a Division Bench of this Court and the Bench held that the interim injunction granted by the trial Court has not reached its finality and the petition seeking police protection for implementation of the injunction order could wait till the disposal of the present appeal preferred against the order. The Bench appointed the second plaintiff, Elango as the Court Receiver to manage the trust and its properties including the educational institutions with a direction to the Receiver to furnish to the lower Court the regular accounts. The Receiver was also directed not to alienate or transfer any of the properties pending disposal of the present appeal. As against this order passed in the writ appeal, a Special Leave Petition was preferred before the Supreme Court in S.L.P.(Civil) No.20571/2003 and the Supreme Court, by order dated 4.11.2003, suspended the operation of the order passed in the writ appeal to the extent it directed the appointment of Receiver. Ultimately, the appeal came up before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.9639 of 2003 and the Supreme Court, by order dated 8.12.2003, set aside the order made in the writ appeal directing appointment of the second plaintiff as Receiver, but held that the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal should be disposed of by the High Court expeditiously. It is on the basis of the suggestion made by the Supreme Court, the appeal is heard. 11. Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the appellants/ defendants are in possession and management of the Polytechnic in question and the plaintiffs are not in physical possession of the said Polytechnic. It is on the basis of the suggestion made by the Supreme Court, the appeal is heard. 11. Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the appellants/ defendants are in possession and management of the Polytechnic in question and the plaintiffs are not in physical possession of the said Polytechnic. He referred to the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, W.P.No.13308 of 2003 wherein the plaintiffs have admitted that the defendants are in possession of the Polytechnic in question and the plaintiffs have admitted the de fendants’ management and administration of the Polytechnic and though the plaintiffs claimed that the possession was taken forcibly in November, 2002, that has to be established by acceptable evidence. His submission was that the defendants are trustees of S.S.Mari Chettiar Trust and to get possession and management of the trust from the defendants, the second plaintiff has made certain false allegations that the defendants took possession forcibly and it is a matter for evidence whether the defendants took possession forcibly or not. Learned senior counsel also referred to the affidavit filed in I.A.No.1677 of 2003 in I.A.No.333 of 2003 in O.S.No.125 of 2003 seeking police aid. He also referred to the affidavit dated 14.8.2003 and the counter affidavit. Learned senior counsel referred to the averments in C.M.P.No.15207 of 2003 in C.R.P.PD.No.2056 of 2003 where interim direction was sought for to implement the order of injunction grated in I.A.No.333 of 2003 which is the subject matter of this appeal. The said C.R.P.No.2056 of 2003 was filed for a direction to the District Judge, Namakkal to dispose of the application filed by the plaintiffs herein to dispose of the petition seeking police aid in I.A.No.1677 of 2003 on the file of Sub Court, Namakkal. He submitted that though this Court granted interim direction by order dated 29.9.2003, this Court by order dated 10.10.2003, dismissed the C.R.P. as withdrawn on the basis of the submission made by learned counsel for the plaintiffs that he had received telephonic instructions for the withdrawal of the C.R.P. Learned senior counsel referred to various proceedings for the disbursement of salary from the month of November, 2002. Learned senior counsel also referred to copies of various proceedings as found in Volume-II of the typedset of papers filed by the appellants and submitted that when the plaintiffs have admitted that the defendants are in possession and management of the institution in question, the petition filed for interim injunction is not maintainable and there is no prayer for possession, nor there is any prayer for handing over the possession. Learned senior submitted that the prayer is couched in such a manner that by obtaining interim injunction, the second plaintiff is attempting to get into possession and management of the institution. Learned senior counsel submitted that the suit in O.S.No.125 of 2003 was filed on 7.2.2003 and since the defendants are in possession and management on the basis of resolution dated 4.9.2002, the prayer has become infructuous. Learned senior counsel submitted that there are laches and delay on the part of the plaintiffs and they have not come to the Court with clean hands and the plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief of injunction. Learned senior counsel submitted that the prior to the order in which the second plaintiff was expelled from the institution, the second plaintiff was in management in a representative capacity only and he was not in exclusive management on his own and all the defendants were managing the institution in question and the second plaintiff was in management of the institution in question in a representative capacity only and the order granting interim injunction on the basis of the order of Government recognising the second plaintiff as a member of the Governing Council is not sustainable. Learned senior counsel submitted that the learned Subordinate Judge overlooked the fact that the second plaintiff was appointed as a member of the Governing Council only on the basis of resolution of the Board of trustees and those proceedings cannot be taken into account to show that the second plaintiff was in exclusive possession and management of the institution in question and the grant of injunction against a co-owner is not permissible. Learned senior counsel also submitted that the award passed by the Arbitrators is void and the Arbitrators had no jurisdiction to pass the award with reference to handing over of the trust to any one of the trustees and the only remedy available to the plaintiffs herein is to initiate proceedings under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Learned senior counsel submitted that since the award is void, no right will flow from the award in favour of the second plaintiff and further, the second plaintiff has not taken any proceedings to enforce the award as he has not filed any petition for the enforcement of the award. Learned senior counsel submitted that the dismissal of the suit earlier filed by the defendants as withdrawn does not operate as res judicata . His submission is that the present suit is not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 92, C.P.C. Learned senior counsel submitted that since admittedly the defendants are in possession and management of the Polytechnic in question and the documents filed clearly establish the same, the interim injunction granted against them is not sustainable either in law or on facts and should be vacated and the order of the learned Subordinate Judge granting interim injunction should also be set aside. 12. Mr.K.Muthukumaraswamy, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that it was open to the trustees to approach the arbitrators regarding the right of management of the trust and its institutions. He referred to the first award passed on 3.5.2001 and the second award dated 28.2.2002 and submitted that all the parties have accepted the earlier award as well as the second award and acted upon the same. He referred to the suit filed by the defendants in O.S.No.179 of 2002 on the file of Sub Court, Sankari and submitted that the said suit was dismissed and the defendants filed another suit in O.S.No.292 of 2002 on the file of District Munsif, Tiruchencode and in that, the plaint was rejected and against the order, a C.R.P. was filed. He submitted that in the suits filed by them, the defendants have taken the same plea as taken in the counter affidavit filed in the application for the grant of interim injunction. He submitted that in the suits filed by them, the defendants have taken the same plea as taken in the counter affidavit filed in the application for the grant of interim injunction. Learned senior counsel also referred to O.S.No.1402 of 2002 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore where the defendants have challenged the award to declare the same as null and void and the plaint in that suit was returned to be presented to the proper forum and against that order, an appeal was filed and as on date, the award is in force and the rights of the second plaintiff to manage the institutions in question flow from the award. He therefore submitted that the second plaintiff has legal right and is entitled to be in management of the trust. Learned senior counsel referred to the position prior to the award as well as after the award. He referred to the documents in Exs.A-1, A-3, A-4, A-18 and A-21 and he also referred to the documents filed by the defendants before the trial Court and submitted that the documents filed by the plaintiffs would show that the second plaintiff is in possession and management of the trust and the polytechnic. As far as the awards are concerned, there is no decision of Court that the awards are null and void. He, therefore, submitted that the plaintiffs have established that there is prima facie case and the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiffs and the parties have accepted and acted upon the awards. Learned senior counsel referred to the rejoinder to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the defendants herein before the Supreme Court in S.L.P.(Civil) No.21569 of 2003 wherein in paragraph-14, which is found at page-210 of Volume-V of the typedset of papers, the first defendant stated that the Arbitrators suggested to hand over the administration to the second plaintiff in order to sort out the problem before the passing of the award and the defendants acted in good faith and handed over the administration before passing of the award. Learned senior counsel therefore submitted that the documents clearly show that the second plaintiff is in legal possession and management of the institutions and the defendants tried to interfere with the management and since the defendants have no legal right to be in possession and management, the plaintiffs are entitled to injunction and the trial Court was right in granting injunction as prayed for. 13. We heard Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, learned senior counsel for the appellants and Mr.Muthukumaraswamy, learned senior counsel for the respondents. The only point that arises for consideration is whether the learned Subordinate Judge was correct in granting interim injunction as prayed for. There is no dispute about the fact that on 22.10.1968 S.S. Mari Chettiar Trust was founded by the settlors who were the original trustees of the trust. The objects of the trust are set out in the deed of trust itself. S.S.M.Purushothaman was holding the office of Managing Trustee during his life time and on 6.12.1972 the trust was reconstituted. Thereafter, the first defendant became one of the trustees and the management of the trust was with five trustees and a memorandum of understanding was arrived at between the parties on 24.8.1993 and the management of certain institutions was given to the second plaintiff group and the other group in the said dispute was also given the right of management of certain other institutio ns. The second plaintiff, Elango and the defendants were authorised to manage S.S.Mari Chettiar Institute of Textile Technology and S.S.Mari Chettiar Lakshmiammal Community Hall. Though the said memorandum of understanding was challenged before this Court in C.S.No.1294 of 1994, the suit is still pending. The second plaintiff was appointed as a Chairman and Correspondent of S.S.Mari Chettiar Institute of Textile Technology (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Polytechnic’) for a period of three years from 2 8.2.2000 and his wife also became a member. 14. There was a dispute between the parties and the matter was referred to arbitration consisting of three Arbitrators. In so far as S.S.Mari Chettiar Trust is concerned, under the award, the second plaintiff with his branch of family will have the exclusive management of the Polytechnic. There are also directions in the award to vest the management of trust institutions in an equitable manner among the members of the family to ensure smooth working. In so far as S.S.Mari Chettiar Trust is concerned, under the award, the second plaintiff with his branch of family will have the exclusive management of the Polytechnic. There are also directions in the award to vest the management of trust institutions in an equitable manner among the members of the family to ensure smooth working. In the award, the management of S.S.M.Foundation Trust and its properties and institutions were given to the defendants. The award was passed on 3.5.2001. Subsequently, another Reference to arbitration was made by the parties to the same Arbitrators in respect of S.S.Mari Chettiar Trust and S.S.M.Foundation Trust. In the agreement of Reference it was made clear that the Reference was made without affecting the award earlier passed on 3.5.2001. The Arbitrators also passed another award on 28.2.2002 on the basis of the Reference to arbitration made on 6.10.2001. In the second award, it has been specifically stated that the earlier award dated 3.5.2001 shall govern the parties and it is not necessary to refer to other terms of the second arbitration award. It is also stated that a petition under section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with Order 21, Rule 11(2), C.P.C. was filed before the Subordinate Judge, Namakkal. Though learned senior counsel for the plaintiffs referred to the minutes of the meeting dated 21.6.2002, we are not placing any reliance on the minutes. However, it is necessary to refer to the plaint in O.S.No.216 of 2002 on the file of District Munsif, Tiruchencode filed by the wife of first defendant and in that suit, S.S.Mari Chettiar Trust represented by its temporary Managing Trustee, P.Elango is shown as the defendant. That suit was filed for injunction with reference to a path way and the description in the cause title of the plaint gives an indication as to who was in management of the polytechnic. There was a registered deed of amendment dated 4.9.2002 by the defendants and the changes in the deed of trust that took place are indicated in the said deed. The main clause in the deed of amendment is that the second plaintiff was relieved from the trusteeship of the first plaintiff trust and he was expelled as a trustee from that trust. Hence, the present suit has been filed by the plaintiffs to declare the deed of amendment dated 4.9.2002 as null and void. The main clause in the deed of amendment is that the second plaintiff was relieved from the trusteeship of the first plaintiff trust and he was expelled as a trustee from that trust. Hence, the present suit has been filed by the plaintiffs to declare the deed of amendment dated 4.9.2002 as null and void. The suit was filed, as earlier stated, on 7.2.2003. Meanwhile, the defendants filed a suit in O.S.No.1402 of 2002 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore to declare both the awards dated 3.5.2001 and 28.2.2002 as null and void. Learned Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore returned the plaint and against that order, an appeal was preferred and the same is said to be pending before the learned District Judge, Coimbatore. The defendants also filed a suit in O.S.No.179 of 2002 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Sankari for the declaration that the plaintiffs therein (defendants in the present suit) are the lawful trustees of S.S.Mari Chettiar Trust and also for permanent injunction restraining the defendant therein (the second plaintiff herein) from interfering with peaceful and smooth running the trust. The said suit has been framed on the basis that the defendants were in possession of S.S.Mari Chettiar Trust and the said suit was filed on 16.9.2002 and the suit in O.S.No.179 of 2002 came to be dismissed on 20.9.2002 as not pressed. The effect of the dismissal of the suit is that the defendants have not established before the Court that they were in possession and management of the polytechnic though they claimed to be in possession of the Polytechnic. After that, another suit was filed by the defendants herein in O.S.No.292 of 2002 for the same relief as sought for in the earlier suit and in that suit, an application was taken out by the plaintiffs herein to reject the plaint. Learned District Munsif, Tiruchencode found that it is not permissible for the defendants herein to institute another suit on the same averments and on the same cause of action and hence, she allowed the application filed by the plaintiffs herein and rejected the plaint in O.S.No.292 of 2002. Learned District Munsif, Tiruchencode found that it is not permissible for the defendants herein to institute another suit on the same averments and on the same cause of action and hence, she allowed the application filed by the plaintiffs herein and rejected the plaint in O.S.No.292 of 2002. As against the order passed by the learned District Munsif, Tiruchencode, a C.R.P. was filed before this Court in C.R.P.No.800 of 2003 and a learned Judge of this Court held that the plaint in the subsequent suit in O.S.No.292 of 2002 was rightly rejected in view of Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. It is also relevant to notice here that the learned Judge noticed the arbitration award and he held that the award has become final and the subsequent suit filed suppressing the material fact of a suit being filed earlier on the same cause of action is an abuse of process of Court. Learned Judge held that unless and until the arbitration award passed is found to be illegal or otherwise set aside, it is not open to the plaintiffs therein (defendants in the present suit) to file one suit in the Sub Court and another in the District Munsif’s Court. Consequently, learned Judge upheld the order of learned District Munsif. It is stated that the order passed in the C.R.P.No.800 of 2003 is the subject matter of challenge before the Supreme Court in S.L.P. 15. The above facts would indicate that the defendants have not established before the Court that they were in possession and management of the Polytechnic in question on the date of institution of the suit. It is relevant to notice here that the plea taken by the defendants in their counter statement are the same that were taken in the plaints filed by them before the Sub Court, Sankari and the District Munsif’s Court, Tiruchencode. Though Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, learned senior counsel urged that it is open to t he defendants to urge those points as defendants in the present suit instituted by the plaintiffs herein and even accepting the submission of Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, the stand of the defendants in the suit clearly shows that they did not establish before the Court that they were in possession and management of the institution in question on the date of institution of the suit. 16. 16. In so far as the awards passed by the Arbitrators are concerned, the Arbitrators passed the awards awarding the exclusive management of the polytechnic to the second plaintiff and certain other institutions to the defendants. The question whether the arbitrators had the jurisdiction and the power to pass the awards is the subject matter of civil proceedings. Though the suit filed on this aspect was dismissed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction, an appeal is said to have filed before the learned District Judge, Coimbatore and arguments have already been heard. We are of the view, the questions whether the arbitrators had the jurisdiction to pass the awards of such a nature and whether the awards passed by them are null and void have to be decided by a competent Civil Court and till the matter is decided finally and till the award is set aside in a manner known to law or in a manner permissible under the law, it is not open to the defendants to claim that the awards are void and unenforceable and they are entitled to continue to be the trustees of the first plaintiff trust and entitled to manage the Polytechnic. Though arguments have been advanced on the ground that the awards are void, we are not expressing any opinion on the question as any opinion expressed by this Court would prejudice the rights of the parties in the pending proceedings before the Civil Court. The fact remains that both the defendants were excluded from the management of the trust and Polytechnic in question by the award and the first award was passed on 3.5.2001 and the suit was instituted on 7.2.2003 and the question that arises is whether the defendants continue to be trustees of the trust and they are entitled to manage the Polytechnic. 17. As far as the maintainability of the suit is concerned, the submission of Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, learned senior counsel is that the suit has to be instituted under Section 92, C.P.C. and the present suit as framed is not maintainable. We are of the opinion that the question of maintainability of the suit has to be decided by the Civil Court either as a preliminary issue or on the conclusion of the trial and it is for the trial Court to decide the same. We are of the opinion that the question of maintainability of the suit has to be decided by the Civil Court either as a preliminary issue or on the conclusion of the trial and it is for the trial Court to decide the same. Moreover, in considering such a question, the case of the plaintiffs has to be seen as they claim that the amendments made to the trust deed on 4.9.2002 are invalid and inoperative against the second plaintiff. Before the learned Subordinate Judge, the plaintiffs have produced certain documents in Exs.A1 to A-26 and the learned Subordinate Judge on the basis of those documents found that the plaintiffs are in possession and management of the institution in question. As far as the documents filed by the defendants are concerned, the first document is a sale deed dated 26.11.1997 and in our view, this document is not relevant in considering the question of grant of interim injunction. As far as other documents are concerned, those documents in Exs.B-3 to B-13 are all subsequent to the filing of the suit on 7.2.2003. Though Ex.B-14 is dated 10.1.2003, that document does not establish that the defendants were in possession and management of the institution in question. In that document, the Director of Technical Education expressed his inability to constitute the Governing Body as the matter was pending before the Civil Court. One other document is Ex.B-15 which is the report of the Commissioner filed in W.P.No.15253 of 2003 dated 26.5.2003. No doubt, in the affidavit filed in W.P.No.13308 of 2003 before this Court, the second plaintiff has stated that the defendants have attempted to take possession of the Polytechnic in question which prima facie shows that the defendants are in the possession of the polytechnic. 18. We are of the view that unless the defendants are able to establish that they continue to be the trustees and they are entitled to manage the Polytechnic notwithstanding the award made by the Arbitrators on 3.5.2001 which was confirmed by the subsequent award dated 28.2.2002, the mere possession of the Polytechnic by the defendants without any legal right is not a ground to deny the relief of interim injunction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. Moreover, in the rejoinder filed by the defendants before the Supreme Court in S.L.P.No.21569 of 2003 the first defendant has admitted that the defendants have handed over the administration to the second plaintiff to sort out the problem before passing of the award. Since it is stated that they handed over the administration before passing the award, we are of the view, it is for the defendants to establish their legal rights to be in possession of the Polytechnic in question. The conduct of the defendants by their own showing makes it clear that the defendants are not in possession and management of the institution in question by virtue of any legal right. It is for the defendants to establish by acceptable evidence that they are in possession by virtue of some legal rights, particularly when the awards of the Arbitrators show that the management of the Polytechnic was handed over to the second plaintiff. We are of the view that till their right is established in the manner known to law, the mere possession of the Polytechnic, even assuming that the defendants are in possession, is not sufficient to deny the relief sought for by the plaintiffs. The claim of the defendants that they are trustees of the first plaintiff trust and they continue to be the trustees is not prima facie acceptable when the Arbitrators passed an award not only regarding the management of the polytechnic in question, but also regarding vesting of the management of trust institutions and the trust also. We are not expressing any opinion on the stand taken by the defendants in the suit filed by them to set aside the awards as null and void and till the matter is decided, the defendants cannot prima facie claim that the award is void and therefore they continue to be the trustees of the first plaintiff trust and they have got right to be in possession and to manage the Polytechnic in question. Though we find force in the submission of Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, learned senior counsel that it is not proper to rely upon the proceedings before the Additional Director of Technical Education as the orders were passed on the basis of resolution of the Board of Trustees, yet, the plaintiffs have established by evidence that the second plaintiff is entitled to be in possession and has the right to manage the Polytechnic. The defendants must establish by acceptable evidence that they have the right to be in possession and they have the right to manage the Polytechnic. We are of the view that the case on hand cannot be compared to a case of property dispute where physical possession by one of the parties to the suit would be a relevant factor in considering the question of grant of interim injunction. On the other hand, we are dealing with the right of management of an educational institution. We are of the view, in considering the question of grant of interim injunction in such cases, the question of control and management of the institution by a person having lawful authority to manage such an institution is relevant. We are of the view that it is possible for a person who has legal authority to manage an institution to control the educational institution and its affairs by sitting in a far off place from the place of the institution and it is not necessary that he must be physically present in the institution at all times to run the institution. He may lay down the policy which may be implemented by the Principal and the staff of the college. Moreover, as we have already observed, it is not the case of a property dispute and it is the case of administration of an educational institution where the educational career of various students, who are studying in the institution is involved and unless there is peace and tranquility in the institution, the academic atmosphere in the institution would be greatly affected and the interest of the students would suffer by the internecine quarrel between the trustees of the trust. We find that prior to the passing of the award and after passing of the award till the institution of the suit, the second plaintiff was/is in management and administration of the Polytechnic in question. 19. As far as various documents relied upon by Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, learned senior counsel are concerned, they are all subsequent to the filing of the suit and further, learned counsel for the plaintiffs is disputing the same. Hence, unless the genuineness and validity of the documents are established, it is not open to the defendants to place reliance on those documents. 19. As far as various documents relied upon by Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, learned senior counsel are concerned, they are all subsequent to the filing of the suit and further, learned counsel for the plaintiffs is disputing the same. Hence, unless the genuineness and validity of the documents are established, it is not open to the defendants to place reliance on those documents. So far as the other submission of Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, learned senior counsel that under the garb of obtaining injunction, the plaintiffs are getting into possession of the institution which is impermissible is concerned, this submission would have some relevance in the case of grant of interim injunction with respect to other physical properties. We have already held that the defendants have prima facie failed to prove their right to be in possession and management of the Polytechnic after the arbitration award and they have also not established that they got prima facie right to be in possession of the Polytechnic after the dismissal of both the suits filed by them. They claimed to be the trustees; but the question whether they are trustees or not has to be gone into in the proceedings initiated by them challenging the awards and till their rights are established, we are of the view, the plaintiffs would be entitled to interim injunction if there is any interference in their management and control over the Polytechnic by the defendants even though the defendants claim that they are in possession of the polytechnic. We have already observed that the question whether their possession is on the basis of legal right or not has to be decided. Moreover, as already observed by us, the Polytechnic cannot be run by two different sets of people with dual authority and the interest of the institution would be protected by a single unified management and control so that the educational institution is run properly to achieve the object for which the institution has been established. Moreover, as already observed by us, the Polytechnic cannot be run by two different sets of people with dual authority and the interest of the institution would be protected by a single unified management and control so that the educational institution is run properly to achieve the object for which the institution has been established. Needless to say, if the defendants establish that they continue to be the trustees and they are entitled to manage the Polytechnic in question, the question whether the plaintiffs would be entitled to the exclusive management has to be decided at that point of time and till that issue is settled in one way or the other, we are of the view, on the basis of their own assertion and claim that the awards are void and on the basis of possession of the Polytechnic, the defendants cannot claim that their possession should be protected. It is not a case where they were in possession prior to the award and continue to be in possession after the award. It is their own case before the Supreme Court that they have handed over the management of the Polytechnic to the second plaintiff before the award was passed and it is for them to establish their legal right for their subsequent entry and management of the Polytechnic after the award. 20. As far as the maintainability of the suit is concerned, the submission of Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, learned senior counsel is that in view of Section 92, C.P.C., the suit itself is not maintainable. Learned senior counsel referred to the decision of this Court in Lakshmikantham v. Ramalingayya , 1938 (2) MLJ 972 . As already observed by us, we are not expressing any opinion as to the maintainability of the suit and the question has to be decided by the trial Court at the appropriate stage. 21. Learned senior counsel referred to the decision of this Court in Lakshmikantham v. Ramalingayya , 1938 (2) MLJ 972 . As already observed by us, we are not expressing any opinion as to the maintainability of the suit and the question has to be decided by the trial Court at the appropriate stage. 21. Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, learned senior counsel also referred to the prayer sought for in the suit wherein the plaintiffs prayed for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the management and affairs of the 1st plaintiff’s trust and its educational and other institutions owned and operated by the 1st plaintiff trust by the second plaintiff, and the prayer made in the interim application is different and further, the prayer sought for in the interim application has become infructuo us as the defendants have already been in possession and management of the educational institution in question. However, we are not expressing any opinion on the prayer sought for in the suit, but the prayer sought for in the interim application cannot be said to be outside the scope of the suit and hence, on that account, the petition cannot be dismissed. 22. As far as laches and delay are concerned, we do not find any delay on the part of the plaintiffs and soon after the amendment in the trust deed, the defendants themselves approached the Court and the suits were dismissed and the Civil Revision Petition filed against that order was also dismissed, and only when the possession was threatened, the plaintiffs came forward with the suit and therefore, it cannot be stated that there was a delay on the part of the plaintiffs to claim the relief. 23. So far as the other submission made by Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, learned senior counsel that the main aim of filing the suit is to dispossess the trustees already in possession is concerned, we have already held that after passing the awards by the Arbitrators, there is no evidence from the side of the defendants to show that they were in possession and management of the educational institution by virtue of any legal right. The defendants have also not established as to when they entered into the management and possession of the Polytechnic and their legal rights to be in management of the institution. 24. The defendants have also not established as to when they entered into the management and possession of the Polytechnic and their legal rights to be in management of the institution. 24. Learned senior counsel referred to number of documents, but, we have already held that those documents are disputed documents and they are all subsequent to the filing of the suit and hence, it is for the defendants to establish the truth, genuineness and validity of the documents at the time of trial. We have gone through the documents which are found in Volume IV of the typedset of papers filed by the appellants and we find that many of the documents relate to the disbursement of salary. Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents pointed out that the said document was signed by the Principal in-charge and he is also one of the persons in whose favour salary was drawn. However, we are of the view, these are all matters that have to be gone into at the time of trial, and hence, we are not expressing any opinion on the question whether those documents can be relied upon or not. Further, it is futile to contend that since the second plaintiff has not taken steps to enforce the awards, it is not open to the second plaintiff to rely upon the awards as the defendants have themselves admitted in the affidavit before the Supreme Court that even before the award was passed, the management of the institution in question was handed over to the plaintiffs. It is true that the submission of Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, learned senior counsel that it would not be permissible to rely upon the order issued by the Director of Technical Education is acceptable and we are not placing any reliance on the order of the Director of Technical Education. 25. Hence, we hold that the second plaintiff has prima facie established that he has the right of exclusive management and administration of the polytechnic in question and being a trustee, on the basis of the award, he has the right to manage the polytechnic. As far as the defendants are concerned, we find that the defendants have not prima facie established that they have the right to be in possession and management of the polytechnic. As far as the defendants are concerned, we find that the defendants have not prima facie established that they have the right to be in possession and management of the polytechnic. As far as balance of convenience is concerned, though the defendants claim that they are in possession, since we have held that the defendants have not prima facie established their right to be in possession and right to manage the Polytechnic, irreparable loss and injury would be caused to the plaintiffs, if injunction is not granted in their favour. We hold that apart from the question of management of institution, the interest of students has to be taken into account. We are of the view that by dual authority and control vested with two different sets of persons who act one against another, the interests of students and the institution would suffer. We are of the view, the defendants would not be greatly affected by holding that the second plaintiff is entitled to interim injunction as he has to maintain proper accounts and he has to act in compliance of the rules and regulations of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976. If ultimately the defendants succeed and the award passed by learned Arbitrators is found to be null and void, then suitable adjustments can be made regarding the management of the institution and in the meantime, if the defendants are allowed to manage the institution by virtue of their physical possession of the institution, irreparable loss would be caused to the second plaintiff as he has prima facie established his right to be in management of the Polytechnic. 26. Before concluding, we wish to point out that the dispute between the parties has generated several litigations. We find that apart from civil suits noticed by us earlier, there were number of writ petitions also filed before this Court. The parties have filed W.P.Nos.43362, 43934, 44340, 45356 of 2002, 2031 and 2088 of 2003. In some of the petitions, the plaintiffs are the petitioners and in some other petitions, the defendants are the petitioners. All the petitions were heard together and a learned Judge of this Court dismissed all the writ petitions on the ground that they are not necessary as disputes are civil disputes. In some of the petitions, the plaintiffs are the petitioners and in some other petitions, the defendants are the petitioners. All the petitions were heard together and a learned Judge of this Court dismissed all the writ petitions on the ground that they are not necessary as disputes are civil disputes. Learned Judge while dismissing the writ petitions, gave the liberty to the parties to request the respective civil Courts for early disposal of their suits. Learned Judge also directed the Revenue Divisional Officer to dispose of the proceedings if any initiated under Section 145, Cr.P.C. expeditiously. Apart from the above writ petitions, there were other writ petitions also. In W.P.No.15253 of 2003 the petitioner is the first plaintiff herein and he approached the Court seeking a direction to appoint an advocate commissioner with a direction to him to issue advertisements calling for applications for admission for the academic year 2003-04 for all seats in the first year and second year in various diploma courses in the Polytechnic in question and to finalise the same by selecting the students on merit basis and in accordance with the rules and regulations. One other writ petition in W.P.No.13308 of 2003 was filed by the second plaintiff herein for the issue of a writ of Mandamus to direct the Director of Technical Education, Government of Tamil Nadu to finalise the Governing Council of the Polytechnic in question. This Court disposed of the above writ petition along with W.P.Nos.15253, 16080, 19868, 20380 and 22641 of 2003 by a common order and directed that the dispute should be resolved in civil Court instead of trying to get it resolved in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. There is one other writ petition in W.P.No.27340 of 2003 filed by the first plaintiff along with one G.S.Jayaprakasam for the issue of a writ of Mandamus to provide police protection to give effect to the order of injunction and that writ petition was also disposed of by a learned Judge by order dated 15.10.2003 against which a writ appeal was filed and in that case, the parties took the matter to the Supreme Court also. Apart from the writ petitions, there are civil revision petitions filed by the parties and it is not necessary to refer to various allegations and counter allegations made in those proceedings. Apart from the writ petitions, there are civil revision petitions filed by the parties and it is not necessary to refer to various allegations and counter allegations made in those proceedings. From the reading of affidavits and counter affidavits filed in various proceedings it is fairly clear that the parties have approached the Court on several occasions and it is not possible to place the blame on any one of the parties for their stand in various proceedings and in our view, both the parties have resorted to proceedings which are sometimes vexatious and time-consuming with the result lot of judicial time has been spent unsuccessfully to resolve the disputes between the parties. 27. We are therefore of the view that while dismissing the appeal, the appellants should be liable to pay costs also. Accordingly, for the reasons stated earlier, we confirm the order of learned Subordinate Judge and the appeal stands dismissed. The appellants shall pay a sum of Rs.25,000 as costs to the State Legal Services Authority, Chennai within a period of four weeks from today. 28. In so far as the petitions filed to receive additional documents filed by both the parties in C.M.P. Nos.19408 of 2003, 1024 of 2004 and 4218 of 2004 are concerned, we have already held that there is a serious dispute raised by both the parties regarding the genuineness and validity of the documents and we are not inclined to place reliance on those documents. We have already held that unless the genuineness and validity of the documents are established in trial, it is not safe to place reliance on those documents. In this view of the matter, the above three petitions are dismissed. C.M.P.Nos.11129 and 17977 of 2003 are closed.